# BOLANI 'oRES LTD. ETC v. STATE OF ORISSA ETC. Seprember 24, 1974

- **Citation:** [1975] 2 S.C.R. 138
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1975
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 1816 & 1817 of 1968
- **Bench:** P. Jaganmohan Reddy, M. H. Beg, A. Alagiriswami
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/bolani-ores-ltd-etc-v-state-of-orissa-etc-seprember-24-1974-6280
- **Pages:** 23

## Headnote

Motor Ve/lie/es Act, 1939-:-5. 2(18)-"Adapted for 11se"-Mea11i11g ofOrissa Motor Ve/1icles Taxation Act, 1930-S. 2(c)--Defi11i1io11 by refermce
-If ame111lme11ls or repeal in tlie Principal Act would affect the provisions in the
Act i11 irhic/1 they are referred 10.
The· appellants who owned Dumpers, Rockers and Tractors claimed that
these machines were not Hable for registration under s. 22 of the Ind•an Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939 and as such were no1 taxable under s. 6 of the Bihar and
Orisrn Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1930.
The trial court helJ that the
machinery were motor vehicles within the meaning of s. 2(18) of the Motor
Vehicles Act and were therefore liable for registration under that Act and so
to payment of tax. 1Jnder. the Taxation Act. The High Court held that unless it
was shown that the vehicles were of a special type adapted for use only in
factories or enclosed premises and incapable of running on any other type of
roads or public roads the vehicks were motor vehicles and that the' three types
not beinit motor vehicles were not liable for registration under s. 22 of the
Act nor were they subject to payment of tax under the Taxation Act.
Section 2 ( c) of the Taxation Act adopted the definition of motor vehicle
contained in the Motor Vehicles Act. 1914. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1914
was repealed and replaced oy the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The definition of
motor vehicle ins. 2(18) of the Motor Vehicles Act having been redefined the
Taxation Act, by the Orissa Amendment Act 2 of 1940 adopted that definition
for the purpose of' taxation. The Orissa Amendment Act,
1943 re·enacted
provisions of ss. 2 to 8 of the' Taxation Act as the Amendment Act 2 of 1940
was due· to expire.
Section 2( 18) of the Motor Vehicles Act was amended bv
Act l 00 of 1956.
But there. WalS no corresponding amendment in the dcfi nition
of s. 2(c) of. the Taxation .Act.
·
rt was contrnded in this Cou·rt that under the definition of motor veliicle
as it existed prior to amendment or subsequent thereto dumpers, rockers and
tractors were not motor vehicles because they were not adapted for use on the
road and (2) the definition of motor vehicle in s. 2(c) of the Taxation Act is
not a definition by incorporation but only a definition by .reference and as such
the meanin~ of motor vehicle for the purpose of s. 2(c) of the Taxation Act
would be the same as defined from time to time under ss. 8(2) to 18 of the
Motor Vehicles Act.
HELD : Dumpers and rockers though registrable uncrer the Motor ·Vehicles
Act are not taxable under the Taxation Act as long as \hey are working solely
within the premises of th1: respective owners.
So far as the tractairs are concerned thev are neither registrable under the Motor Vehicles Act nor taxabl~
under the Taxation Act. [ 160 Fl
A motor vehicle which is not "adapted for use" upon roads to which
public have no right of a1:cess is not a motor vehicle within the meaning of s.
2(18) of the Act. The words "is adapted for use" have the same connotation
as "is suitable" o'r "is fit'' for use on the roads. The meaning of the word
"adopted" in s. 2(18) of the Act is itself indicated in entry 57 of List H
of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution which confers powers on the State to
tax vehicles whether prop~llecl mechanically or not and uses the words "suitable" in relation to its me on the roads. The words "adapted for use" must.
therefore, be constructed as "suitable for use".
The words "adapted for use"
A
8
c
D
E
F
G
H
,
A
B
c
0
E
F
G
BOLAN! Oil.ES LTD, V, ORISSA
13&
cannot be larger in their import by including vehicles which are not "suitablefor use" on roads. A perusal of the provisions of the Act would justify trae
conclusion that it is not necessary,.for other vehicles registered under the Act to·
.be al.so liable for payment of tax under the Taxation Act.
[153 G-A; 151
F'.G.l
Daley and others v. Hargreaves [1961] l All E.R. 552, MacDonald v. Car·
micliae/ (1941) S.C. (J) 27, Maddox v. Storer [1963] 1 Q.B. 451 and B

## Text

_Characters 0–39,951 of 74,784. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39951 for what follows._

138
BOLAN! 'oRES LTD. ETC.
v.
STATE OF ORISSA ETC.
Seprember 24, 1974
[P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, M. H. BEG AND ,A. ALAGIRISWAMI, JJ.]
Motor Ve/lie/es Act, 1939-:-5. 2(18)-"Adapted for 11se"-Mea11i11g ofOrissa Motor Ve/1icles Taxation Act, 1930-S. 2(c)--Defi11i1io11 by refermce
-If ame111lme11ls or repeal in tlie Principal Act would affect the provisions in the
Act i11 irhic/1 they are referred 10.
