# BOMBAY GAS CO. LTD v. GOP AL BHIV A & ORS

- **Citation:** [1964] 3 S.C.R. 709
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 333-334 of 1962
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanohoo, K. C. DAB Gul'TA
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/bombay-gas-co-ltd-v-gop-al-bhiv-a-ors-3018
- **Pages:** 16

## Headnote

lnduatrial Di1pule-Applicatiom under •· 330 (2) lo
claim certain benefits uw.ler an Award-Scope oJ s. 330 (2)-
0ategorie• of workera entitled to
beneji'8-Limitation for
·application• under•· 330 (2)-Wkether Payment of Wagea
A.cl or art. 181 of Limitation Act applicable-lndualrial
Diaputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), a. 330 (2j.
Petitions were filed by sixteen respondents under s. 330(2)
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, claiming certain
benefits under an award made by an Indus•rial Tribunal. The
prayer was to compute the benefits in terms of money and
direct the appellant to pay the same to them. Many objections
were raised by the appollant but these were rejected by the
Labour Court which accepted the claim of the respondents
and directed the appellant to pay to the respondents the
respective amounts specified against their names in the award.
Tbe appelJant came to this Court by special leave.
The contentions raised by the appellant
before this
Court were that the award, on which the claim was based,
was without jurisdiction and hence the Labour Court should
have refused to implement it; that in order to get benefit, the
workers must show that they actu.dly worked on all Sundays
in the year before September, 1948; and that as the claims
of the respondents were belated, those should not have been
awarded.
Held that the Labour Court would have been justified
in refusing to Implement the award if it was satisfied that the
/ !
19Q
Sri c.,.1 i.1 .. s
Comp,.,
y,
Calculla Si.el
Ex.U.11 AuacialiMI
/.I,.
s.,,., I.
1963
M,, 10.
•
1963
Bomb'l1 Cos c., Lti.,
••
G•l•I Bhioa
-.· .. ,
. l, ''"
•
710; SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964) VOL.
diiectl6n in the· award on which the respondents' claim was
based, was without jurisdiction, but as that was not actually
so, the impugned direction was according to law .
·.
The applications made by respondents were competent
and the Labour Court had jurisdiction to deal with the quc•tion
as to the computation of the benefit conferred on the respon·
dents in terms of money. The proceedings contemplated by
s. 33C (2) were, in many cases, analogous to execULion proceedings and the Labour Court which wa• called upon to compute
in terms of money the benefit claimed by an industrial
employee, was in the position of an executing court and was
competent to interpret the award on
which the claim was
based and also consider the plea that the award, sought to be
enforced, was a nullity .
HP.Id also, that there was no substance in the argument
that since the respondents had not been actually required to
work on all Sundays in the relevdnt year, they were not
entitled to the benefit given in the award. The test which
had to be satisfied by the workers was
that •hey could have
beenrequired to work on Sundays in that year and not that
they actually so worked.
Held also, that the legislature has not made any provi 0
sion for limitation for applications under s. 33C (2) and
it was .11ot open to the Courts to introduce any such limitation·
ori grounds of faimess or justice. The words of s. 33 C (2)
were plain and unambiguons and it was the duty of the
Labour Court to give effect to the said provisions without
any considerations of limitation. The employees who arc
entitled to take the benefit of s. 33C (2) may not always be
conscious of their right and it would not be right to put the
restriction of limitati•)n in respect of claims which they may
have to make under the said provision. There was no
justification for applying the provisions of the Payment of
Wages Act and art.
181 of the Limitation Act to the proceedings, under s. 33C (2).
Claims like bonus are distinguishable from claims made
under s. 330 (2). A claim for bonus is
entertained on
grounds of social justice and is not based on any statutory
provision and in such a case, it is open to industrial adjudicat.ion to have regard to all the relevant considerations before
awarding the claim and in doing so if it appears ,that a claim
f~r .Jionus was made
after long lapse

## Text

3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
709
We think for these reasons that the appeal fails
and we dismiss it with costs.
Appeal diamiaeed.
BOMBAY GAS CO. LTD
v.
