# BRIJENDRA SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS

- **Citation:** [1981] 2 S.C.R. 287
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1980-11-25
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/brijendra-singh-v-state-of-u-p-ors-8079
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

•
,)
• •
281
BRIJENDRA SINGH
v.
STATE OF U.P. & ORS.
November 25, 1980
fR. S. SARKARJA AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.J
Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling .of Land Holding Act, 1960 (Act l
of 1961)-Section 5(6) proviso (b) Effect of the Amending Act 1972 (Act
18 of 1973) "Good Faith"-True nteaninR and scope of.
A
B
The Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling of Land Holding Act 1960 was
amended by the Amending Act
1972. Section 5(6) proviso (b) of the Act
C
States:
"(6) Jn determining the ceiling area applicable to a tenure-holders,
any transfer of land made after the t\\'enty-fourth day of January,
1971, which but for the transfer would have been declared surplus
land under this act, shall be ignored and not taken into account :
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to-
(a) .........••..•.•
f)
(b) a transfer proved
to
the
satisfaction
of the
prescribed
authority to be in good faith and for
ndequate
consideration
and
under an irrevocable instrument not being a
benami transaction or
for immediate or deferred benefit of the
tenure-holder
of
other
E
members of his family.
The appellant so1J 25 acres of land for consideration
by registered deeds
dated 2nd January and 9th August, 1971.
The Prescribed Authority under·
the U.P. Itnposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 issued notice to
the appellant to sho\': cause why 25.96 acres land from his holding be
not
declared surplus.
The appellant filed objections stating that (i) the
entire
F
land was unirrigated; (ii) there was no source of irrigation in the fields and
he had made two sales of 25 acres for acquiring a site and constructing a
residential house.
The Prescribed Authority rejected the ob1ections of the
appellant and declared the said !and as surplus.
Aggrieved by the said order the appellant went
in
appeal
before
the
Appellate Authority, who, partly allowed the appeal.
The appellant filed a
\Vrit petition in the High Court, which was dis1nissed in limine.
By special
leave petition, the point for consideration was whether a sale made
by a
tenureMholder on a date between January 24, 1971
and June
8,
1973
for
adequate consideration and under an irrevocable instrument not being a be~
nami transaction or for immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure holder
or other 1nembers of his family, can be held to be not in 'good faith' wi~~in
the contempiation of proviso (b) to subMsection (6) of section 5 of the_ Ced!ng
~-\ct, merely because the tenure-holder ha<l failed to. prove
the satisfact1.on
of the Prescribed Authori'.y or the
Appellate Authonty that the
purpose I or
G
288
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1981] 2 S.C.R.
A
which the sale was made, did not constitute an impelling necessity for the
saJe.
B
Allowing the appeal,
IIELD : It is clear that the crucial date on or fron1 V.'hich no tenure-tclder
is enti1'1ed to hold land in excess of the
ceiling area is
June 8, 1973.
Tt is
n cardinal canon of construction that an exPression which has no
uniform
pr.ecisely fixed meaning, takes its colour, light and content from the context.
[293E-F, HJ
The benefit of clause (b) of the proviso to sub·section (6) is availab1e to
a transfer made in good faith, that is, to a bona fide
transfer whereby
the
tcnure·holder genuinely and irrevocably transfers all right, title and interest
in the land in favour of the transferee, in the ordinary course of managen1rnt
C
of his affairs and which is not a co1Iusive arrangement, or device or snbter·
tuge to enable the tenure-holder to continue to hold the surplus land or any
reserved interest in presenti or in futuro therein, (or merely to convert it into
cash), and thus circumvent the ban under section 5(1) of the Ceiling
Act,
In order to be entitled to the benefit of proviso (b) of Sec. 5(6), a tran<fer
made in good faith, must satisfy the further conditions, (ii) to (iv), enume·
rated in the proviso (b). [294C-F]
()nee it is established by the transferring tenure holder that the transfer
in question effected in the course of ordinary management

## Text

•
,)
• •
281
BRIJENDRA SINGH
v.
