# C. BUCIDVENKATA RAO v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS

- **Citation:** [1972] 3 S.C.R. 665
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1972-03-08
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 2580 of 1969
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/c-bucidvenkata-rao-v-union-of-india-ors-5604
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

B
D
E
F
G
H
665
C. BUCIDVENKATA RAO
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
March 8, 1972
IA. N. GROVER AND M. H. BEG, JJ.]
Mineral Concession Rules, 1949, rr. 27 and 32r-Application not accomp•nied by map and containing defects re : area-If should be rejected.
Practice-If legal representative can continue application for mining
lease-Eauities.
The application of one B for a mining lease was rejected on the ,ground
th~t another applicant V had a prior claim. B's writ application was dismiss¢ by the High Court and while bis appeal in this Court was pending he died and his sons were allowed to be impleaded as legal r~reoen·
tatives subject to any objection that may be taken tb th,eir nght to
continoo the appeal.
Pn the question whether V's application was defective because it was
not in accordance with r. 27 of the Mineral Concession Rules and because
of want of a map and ·some details regarding .r,,., and therefore, whether
B's application should ha"" been granted,
HELD : ( 1) The details mentioned in r. 27 are intended for· the
correct identification of the individual to whom the lease is to be granted,
the minerals which are to be mined the area in respect of which the lease
was to be granted and the qualifi~tions of till' applicant
Rules 32(2),
introduced in 1955, before the grant of V's application, shows that individual qualifications of the applicants including their special kriowledge,
their capacity to engage technically efficient staff, their financial soundness
and stability, had to be taken into account in determining the question
of priority. There is no prohibition against the grant of an application
on the ground that the application is oofioctive or not ~ccornpanied by
a map. There is also no provision in the Act showing that defects in
an application could not be .subsequently removed. The form of the
application is subordinate to the essential facts to be taken into account
before grnnting a lease. The information given in the application is
intended for the satisfaction of the authorities granting the lease, so that,
after coosidering the merits and making a grant, proper details are em·
bodied in the ·le""" a<',tually granted. The supply of neces931Y details
is directory and not mandatory. It was not the case here that as a result
of the defects in V's application the lease itself could nDI be executed.
Therefore, the mere want of a map or of details describing the area for
which the lease was applied for, would not Illllke the application itself
void or of no effect If it did not produce a defect which afiected the
validity of the leue, and the details supplied in the application colT~
ponded with the contents of the lease af!U the Glle&ed lacuna had bQoll
removed the grant of the lease to V was valid. t669F-H; 670B·FJ
( 2) In order to ~ble a le pl repreae.ntative fu conliauo a legal proceejing, the right to sue or pursue a remedy must survive the death of his predecessor, Under the rules, ~
right of an applicant on the st=ath of
a superior claim cannot be separated !from his personal quali&atiOltl.
r6110-HJ
666
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972] 3 S.C.R.
Moreover, there is no provision in the Rules for impie:lding an heir
A
to continue the application for a mining lease. The scb<lme under the
Rules is that if an applicant dies, a fresh application has to be presented
by the heirs or legal representatives if they desire to apply for the grant
of a lease. It may be that they may obtain priority owr an earlier appli·
cant if they are continuing the busmess or industry of the d.ecj:ased, but
It would be on a fresh application setting out their qualifications. Therefore, the heifs had no right to continue the appeal in this Court, [672A-Cl
B
Dhani Devi v. Sant Bihari & Ors., [1969] 2 S.C.R. 507, distinguished.
( 3) The acceptance of V's claim by the Government on the strength
of which he had made his investment, clothes his claim with an equity
which could not be defuat,ed without clear proof of some overriding legal
right or intere

## Text

B
D
E
F
G
H
665
C. BUCIDVENKATA RAO
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
March 8, 1972
IA. N. GROVER AND M. H. BEG, JJ.]
Mineral Concession Rules, 1949, rr. 27 and 32r-Application not accomp•nied by map and containing defects re : area-If should be rejected.
Practice-If legal representative can continue application for mining
lease-Eauities.
The application of one B for a mining lease was rejected on the ,ground
th~t another applicant V had a prior claim. B's writ application was dismiss¢ by the High Court and while bis appeal in this Court was pending he died and his sons were allowed to be impleaded as legal r~reoen·
tatives subject to any objection that may be taken tb th,eir nght to
continoo the appeal.
