# C.P. SIKH REGULAR MOTOR SERVICE ETC v. THE STATE OF MAHARASIITRA & OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1975] 2 S.C.R. 10
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1974-09-05
- **Bench:** A. 'N. Ray, K.K. Mathew, V.R. Krishna Iyer
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/c-p-sikh-regular-motor-service-etc-v-the-state-of-maharasiitra-others-6279
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Motor Vehicles Ace-1939-ss. 2( 1); 2(28) and 68C-Scope of.
Section 68C of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 says that where any State
Transport Undertaking is of opinion that it is necessary in the public interest
thal road transport services in general should be run and operated by the Road
Transport Undertaking it may prepare a scheme giving particulars of the area
or route proposed to be covered and shall cause every such scheme to be published
in the official gazette. Section 2 (I) says that unless there is anything repugnant
A
B
in tbe subject or context in relation to any provision of the Act, area means such
C
area as the State Government may, having regard to that provision, specify by
notification in the official gazette.
The State Government established the Road
Transport Corporation μnder s. 3 of the Road Transport Corporation Act 1950.
The Corporation prepared a scheme proposing to operate stage carriage services
in the entire State and on all routes and ·portions thereof falling within the
said area to the complete exclusion of all other persons. The scheme approved
by the State Government was published in the gazette. The appellants who were
transport operators in the State challenged the validity of the scheme. The Jfigh
D
Court dismissed the writ petitions.
On appeal to this Court it was contended that it was necessary for the State
Government to have specified the area by notification because wher~ver the word
'area' occurs in the Act the meaning to be. given to that word is the one given
in s. 2( 1) unless there is something requgnant in the context or the subject
matter in s. 68C.
Dismissing the appeals.
HELD: (a) In the con.text of s. 680-the word 'area' does not mean an area
specified by the State Government in a notification in the gazette in accordance
with the substantive part of the definitio,n clause 2(1 ). The context in which the
word occurs makes the application of the substantive part of the definition
repugnant.
[13F)
(b) The word 'area' concurring in s. 68C does not have the same meaning
as the word 'route' in the section. A route postulates an area; but for that reason
it cannot be said that the legislature made no
distinction between the
two.
'Area' is defined in S.2(1) and that definition does not speak of any route.
Route is defined in S.2(28) of the Act. In fact "area" and "route" are distinct:
Otherwise the legislature w<luld not have found it necessary to provide a separate
definition clal!lse for route. [14D; GI
(c) If in respect of a scheme in relation to a route or routes, it is not
necessary that the State Government should make a notification specifying the
route or routes, there is no reason why the Stale Government should specify the
urea by a notification in the gazette for framing a scheme in relation to
an
area.
It is impossible to understand the rationale behind the distinc•ion
why
when n scheme is framed in relation to an area a notification in the
gazette
specifying its extent is necessary and why when it is framed in relation to a route
or routes a notification specifying the route or routes is not required.
[15B-C]
CIVJL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 614 to 635
and 663 of 1974 and 664 to 668 of 1974, and 669 tcj 678 of 1974
and 688 to 718 of 1974.
Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the
19th and 22nd March of 197 4 and 2nd April, 197 4 of the Bombay
E
F
G
H
c. P. SIKH MOTOR SERVICE v. MAHARASHTRA (Mathew,/.)
,11
A
High Court (Nagpur Bench) in Special avil Applications Nos. 1704.
1705, 1707, 1710-1716, 1709, 1719-1722, 1729-1731, 1756 and
1706 of 1973 and 384 of 1974 and 1776 of 1973, and 3180-81,
3183·84 and 3139 of 1974 and 1760, 1763, 175~. 1782 cl, 1973 ancl
31of1974 and 1708, 1755, 1757, 1765, 1773, 1775, 1777-78, 1780,
1783, 1787-89 of 1973 and 57-58 of 1974 respectively.
8
Special Leqye Petitions (Civil) Nos. 1389-1390 of 1974.
c
D
E
From the judgment and order dated March 19, 1974 of the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) in Special Civi

## Text

10
C.P. SIKH REGULAR MOTOR SERVICE ETC.
v.
THE STATE OF MAHARASIITRA & OTHERS.