STATE OF U.P. & ORS.
November 25, 1980
fR. S. SARKARJA AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.J
Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling .of Land Holding Act, 1960 (Act l
of 1961)-Section 5(6) proviso (b) Effect of the Amending Act 1972 (Act
18 of 1973) "Good Faith"-True nteaninR and scope of.
A
B
The Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling of Land Holding Act 1960 was
amended by the Amending Act
1972. Section 5(6) proviso (b) of the Act
C
States:
"(6) Jn determining the ceiling area applicable to a tenure-holders,
any transfer of land made after the t\\'enty-fourth day of January,
1971, which but for the transfer would have been declared surplus
land under this act, shall be ignored and not taken into account :
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to-
(a) .........••..•.•
f)
(b) a transfer proved
to
the
satisfaction
of the
prescribed
authority to be in good faith and for
ndequate
consideration
and
under an irrevocable instrument not being a
benami transaction or
for immediate or deferred benefit of the
tenure-holder
of
other
E
members of his family.
The appellant so1J 25 acres of land for consideration
by registered deeds
dated 2nd January and 9th August, 1971.
The Prescribed Authority under·
the U.P. Itnposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 issued notice to
the appellant to sho\': cause why 25.96 acres land from his holding be
not
declared surplus.
The appellant filed objections stating that (i) the
entire
F
land was unirrigated; (ii) there was no source of irrigation in the fields and
he had made two sales of 25 acres for acquiring a site and constructing a
residential house.
The Prescribed Authority rejected the ob1ections of the
appellant and declared the said !and as surplus.
Aggrieved by the said order the appellant went
in
appeal
before
the
Appellate Authority, who, partly allowed the appeal.
The appellant filed a
\Vrit petition in the High Court, which was dis1nissed in limine.
By special
leave petition, the point for consideration was whether a sale made
by a
tenureMholder on a date between January 24, 1971
and June
8,
1973
for
adequate consideration and under an irrevocable instrument not being a be~
nami transaction or for immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure holder
or other 1nembers of his family, can be held to be not in 'good faith' wi~~in
the contempiation of proviso (b) to subMsection (6) of section 5 of the_ Ced!ng
~-\ct, merely because the tenure-holder ha<l failed to. prove
the satisfact1.on
of the Prescribed Authori'.y or the
Appellate Authonty that the
purpose I or
G
288
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1981] 2 S.C.R.
A
which the sale was made, did not constitute an impelling necessity for the
saJe.
B
Allowing the appeal,
IIELD : It is clear that the crucial date on or fron1 V.'hich no tenure-tclder
is enti1'1ed to hold land in excess of the
ceiling area is
June 8, 1973.
Tt is
n cardinal canon of construction that an exPression which has no
uniform
pr.ecisely fixed meaning, takes its colour, light and content from the context.
[293E-F, HJ
The benefit of clause (b) of the proviso to sub·section (6) is availab1e to
a transfer made in good faith, that is, to a bona fide
transfer whereby
the
tcnure·holder genuinely and irrevocably transfers all right, title and interest
in the land in favour of the transferee, in the ordinary course of managen1rnt
C
of his affairs and which is not a co1Iusive arrangement, or device or snbter·
tuge to enable the tenure-holder to continue to hold the surplus land or any
reserved interest in presenti or in futuro therein, (or merely to convert it into
cash), and thus circumvent the ban under section 5(1) of the Ceiling
Act,
In order to be entitled to the benefit of proviso (b) of Sec. 5(6), a tran<fer
made in good faith, must satisfy the further conditions, (ii) to (iv), enume·
rated in the proviso (b). [294C-F]
()nee it is established by the transferring tenure holder that the transfer
in question effected in the course of ordinary management of bis affairs, was
made for adequate consideration and he had genuinely, absolutely
and
irre·
vocably divested himself of all right, title and interest (including
cultivatory
possession) in the land in favour of the transferee, the onus under Explanation II, in the absence of any circumstances suggestive of collusion,
or
an
intention or design to defraud or circumvent the Ceiling Act, on the tenure
holder to show that the transfer was effected in good faith will
stand
dis.
charged. It will not be necessary for the tenure to prove
further
that
the
transfer was made for an impelling need or to raise money for meeting
a
pressing legal necessity.