The· appellants who owned Dumpers, Rockers and Tractors claimed that
these machines were not Hable for registration under s. 22 of the Ind•an Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939 and as such were no1 taxable under s. 6 of the Bihar and
Orisrn Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1930.
The trial court helJ that the
machinery were motor vehicles within the meaning of s. 2(18) of the Motor
Vehicles Act and were therefore liable for registration under that Act and so
to payment of tax. 1Jnder. the Taxation Act. The High Court held that unless it
was shown that the vehicles were of a special type adapted for use only in
factories or enclosed premises and incapable of running on any other type of
roads or public roads the vehicks were motor vehicles and that the' three types
not beinit motor vehicles were not liable for registration under s. 22 of the
Act nor were they subject to payment of tax under the Taxation Act.
Section 2 ( c) of the Taxation Act adopted the definition of motor vehicle
contained in the Motor Vehicles Act. 1914. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1914
was repealed and replaced oy the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The definition of
motor vehicle ins. 2(18) of the Motor Vehicles Act having been redefined the
Taxation Act, by the Orissa Amendment Act 2 of 1940 adopted that definition
for the purpose of' taxation. The Orissa Amendment Act,
1943 re·enacted
provisions of ss. 2 to 8 of the' Taxation Act as the Amendment Act 2 of 1940
was due· to expire.
Section 2( 18) of the Motor Vehicles Act was amended bv
Act l 00 of 1956.
But there. WalS no corresponding amendment in the dcfi nition
of s. 2(c) of. the Taxation .Act.
·
rt was contrnded in this Cou·rt that under the definition of motor veliicle
as it existed prior to amendment or subsequent thereto dumpers, rockers and
tractors were not motor vehicles because they were not adapted for use on the
road and (2) the definition of motor vehicle in s. 2(c) of the Taxation Act is
not a definition by incorporation but only a definition by .reference and as such
the meanin~ of motor vehicle for the purpose of s. 2(c) of the Taxation Act
would be the same as defined from time to time under ss. 8(2) to 18 of the
Motor Vehicles Act.
HELD : Dumpers and rockers though registrable uncrer the Motor ·Vehicles
Act are not taxable under the Taxation Act as long as \hey are working solely
within the premises of th1: respective owners.
So far as the tractairs are concerned thev are neither registrable under the Motor Vehicles Act nor taxabl~
under the Taxation Act. [ 160 Fl
A motor vehicle which is not "adapted for use" upon roads to which
public have no right of a1:cess is not a motor vehicle within the meaning of s.
2(18) of the Act. The words "is adapted for use" have the same connotation
as "is suitable" o'r "is fit'' for use on the roads. The meaning of the word
"adopted" in s. 2(18) of the Act is itself indicated in entry 57 of List H
of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution which confers powers on the State to
tax vehicles whether prop~llecl mechanically or not and uses the words "suitable" in relation to its me on the roads. The words "adapted for use" must.
therefore, be constructed as "suitable for use".
The words "adapted for use"
A
8
c
D
E
F
G
H
,
A
B
c
0
E
F
G
BOLAN! Oil.ES LTD, V, ORISSA
13&
cannot be larger in their import by including vehicles which are not "suitablefor use" on roads. A perusal of the provisions of the Act would justify trae
conclusion that it is not necessary,.for other vehicles registered under the Act to·
.be al.so liable for payment of tax under the Taxation Act.
[153 G-A; 151
F'.G.l
Daley and others v. Hargreaves [1961] l All E.R. 552, MacDonald v. Car·
micliae/ (1941) S.C. (J) 27, Maddox v. Storer [1963] 1 Q.B. 451 and Bums v.
Curre// [1963] 2 Q.B. 433, referred to.
(2) The power of taxation under Entry 57 List _II cannot e~ceed t~e com·
pensatory nature which must have some nexus wit~ the v~h1cles · usmg the
public roads.
If the vehicles do not use roads notw1t~standmg that they are
registered under the Act they cannot be taxed. . If t~1s be the purpose and
object of the Taxation Act, when the motor vehicle is defined unde~ s. 2(c)
of the Taxation Act as having the. same meaning as in the Motor Ve~1cles Act.
193°9 then the intention cf the legislature could not have been anythmg but to·
incorporate only the definition in the Motor Vehicles Act as it .existed ~n 1943.
as if that definition was bodily written into s. 2(c) of the Taxation Act.
If the·
subsequent Orissa Motor Vehicle Taxation (Amendment) .A.ct 1943 incorporating the definition of "motor vehicle" referred to the d·~finition of "motor
vehicle" 11ndu the Act as then existi11g the effect 0f thi.s 1e1mlative method would
amount to an incorporation by reference to the provisions of ~. 2(18) cf the
Act in s. 2(c) of the Taxation Act.
Any subsequent amendment in the Act
or a total repeal of the Act under a fre~h legislation on that topic would not
affect the definition of "motor vehicle" in s. 2(c) of the Taxation Act. [155 B;
D-E]
The use of the word 'has' in the expression "has the same meaning as in
the Motor Vehicle .Act, 1939" in s. 2(c) of the Act would justify the assump·
tion that the legislature had intended to incorporate the definition under the Act
as it then existed and not as it may exist from time to time. [155 Fl
In re. Woo-?s Estate (1886)31 Ch.D.607,
Clarke v. Brad/Ou!fh (1888)8.