September 5, 1974
[A. 'N. RAY, C.J., K.K. MATHEW AND V.R. KRISHNA IYER JJ.]
Motor Vehicles Ace-1939-ss. 2( 1); 2(28) and 68C-Scope of.
Section 68C of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 says that where any State
Transport Undertaking is of opinion that it is necessary in the public interest
thal road transport services in general should be run and operated by the Road
Transport Undertaking it may prepare a scheme giving particulars of the area
or route proposed to be covered and shall cause every such scheme to be published
in the official gazette. Section 2 (I) says that unless there is anything repugnant
A
B
in tbe subject or context in relation to any provision of the Act, area means such
C
area as the State Government may, having regard to that provision, specify by
notification in the official gazette.
The State Government established the Road
Transport Corporation μnder s. 3 of the Road Transport Corporation Act 1950.
The Corporation prepared a scheme proposing to operate stage carriage services
in the entire State and on all routes and ·portions thereof falling within the
said area to the complete exclusion of all other persons. The scheme approved
by the State Government was published in the gazette. The appellants who were
transport operators in the State challenged the validity of the scheme. The Jfigh
D
Court dismissed the writ petitions.
On appeal to this Court it was contended that it was necessary for the State
Government to have specified the area by notification because wher~ver the word
'area' occurs in the Act the meaning to be. given to that word is the one given
in s. 2( 1) unless there is something requgnant in the context or the subject
matter in s. 68C.
Dismissing the appeals.
HELD: (a) In the con.text of s. 680-the word 'area' does not mean an area
specified by the State Government in a notification in the gazette in accordance
with the substantive part of the definitio,n clause 2(1 ). The context in which the
word occurs makes the application of the substantive part of the definition
repugnant.
[13F)
(b) The word 'area' concurring in s. 68C does not have the same meaning
as the word 'route' in the section. A route postulates an area; but for that reason
it cannot be said that the legislature made no
distinction between the
two.
'Area' is defined in S.2(1) and that definition does not speak of any route.
Route is defined in S.2(28) of the Act. In fact "area" and "route" are distinct:
Otherwise the legislature w<luld not have found it necessary to provide a separate
definition clal!lse for route. [14D; GI
(c) If in respect of a scheme in relation to a route or routes, it is not
necessary that the State Government should make a notification specifying the
route or routes, there is no reason why the Stale Government should specify the
urea by a notification in the gazette for framing a scheme in relation to
an
area.
It is impossible to understand the rationale behind the distinc•ion
why
when n scheme is framed in relation to an area a notification in the
gazette
specifying its extent is necessary and why when it is framed in relation to a route
or routes a notification specifying the route or routes is not required.
[15B-C]
CIVJL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 614 to 635
and 663 of 1974 and 664 to 668 of 1974, and 669 tcj 678 of 1974
and 688 to 718 of 1974.
Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the
19th and 22nd March of 197 4 and 2nd April, 197 4 of the Bombay
E
F
G
H
c. P. SIKH MOTOR SERVICE v. MAHARASHTRA (Mathew,/.)
,11
A
High Court (Nagpur Bench) in Special avil Applications Nos. 1704.
1705, 1707, 1710-1716, 1709, 1719-1722, 1729-1731, 1756 and
1706 of 1973 and 384 of 1974 and 1776 of 1973, and 3180-81,
3183·84 and 3139 of 1974 and 1760, 1763, 175~. 1782 cl, 1973 ancl
31of1974 and 1708, 1755, 1757, 1765, 1773, 1775, 1777-78, 1780,
1783, 1787-89 of 1973 and 57-58 of 1974 respectively.
8
Special Leqye Petitions (Civil) Nos. 1389-1390 of 1974.
c
D
E
From the judgment and order dated March 19, 1974 of the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) in Special Civil Application Nos.
1789 of 1973 and 61 of 1974.
M; N, Phadke, G. L. Sanghl, P. H. Palshikar, C. G. Madkholk/Jr
and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellants in C.A. Nos. 614 to 635,,
664 to 678, 689 to 717 of 1974.