[294G-H, 295AJ
The other conditions of Proviso (b) to Sec. 5(6) being satisfied, the AppelJate Authority was not justified in holding that the sales were not in
'good
:F
faith' merely on the ground that the construction of a residential house in
New Delhi did not in bis opinion constitute a compe11ing necessity for the
sales. Moreover, in the
instant case, the tenure-holder at t'he
material time
was serving in the army in the rank of Brigadier which implies that he \vas
nearing the age of retirement from army service. It is not shown that he had
any other house where he could Jive.
He had, in fact,
borro\.\ed part of the
cost of construction from the Governmnent. There was therefore nothing sinis·
{;
ter in his intention if he arranged to sell his lands to other cultivators to raise
H
funds to acquire a site and build a residential house in New Delhi where he
wouJd live in reasonable comfort after retirement from army service.
t295G-H, 296A-DJ
CIVIL APPELLATE JURJSD!CTION :
Civil
Appeal No. 2726
of
1980.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Onkr dated
23-5-1978 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc.
Writ No.
4497/78.
)
.
'
•
•
BR!JENDRA SINGH v. U.P. STATE (Sarkaria, J.)
Manoj Swarup and Miss Lalita Kohli for the Appellant.
O. P. Rana and Mrs. Shobha Dixit for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
289
SARKARIA, J .-This is an appeal by special leave against a judgment
dated May 23, 1978 of the High Court of Allahabad. The material
fact• giving rise to this appeal are as under :
The Prescribed Authority under Section 10(2) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 (Act No. 1 of 1961)
(as amended by U.P. Act 18 of 1973) issued notice to the appellant
to show cause why 25 .96 acres out of 44 acres of irrigated land from
his holding be not declared surplus.
In response to this notice,
the
appellant filed objections stating, inter alia, (i) that the entire land was
unirrigated; (ii) that there was
no
source of irrigation
in
field
Nos. 1373, 79 and 80; (iii) that the appellant had made two sales of
12.50 acres each, 25 acres in all, for a valid necessity, namely,
to
rais2 funds for acquiring a site and constructing a residential house in
New Delhi.
(a) The appellant being an Army Officer in the rank of
Brigadier, had after obtaining permission on January 2, 1971 from
the Army Headquarters, sold 12.50 acres of the land for a consideration of Rs. 25,000/- to one Inderjit Singh by a registered deed, dated
August 9, 1971, and handed over the possession to the vendee; (b)
Similarly, after obtaining the pennission of the Army Headquarters
on January 2, 1971, he sold 12.50 acres of the land for Rs. 25,000/-
to one Gurjeet Singh by another registered sale-deed and handed over
the possession to the vendee. Since the money raised by these sales was
insufficient to purchase a building site and
constructing a
house
then~on, the appellant also raised a loan of Rs. 50,000/- from the Government for that purpose.
The Prescribed Authority by its order dated June 26, 1977, rejected the objections of the appellant and declared 25.96 acres of the land
as surplus.
c
()
E
F
G
Aggrieved by the order of the Prescribed Authority, the appellant
went in appeal before the Appellate Authority (District Judge, Rampur), who, by his ·order dated December 8, 1977, partly allowed the
appeal, holding that the (lntire land was unirrigated and accordingly
declared 16.94 acres of unirrigated land as surplus.
The District
Judge has not held that the aforesaid sales made in favour of Inderjit
H
Singh and Gurjeet Singh by two sale deeds of 12.50 acres each, were
fictitious or Benami, nor has he found that the vendees were not in
A
290
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1981] 2 S.C.R.
possession of the said land.