Pn the question whether V's application was defective because it was
not in accordance with r. 27 of the Mineral Concession Rules and because
of want of a map and ·some details regarding .r,,., and therefore, whether
B's application should ha"" been granted,
HELD : ( 1) The details mentioned in r. 27 are intended for· the
correct identification of the individual to whom the lease is to be granted,
the minerals which are to be mined the area in respect of which the lease
was to be granted and the qualifi~tions of till' applicant
Rules 32(2),
introduced in 1955, before the grant of V's application, shows that individual qualifications of the applicants including their special kriowledge,
their capacity to engage technically efficient staff, their financial soundness
and stability, had to be taken into account in determining the question
of priority. There is no prohibition against the grant of an application
on the ground that the application is oofioctive or not ~ccornpanied by
a map. There is also no provision in the Act showing that defects in
an application could not be .subsequently removed. The form of the
application is subordinate to the essential facts to be taken into account
before grnnting a lease. The information given in the application is
intended for the satisfaction of the authorities granting the lease, so that,
after coosidering the merits and making a grant, proper details are em·
bodied in the ·le""" a<',tually granted. The supply of neces931Y details
is directory and not mandatory. It was not the case here that as a result
of the defects in V's application the lease itself could nDI be executed.
Therefore, the mere want of a map or of details describing the area for
which the lease was applied for, would not Illllke the application itself
void or of no effect If it did not produce a defect which afiected the
validity of the leue, and the details supplied in the application colT~
ponded with the contents of the lease af!U the Glle&ed lacuna had bQoll
removed the grant of the lease to V was valid. t669F-H; 670B·FJ
( 2) In order to ~ble a le pl repreae.ntative fu conliauo a legal proceejing, the right to sue or pursue a remedy must survive the death of his predecessor, Under the rules, ~
right of an applicant on the st=ath of
a superior claim cannot be separated !from his personal quali&atiOltl.
r6110-HJ
666
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972] 3 S.C.R.
Moreover, there is no provision in the Rules for impie:lding an heir
A
to continue the application for a mining lease. The scb<lme under the
Rules is that if an applicant dies, a fresh application has to be presented
by the heirs or legal representatives if they desire to apply for the grant
of a lease. It may be that they may obtain priority owr an earlier appli·
cant if they are continuing the busmess or industry of the d.ecj:ased, but
It would be on a fresh application setting out their qualifications. Therefore, the heifs had no right to continue the appeal in this Court, [672A-Cl
B
Dhani Devi v. Sant Bihari & Ors., [1969] 2 S.C.R. 507, distinguished.
( 3) The acceptance of V's claim by the Government on the strength
of which he had made his investment, clothes his claim with an equity
which could not be defuat,ed without clear proof of some overriding legal
right or interest of another claimant, and, there is no such right in the
heirs ,of B. [672G·Hl
C
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2580 of
1969.
Appeal from the judgment a:nd order dated August 6, 1969 of
the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No. 3124 of 1967.
A. Subba Rao, for the appellants.
S. P. Nayar, for respondent No. I.
P. Ram Reddy and A. V. V. Nair, for respondents Nos.-Z1Uld,3;
P. P. Rao and T. V. S. Narasimhachari, for respondent No. 4.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D
E
Beg, J. This appeal, from a Judgment and order of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court dj_smissing the appeallant's Writ ·Petition,
comes up before us by a Certificate under Article I 33(1)(a) of the
Constitution, in the following circumstances :
F
One Buchivenkata Rao had fil~d application on 1-9-1959 and
1-8-1960 under Mineral Concession Rules, (hereinafter referred
to as 'the Rules') before-the Collector of. Nellore, for the giant of
a mining lease to him of an area mentioned in his applications.
He alleged that his applications complied with the rules framed
G .
under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act
of 1957. The State Government rejected the application of
1-8-1960 on 7-12-1960, but granted the application made on 4th
October, 1950, by the Respondent Kumara Rajah of Venkatagiri
(hereinafter referred to as Venkatagiri). The ground on which the
application of the appellant Rao. was rejected was that Venkatagiri
H
had a prior claim. The appellant Rao had then preferred a
Revision application to the Central Government under the Mineral
Concession Rules which came into force on 11th November, 1960.
C. B. RAO V. UNION (Beg, J.)
667
'
A The Central Government had rtjected the revision application on
the ground that it was not filed within the prescribed time. Upon a
Writ Petition filed in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, the order
vf rejection of the revision application by the Central Government
was quashed. The Central Government was directed to consider
Rao's application on merits. The Central Government had, after
B giving due opportunity to be ~d
to the appellant Rao, dismissed
his application on 18th October, 1967, holding that Venkatagiri
had priority over his cfaim. Rao then filed a second Writ Petition
which was dismissed on 26th September, 1969.
