# CANARA BANK AND ORS v. SHRI DEBASIS DAS AND ORS

- **Citation:** [2003] 2 S.C.R. 968
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2003-03-12
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 7539 of 1999
- **Bench:** Shivaraj V. Patil, Arijit Pasayat
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/canara-bank-and-ors-v-shri-debasis-das-and-ors-19038
- **Pages:** 24

## Headnote

Service law:
Canara Bank Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations, 1976C Regulation 6(18)-Charge sheet against employee-Report by Inquiry Officer
without giving him opportunity of filing written brief under the Regulation--
Employee given personal hearing at appellate stage-Dismissal from serviceWrit Petition-High Court held order of dismissal violative of principles of
Natural Justice and violative of the Regulation which is mandatory provision--
D Case not decided on merit-Order of Single Judge upheld by Division BenchOn appeal, held: Principles of Natural Justice not violated as no prejudice is
proved by the employee-Regulation does not require opportunity being granted
to the employee to file written brief-In the facts of the case post-decisional
hearing obliterated the procedural deficiency of a pre-decisional hearingRemitted back to High ·Court to decide the case on merit-Administrative
E law-Principles of Natural Justice.
Administrative law:
"Natural Justice" and "legal Justice "-Co-relation between-Discussed
F
Maxims:
G
H
"Nemo debet esse judex in propria causa sua"; "Aliquis non debet
judex in propria causa quia non palest esse judex at pars"; "nemo pot est esse
simul actor at judex "and qui aliquid statuerit parte inandita al/eram act quam
licet dixerit, hand acquum facer it "-Meaning of
Words and Phrases:
Natural justice_' and 'Civil consequences '-Meaning of
Respondent-employee was issued four charge-sheets. After enquiry
968
-'
CANARA BANK 1•. DEBASIS DAS
969
in respect of one of the charges, disciplinary authority directed dismissal A
of the employee. The order of dismissal was set aside by High Court and
the employee was reinstated. After his reinstatement office orders were
issued to proceed with the inquiries regarding the remaining three charges.
Employee first requested to exonerate him from the charges, but later on
the basis of a letter from the bank dated 13.9.1989, took the stand that he B
had already been exonerated of the three charges. Photocopy of the above
letter which was written by Acting General Manager, was sent. Alleging
the letter to be fabricated document further charge-sheet was 'issued to
the employee. The employee wrote to the Acting Deputy General Manager
that the letter was signed by Deputy General Manager and not Acting
General Manager. During enquiry, employee wanted to make further C
submissions in his written briefs in terms of Regulation 6(18). Inquiry
Officer directed the Presenting Officer to submit his written briefs and to
send the same to the employee. Employee was directed to submit his
written brief within I 0 days from the receipt of the written briefs from
the Presenting Officer. On not getting written briefs from the employee,
Inquiry Officer sent.his report to the disciplinary authority who sent the D
report of the Inquiry Officer to the employee and asked for his submission
on the Report. Employee refused to make his submissions in the absence
of written brief of the Presenting Officer. Subsequently on getting the
written brief of the Presenting Officer the employee refused to file
submissions to the finding of the Inquiry Officer and took the stand that E
his written brief should be first considered by the Inquiry Officer
whereafter he should give a finding. Disciplinary authority on not getting
the submission of the employee on the Inquiry Report, held the employee
guilty and dismissed hiin from service. After one round of unsuccessful
litigation initiated before High Court by the employee against the dismissal
order passed by the disciplinary authority, he filed departmental appeal. F
Appellate authority, after giving a personal hearing to the appellant,
upheld the order of dismissal. Appellant filed writ petition which was
allowed by Single Judge of High Court holding that not affording
opportunity to the appellant by the Inquiry Officer was violative of
principles of natural justice. It was also directed that the disputed G
document be sent to Government Handwritin

## Text

_Characters 0–39,677 of 61,430. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39677 for what follows._