Q.B.D. 63, Secrttary of State for India in Council v. HiwfU11than Co-operative
l11~ura11ce Somty Ltd. L.R. 58 I.A. 259, State of Bihar v. S. K. Ray [1966]
Supp. S.C.R. 259 and Ram Sarup v. Munshi and Others [1963] 3 S.C.R. 858,
referred to.
·
The definition of motor vehicle as. existing prior to the 1956 amendment of
the Motor Vehicles Act would alone be applicable as being incorporated in the
Taxation Act. The intention of Parliament for modifying the Motor Vehicles
Act has no relevapce in determining the intention of the Orissa Lejtislature in
enacting the Taxatibn Act. The power of taxation is not in the concurrent Li'lt
but in List II and construed
as a taxation measure the ambit of it cannot
be extended by mere implication. It is possible for both the Acts to co-exist
even after the definition of "motor vehicle" in the Act has been amended. [159
B; 158 HI
In the instant case there is evidence to show that the dumpers, rockers and'
tractairs are exclusively used on the premises of the owners. [159 El
The machines which are the subject matter of these appeals must be working in their respective mining areas. The mere fact that there is no fence or
barbed wire around the leasehold premises is not conclusive. There is evidenct
to show that the public are not allowed to go inside withollt prior permission,
there are gates and a check on ingress and egress is kept by guards who also
ensure that no unauthorised tiersons have access to the m·inin11: area.
[160 DE]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1816 & 1817
of 1968.
H
Appeal from the Judgment & Order dated the 30th March 1967 of
Orissa High Court in F.As. Nos. 44 & 45 of 1963.
'
Weit Petition No. 372 of 1974
'··
140
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 2 s .. c.1t.
Petition under Article 3 2 of the Constitution of India
A
Civil Appeal No. 336 of 1970
.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated 28th
March 1969 of the Mysore High Court in W.P. No. 226 of i967 .
. Lal Narain Sinha, Sol. Gen. of India, A. K. Basu ani:l D. N. Gupta,
for the Appellant On CA. No. 1816/68) and Petitioner in W.P. No.
B
372/74);
A. K. Basu & D. N. Gupta, for the Appellant (In CAS. Nos. 1817 I
68);
.
V. M. Tarkunde, Santosh Chatterjee and R. N. Sachthey, for the
Respondents (In CAs. Nos. 1816-1817/68 & W.P. No. 372174);
Soli J. Sorabjee, Obed Shenio, P. C. Bhartarl, Ravinder Narain &
K. J. John, for Intervener No. 1;
S. P. Nayar for Intervener No. 2;
S. T. Desai, B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Seth, for Intervener No .
.3;
S. T. Desai, B. P. M'aheshwari & Suresh Seih for the Appellant
· .(In CA No. 336/70).
M. Veerappa, for the respondent- (In C.A. No. 336/70).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c
D
JAGANMOHAN REDDY, J.-These appeals raise a common question·
E
.as to whether Dump1:rs, Rockers and Tractors are motor vehicles within the meaning of the relevant State Motor Vehicles Taxation Acts, and
are accordingly taxable thereunder.
Apart from these appeals, Boiani
Ores Ltd.-Appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1816 of 1968-has filed
a writ petition chall1mging the constitutional validity of the Bihar and
Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act; 1930.
The question raised in
the writ petition will only arise for determination, if the judgment of
the High Court of Orissa is held to be valid otherwise the question of
· F
the constitutional validity of the Bihar and Orissa Motor
Vehicles
Taxation Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Taxation Act') does not
fall for determination as that would be purely academic.
The two Civil Appeals Nos. 1816 of 1968 and 1817 cf 1968 arise
out of two suits-one filed by Boiani Ores Ltd. and the other by
Orissa Minerals Development Company Ltd., respectively,. for a deeG
laraticn that the machineries in their possession which were described
in the respective Schedules to the plaints were not Fable for registration under s. 22 of the Indian Motor Vehicles Act-hereinafter referred
to as 'the Act', and cannot, therefore, be taxed under s. 6 oi the Taxation Act.
In the suit filed by Boiani Ores Ltd., 8 types of machinery
were involved : (1) Shovels, (2) Drill Master, (3) Caterpillar Bun:
dozers, (4) Rockers, (5) Dumpers, (6) Motor Grader, (7) Tractors
H
and (8) Fargo Truck fitted with serving tank for diesel oil etc. The
Trial Court held that all the items of machinery as above mentioned,
except item ( 6) i.e. Motor Grader, came within . the definition of a
BOLAN! ORES LTD. v. OR.ISSA (Jaganmohan Reddy, J.)
141
A
'motor vehicle' given in s. 2 (18) of the Act,' and were' therefore liable
for registration under. s. 22 of the Act as well as payment of taxe.s
under the Taxation Act.
Against this decision, First Appeal No. 44 of
1963 was. filed in the Orissa High Court.
The State did not file any
B
c
cross appeal against the declaration that item ( 6) was not taxable. .