GOP AL BHIV A & ORS.
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANOHOO
and K. C. DAB Gul'TA JJ.)
lnduatrial Di1pule-Applicatiom under •· 330 (2) lo
claim certain benefits uw.ler an Award-Scope oJ s. 330 (2)-
0ategorie• of workera entitled to
beneji'8-Limitation for
·application• under•· 330 (2)-Wkether Payment of Wagea
A.cl or art. 181 of Limitation Act applicable-lndualrial
Diaputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), a. 330 (2j.
Petitions were filed by sixteen respondents under s. 330(2)
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, claiming certain
benefits under an award made by an Indus•rial Tribunal. The
prayer was to compute the benefits in terms of money and
direct the appellant to pay the same to them. Many objections
were raised by the appollant but these were rejected by the
Labour Court which accepted the claim of the respondents
and directed the appellant to pay to the respondents the
respective amounts specified against their names in the award.
Tbe appelJant came to this Court by special leave.
The contentions raised by the appellant
before this
Court were that the award, on which the claim was based,
was without jurisdiction and hence the Labour Court should
have refused to implement it; that in order to get benefit, the
workers must show that they actu.dly worked on all Sundays
in the year before September, 1948; and that as the claims
of the respondents were belated, those should not have been
awarded.
Held that the Labour Court would have been justified
in refusing to Implement the award if it was satisfied that the
/ !
19Q
Sri c.,.1 i.1 .. s
Comp,.,
y,
Calculla Si.el
Ex.U.11 AuacialiMI
/.I,.
s.,,., I.
1963
M,, 10.
•
1963
Bomb'l1 Cos c., Lti.,
••
G•l•I Bhioa
-.· .. ,
. l, ''"
•
710; SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964) VOL.
diiectl6n in the· award on which the respondents' claim was
based, was without jurisdiction, but as that was not actually
so, the impugned direction was according to law .
·.
The applications made by respondents were competent
and the Labour Court had jurisdiction to deal with the quc•tion
as to the computation of the benefit conferred on the respon·
dents in terms of money. The proceedings contemplated by
s. 33C (2) were, in many cases, analogous to execULion proceedings and the Labour Court which wa• called upon to compute
in terms of money the benefit claimed by an industrial
employee, was in the position of an executing court and was
competent to interpret the award on
which the claim was
based and also consider the plea that the award, sought to be
enforced, was a nullity .
HP.Id also, that there was no substance in the argument
that since the respondents had not been actually required to
work on all Sundays in the relevdnt year, they were not
entitled to the benefit given in the award. The test which
had to be satisfied by the workers was
that •hey could have
beenrequired to work on Sundays in that year and not that
they actually so worked.
Held also, that the legislature has not made any provi 0
sion for limitation for applications under s. 33C (2) and
it was .11ot open to the Courts to introduce any such limitation·
ori grounds of faimess or justice. The words of s. 33 C (2)
were plain and unambiguons and it was the duty of the
Labour Court to give effect to the said provisions without
any considerations of limitation. The employees who arc
entitled to take the benefit of s. 33C (2) may not always be
conscious of their right and it would not be right to put the
restriction of limitati•)n in respect of claims which they may
have to make under the said provision. There was no
justification for applying the provisions of the Payment of
Wages Act and art.
181 of the Limitation Act to the proceedings, under s. 33C (2).
Claims like bonus are distinguishable from claims made
under s. 330 (2). A claim for bonus is
entertained on
grounds of social justice and is not based on any statutory
provision and in such a case, it is open to industrial adjudicat.ion to have regard to all the relevant considerations before
awarding the claim and in doing so if it appears ,that a claim
f~r .Jionus was made
after long lapse of time, industrial
adjudfoation may refuse to entertain the claim or Government ·may refuse to make the reference in that bQhalf,
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
711
However, those considerations arc irrelevant when claims
are made under s. 33C (2). In such cases limitation cannot
be introdnced by industrial adjudication on academic grounds
of social justice.