The judgment
and, order of dismissal are now under appeal before us.
c
The judgment of the High Court shows that the appellant Rao
had relied on the following three grounds only at the time of agruments on his Writ Pe_tition :-firstly, that the application of
Venkatagiri was not maqe in accordance with Rule 27 and 32 of
the said Rules of 1949; secondly, that the application of Venkata-
,,:;
D
giri was not for a fresh lease but for the continuation of a previous
lease so that it did not fall within the purview of the rules; and,
thirdly: that the Central Government had not considered in detail
the various comments offered by the State Govt. with regard to
each ground of revision.
•
A contention noticed by the High Court, as a separate ground
of attack, was that the _Central Govt. had relied upon a ruling of
E a Single Judge of the Punjab High Court.in J. A. Trivadi Brothers
V. Union of lndia( 1), holding that Rules 27 to 29 did not make
defective applications ·void, biut this view had been reversed by a
Division Bench of that Court.
This was not/ really a separate
ground ·but a contention relating to the effect of failure to comply
strictly with Rules 27 to 29 of the Rules of 1949.
The main
F
contention of Rao was that the application of Venkatagiri had to
be disregarded as it failed to comply with the rules, and, therefore,
was not an application in the eye of law, so that, out of several
competing applications, Rao's application ought to have been
granted. The High Court, made it clear that other grounds were
taken in Rao's petition, but were not argued there. In this Court,
a freSh ground, neither taken nor argued before the High Court,
G
is sought to be urged in addition to the ol!her grounds before the
High .Court which were repeated before us. We will take up the
grounds advanced in the High Court and again in this Court before
considering the entertainability of l!he fresh ground.
At this stage, before dealing with the first ground, we may set
out the ,elevant rules 27 and 32 of 1949 which run as follows :-
H
"27.
Application for mining; lease-An application for .
a iQining lease shall, in case of land in which the mine-
(I) .A.I.R. 1959 Purtjab 589.
668
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972] 3 s.c.R.
rals belong to Govjlrnment, be made to the State
Government concerned through such officer or authority
as it may appoint in this behalf and shall contain the
following particulars :-
(a)(i) If the_ applicant is an individual; his name,
nationality, profession, and residence, and
(ii) if the applicant is a partnership firm, a company
or an association or body of individuals, whether ini:orporated or not; its name, nature and place of business,
place of registratio11 of incorporation and except in the
case of a company which is not a private company as
defined in the Indian Companies Act, 1913 (VU of
1913) the names and addresses of the individuals constituting such partnership firm, company, association or
body.
(b) The number and date of the notification of the
grant or renewal of certificate of approval of the
applicant;
(c) A descript!on, illustrated by a map or plan,
showing as accurately as possible the situa~oll, boundaries and area of the land in respect of which the lease
is required;
·
·
·
( d) The mineral or minerals which the applicant intends to mine;
(e) The areas and minerals within the jurisdiction of
the State Qovernment for which the applicant or any
person .ioint in interesLwith him already holds a .mining
lease;
(f) If the applicant holds· a prospecting !icellse for
the area applied for, the number and date of such
license;
(g) The period for which the lease is required; and
( h) The industry, if any, which the applicant proposes to develop and the location of such industry.
Explanation :-The map or· plan referred to in item
( c) should give sufficient information to enable identification of the area in respect of which the lease is required".
"3 2. Prioritiy-{ 1) If more than one application' fe$8i'ding.
the same land is received,· pmerence shiill be given t.o
the application received first, unless the State Govern~
A
B
c
D
G
H
B
D
E
F
C. B. RAO v. UNION (Beg, J.)
ment, for any special reason, and with the prior approval
of the Central Government decides to the contrary.
Provided that where more than one application in
respect of the same land is received on the same day, the
State GovernmentJ afier taking into. consideration the
matters specified in sub-rule (2) an<I after obtaining the
prior approval of the Central Government, may grant
the mining lease to such one of the applicants whom it
considers to be t:he most suitable.
Provided further that no application shall be deemed
to be incomplete for the purposes of this rule on account
,1f the omission or misdescription of the number and
date of the prospecting licence and of the profession or
residence or nationality in the case of an individual or of
the place ·of business in the aase of a partnership firm,
a company pr an association or body of individuals,
whether incorporated or not, if such omission or misdescription is corrected within a period specified by the
State Government or an officer appointed by thl!-t Goverument in' this behalf.