The High Court was of the view that unless it is shown that the v.chic.le
is of a special type adapted for use ()nly in factories or enclosed premises and incapable of running on any other type of roads or public
roads, the vehicles were motor vehicles. It was conceded during the
hearing on behalf of the appellant that type (8) Fargo Truck clearly
comes within the definition of motor vehicle and likewise the Advocate
General conceded that ·type (2) Ingersoll--Rand-Drill Master· cannot
be held to be a Motor Vehicle.
The High Court accordingly modified
the order of the Trial Court in respect of the types fa items (l), (2)
and ( 3) . It held that these three . types as well as the Motor Grader
in item (6) already held by the Trial Court not to be a motor vehicle,
were not liable for registration under s. 22 of the Act, nor would they
be subiect to payment of tax under the Taxation Act.
·
In _the suit filed by Orissa Mineral Development Company Ltd.,
out of which First Appeal No. 45 of 1963 arose, the plaintiff sought
D
a declaration that nine types of ·machinery which it owns were
not
liable for registration under the Act: Item (1) & (2) being Dumpers,
(3) & (3A). Tractors, (4) Caterpillar Trax Cavetror; (5) & (6)
Caterpillar Bull-dozers, (7) & (8) Scrapers and (9) Shovel.
The
Trial Court found on evidence that items ( 4) to (9) had a sort of
crawler mechanism and were not adapted for regular use on the roads.
This fact was also admitted by the opposite party. Accordingly it
E
held that the vehicles in these items did not come within the ambit of
the definition of 'motor vehicle' under s. 2 (18) and were not liable
for registeration under s. · 22 of the Act.
The case of bumpers and
Tractors items (1) to (3) and (3A), however, was .held to stand on
a different footing, as these vehicles were adapted for being used on
roads for transporting the goods of . the plaintiff, though it may be
within its own field of operation.
The reasons for bringing such vehiF
cles and the tractors within the purview of s. 2(18) of the Act were
discussed at some length, and accordingly it was held in both the suits
·that the vehicle indicated in the respective suit were liable for registration under s. 22 of the Act and for payment of the requisite ta...: under
G
H
the Taxation Act.
·
.
In these appeals intervention of M/s. Chougle & Co., M/s N.C.D.C.
Ltd. and Mis. Dalmia Cement Ltd. who allege that proceedings taken
by them are pending in Courts, was permitted and they are represented by the learned Advocates Soli J. Sorabji, S. P. Nayar and S. T.
Desai respectively.
Civil Appeal No. 336 of 1970 is irt respect of the Mysore Motor
Vehicles Taxation Act-hereinafter called 'the Mvsore
Act'.
The
appellants in this appeal filed a petition under Art. · 226 of the Constitution in tJ-ie High Court of Mysore challenging the demand by the
Regional Transport Officer to get the Dumpers registered under the
Act failin$ which they would be committing an offence entailing penal
142
SUPREME couin REPORTS
[ 197 5] 2 s.c.R.
.consequences. The High Court of Mysore, while dismissing the peti·
A
tion, held that the Dumpers can be used for carrying loads even cutside
1he mining area or any other enclosed premises, like any other 'goods
vehicle' which is required. to be registered under the Act. According
to it, what would take the vehicle out of the catc:gory of 'motor vehi-
.cles' under the Mysore Act is that they must be such as ''are incapable of use in any other place for the purpose of trans;iort of goods or
passengers", which, in its view, was not "the same thing as saying that
il
if the vehicle is not put to use elsewhere, or used for a special purpose,
it must be exempted from registration under section 22 of the Act."
It further observed : "The test of purpose, as argued by the learned
,counsel, does not also, in our view, fall clearly within the purview of
the statuto1~y "exemption in sccUon 2(18) of the Act.
On the other
hand, what is enjoined is that its very design and manufacture must be
such as would confine its capability for use only in a factory or enclosed
C
premises." Referring to the case of M/s. Boiani Ores Ltd. v. State of
Orissa,( 1) the interpretation. placed by the Orissa High Court on the
judgment of the Supreme Court in The State of Mysnre v. Syed
lbrahim(2) was not accepted.
On this aspect of the Mysore High
Court observed :
"But, it may also. be noted that in the decision of the Supreme
D
Court, above referred to, what was in question was whether
the owner of a Motor Car, which was used for transporting
passengers for hire was liable for prosecution under section
42(1) of the Act.
The exemption under section 2(18) did
not fall for consideration in the said decision. It was in this
contex.t that the Suprem~ Court laid down that if a Motor
Ve.hide is used as a transport vehicle, the owner who so uses
E
it or permits it to be so used is required to obtain the necessary permit. It is the use of the vehicle for carrying passengers f()r hire or reward which determines the application of
section 4 2 (1 ) of the Act."
The High Court, however, agreed with the test laid down by the
Orissa High Court for determining what under the Motor Vehicles
F
Act is a 'motor vehicle'.
The decision in these appeals hinges on the view we take of what
a 'motor vehicle' is for the purpose of s. 2(c) of the Taxation Act
under which the motor vehicle has the same meaning as in the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939, and whether the subsequent amendment of the
definition ins. 2(18) of the Act by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment)
G.
Act, will govern the definition of 'motor vehicle' for the purposes of
the Taxation Act.