Oontral Bank of India Ltd. v. P. 8. Rajagopalan, [1964]
Vol. 3 S.C.R. 140; Rai Manekbai v. Manekji Kava,.ji, (1883)
7 Bom. 213; Hanara.i Gupta v. OJ!foial Liquidators, Dehra Dun
Muesoorie Electric Tramway Oo. Ltd., (1932) L.R. 60 I.A. 13
and Sha Mulclv.Jnd & Oo. Ltd. v. Jawahar .Milla Ltd. [1953]
S.C.R. 351, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals
Nos. 333-334 of 1962.
Appeals by special leave from the preliminary
order dated June 3, l 91H and Order dated Septem·
her 29, 19lll of the :Second Labour Court, Bombay
in Applications (I.D.A.) Nos. 447 to 462 of 1958.
R.J. Kolah, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. 0. Mathur
and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant.
S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General of
India, K. T. Sule, M. 0. Bhandare, .M. Rajagopalara
and K. R. Chaudhuri, for the respondents.
1963. May 9. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
B,..u_, Gu Co. f.,U•
••
~··
GAJENDRAGADKARJ.-These 16 appeals arise ~·
1.
out of petitions filed by the 16 respondents who arc
the employees of the appellant, the Bombay Gas
Co. Ltd., under section 330 (2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act (No. 14 of 1947) (hereinafter called
the Act). These respondents are the District Syphon
Pumpers and Heat Appliances Repairers Inspectors,
and in their applications made before the Second
Labour Court, Bombay, they alleged that as a result
of the award made by the Industrial Tribunal in
reference {I. T.) No. 54 of 1949 published in the
Bombay
Government
Gazette
on
May
11,
1960, they were fntitled to
a certain benefit
712
SUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
and they moved the Labour Court to. compute that
1963 . .
benefit in terms of money and to direct the appellant
,,,...bo;1 ·G., c •. Lt,,· to pay the same to them. The direction iu the
Go;.:I'Bm•• ·
earlier award on which this c1aim was based was
made in these terms :-
Gqj1llllro1adkor 1.
"The demand in respect of the workers of
the Mains, Services and
District Fittings
Departments and Lamp Repairers and otherli
who were till 1948
required to work on
Sundays and in respect of whom' a weekly day
off was enforced thereafter
without
any
. corresponding increase in wages is granted.
In respect of the' rest, the demand is rejected."
This demand was resisted by the appellant
on several preliminary grounds which formed the
subject-matter of several preliminery issues framed
by the Labour Court. The principal contentions
raised by the appellant by way of preliminary
objections were that the applicatiom made by the
respondents were not maintainable under s. 33C (2)
of the Act and that the said applications were
barred by res judicata by reason of awards made in
other proceedings between the same parties. It was
also urged by the appellant that if the claim made
by the respondents was held to be justified by the
direction of the a ward on which the respondent~
relied, then the said direction was given by the
· earlier Tribunal without jurisdiction and as such,
was incapable of enforcement. On the construction,
. the appellant urged that the said direction did not
cover the cases of the respondents, and it was argued
that even if the said direction was held to be valid
and it was also held that it gave the respondents
the right to make the present claim, the conditions
precedent prescribed by the said direction had not ·
been satisfied by any of the respondents, and so,
on the merits, their claim could not be sustained.
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
713
The Labour Court took up for trial 10 preliminary issues in the first instance and by its judgment
delivered on June 3, 1961, it rejected all the
preliminary pleas raised by the appellant. In other
words, the preliminary issues framed by the Labour
Court were found in favour of the respondents.
Thereafter, the applications were set down for
hearing on the merits and evidence was led by both
the parties in support of their res pee ti ve claim1.
On considering the evidence,
the Labour Court
came to the conclusion that the respondents had
established their claims, and so. it has directed the
appellant to
pay to the respondents the respective
amounts
specified
against
their
names
in
the award. The plea raised by the appellant that
the whole of the claim made by the respondents
should not be allowed on the ground of belatedness
and !aches, was, according to the Labour Court, not
sustainable under section 33C (2). That is why the
Labour Court computed the benefits claimed by the
respondents in terms of money from the date when
the earlier award became enforceable until the date
of the present applications filed before it.