The District Judge seems to have denied
the prot_ection of Proviso (b) of sub-section ( 6) of Section 5 of the
Ceiling Act to the said two sales, merely for the reason that "the appellant had failed to prove any impelling necessity for building a house
and that he could not do without a house in New Delhi'', and therefore, "it could not be held that the sales in question were not effected
to avoid the Ceiling Law."
To impugn this decision of the District Judge, in so far as he did
not uphold the aforesaid sales relating to 25 acres of land, the appellant filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the
High Court, which dismissed the same in limine by its order, dated
,C
May 23, 1978.
Hence this appeal by special leave.
.G
The question of law that has been mooted before us is, whether a
sale made by a tenure-holder on a date between January 24, 1971 and
June 8, 1973 for adequate consideratiou and under an irrevocable instrument, not being a benami transaction or for immediate or deferred
benefit of the tenure-holder or other members of his family, can be
held to be not in 'good faith' within the contemplation of proviso (b)
to sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the Ceiling Act, merely because
the tenure-holder had failed to prove to the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority or the Appellate Authority that the
purpose for
which the sale was made, did not constitute an impelling necessity for
the sale.
Answer to this question tnms on a correct interpretation of the expression "good faith" used in the aforesaid proviso (b).
Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contends that the
District Judge had committed an error of law inasmuch as he held that
in order to get t11e protection of the aforesaid Proviso (b), it is essential for the tenure-holder to prove that the sale was made for some
pressing valid necessity.
It is emphasised that this is not the requirement of that provision; that the expression "good faith" only means
that it should not be a benami or fraudulent transaction in which the
transferor continues to be the beneficial owner or right-holder of the
land on the crucial date, viz. June 8, 1973.
It is emphasised that in the instant case, it was not disputed that
the sales were made to raise funds for purchasing a building site and
constructing a house thereon in New Delhi, that the authenticity of tbe
documentary evidence produced by the appellant to establish that fact
W'as not doubted by the Appellate Authorit,y; nor the adequacy of the
sale considerations, nor the fact that the appellant had
parted with
.possession of the sold lands: that in this situation, by no stretch of
•
..
•
)
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~
BR!JENJ)RA SINGH v. U.P. STATE (Sarkaria, I.)
291
reasoning, it could be said that the sale was not bona fide or in good
faith.
On the other hand, Shri 0. P. Rana stontly dclcnds the finding
of the Appellate Authority (District Judge), which has been upheld by
the High Court, that the sale coul<l not be said to be in 'good faith'
merely because no impelling necessity for making it had been
established.
Before <lcaling with these co11tentions, let us have a look at the
material part of sub-section (1) of Section 5, which reads thus:
.. (l) On and from the conunencement of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment)
Act, 1972, no tenure-holder shall be entitled to hold in the
aggregate throughout Uttar Pradesh, any land in excess of
the ceiling area applicable to him.
Explanation !.-In detennining the ceiling area applicable to a tenure-holder, all land held by him in his own right,
whether in his own name, or ostensibly in the name of any
other person, shall be taken into account."
Explanation II is not material for our present purpose.
A
B
c
0
The Amendment Act, 1972 (Act No. 18 of 1973) (for short callE
ed the Ceiling Act) came into force with effect from June 8, 1973. It
is clear that the crucial date on or from whifh no. tenure-holder is
entitled to hold land in excess of the ceiling area is June 8, J 973.
Keeping this in view, let us now examine sub-section (6), the relevan\
part of which reads as under :-
" ( 6) In determining the ceiling area applicable to a tenureholder, any transfer of land made after the twenty-fourth
of January, 1971, which but for the transfer would have
been declared surplus land under this Act, shall be ignored
and not taken into account :
F
Provided that nothing in this
sub-section shall apply
G
to--
{a) ........................................ .