Section 6 of the Taxation Act imposes on every
motor vehicle a tax at the rate specified in the Second Schedule to
the Act. The question, therefore, arises as to what is a 'motor vehicle' for the purposes of the Taxation Act. It may be pointed out that
s. 2 ( c) of the Taxation Act, prior to its amendment in 1940, defined
a 'motor V(~hicle' as meaning any vehicle ,propelled, or which· may be
H
propelled, on a road by ek:tr!cal or mechanical power either entirely
(I) A. I.IU95S Orissa I.
(2) [1967] 2 S. C.R. 673.
\.
I
I
A
B
c
D
E
F
lI
BOLAN! ORES LTD. v. OIUSSA (Jaganmohan Reddy, J.)
143
or partially. In 1939 the Motor Vehicles Act of 1914 was repealed
and a new Act substituted in its place.
The 1914 Act defined 'motor
vehicle' as including "a vehicle, carriage or other means of conveyance
propelled, or which mar be propelled, on a road by electrical or mechanical power either entirely or partially." The Orissa Act, therefore,
initially adopted the definition in the Taxation Act, which was in consonance with the Motor Vehicles Act, as it then stood.
The definition of 'motor vehicle' under s. 2( 18) of the Act having been redefined, the Taxation Act by the Orissa Amendment Act 2 of 1940
adopted that definition for the purposes of taxation.
The preamable
to this amendment stated that the amendment was made for the purpose of avoiding repugnancy in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The
Orissa Amendment Act of 1943 re-enacted provisions of ss. 2 to 8
of the said Act, as the Amendment Act 2 of 1940 was due to expire
on November 23, 1943.
Section 2(18) of the Act was, however,
amended by Act 100 of 1956 but there was no corresponding amendment in the definition of s. 2(c) of the Taxation Act.
It is .• therefore,
contended that the amended definition is inapplicable to the Taxation
Act, but it is only the definition of a 'motor vehicle' as it existed under
the Act prior to the amendment that has to be read in s. 2 ( c) of the
Taxation Act, inasmuch as the purpose and intendment of the Legislature was only to incorporate the definition as it existed at the time
when the Taxation Act was amended in 1943. If it was otherwise,
following the legislative practice adopted earlier by the Orissa Legislature, the definition of a 'motor vehicle' would have been suitably
amended in order to avoid any repugnancy with the amendment. Apart
from this contention, it is also submitted that under the definition as
it existed prior to the amendment or. subsequent thereto dumpers, rockers and tractors are not 'motor vehicles', because they arc not adapted
for use on the road.
Before we deal with this question it is necessary to riote the preliminary objection raised by the learned Advocate for the State of
Orissa that the appellants should not be permitted to raise this question as it was not pleaded or urged either before the Trial Court or
before the High Court, nor is there any evidence to determine the
question whether the vehicles, on which the levy of the impugned tax
is held to be valid, are used solely upon the premises of the owners.
It is submitted that the contention is contrary to what is stated in the
plaint and that it is also not covered by any of the issues under which
the question as to whether the premises in_ which the plaintiffs operate
are the exclusive premises of the plaintiffs, nor is there any evidence
as to whether the area where the vehicles operate is the exclusive area
of the plaintiffs.
In our view, the preliminary objection has no validity, because,
firstly, in para 2 of the plaint it is definitely pleaded : "That for the
specific purpose of mining operations within their leasehold areas, they
possess Caterpillar Bulldozers Model D.S ..... Letourneau Westinghouse Dumpers and Euclid Dumpers ... Motor Grader ... Tractors ...
Fargo Truck" etc. "These machines are mechanically propelled but
are neither intended nor adapted for use on public roads nor arc ever
used by the plaintiffs on public roads or public places." Secondly,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 2 s.c.R.
the relief asked for is that the machines in possession of the plaintiffs · A.
as described above for the purpose of working in the niines. and removing over burdens are not liable for registration and consequent
payment of taxes under the Taxation Act. Thirdly, the written state·
ment clearly comprehends what the plaintiffs' case is. It is categori·
cally stated in para 4 th11t "the various types of machines "'numerated
in para 2 bf the plaint bei11g mechanica!Iy propelled vehicles come
within the definition of motor vehicles as contained in section 2 (18)
of the Act since they do not come under the exceptions provided therein. It is incorrect to say that these vehicles are neither intended nor
adapted for use on public roads, nor are ever so used by the plaintiffs
on public roads or public places. . On the contrary the Rlaces where
the aforesaid machines are operating are public places within
the
meaning of section 2 ( 24) of the Motor Vehicles .Act since the public
are granted the right of access to the same for transacting day to day
business." Fourthli, issues Nos. 4 and 5, viz. "Are the suit vehicles
not 'motor vehicles' within the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act ?" and
"Are the suit vehicles liable for registration and taxation 'l" respectively
give scope for the question now raised. Lastly, the evidence
also
which has been led qy ihe plaintiffs, and to which we shall have occasion to refer later entitles the appellants to raise this question.. For
these reasons, we reject the preliminary objection.
It is now necessary to compare the two definitions of 'motor vehicle' under s. 2(18) of the Act both before and after the amendment
by Act 100 of 1956. We, therefore, give below both these definitions :
Section 2 (18) before amendment.