The
appellant has come to this Court by special leave
against the preliminary decision and the final order
passed by the Labour Court in favour of the
respondents.
Before dealing with the points raised in the
present appeals by the appellant, it is necessary to
set out briefly the terms of the earlier award on
which the respondents' claims are based.
[n the
previous industrial dispute, the employees of the
appellant had made several demands. In the present
case, we arc concerned with demand No. 11. This
demand was made in these terms :-
"(a) Workers should get a paid weekly off.
(b) Workers of Mains, Services and District
Fittinga Departmenta.and Lamp Repairers,
J!/C
lftmi•J Gos C1. Lli.
••
G.p.I IJAi••
1969
B ... bay Gu Co. LI,.
••
Gop.I Bbiv«
Gojlrlliroiodkor J.
714
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]VOL.
who have been adversely affected in the
matter of their earnings on account of
closing down of the overtime and Sunday
Work, should be compensated for the loss
suffered by them; compensation being
the amount lost by them since the scheme
was· introduced."
The Tribunal which dealt with this demand ob,erved
that demand No. 11 (a) had been badly worded.
There was, however, no doubt that what the employees claimed against the appellant was, in substance, a
demand for paid weekly off only for those worken
who were actually getting a weekly off, though without pay. In dealing with this demand, the Tribunal
noticed the fact that all the monthly paid staff employed by the appellant got a paid weekly off, and so,
it thought that there was no reason to dicriminate
between the said staff and the daily rated workers ..
In regard to the daily rated workers usually, their
monthly income would be determined on the basis
of a month consisting of 26 working days. From the
statement of claim filed by the Union before the
Tribunal, it appeared that prior to 1946, most of the
workers used to work for all the seven days of the
week.
By about August, 1946, however, weekly offs
were enforced upon the major section of the workmen.
InJune 1946, the appellant and the Union had entered into an agreement as regards wage scales of
various categories of workers, and the Tribunal as.
sumed that in respect of most of the daily rated workers, the wages must have been fixed on the basis or
what their monthly income would be for 26 working
days. It is in the light of this background that the
Tnbunal proceeded to examine demand No.11 (a).
The Tribunal noticed that in the case of the
four categories of workers specified in demand No.
11 (b), difference had to be made because it could
not be 11aid in their C&llC thaC ~their daily ratca of
3 .S.C.R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
'715
wages were fixed with reference to a month of 26
working days. The result was that with the introduction of the weekly off, the wages of those workers
were reduced.
Naturally, the Tribunal observed
that in auch a case, the concession of a weekly off
would be a very doubtful benefit if as a result, the
monthly income of the workers was to go down. That
is why the Tribuhal gave the direction on which the
respondents' present claim is based. This direction
we have already quoted at the beginning of the
judgment.
Having thus dealt with demand No. 11 (a}, the
Tribunal proceeded to examine demand No, 11 (b),
and it ordered that the workers of Mains, ::iervices
and District Fittings Departments and Lamp Repairers who had been adversely affected in the matter of
their earnings on account of closing down of Sunday
work, should be compensated for the loss suffered by
them, by payment of their wages and dearness allowwance for the weekly offs given to them from
June I, 1941J onwards till the date of the publication of
the award.
The question about the scope and effect of the
provisions of s. 330 (2) of the Act and the extent of
the jurisdiction conferred on the Labour Court by it
have been recently considered by us in the case of
The Oenlral Bank of India Ltd. v. P. S. Rajagopalan (1 ). That decision shows that the applications
made. by the respondents were competent and the
Labour Court hadjurisdiction to deal wilh the question as to the computation of the benefit conferred on
the respondents in terms of money.
Mr. Kolah for
the appellant contends that though the applications
made by the respondents may be competent and the
claim made by them may be examined under s. 330
(2), it would, nevertheless, be open to the appellant
to contend that the award on which the said claim is
based i1 without jurisdiction and if he succeeds in
(I) UNtJ I 1.C.R. HO.
196$
Bomb1J "°'Co Ltd.
••
Gop.J Bhi.,
G!JJ'""'""'°"'' J.