(b) a transfer proved to the satisfaction of the prescribed authority to be in good faith and for adequate con-
~ideration and under an irrevocable instrument not being a
H
benami transaction or for immediate or deferred benefit of
!he tenure-holder or other members of bis family.
292
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1981] 2 S.C.R.
A
Explanation ! .. ..................... · · ...... · · · · · ·
Explanation 11.-The burden of proving that a case falls
within clause (b) of the proviso shall rest with the party
claiming its benefit."
B
D
E
F
It will be seen that when sub-section ( 6) of Section 5 provides
that in determining the ceiling area and surplus area, any transfer
of land which but for the transfer would have been declared surplus
land under the Act, shall be ignored, it proceeds on the presumption
that the tenure-holders being aware of the resolution or manifesto
adopted by the ruling All India Congress Party on January 24, 1971,
and of the consensus at the Chief Minister Conference held in July
1972, to take measures to lower the ceiling on agricultural holdings,
might make attempts to defraud, defeat and evade the ceiling 1aw,
then in offing, by making fictitious transfers of land in favour of other
persons.
The presumption which underlies the main provision in Section
~ ( 6) can be displaced, as the Legislature has itself indicated, on proof
of the conditions set out in Proviso (b).
Although the strength of
the aforesaid presumption and the nature and quantum required to
satisfy the
conditions of Proviso (b) may vary
accon:ling to the
circumstances of the particular case, yet it can be said as a general
proposition that in the case of transfers made prior to the decision
of the Chief Minister's Conference in July 1972 to lower the ceiling
the burden under Explanation II on the tenure-holder to establish the
facts bringing his case within clause (b) of the Proviso, would be
lighter than the one in the case of a transfer made after the aforesaid
decision in July 1972.
In order to bring his case within the purview of Proviso (b) , the
tenure-holder has to show-
( i) that the transd'er has been made in 'good faith';
(ii) that it is a transfer for adequate consideration;
G
(iii) that it has been made under an irrevocable instrument:
and
(iv) that it is not a henami transaction or for immediate
or deferred benefit of the tenure-holder or other
members of bis family.
(
•
R
There is no dispute in regard to the connotation, construction and
•
existence of ingredients (ii), (iii) and (iv) in the instant case. Controversy, however centres round the true meaning and scope of the
•
•
-
-(
BRIJENDRA SINGH v. U.P. STATE (Sarkaria, /.)
293
expression 'good faith' within the contemplation of clause (b) of the
Proviso. In the instant case, the Appellate Authority appeats to have
taken the view-a view which has been upheld by the High Court-·
that a transfer cannot be said tO, have been made in 'good faith'
merely because it has been honestly or genuinely made and satisfies
the aforesaid conpitions (ii), (iii) and (iv), unless it is proved further
that it was made for a valid pressing necessity.
The thrust of the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant
is that the expression 'good faith' within the contemplation of Proviso
(b) only means that the transfer is honestly and genuinely
made,
and is not designed to circumvent the Ceiling Act or defeat its object,
A
B
and that this expression cannot be legitimately
stretched so as to
C
import into Proviso (b), as a requirement of law, an additional obligation to prove that the transfer was made for a pressing necessity,
or valid personal need of the transferor. The argument is not devoid
of merit.
The expression 'good faith' has not been defined in the Ceiling
Act. The expression has several shades of meaning.
Jn the popular
sense, the phrase 'in good faith' simply means
"honestly,
without
fraud, collusion, or deceit; really, actually. without pretence and without intent to assist or act in furtherance of a fraudulent or otherwise
unlawful scheme".
(See Words & Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol.
l 8A, page 91). Although the meaning of "good faith" may vary in
the context of different statutes, subjects and situations, honest intenb
free from taint of fraud of fraudulent design, is a constant element of
its connotation.
Even so, the quality and quantity of the honesty
requisite for constituting 'good faith' is conditioned by
the context
and object of the statute in which this term is employed.