(2) The matters referred to in the proviso to subrule (1) shall be the following namely:-
(i) experience of the applicants in mining;
(ii) financial soundness and stability of the applicants;
(iii) special knowledge of geology or mining and the
technical staff already employed or to be employed for the work.
669
It is clear to us that the details mentioned in Rule 27 are intended for the correct identification of the individual to whom the
lease is to be granted, the minerals which are to be mined, the
area in respect of which the lease was to be granted, and ~e qualifications of the. applicant. Considerable emphasis was placed on
the word 'shall' in Rule 32 with regard to the priority to be given
G
between different applicants. This rule dbes illo't directly affect
the question whether an application for a lease could be considered
a proper application or not by the authorities concerned.
The
se<iond .proviso to this rule, however, pro'llides for the manner in
which :ertain defects may be cured. Rule 32, sub-rule (2), introduced Ill 1955 )'ef?r_e !lie gra!!t of .the application of Venkatagiri,
H
sho_l"s tha! the md1v1dual qu:ilificatio!1s .of the applicants including
their special knowledge, their capacrty to engage technically efficient staff, their financial SOWl.dness and stability, had to be taken
into account in determining the question of priority. Again Rule
610
SUPll.BMB COURT 11.BPOll.TS
[1972] 3 S.C.ll.
26, imposing certain restrictions, prohibits the grant of the lease
-'
to any person who doe~ !IOI hold a certificate of approval from the
State Government or who has not produced an Income tax clear·
ance certificate, It does not prohibit anY· grant on the ground that
t:he application for it is defective or not accompanied by a map.
The form of the application seems to be subordinate to the essen·
tial facts to be taken into account before granting a lease.
B
There is no provision in the Act showing. that the defects in an
application which is accompanied by the fee prescribed in Rule
28 cannot be subsequently removed. The information given in the
application is intended for the satisfaction of the authorities grant·
ing the lease so that, after considering merits' and making a grant,
proper details are embodied in the lease actually granted. It was
not urged anywhere that, as a result of any defects in the applica·
ti on. of V enkatagiri, the lease itself could not be ~uted. This
indicates that the omission to file a1 proper map in?tially was cured.
·The High Court had relied on a decision of this Court in
Banarsi Das v. Cane Commissioner, U.P.( 1), where .conditions
similar to those laid down by Rule 27 were held to be directory.
It had also held that, even assuniing that some of the requirements
in the. rules may be mandatory, it could not be held that the mere
want of a map or of details, describing the area for which the lease
was applied for, would make the application itself void or of no
effect.
We are, therefore, unable to find any error in the view
adopted by the High Court that the supply of necessary details was
directory and not mandatory. If_ it did not produce a defect which
affected the validity of the lease, and the details supplied in the
application corresponded with the contents of the lease after the
alleged lacuna had been filed up, the grant of the lease to Venkatagiri: was valid.
As regards •the second ground that the application of Venkatagiri had to be interpreted_ as an application for the continuation of
an already existing lease and not for the grant of a fresh lease, we
find that the High Court had rejected this contention by pointing
out that the application was on a form which complied with Rule
c
D
E
F
27 so that. it could be treated as a fresh application. We find
G
nothing wrong with the 'High Court's interpretation of the application made by Venkatagiri.
The High Court had' also found; as a fact, that the order of
the Central Government disclOsed that it was based on relevant
considerations and could not be said to have omitted consideration
of an:Ything material sil!lplv because the details of matters consiII
dered 'were not fully s.et out. We concur with this view and are
.(1)-A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1947 ..
C. B, :RAO v. 'UNION (Beg, /,)
671
A
unable to hold that the order of the Central Government was vitiated on the third ground urged on behalf of Rao.
We may now refer to the fresh question which was sought to
be raised on behalf of the appellant by means of an application
before us.
This was, that this Court had pointed out in Nookala
B
Satharamaiah v. Kotaiah Naidu & Ors. (I), that, on 15th Sep·
tember, 1956, the Mineral Concession Rules were amended and
a new sub-rule 28(1-A) was introduced which provided that every
application·under.Rule.27, shall be disposed of within nine months
from tihe date of its receipt, and had held that the effect of the
amended Rule 57, which was further amended on 14-9-1956, was
that an application r!lffiaining undisposed of within the period
C
prescribed will be deemed to be rejected. It was urged that we
should allow this point to be ar£ued for the first time in this Court
although it was neither raised nor argued in the High Court. It
was submitted that this was a pure question of law on which no
investigation of facts afresh was required.