1961
1Jomh7 G., c •. Ltd.
Y•
Gopat Bhi••
Gaj1ndta1"'1k.r I.
716 SUPREI\-IE COURT REPORTS[I964] VOL.
establishing his plea, the Labour Court would be
justified in refusing to give effect to the said Award.
In our opinion, this contention is well-f.~unded. The
proceedings contemplated by s. 330 (2) are, in many .
cases, analogous to execution proceedings, and the
labour Court which is called upon to compute in
terms of money the benefit claimed by an industrial
employee is, in such cases, in the position of an execu·
ting court; like the executing . court in execution
proceedings governed by the Code of Civil Procedure
the Labour Court under s. 330 (2) would be compe·
tent to interpret the award on which the claim is
based, and it would also be open to it to consider the
plea that the award sought to be enforced is a nullity.
There is no doubt that if a "decree put in execution is
shown to be a nullity, the executing court can refuse
to execute it. The same principle would apply to
. proceedings taken under s. 330 ( 2) and the j urisdi·
ction of the labour court before which the said proceedings are commenced. Industrial Tribunals which
deal with industrial disputes referred to them under
s. 10 (1) (d) of the Act are, in a sense, Tribunals
with limited jurisdiction. They are entitled to deal
with the disputes referred to them, but they cannot
travel outside the terms of reference and deal with
matters not included in the reference, subject, of
course, to incidental matters which fall within their
jurisdiction. Therefore, on principle, Mr. Kolah is
right when he contends that the Labour Court would
have been justified in refusing to implement the
award, if it was satisfied that the direction in the
award on which the respondents' claim is based is
without jurisdiction.
That takes us to the question about the merits .
of the plea raised
by Mr. Kolah.
Mr. Kolah
contends that the direction iri question on which the .
respondent's claim is based, is invalid for the reason ,
that the Tribunal travelled outside the terms of refe• .
rencc wllen it added the words "and othel'li" in tho
'
3 .s.c.R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
717
/91ij
said direction.
Hi9 argument is that the said direction has really been issued under demand No. 11 (b}
Born•~' c .. C• Ltd.
and since the said demand was confined to the four
categories of workmen specified in it, the Tribunal
had no jurisdiction to extend the relief to any workers
Gaj,.d.agodlar J.
outside the said four categories by adding the word11
"and others". Thus presented, the
argument is no
doubt attractive, but on a careful examination of the
scheme of the award in so far as it relates to demand
No. 11, it would be clear that the impugned direction
has relation not to demand No. 11 (b), but to demand
No. J l(a), and it is obvious that that demand referred
to all workers and was not confine i to any specified
categories of workers. It is true that in dealinj!' with
the said demand, the Tribunal promniently referred
to the four categories of employees specified in
demand No. 11 (b), but that is not to say that it was
confining the said demand to the said four categories.
The said four categories were mentioned specifically
because they clearly brought out the cases of workmen to whom relief was due under demand No. 11
(a). Having thus dealt with the said four categories
by name, the Tribunal thought it necessary, and
we think, rightly, to add the words "and others",
because if there were other workmen who were
till 1948 required to work on Sundays and in respect
of whom a weekly day off was introduced thereafter
without any corresponding increase in their wa11:e~,
there was no reason why they should not have been
given the benefit which was given to the workmen
of the four categories specifically discussed.
It is
significant that having thus comprehensively described
the workmen who were entitled to the said benefit
the Tribunal has added that in respect of the remain'.
ing workmen, demand No. 11 (a) was rejected.
Therefore, we are satisfied that the relief granted
by the Tribunal in paragraph 115 of its award has
reference to demand No. 11 (a) and the use of the
words "and others" is not only not outside the terms
of reference, but is quite appropriate and justified.
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
196!
That being so, it is difficult to sustain the plea that
Bomb.,, Gas Co. Lid. the impugned direction was without jurisdiction.
v.
G01ol Bhiv•
Gqjendragtulkar J.