Section 2 (18) after
amendment by
Act 100 of 1956
"motor vehicle" means any mechani-
"motor vehiCle" means .any mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use cally propelled vehicle adapted for use
upon roads whether the power of proupon roads whether the power of propulsion is transmitted thereto from an pulsion is uansmitted thereto from an
external or internal source and includes external or internal
source and ina chassis to which a body has not been eludes a chassis to which a body has not
c
D
E
attached and a trailer; but does not inbeen attached and a trailer; but does
F
elude a vehicle running upon fixed rails not include a vehicle running upon fixed
or used solely
upon the premises of rails or a vehicle of a special type adapthe owner.
ted for use only in a factory or in any
other enclosed premises.
It will be observed from a comparison of the two definitions that the
vehicles which have been taken out o~ the category of a 'motor vehicle'
are different in these ,two definitions. Before the amendment a motor
vehicle though a motor vehicle within the meaning of the first part of
the definition is nonetheless not so, because of its specified user, i.e.
if it is used solely upon the premises of the owner. These r1eliicles
under s. 6 of the Taxaition Act read with s. 2( c) thereof would not
attract liability to tax. But after the amendment though a motor
vehicle may be adapted for use upon roads, nonetheless in order to
be taken out of the category of the definition it had to be further
adapted, namely, it should be a vehicle of a special type adapted for
use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises. In other
G
H -
•
-
I
A
BOLANI ORES LTD. v. ORISSA (Jaganmohan Reddy, /.)
14-5
words, a motor vehicle of a special type adapted as stated in the post
amendment definition would be such as would not be considered to
be adapted for use upon roads.
. The. position is t_he same with respect to the. Motor Vehicles Taxa•
t1on Acts of other States also.
We have seen the Mysore Motor Vehi8. cles Taxation Act, 1957, which though does not define "motor vehicle"
as such, nonetheless under s. 2 (j) states that words and expressions
used but. not· defined in the Act shall have the meanings assigned to
them in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It also says that the Mysore
General Clauses Act, 1899 (Mysore Act III of 1899) shall apply for
the interpretation of the Act, as it applies for the interpretation of a
Mysore Act. Section 3 .is the taxing provision which provides that a
c tax at the. rates specified in Part A of the Schedule shall be levied
on all motor vehicles suitable for use on roads, kept in the State of
¥ysore.
In the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Motor Vehicles Taxation
.Act, 1931, s. 2(i) states that the expressions mentioned in clauses (a)
to (f),. of which clause (d) refers to 'motor vehicle', shall have the
o·
meanings assigned to them in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It is
also pertinent to mention that the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area)
·Motor Vehicles Taxation Act bys. 2(v) defines a 'public road' and by
s. 4 which is the taxing provision it is provided that the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time
direct tl!at a tax shall be levied on every motor vehicle using ahy public
E
F
G
road in the Andhra area of the State of -Andhra Pradesh.
. The Madras Act uses the same language as that of the Andhra
Pradesh (Andhra Area) Act. It appears that usii:tg any public road
in the Presidency of Madras was first substituted for the . words "kept
or used in the Pr~sidency of. Madras" by s. 3 (i) of the Ma~ras Motor
Vehicles Taxation (Amendment) Act, 1932 (Madras
Act V of
1932).
· The Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958 follows the same pattern as the Mysore Act and though it does not define a 'motor vehicle',
yet, by s. 2(10) it provides that other words and expressions used, but
not defined, in the Act shall have the meanings respectively assigned
to them in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
. The Bengal Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1932, also is similar as that
of the Bombay Act inasmuch as s.2(5) thereof states that words and
expressions used, but not defined, in the Act shall have the same mean ..
ing as in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
In aU these cases the J.:ommon question would be whether the definition of a 'motor vehicle' as it existed before the Amendment Act
of 1956 is the same as ins. 2(c) of the Taxation Act or does the defiff
nition in s. 2 ( c) of the Taxation Act inean that the motor vehicle as
defined in the Act from time to time is to be adopted for the purpose
of s. 2(c) of the Ta)!:ation Act. In so far as the larger question is
ll-L251 Sup.Cil75'
146
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 2 s.c.R.
concerned, as to whether dumpers, rockers and tractors are motor vehi·
cles at all within the meaning of the first part of the definition of 'motor
vehicle' in s. 2(18) of the Act, which is the same before and after
the amendment, it is contended that these vehicles are not &uitably
adapted for use upon road11, which according to the learned Advocates
mean the public roads or roads to which the public has a right of
access.
The Motor Vehic:les Taxation Acts are enacti:d in ex~rcise
of the powers confetred on the State Legislatures under entry 57 of
List II of the S'eventh Schedule to the Constitution, while the Motor
Vehicles Act is enacted by the Parliament in exercise of the concurrent legislative powet in entry 35 of List III of the Seventh Schedule
to the Constitution. Entry 57 of List II empowers legislation in respect of taxes on vehicles, whether mechanically propelled or not, suit·
able for use on roads, including tramcars subject to the provisions of
entry 35 of List III.
The power exercisable under entry 57 is the
power to impose taxes which are in nature of regulatory and compensatory measures.