D
On the other hand, it has been contended, on behalf of the
contesting respondent, that a new point should not be allowed to
be urged at this stage for which reliance was placed on Bhagwati
Saran & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh('), S. L. Aggarwal v.
General Manager, Hindustan Steel Ltd.('), Chitra Ghosh & Anr.
v. Union of India d: Ors.(').
,
E
Even if we had been disposed to consider this new ground on
the plea that exceptional circumstances justified our going into it,
we must here point out a.nother fact which affects the very maintainability of the appeal before us now.
The appellant B. Rao
died on 18-2-1970. His sons filed an application in this Court
on 20· 7·1970 for impll)llding them as the heirs and legal repreF
sentatives of the deceased. This application was tentatively allowed,
on 3-11-1970, under the orders of the Registrar of this Court,
subject to such objections to the rights of the substituted appellants
to be heard and to continue this appeal on behalf of the decea<ed
as may be taken before us at the hearing of the appeal.
It .has to be remembered that, in order to enable a legal repreG
sentative to continue a legal proceeding, the right to sue or to pur-
~ue a remedy must survive the death of his predecessor. In the
ms!31Jt case, ~e have set out provisions showing that the rights
which an appltcant may have had for the grant of a mining lease,
on the .strength of ah alleged superior claim, cannot be separated
from his personal qualifications.
No provision 4as been pointed
H
out to us_ in the rules for impleading an heir who could continue
the application for a mining lease. The scheme under the rules
(I) [1971] (I) S.C.R. 153.
(2) [1961] (3) S.C.R. 563 at 568.
(3) [1970] (3) S.C.R. 363 at 365.
(4) [1970] (1) S.C.R. 413 at 420.
672
SUPREMi COURT lll!fOllTI .
[1972] 3 s.c.~.
seems to be that, .if an applicant dies, a fresh application bas to be
A
presented by his heirs or legal representatives if they themselves
desire to apply for the grant of a lease. It may be that the heirs
and 1egal representat!_ves, if lj!J.ey are continuing the business or
industry of the dee~ and have the required qualifications, obtain
priority over an earlier applicant on account of speciltl. reasons for
this preference. But, in each case, they have to apply afresh and
JS
set out their own qualifical!ions. It- has not been shown to us that
any of the legal repre~ntatives have applied afresh. . The legal
representatives only claim to be entitled to sucCeed the deceased
Buchivenkata Rao under a will. The assumption 1111derlying the
application is that, whatever right the deceased may have had to
-0btain a lease survived and vested in the heirs after his ·death. We
are unable to accept the correclness of this assumption.
C
In support of. the contention on behalf of the heirs of Buchivenkata Rao, our attention was drawn to the case of Dhani Devi
v. Sant Bihari & Ors.( 1), which related to a right to obtain
transfer of a permit for a Motor vehicle under Section 61, sub. s.
D
(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act It was.held there that, iμ the case
-0f 1he death of an applicant,for the grant of a permit in respect of
his motor vehicle, the Regional Transport Authority had the
power to substitute the person suc,ceeding: to the possession of the
vehicle in place of the deceased applicant: It was pointed out there
that the right to the permit was relate4 to tile possession of the
vehicle. Moreover, there was a rule enabling the Transport E
Authorities to substitute the heir or Jegiil representatives of the
deceased. No such rule applicable to the case of .the heirs of the
dece.!ised Buchivenkata Rao bas been pointed out. tp vs. Therefore,
we are unable to hold· that the heirs, who have been heard, had
any right to continue !he appeal before us. This feature of. the
case is decisive not only on die right 'to be heard on the fresh
l1
ground but also on the right to advance any l\l'gumellt in· support
of the appeal of the deceased .
. We may mention that it was also urged that the matter was so
old that any reversal ?f the grant of the mining lease to Venkata·
G
girl, as Jong ago as 1960, would involve considerable dislocation
and injury to respondent Venkatagiri without any fault on his part.
The respondent V enkatagiri must have invested · considerable
amount of money in mining operations. The acceptance of the
claim of Venkatagiri by the Government on the strength of whicli
Venkatagiri made his investment clothes Venkatagiri's claim with
an equity which could not be defeated without clear proof of. liOlllC II
'Over-riding legal right or interest of another claimant. We are
(I) [1969] (2) S,C.R. SfTI.
c. B. RAO v. UNION (Beg, J.)
673
A unable to see any such right in the heirs of the deceased
Buchivenkata Rao.
Consequently this appeal is dismissed but we make no orders
as to costs in this Court.
B V.P.S.
Appeal dismissed ..