Mr. Kolah no doubt relied on the fact that the
present respondents never thought that they were
entiteld to the benefit conferred by the impugned
direction and in support of this plea, he referred us
to the fact that in 1952, a demand was made on
their behalf for a similar benefit. If the respondents
had felt that the benefit conferred by the impugned
direction was available to them, it is very unlikely
says Mr. Kolah, that they would have made the same
demand in 1952 on the basis that it had not been
granted to them by the earlier award. It does appear
that this demand was made on behalf of the respon·
dents and the Government of Bombay took the view
that the said demand had already been considered by
the Tribunal and that it was too late to reopen it in
regard to other categories of employees; that is why
the Government refused to make a reference. In our
opinion, this fact cannot materially assist Mr. Kolah,
because on a fair and reasonable construction of the
material direction in the award, we are satisfied that
the said clause applies to a U workers of the appellant
who satisfy the test prescribed by it. If the respondents did not understand the true scope and effect of.
the said clause, that cannot affect the construction
of the clause. Therefore, we do not think that tbe
failure of the respondents to take advantage of the
said clause soon after the earlier award was pro•
nounced can have any bearing on the construction
of the clause.
Then, Mr. Kolah has suggested that on the
merits the respondents are not entitled to make the
claim, because it is not shown by them that they
were required to work on all Sundays in the relevant
years.
He argues that the test prescribed by the
direction is that the benefit should be available to
3 S.C.R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 719
workmen who were, till 1948, required to work on
Sundays and that, it is suggested, must mean "who
were required to work on all Sundays in the year".
This argument has been examined by the Labour
Court and it has found that the respondents were
req•1ired ro work on Sundays before 1948, though they
might not have attended on all Sundays. In support
of this finding, the Labour Court has referred to
Ext. 32 and has drawn the inference from the said
document that the workers in the Syphon Department were required to work on all Sundays before
September, 1948, and it has added that the fact that
they did not work on some Sundays may be attributed to some casual circumstances, such as the workers
having voluntarily remained absent, or there not
being sufficient work for all, some might have been
sent home. Mr. Kolah has invited our attention to
the chart (Ext. 32) and has shown that in some cases,
the employees were not required to work even half
the number of Sundays during that year.
In our
opinion, this argument proceeds on a misconstruction
of the relevant clause in the award. The said clause
does not provide that bewre getting the benefit in
question, the workers must show that they actually
worked on all Sundays in the year. The test which
has to be satisfied by the workers is that they could
have been required to work on Sundays in that year.
In other words, what the Tribunal decided was that
if there were workers employed by the appellant
whom the appellant could require to work on Sun·
days during the relevant year, they would be entitled
to the benefit. In other words, the test is : did the
terms and conditions of service impose an obligation
on the workers to attend duties on Sundays if called
upon to do so? That is very different from saying
that the benefit would be available only if the
workers in question worked on all Sundays. There·
fore, we do not think there is any substance in the
argument that since the respondents had not been
. actually required to work on all Sundays in the
1963
Bam6ay G«s Co. Lti.
"·
G#'JI Bhioc
720
SUPREME COURT REPORTS(l964JVOL.
1969
relevant year, they were not entitled to the benefit of
s ... &i, Gu Co. Lid. the relevant clause in the award •
••
Gopal Bhioa
That leaves one more question to be considered.
Mr. Krilah has strenuously argued that the Labour
Court should not have allowed the claim of the res-
. pondents for such a long period when they made the
present applications nearly 8 years after the award
was pronounced.
It is true that the earlier award
was pronounced on May 11, 1950 and the present applications were made in 1958. In support of
his argument that the delay made by the respondents
should be taken into account, Mr. Kol ah has referred
to the fact that under the Payment of Wages Act
(No. 4 of 1936) a claim for wages has to be made
within six months from the date on which the cause
of action accrues to the employees. In the State of
Maharashtra, by local modification, this period is
prescribed as one year. The argument is that the
present claim made by the respondents under s. 33 C(2)
is a claim for wal!"el within the. meaning of the
Payment of Wal!"es Act. If the respondents had made
such a claim before the authority under the said Act,
they could not have got r~lief for more than a year.