The regulatory and compensatory nature of the tax
is that the taxing power should be exercised to impose taxes on motor
vehicles which use the roads in the State or are kept for use thereon
either throughout the whole area or parts thereof and are ~ufficient to
make and maintain such roads : See
The
Automobile
Transport
(Rajasthan) Ltd. v. The State of Rajasthan and others.(1)
Jn this
case, the earlier decision in Atiabari Tea Company Ltd. v. The State
of Assam and others( 2 ) was considered. Since the taxing statute is
a regulatory or compensatory statute, it is contended that the provi5ions of ss. 6B, 7, 9A of the Taxation Act relate only to the actual
use of the public road.
It is pointed out that s. 6 of the Taxation Act
does not place the burden of taxation on the registered owners of the
motor vehicles, but only on the persons who keep the motor vehicles
for use which would mean use their on the public roads. If no such
use of public roads is made or the vehicles are not such as can be used
on the public roads, then no tax could be levied under the Taxation
Act.
Reference in the Taxation Act to the re!!i,tered owners is, it is
submitted, meant only for the purpose of enabling refund of tax paid
but not payable in terms of the Act, or s. 7 of the Taxation Act.
Under
Entry 35 of the Concurrent List, the Parliament as ..yell as the State
Legislatures can legislate in respect of only mechanically propelled
vehicles including the principles on which taxes_ on such vehicles are
to be levied.
It ha' no power to deal with vehicles which are not
mechanicaUy propelled though under the Taxation Act these
nonmechanically propelled vehicles which are suitable for use on roads
can also be taxed even without t\leir being registered under the Act.
It will thus be seen that while entry 57 of List II is solely concerned
with taxes on vehicles whether mechanically propelled or not. entry
35 deals with also the principles on which taxes on such vehicles are
to be levied.
Taxes on vehicles cannote the liability to pav tax~s at
the rates at which th~ taxes are to be levied.
On the other hand, the
expression 'principles of taxation' denote rules of p:uidance in the matter of tax:ition.
The ambit and amplitude of these two le~islative
entries in the respective Lists was dealt with iii. State of Assam & Others
(1) [1963] l S. C.R. 491.
(2) [1961] l S. C. R. 809.
A
B
c
D
E
F'
G
H
A
8
c
D
E
F
G
·c.H
BOLAN! ORES LTD. v. ORISSA (Jaganmohan Reddy, J.)
147
v. La~an>'a Probha Debi,(1) where Suba Rao, C.J~. speaking for the
Constitution Bench of this Court observed at p. 614 :
"The two entries deal with two different matters
though
allied ones-one deals with taxes on vehicles and the other
with the principles on which such taxes are to be levied.
when two entries in the Constitution, whether in the same
List or different Lists, deal with two subjects, if possible, an
attelil,\'t shall be made to harmonize them rather than to bring
them mto confilct.
Taxes on vehicles in their ordinary meaning connote the liability to pay taxes at the rates at which
the taxes are to be levied.
On the other handi the expression
"principles of taxation" denotes rules of guidance in the
matter of taxation.
We, therefore, hold that the Amending
Acts do not come into conflict with the existing law in respect of any principles of taxation, but only deal with a subjectmatter which is exclusively within the legislative competence
of the State Legislature."
It is contended that having regard to the nature of the vehicles
in
question they are particularly suitable for the functions they are per·
forming and unsuitable for the roads on which they would be only a
source of damage, inconvenience, danger and uneconomical compared
with the other vehicles usually utiHsed for transport of goods. Accordingly it is submitted that : ( 1) the present case should be determined
with reference to the definition of 'motor vehicle' read without the
amendment in the Act, as such vehicles operating solely within the
appellants' premises should not be liable to tax; ( 2) the vehicles not
being suitable for public roads would not be either registered or taxed
whether before or after 1956. Both for the purposes of registration
and taxation the common question arises, viz., whether the vehicles in
question are adapted for use upon roads, which, it is submitted, are
public roads or roads to which public have a right of access. If they
are not, then they are not 'motor vehicles' within the meaning of either
the Act or the Taxation Act; (3) the concept 'adapted for use on
roads' must lie within the ambit of the expression used by the. Constitution; otherwise it would be unconstitutional. . It must,
therefore,
follow that the definition can only refer to vehicles which are reasonably suitable for the road in the sense that an average man could think
that plying of the vehicles on the road would be one of the normal uses
of the vehicles.
That alone would be a test of suitability; and ( 4) for
the interpretation of s. 22 of the Act it would be permissible and even
obligatory to examine the section not in isolation but ii~ ~he light of
the object and scheme of the Act and the regulatory prov1s10ns regarding the licensing of drivers, issuing of permits, provisions for compulsory registration and other regulatory provision are confined to the
vehicles on the public roads.
The provisions of s. 22 are definitely to
advance the objects of the Act and to effectuate the regu!mory provis;cns.
By the very language the principal purpose is to insist upon
registration in respect of vehicles plying in public places.
Further, the
(1) [19671 3 S. C.R. 611.
148
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[197512 s.c.R.
expression must be interpreted to advance the object 1>f the Act exactly
as the other para of ~. 22 does. In this view the expression "purpose
of carrying passengers or goods" cannot mean the personal use of the
owner.