G. D. Sanghi,. P. H. Palshikar, C. G. Madkholkar, and A. G.
Ra1~1aparkhi, for the appellants in C.A. Nos. 688, and 718174.
K. IJ, Rohatgi, for the appellant in C.A. No. 663174.
4, G. Ratnaparkhl, for the petitioners in S.L.P. Nos. 1389-90174.
Niren De, Attorney General for India, Santosh Chatterji, V. R.
Manohar and G. S. Chatterji, fci respondent No. 2 (In C.A. 614/74).
Santosh Chatterjee, V. R. Manohar and G. S. Chatterjee, for res-·
pondent No. 2 in C.A. Nos. 615-635, 663-668 of 1974.
, F. S. Nariman, Additional Solicitor General oj India and M. N.
Shroff, for respondents Nos. 1, 3 tel 6 (In C.As. Nos. 614, 663 and.
718 of 1974).
Niren De, Attorney Generiil for India and M. N. Shroff for Union
of India in C.As. 614, 663, 688 & 71804·
M. N. Shroff, for respondents Nos. 1, 3 to 6 in C.As. Nqs, 614 to.
F
635, 663 to 678, 688 to 718 of 1974.
G
S. Govind Swaminathan, A. V. Rangam and A. Subha.rhni, for
interveners.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MATHEW, J. In these Civil Appeals and Petitions for Special Leave:
to appeal, the question for consider!ltion are practically the same.
They arc, therefore, disposed of by this common judgment
The appellants filed petitions before the High Court cl. 'Bombay
(at Nagpur and Bombay) challenging the validity of a scheme framed.
under s. 68C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred t~
as 'the Act'). The High Court dismissed the petitions and these
appeals and petitions for special leave to appeal are directed against.
H
thoso or,ders.
Secticn 68C under which the scheme was framed occurs in Chap-
. ~ IVA of the Act. That chapter was added by Act 100 of 19S6r
12
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 2 s.c.R.
which camr into effect from February 16, 1957. The Maharashtra
State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter called 'I.he Corpora·
tion') is a corporation established for the whde of the State of Maha·
.rashtra under s. 3 of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950, and
.it is a 'state transport undertaking' within the meaning of s. 68A(b) of
the Act.
By the scheme, the Corporaticln proposes to operate stage carriage
and contract carriage services in the entire State of Maharashtra and
on all routes and portions thereof falling within the said area to the
.complete exclusion of all other persons subject to the exceptitils mentioned in the scheme. The scheme, as approved, was published in the
·Gazette dated November 29, 1973 and was to come into force with
effect from January 1, 1974. It was the validity of this scheme that
the appellants challenged before the High CcrJrt by their petitions.
In these appeals and petitions for special leave to appeal, we are
.conc~rned only with two questions, namely, whether the area in relation to which the scheme has been framed should have been specified
by a notification in the official Gazette by the State Government under
s. 2 ( 1) of the Act; and whether the scheme was invalid fct the reason
1hat it did not specify the minimum and maximum number .of vehicles
to be put on a route as also the minimum and maximum trips on each
Toute.
It was submitted for the appellants that no valid scheme under
s. 68C cc.uid be framed without specifying the area in relation to
which the scheme has been framed by a notification by the State Government in the official gazette. This submission is founded on s. 2 (1 )
of the Act which was inserted in the Act by Act 56 of 1969 :
"2. In this A ct, unless there iS anything repupant in
the ~ubject or context,.-
(1} 'area• in relation to any provision of this Act, means
such area as the State Gtt1ernment may, having regard to the requirements of that provision, specify by
notification in the Official Gazette".
Section 68C did not require that the area in relation lo which the
scheme has been framed should have been specified by notification in
the official gazette by the State Government before the inscrticn of
s.2(1) by the Amendment Act 56 of 1969. Therefore, the question
for considerati.on is whether, after its insertion in the Act, it was neces·
sary for the State Government to have specified the area by notification in the· official gazette in ceder that the Corporation may frame a
scheme in relation to that area.
The appellants contended that wherever the word 'area' occurs in
any of the provisions of the Act, the meaning to be given to the 1vord
is the one given in s, 2 (1) unless there is something repugnant in the
CC'l'l!ext or r,ubject matter and, as there is nothing in the context of or
subject matter in s. 68C, which, by necessary implication, excludes
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
c. P. SIKH MOTOR SERVICE v. MAHARASHTRA (Mathew, ].)