It would be anomalous, says Mr. Kolah, that by
merely changing the forum, the respondents should
be permitted to make a claim for as many as 8 years
under s. 33C (2). In this connection, Mr. Kolah also
contenrls that by virtue of s. 22 of the Payment oC
wages Act, a claim for wages cannot be made by an
industrial employee in a civil court after a lapse of
one year, because though the period for such a suit
may be 3 years under Art. 102, a .civil suit is barred
by s. 22.
The jurisdiction conferred on the payment
authority is exclusive and so far as the said Act goes,
all claims must be made within one year.
Prima facie, there is some force in this argu·
ment. It does appear to be somewhat anomalous
that a claim which would be rejected .as barred by
,)
a S.C.R..
SlJPlU:ME COURT REPORTS
721
time if made under the Payment of Wages Act,
should be entertained under s. 33C ( 2) of the Act; but
does this apparent anomaly justify the introduction of
considerations of limitation in proceedings under
s. 33C (2)? Mr. Kolah suggests that it would be open
to this Court to treat !aches on the part of the employees as a relevant factor even in dealing with cases
· under s. 33C (2) and he has relied on the fact that
this Court has on several
occasions discouraged
belated claims in the matter of bonus. In appreciating the validity of this argument, we do not prop0se
to consider whether the jurisdiction conferred on the
authority under the Payment of Wages Act is exclusive in the sense that a claim for wages cannot be
made by an industrial employee in a civil court
within 3 years as permitted by art. 102; that is a
question which may have to be decided on the merits
when it directly arises.
For the purpose of the present appeal, the only point which we have to consider is : does the fact that for recovery of wages
limitation has been prescribed by the payment of
Wages Act, justify the introduction of considerations
of limitation in regard to proceedings taken under
s. 33C (2) of the Act ?
In dealing with this question, it is necessary to
bear in mind that though the legislature knew how
the problem of recovery of wages had been tackled
by the Payment of Wages Act and how limitation
had been prescribed in that behalf, it has omitted
to make . any provision for limitation in enacting
s. 33C (2).
The failure of the lagislature to make
any provision for limitation cannot, in our opinion,
be deemed to be an accidental omission. In the
circumstances, it would be legitimate to infer that
legislature deliberately did not provide for any limi·
tation under s. 33C (2). It may have been thought
that the employees who are entitled to take the bene·
fit of s. 33C (2) may not always be conscious of their
rights and it would not be right to put the restriction
•..
a.p•1 Blriu
Gaj.,.J~ J;
/HJ
l""h!f Gas ,C.. Lti1
y.,
G.μ/ BltiN
G4}111i••1a4lcar J.
722 SUPR.EMB COURT REPORT~ [19M] VOL •
.
of limitation in respect of claims which they may
have to make under the said provision. Besides, even
if the analogy of execution proceedings is treated as
relevant, it is well known that a decree passed under
the Code of Civil Procedure is capable of execution
within 12 years, provided, of course, it is kept alive
by taking steps in aid of execution from time to
time as required by art. 182 of the Limitation Act,
so that the test of one year or six moo ths' limitation
prescribed by the Payment of Wages Act cannot be
treated as a uniform and universal test in respect of
all kinds of execution claims.
It seems to us that
where the legislature has made no provision for limitation, it would not be open to the courts to introduce any such limitation on grounds of fairness or
justice. The words of s. 33C (2) are plain and unambiguous and it would be the duty of the Labour
Court to give effect to the said provision without any
considerations of limitation. Mr. Kolah no doubt
emphasised the fact that such belated claims made
on a large scale may cause considerable inconvenience
to the employer, but that is a consideration which
the legislature may take into account, and if the
legislature feels that fair play and justice require
that some limitation should be prescribed, it may
proceed to do so. In the absence of any provision,
however, the Labour Court cannot import any such
consideration in dealing with the applications made
under s. 33C ( 2).