It is a
cardinal canon o,f construction that an expression which has no uniform, precisely fixed meaning, takes its colour, light and content from
the context.
The meaning and scope of the expression 'good faith' is therefore,
to be considered in the light of the scheme and purpose of Section 5,
in general, and the context of Proviso (b) to sub-section (6), in particular. We have already noticed that the primary object of the Ceiling
Act, as adumbrated in the pivotal provision in Section 5 (I) is to
prohibit and disentitle a tenure-holder from holding land
in
the
aggregate in the State of Uttar Pradesh, in excess of the ceiling area,
in his own right,
whether in his own
name, or ostensibly in
the
name of any other person. The ceiling area and snrplus land of a
tenure-holder under the Ceiling Act, as already mentioned, are to
be determined as on June 8, 1973 when the U.P. (Amendment) Act.
3-57 SCI/81
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
294
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1981j 2 S.C.R.
No. 18 of 1973 came into force.
A transfer, therefore, made after
January 24, 1971 which is designed to serve as a cloak for retention
of a right or interest of the transferor in the ostensibly transferred
land in excess of the ceiling area, even on or after June 8, l 973,
will be patently not in 'good faith'.
But the Proviso (b) to subsection ( 6) of Section 5 extends the negative aspect of the concept
'good faith' a little further by indicating, that even if the transfer is
not an ostensible transfer and the transferor divests himself of all
interest and rights in presenti in the transferred land, bnt reserves
some benefit in futuro for himself or other members of his family,
then also the transfer will be not in 'good faith'.
A transfer solely
for the purpose of converting surplus land into cash without any kind
of need (not to be confused with legal necessity) may also lack good
faith.
Broadly speaking, the benefit of clause (b) of the Proviso to subsection. ( 6) is available to a transfer made in good faith, that is, to
a bona fide transfer whereby the tenure-holder genuinely and irrevocably transfers all right, title and interest in the land in favour of
the transferee, in the ordinary course of management, of his
affairs and which is not a
collusive arrangement, or device or
subterfuge to enable the tenure-holder to continue to hold the surplus
land or any reserved interest in presenti or in futuro,
therein
(or
merely to convert it into cash), and thus circumvent the ban under
Section 5 (1) of the Ceiling Act. In order to be entitled to the benefit of Proviso (b), a transfer made in good faith, must satisfy the
further conditions, (ii) to (iv), enumerated in the Proviso (bl. The
positive conditions laid down in Proviso (b) are : that the transfer
should be for adequate consideration; that it should have been made
under an irrevocable instrument.
The negative conditions set out
in clause (b) of the Proviso are : that it must not be a benami
transaction; that it must not be for immediate or deferred benefit of
the transferring tenure-holder or other members of his family.
These
tests or conditions (ii), (iii) and (iv) provided in Proviso (b) may
not by themselves be conclusive to bold that the transfer was
in
'good faith'.
For instance, another important test for judging the
genuineness or otherwise of a sale would be whether or not cultivatory
possession and enjoyment of the land has passed under the sale to
the vendee.
Even so, once it is
established by the transferring
tenure-bolder that the transfer in question effected in the course of
ord!nary management of his affairs, was made for adequate consideration and he bas genuinely, absolutely and irrevocably divested himself
of all right, title and interest (including cultivatory possession) in the
land in favour of the transferee, the onus under Explanation TI. in
•
•
•
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)
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,
·1
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BRIJENDRA SINGH v. U.P. STATE (Sarkaria, J.)
295
the absence of any circumstances suggestive of collusion, or an intention or design to defraud or circumvent the Ceiling Act, on the tenure.
holder to show that the transfer was effected in 'good faith', will
stand discharged, and it will not be necessary for the tenure-holder
to prove further that the transfer was made for an impelling need
or to raise money for meeting a pressing legal necessity.