A person himself cannot be the passenger and goods, and as
such it must not bii interpreted disjunctively. It is a single expression
"passenger or goods". It is conceivable that this alternative part of
the section is only to ensure that in connection with the joW"ney on a
public road even i( a motor vehicle goes into a place which will not
be strictly a public place like hotel or. inside a railway, such as in a
Railway Station,. or even inside the pmnises of a bus depot, hospitals,
etc. provisions for compulsory registration should be applicable.
The
judgment of the High Court is assailed on the ground that while formulating the test to determine whether a vehicle is adapted for use on
the roads it has evidently equated compatibility with suitability, because
at certain places it has laid down the test in terms of compatibility and
at other places in terms of suitabil.ity.
Th.is is clearly illustratived by
its decision regarding 'tractor'. A tractor without a trailer can neither
carry passengers nor goods.
In the instant case, it is s:aid that the
tractor cannot ply in a public place, nor does it ply in any other place
for carrying l!.a!iSengers or goods. It could not evidently fall within
s. 22 of the Act. Though this is so, the High Court s11ys that because
it can be adapted by attaching a trailer, it comes withins. 2(18), forgetting that wha:t we are concerned with is a tractair without a trailer
which is actually used to supply c:ompressed air to certain plants or
machines, which clearly shows that the High Court did not have a
correct concept of "adapted for use on road".
·
Shri Soli Sorabji on behalf of the interveners has more or less
adopted a similar line of argument and has referred us to the several
dictionary meanings of the word 'adapted'. He has also referred to
the English cases on this question and submitted that no vehicle can
be t;ued unless it possessses the attribute of being "suitable for use on
roads". The expres$,ion "adapted for use on roads" must be construed as suitable for use on roads in the light of entry 57; otherwise, the
legislation would be ultra vires the said entry, and oonsequently such
a construction should be avoided by courts. He further .submitted
that the Orissa High Court has misconstrued the judgment of
thi;.
Supreme Court in State of Mysore v. Syed Ibrahim,( 1)
where the
observations were made with referenc(~ to the definition of "a public
service vehicle" as defined in s. 2(25) of the Act, under which user
by itself was sufficient to bring the vehicle within its purview. He
has referred us toss. 47(f), 55(f), 71(2), 74, 75(1) and (3) and 77
of the Act in support of his proposition that having regard to the general object, purpose and the policy underlying the Act the expression
"roads" must mean public roads and not private roads.
If so, the
dumpers, rockers and tractors etc. which do not ply or a.re not suitable for plying on public roads cannot: be either registered under the
Act or ta:xed under the Taxation Act.
Mr. Tarkunde for the State of .()Jissa submits that every motor
vehicle registered under the Act is liable to pay tax under the Taxation Act and since dumpers, rockers and tractors are by their nature
(!) [1967) 2 S. C. R. 673.
A
II
c
D
E
F
G
H:
A
B
c
D
·E
BOl.ANi ORES LTD. v. ORISSA (Jaganmohan Reddy, I.)
14 9 ,_,,.
adapted for use on the roads they are registerable, and they have to be
registered and are liable for payment of tax under the Taxation. Act.
There has been a good deal of argument on both sides on the meaning of the expression "adapted for use upon roads".
We have been
referred to certain English decisions which deal with the meaning of
the word 'adapted' in the English Road Traffic . Act, 1960. While
the definition of 'motor vehicle' in the Act describes it as a mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads, the English Road
Traffic Act describes it as a mechanically propelled vehicle "intended
or adapted for use on roads". Even the earlier English Road Traffic
Act, 1930, had used the words "intended or adapted for use
on
roads'', whil~ making Part I applicable to. motor vehicles ..
In Daley and others v. Hargreaves( 1) the Queen's Bench Division
took the view that as there was no evidence sufficient to show that the
dumpers were "intended or adapted for use on roads" within the meaning of s. 36 of the Road and Rail Traffic Act, 1933, and s. 1 of the
Road Traffic Act, 1930, and the case being indistinguishable in substance from the Scottish decision in MacDonald v.
Carmichael( 2 )
which the Court would follow for conformity, it had not been established that dumpers were motor vehicles to which the
regulations
applied.
In M11cDonald's case(2) it was held that the dumpers were
solely used in connexion with road construction and were not constructed to carry goods on an ordinary highway.
They were so constructed as to be capable of, and were in fact occasionally used for,
carrying road-making material along. short stretches of tQe public highway in the vicinity of the work of reconstruction.
The ratio of that
decision was applied to the Daley's case,(1) where Salmon, J. observed at p. 555:
"In my judgment, the true effect of the Court of Justiciary's
decision was that the very limited use of the dumpers on the
road in that case did not establish, that they were "intendc
/
ed or adapted for use on the road", within the meaning of
those words in the Road Traffic Act, 1930, s. 1."
,
F
Lord Parker, CJ., though agreeing reserved his opinion by emphasis-
'ing that it must not be taken as the result of this decision that dumpers
<>f the type used in this case were not motor vehicles intended or
adapted for use on the road. He indicated that he had agreed with
:Salmon, J., merely because there was no proof in that case that the
dull\pers used were motor vehicles.
'
G
While dealing with the English cases it must riot be forgotten that
the definition of "motor vehicle" in the Road Traffic Act imports the
element of intentiort into the definition for ascertaining whether a
vehicle is a motor vehicle. In Maddox v.