Mr. Kolah then
attemp~ed to suggest that
art. 181 in the First Schedule of the Limitation Act
may apply to the present applications, and a period
of 3 years' limitation should, therefore, be held to
govern them. Article 181 provides 3 years' limitation
for applications for which no period of limitation
is provided elsewhere in Schedule I, or bys. 48 of the
Code o( Civil Procedure, and the said period starts
when the right to apply accrues. In our opion, this
ar~ument is one of desperation. It is well settlec!
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
723
that art, 181 applies only to applications which are
made under the Code of Civil Procedure, and so, its
extension to applications made under s. 33C (2) of
the Act would not be justified. As early as 1880,
the Bombay High Court had held in Rai Manekbai
v. Manekji Kavasji (1), that art. 181 only relates to
applications under the Code of Civil Procedure in
which case no period of limitation has been prescribed for the application, and the consensus of judicial
opinion on this point had been noticed by the Privy
Council in Hansraj Gupta
v. Official Liquidators,
D'hra Dun Mussoorie Electric Tramway Company
Ltd. (').
An attempt was no doubt made in the
case of Sha Mulchand & Oo. Ltd.
v. Jawahar
Mills Ltd. (1), to suggest that the amendment of articles 158 and 178 ipso facto altered the meaning which
had been attached to the words in art. 181 by judicial decisions, but this attempt failed, because this
Court held "that the long catena of decisions under
art. 181 may well be said to have, as it were, added
the words "under the Code" in the first column of
that Article.'" Therefore it is not possible to acceed to
the argument that the
limitation prescribed by
art. 181 can be invoked in dealing with applications
under s. 33C (2) of the Act .
. It is true that in dealing with claims like bonus,
industrial adjudication has generally discouraged
!aches and delay, but claims like bonus must be
distinguished . from claims made under s. 33C (2).
A claim for bonus, for instance, is entertained on
grounds of social justice and is not based on any
statutory provi~ion. In such a case, it would, no
doubt, be open to industrial adjudication to have
regard to all the relevant considerations before
awarding the claim and in doing so, if it appears
that a claim for bonus was made a'ter long lapse of
time, industrial adjudication may refuse to entertain
the claim, or Government may refuse to make reference in that behalf. But these considerations would
~ 1) p880) I.LR. 7 Bom. 213.
(2J 11932] L.R. 60 I.A, 13, 20.
(31 (1953) S.O.R, 3511 371
B""l.J 0.. CO. Lti,
v.
Gtl•IBAIH
Gaj~J.
IHI
124 St:JPREN:IE COURT REPORTS [19tl4] VOt.
be irrelevant when claims are made under s. 33C ( 2),
where these claims are, as in the present case, based
on an award and are intended merely to execute the
award. In such a case, limitation cannot be introduced by industrial adjudication on academic ground
of social justice. It can be introduced, if at all, by
the legislature. Therefore, we think that the Labour
Court was right in rejecting the appellant's contention that since the present claim was belated, it
should not be awarded.
In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed
with costs.
Appeals diamiuei.
J. K. COTTON SPINNING & WEAVING
MILLS Co., Ltd.
v.
BADRI MALI AND OTHERS
(P. B. GAJENDBAGADKAR, K.. N. WANOJIOO,
and K. C. DAS GUPTA JJ.)
lruiurial DiBpute-Definition of 'worker'.-MaliB u.WAer
tMWkera-JlaliB whether induatrial employee&-" Employed in any
'1iduatr1/'-Meaning-Principle of incide11tal
relati0111Jhip--:
Gninl of 'leave' on ground of fair play and social juaticeValldity-(]oncept of •OcUd justice-Uttar Praie&h Industrial
l>NpvleB Acl, 1947 (U.P. 28 of 19il7), s. 2-Induatrial !Mpulsa
..tel, lfl''I (1' of 1947), •· 2 (s).
An Industrial diaputc was referred by the Government of
U«ar Pradesh for adjudication to the Adjudicator, Kaupur.
The Adjudicator held that the Malis were worlimen under . the
U.l'.' Industrial Disputes Act but they were not Industrial
employees arid hence were not entitled to claim dear food
allowance under the Government order dated December 6, 1948.
ThO claiioa of the Malis with regard to weekly holidays and
leave with wages were also rejected by the Adjudicator.
-