13
A -the meaning given in the definition clause to the word 'area' occurring:
in the section, the meaning must be assigned to the word.
On the other hand, the learned Attorney General, appearing fer the:
Corporation, submitted that the definition clause does nett: require the
State Government to specify the area by a notification in the gazette
. merely because. the word 'area' occurs in a section of the Act. He
B
submitted that it is only if the State Government is of cpinion that the:
provisions of a section so require it, that they need specify the area by
a notification in the gazette. In other words, the argument was that
in order that the definition clause may, come into play, it is necessary
that the State Government should from an opinion, having regard to
the requirement of the particular section in which the word 'area'
occurs, that it is necessary to specify the area by a notification in the·
C
gazette.
D
E
F
G
H
We are not quite sure whether the language of the definition clause·
is susceptible of the construction contended for by the learned Attorney
General. We are inclined tc1 think that the discretion that is vested in
the State Government is only with respect to the specification of the
extent of the area in the notification having regard to the requirement
of the section in which the word 'area' occurs. That discretion has
nothing to dc1 with the necessity or otherwise of a notification specifying the area. In other words, the decision of the State ·Government
is confined to the specification of the extent of the area, having regard·.
to the requirement of the section where the word 'area' occurs and not
to the necessity or otherwise of the notification in the ga~tte speci!y··
ing the area.
·
.Be that as it may, we do not think it necessary to resolve this ques-·
tion in this case. as, in our. view, the word 'area' occuring in s. 6RC
does not, in the context, require specification by a notification in the·
gazette by the State Government. To put it differently, we do not
think that in the context of s. 68C the word 'area' means an area specified by the State Government in a nc~ification in the gazette in accord·
ance with the substantive part of the definition clause. The context in:
which the word occurs makes the application of the substantive part
of the definition repugnant.
Section 3 of the Road Transport Corporaticn Act,· 1950, provides
that the State Government may, by a notification in the official ga1.ette,
establish a Road Transport Corporation for the whc~e or any part of
the State. Section 18 of that Act provides that it shall be the general
duty of a Corporation so to exercise its powers as prcgressively lo.
provide an efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated
system of road transport services. in the State er part of the State for
which it is established and in any extended area and s. 19 specifies
the powers of the Corporation. Sub-section· (2)(c) of that section
empowers the Corporation to prepare schemes for the acquisition of,
and to acquire the whole or any part of any undertaking of any other
person to the extent to which the activities thereof oonsist of the operation of road transport services in that State or in any extended area ...
14
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 2 s.c.R.
Section 68C of the Act says :
"Where any State transport undertaking is of opinion
that fctr the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, eco·
uomical and properly coordinated road transport service,
it is necessary in the public interest that road transport services in general or any particular class of such service in
relation to any area. or route or portiqn thereof should be run
.and operated by the State transport undertaking, whether to
the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons or qtherwise, the State transport undertaking may prepare a scheme
_giving particulars of the nature of the services proposed to be
:rendered, the area or route propcjsed to be covered and
such other particulars respecting there to as may be pres·
.cribed, and shall cause every such scheme to be published
in the Official Gazette and also in such other manner as ihe
State Government ma.y direct".
It is clear that a scheme under s. 68C can be framed only in rela-
' tion to an area or route or part thereof see Dosa Satyanarayanamurty,
.etc. v. The Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation(').
We do not think ihat the word 'area' occurring in s. 68C has .the
same meaning as the word 'rQUte' in the section. When s. 68C talks
e>f 'area' or 'route' or part thereof, it is not to be presumed that the
legislature made no distinction between 'area' and 'route'. No doubt,
a route must necessarily run over an area but, for that reason, one
cannot equate an area to a route. An area simplidter is certainly not
a route. Its potentially to become a route would not make it a route.
A route is an area plus sdmething more. At any rate, there is no
justification for making an assumption that ihe legislature, in the context of s. 68C did not want to make any distinction betw~n 'area'
and 'roue'. In Dosa Satyanamurty's Case('}, Subba Rao,
J.
e>bserved :
.