Although
proof of the fact that a transfer was
made for a valid pressing
necessity, may highlight or strengthen the inference in favour of the
genuineness of the transfer, it is not an indispensable constituent
o~
'good faith', nor is the proof of legal necessity requisite, as a matter
of law, to enable a tenure-bolder to avail of the br,nefit of clause (b)
of the Proviso.
It may be remembered that at the time when such
a transfer was made, there was no legal restriction on his power to
alienate the whole or any part of his holding.
In other words, at
the time when such a transfer was made it was not unlawful, even
if it were made without any pressing necessity.
It became unlawful
by the subsequent enactment of a legal fiction introduced in Section
5 (6) of the O~iling Act (No. 18 of 1973) with retrospective effect
from January 24, 1971.
Even so, under this statutory fiction, a
transfer of land made after January 24, 1971 does not become wholly
void for all purposes; it can be ignored and would not be taken into
account in determining the ceiling area of the transferring tenureholder for purposes of the Ceiling Act, and that too, if the following
two conditions are satisfied:
(a) that the land but for the transfer would have been
declared surplus land under tbe U.P. Act
18
of
1973; and
(b) that the transfer is not of a kind covered by Proviso (b) to Section 5(6) of the Act.
A
B
c
D
E
F
This being the position, once a transfer is shown to be bo11a fide and
further satisfies all the other positive and negative conditions laid
down in the Proviso (b) to Section 5 ( 6), there is no justification
in law to stretch the legal fiction further and to spell out from the ./
expression 'good faith' an additional requirement of proving pressing
necessity for the transfer before the enture-holder is entitled to the
G.
benefit of the aforesaid Proviso (b).
In the instant case, the two sales in question have not only been
found to be genuine and for adequate consideration, but it has been
further accepted that the sales were made by the tenure-holder to meet
an ordinary need of every house-holder i.e. for raising funds for constructing a residential house in New Delhi. The sales have been held
by the Appellate Authority to be not in 'good faith' merely on the
.. ,
A
B
c
D
296
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1981] 2 S.C.R.
ground that the construction of a residential house in New Delhi bv
the tenure-holder could not, in the opinion of the Authority, be said
to be an "impending" (impelling?) necessity.
This approach and
finding is manifestly erroneous.
As discussed above, in order to get the protection of Proviso (b)
to Section 5 ( 6), it is not legally necessary to proviso, in addition to
the conditions set out in the Proviso (b), that the sales were for
valid pressing necessity.
Even so, in the instant case, it had been
shown that the sales were made to raise funds for building a residential house in New Delhi which was obviously a valid necessity.
The necessity and its urgency was to be judged from
the tenurchnlder's point of view.
The tenure-holder at the material time was
serving in the Army in the rank of Brigadier which implies that he
was nearing the age of retin;ment from Army Service. It is not shown
that he had any other house where he could live.
He had, in fact,
borrowed part of the
cost of construction from the
Government.
There was therefore nothing sinister in his intention if he arranged
to sell his lands to other cultivators to raise funds to acquire a site
and build a residential house in New Delhi where he would live in
rea~onable comfort after retirement from Army service.
For all the foregoing reasons, we allow this appeal, set aside the
orders of the High Court and of the Appellate Authority and the PresE
crihcd Authority in so far as they relate to these two sales in question
of 12.5 acres each, and hold that both these sales were entitled to
the exemption of Proviso (b) to Section 5 ( 6) of the Ceiling Act.
The Prescribeμ Authority is, therefore, directed not to ignore these
two transfers, but after taking them into account determine afresh the
ceiling area of the appellant. We make it clear that the Prescribed
F
Authority shall determine the ceiling area and surplus area of the.
appellant on the basis that the whole of the land held hy the tenureholder (appellant) on the crncial date was unirrigated land, as the
decision of the Appellate Authority (which was upheld by the High
Court) on that issue has become res iudicata.
G
In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs
H
of this appeal.
These, then, are the reasons for our Order dated November 13,
1980, whereby we had allowed this appeal.
N.K.A.
Appeal allowed.
(