# BRAHAM DASS -4 v. STATE OF H.P

- **Citation:** [2009] 8 S.C.R. 908
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2009-05-05
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 26 of 2003
- **Bench:** Dr. Arijit Pasayat, Asok Kumar Ganguly
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/braham-dass-4-v-state-of-h-p-26103
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

' .
Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 279 and 304A - Applicability of
c - Allegation against bus driver that he started the bus while
one of the passengers was on its roof -
Passenger
succumbing to the injuries - Acquittal by trial court -
Conviction by High Court - On appeal, held: accused liable
to be acquitted - Provisions of s. 279 and 304A not
t:
D applicable in the facts of the case.
Prosecution was initiated against the appellantaccused (a bus driver), uls. 279 and 304A IPC, alleging
that he started the bus, all of a sudden, without waiting
E for a signal from the conductor and without verifying if
all the passengers on the board whether had alighted.
This resulted in injuries to one passenger, who had gone
~
on the top of the bus to unload his luggage. He latter
succumbed to the injuries. Trial court acquitted the
F appellant. High Court convicted him. Hence the present
appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: Section 279 IPC deals with rash driving or
G riding on a public way. A bare reading of the provision
makes it clear that it must be established that the
~-
accused was driving any vehicle on a public way in a
manner which endangered human life or was likely to
cause hurt or injury to any other person. The foundation
H
908
BRAHAM DASS v. STATE OF H.P.
909
1
in accusations u/s. 279 IPC is not negligence. Similarly
A
in Section 304A IPC, the stress is on causing death by
negligence or rashness. Therefore, for bringing in
application of either Section 279 or 304A, it must be
established that there was an element of rashness or
negligence. Even if the prosecution version is accepted
B
in toto, there was no evidence which led to show that any
negligence was involved. [Paras 3 and 4] [910-G-H; 911A-CJ

## Text

[2009] 8 S.C.R. 908
•
A
BRAHAM DASS
-4
V.
STATE OF H.P.
(Criminal Appeal No. 26 of 2003)
B
MAY 5, 2009
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASOK KUMAR
GANGULY, JJ.]
' .
Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 279 and 304A - Applicability of
c - Allegation against bus driver that he started the bus while
one of the passengers was on its roof -
Passenger
succumbing to the injuries - Acquittal by trial court -
Conviction by High Court - On appeal, held: accused liable
to be acquitted - Provisions of s. 279 and 304A not
t:
D applicable in the facts of the case.
Prosecution was initiated against the appellantaccused (a bus driver), uls. 279 and 304A IPC, alleging
that he started the bus, all of a sudden, without waiting
E for a signal from the conductor and without verifying if
all the passengers on the board whether had alighted.
This resulted in injuries to one passenger, who had gone
~
on the top of the bus to unload his luggage. He latter
succumbed to the injuries. Trial court acquitted the
F appellant. High Court convicted him. Hence the present
appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: Section 279 IPC deals with rash driving or
G riding on a public way. A bare reading of the provision
makes it clear that it must be established that the
~-
accused was driving any vehicle on a public way in a
manner which endangered human life or was likely to
cause hurt or injury to any other person. The foundation
H
908
BRAHAM DASS v. STATE OF H.P.
909
1
in accusations u/s. 279 IPC is not negligence. Similarly
A
in Section 304A IPC, the stress is on causing death by
negligence or rashness. Therefore, for bringing in
application of either Section 279 or 304A, it must be
established that there was an element of rashness or
negligence. Even if the prosecution version is accepted
B
in toto, there was no evidence which led to show that any
negligence was involved. [Paras 3 and 4] [910-G-H; 911A-CJ
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal c
No. 26 of 2003.
From the Judgment & Order dated 17.7.2002 of the High
Court of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla in Crl. Appeal No. 373 of
1998.
-~
D
Ranjit Kumar and Binu Tarnta for the Appellant.
Naresh K. Sharma for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Challenge in this appeal is
to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Himachal
~
Pradesh High Court convicting the appellant who had been
"
acquitted by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Nurpur,
Kangra. The appellant was the driver of a bus of the Himachal
F
Pradesh Road Transport Corporation ( in short the
'Corporation'). According to the prosecution version on
19.11.1991 while he was driving the vehicle, the bus had
stopped at a bus stop. One passenger after alighting from the
bus went to its roof top for the purpose of unloading his luggage.
G
The accused without waiting for a signal from the conductor and
... ->
without verifying if all the passengers who were to board, had
boarded and who were to alight had alighted, all of a sudden
started the bus as a result of which the said passenger fell down
and sustained injuries. He was carried to the hospital where
H
he succumbed. A case was registered. On complaint of
910
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 8 S.C.R.
A investigation, charge sheet was filed and he pleaded
innocence. He was charged for commission of offences
punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 304 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 ( in short 'IPC'). Eight witnesses were
examined to further the prosecution version. The trial court found
B that there was no negligence and as a matter of fact there was
nothing on record to show that he had been asked to wait till
all passengers alighted and/or boarded the bus. The High Court
reversed the conclusion in appeal filed by the State. The basic
stand of the State before the High Court was that the accused
c was supposed to wait till he was given a signal by the conductor
to do so. It was noted that one of the witnesses stated that the
conductor told the driver that one of the passenger was still on
the roof of the bus but the driver started the bus. Accordingly,
...
the appellant was found g~ty of offences punishable under
0 Sections 279 and 304 A IPC and sentenced to rigorous
1.
imprisonment for six mo• .ths and fine with default stipulation.
2. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the
appellant submitted that there was no evidence on record to
show any negligence. It has not been brought on record as to
E how the accused-appellant was negligent in any way. On the
contrary what has been stated is that one person had gone to
the roof top and driver started the vehicle while he was there.
There was no evidence to show that the driver had knowledge
that any passenger was on the roof top of the bus. Learned
F counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that
PW1 had stated that the conductor had told the driver that one
passenger was still on the roof of the bus and the driver started
the bus.
G
3. In the cross-examination PW1 categorically stated that
he does not know who the driver was. It is of relevance that the
conductor was not examined as a witness. Section 279 deals
rash driving or riding on a public way. A bare reading of the
provision makes it clear that it must be established that the
accused was driving any vehicle on a public way in a manner
H
BRAHAM DASS v. STATE OF H.P.
911
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.)
1
which endangered human life or was likely to cause hurt or injury A
to any other person.
4. Obviously the foundation in accusations under Section
279 IPC is not negligence. Similarly in Section 304 A the stress
is on causing death by negligence or rashness. Therefore, for 8
bringing in application of either Section 279 or 304 A it ml.lst
be established that there was an element of rashness or
negligence. Even if the prosecution version is accepted in toto,
there was no evidence led to show that any negligence was
involved.
5. Above being the position, the judgment of the High Court
cannot be sustained and is set aside. The accused appellant
is acquitted of the charges. The bail bonds executed to give
effect to order dated 7.10.2002 shall stand discharged.
K.K.T.
Appeal allowed.
c
D