"Under s. 68C of the Act the scheme may be framed in
respect of any area ()r a r<*Jte or a portion of any area or a
portion of a route. There is no inherent inconsistency between an ~~a' and a 'route I The proposed route is also
an area hm1ted to the route propclsed. The scheme may as
well propose to o~rate a trapsport service in respect of a
new route from pomt A to point B and ihat route would
certainly be an area within the meaning rl. s. 68C''.
There can be no dispute ·that a route postulates an area. But, for
that rea.~on, as we said, it is difficult to maintain that ihe legislature
made no distincti~n between th~ .two. In s.2 ( 1), the definition is only
o'f the word 'area . That defimtton does not speak cl. any route. By
Act 56 of 1969, the legislature has defined the expression 'route' ·in
:S. 2(28A). That reads :
" 'route' means a line .of travel which specifies ihe highway which may be traversed by a moor vehicle between one
terminus and another".
(I) [19'61] 1 S.C.R. 642, 664.
A
B
c
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
G
H
c. P. SIKH MOTOR SERVICE v. MAHARASHTRA (Mathew, ].)
15
Certainly, the line of travel which specifies the highway . which
'
may be traversed by a motor vehicle is an area. but nevertheless,
the two are distinct. Otherwise, the legislature would not have found
it necessary tct provide a separate definition clause for 'route'.
If, therefore, in respect of a scheme in relation to a route or
routes, it is not necessary that the State Government should make a
notification specifying the route or routes, we fail to understand the
reasqn why the State Government should specify the area by a notification in the gazette for framing a scheme in relation to an area. In
other words, it is impossible to understand the rationale behind the
distinction why when a scheme is framed in relation to an area a notification in the gazette specifying its extent is necessary. and why when
it is framed in relation to a rciute or routes a notification specifying
the route or routes is not required. When s. 68C says "where any
State Transport Undertaking is of opinion that. . . . . . it is necessary
in the public interest that road transport services in general or any
particular class of such service in relation to any area cit' route or
portion thereof should be run and operated by · the State transport
undertaking'", it means, in the context of the present case, that the
Corporation has to form an cipinion whether it is necessary in the
public interest that road transport service should be nationalized in
relation to any area or route. We· are aware of a plausible construe·
tion cf. the section which would enable the Corporation to form an
opinion only as to the necessity i~ the public interest of a scheme in
relation to an area specified in the notification by the State Government.
But we think, it comports more with the legislative purpose to hqld
that the 'State transport undertaking is invested with the discretion to
select the area in relation to which it will frame the scheme than to
hold that that discretion has been vested in the State Government.
If, in forming an opinicln with respect to the necessity of a scheme
in relation to a route or routes, the power of 'State transport undertak··
·ing' and, therefore, of the Corporation, is untrammelled by an outside
authcirity like the State Government, we fail to see why it cannot form
an opinion as to the necessity of a scheme in relation to any area in
the State.
As the Gorporation here was established for the whole of the State
of Maharashtra, it was within its power to form an qpinion as to
necessity of a ·scheme in relation to any area or route wit~in the State.
We hold that there is no substance in the first contention pf the appellants.
The second point urged cin behalf of the appellants was that a
scheme framed under s. 68C should specify all the necessary particu·
Jars and as it did not specify the minimum and maximum number of
vehicles to be put on a route as also the minimum and maximum trips
in respect of each route, the scheme was invalid. The decision of this
Court in Aswathamarayan Singh v. State of Mysore( 1) was relied on
in support of this contention.
(I) [1966) 1 S. C. R. 87_, at 92 and 94.
16
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 2 s.c.R.
.In the first place, t.his contention was not taken before the State
Gqvernment in the objections filed by the appellants to the
Sche~e.
Quite apart from that, we think that· there is· ncl factual foundation for
.. the contention. The approved scheme specifies the · minimm . ~
m~um number of vehicles to be put on a route as also the mini·
mum and maximum trips in respect of each route.
.
·We dismiss the appeals without costs. We also dismiss. the petitio~ fpr special leave tel appeal.
i'
P.B.R.
Appeals dismissed.
B