A
CANARA BANK AND ORS.
V.
SHRI DEBASIS DAS AND ORS.
MARCH 12, 2003
B
[SHIVARAJ V. PATIL AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.]
Service law:
Canara Bank Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations, 1976C Regulation 6(18)-Charge sheet against employee-Report by Inquiry Officer
without giving him opportunity of filing written brief under the Regulation--
Employee given personal hearing at appellate stage-Dismissal from serviceWrit Petition-High Court held order of dismissal violative of principles of
Natural Justice and violative of the Regulation which is mandatory provision--
D Case not decided on merit-Order of Single Judge upheld by Division BenchOn appeal, held: Principles of Natural Justice not violated as no prejudice is
proved by the employee-Regulation does not require opportunity being granted
to the employee to file written brief-In the facts of the case post-decisional
hearing obliterated the procedural deficiency of a pre-decisional hearingRemitted back to High ·Court to decide the case on merit-Administrative
E law-Principles of Natural Justice.
Administrative law:
"Natural Justice" and "legal Justice "-Co-relation between-Discussed
F
Maxims:
G
H
"Nemo debet esse judex in propria causa sua"; "Aliquis non debet
judex in propria causa quia non palest esse judex at pars"; "nemo pot est esse
simul actor at judex "and qui aliquid statuerit parte inandita al/eram act quam
licet dixerit, hand acquum facer it "-Meaning of
Words and Phrases:
Natural justice_' and 'Civil consequences '-Meaning of
Respondent-employee was issued four charge-sheets. After enquiry
968
-'
CANARA BANK 1•. DEBASIS DAS
969
in respect of one of the charges, disciplinary authority directed dismissal A
of the employee. The order of dismissal was set aside by High Court and
the employee was reinstated. After his reinstatement office orders were
issued to proceed with the inquiries regarding the remaining three charges.
Employee first requested to exonerate him from the charges, but later on
the basis of a letter from the bank dated 13.9.1989, took the stand that he B
had already been exonerated of the three charges. Photocopy of the above
letter which was written by Acting General Manager, was sent. Alleging
the letter to be fabricated document further charge-sheet was 'issued to
the employee. The employee wrote to the Acting Deputy General Manager
that the letter was signed by Deputy General Manager and not Acting
General Manager. During enquiry, employee wanted to make further C
submissions in his written briefs in terms of Regulation 6(18). Inquiry
Officer directed the Presenting Officer to submit his written briefs and to
send the same to the employee. Employee was directed to submit his
written brief within I 0 days from the receipt of the written briefs from
the Presenting Officer. On not getting written briefs from the employee,
Inquiry Officer sent.his report to the disciplinary authority who sent the D
report of the Inquiry Officer to the employee and asked for his submission
on the Report. Employee refused to make his submissions in the absence
of written brief of the Presenting Officer. Subsequently on getting the
written brief of the Presenting Officer the employee refused to file
submissions to the finding of the Inquiry Officer and took the stand that E
his written brief should be first considered by the Inquiry Officer
whereafter he should give a finding. Disciplinary authority on not getting
the submission of the employee on the Inquiry Report, held the employee
guilty and dismissed hiin from service. After one round of unsuccessful
litigation initiated before High Court by the employee against the dismissal
order passed by the disciplinary authority, he filed departmental appeal. F
Appellate authority, after giving a personal hearing to the appellant,
upheld the order of dismissal. Appellant filed writ petition which was
allowed by Single Judge of High Court holding that not affording
opportunity to the appellant by the Inquiry Officer was violative of
principles of natural justice. It was also directed that the disputed G
document be sent to Government Handwriting and Questioned Documents
Expert. Bank's appeal to Division Bench of High Court was dismissed
holding that the provisions of Regulation 6(18) are mandatory and the
same was not complied with as opportunity was not given to the employee
to file his written briefs; and that unfair trial cannot be cured by a fair
ap~L
H
970
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2003) 2 S.C.R.
A
In appeal to this Court, appellant-Bank contended that High Court
did not consider true import of Regulation 6(18) as no prejudice is caused
to the employee by the act of disciplinary authority and there was full
compliance of principle of audi alteram par/em; that even if deficiency in
the order of disciplinary authority is assumed, the same was made good
B by appellate authority by granting personal hearing; and that post
decisional hearing is permissible.
Respondent-employee contended that the Inquiry Officer was bound
to consider his written brief as he had given him opportunity for filing•
the same; that opportunity of personal hearing granted at appellate stage
C did not cure the incurable defect in the proceedings; and that the direction
of Single Judge to send the disputed document to Handwriting expert
stands as no prejudice is caused to the appellant-Bank.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
D
HELD: I.I. A bare reading of sub-regulation (18) of Regulation 6
makes the position clear that there is no requirement of the employee being
granted an opportunity to file written briefs after the Presenting Officer
files written briefs. On the contrary, as the provision postulates, after
completion of production of evidence two options are open to the Inquiry
Officer. It may hear the Presenting Officer appointed and the concerned
E employee or in the alternative permit them to file written briefs within 15
days of the date of completion of the production of evidence if they so
desire. The written briefs are relatable to the cases of the party concerned;
otherwise the expression 'respective case' would be meaningless. It is not
required that one party has to wait till the filing of written briefs by the
F other. The expression "respectively", means belonging or relating
separately to each of several people. It is a word of severance.
1980-G, H; 981-A, Bl
1.2. In the appeal before the Appellate Authority findings of the
Inquiry Officer were challenged and, therefore, the question of any
G prejudice does not arise. Since employee had the opportunity to meet the
stand of the Bank, it was to his advantage, and opportunity for personal
hearing was also granted, though Regulation 6(18) does not even speak
of granting such an opportunity. Thus, there was no question of violation
of principles of natural justice. 1981-B, Cl
H
Managing Director EC!L, Hyderabad and Ors. v. B. Karunakara and
-
CANARA BANK r. DEBASIS DAS
971
Ors., 11993) 4 SCC 727, relied on.
A
2.1. Natural justice is another name for commonsense justice. Rules
of natural justice are not codified canons. But they are principles ingrained
into the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration of justice
in a commonsense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural
ideals and human values. The administration of justice i~ to be freed from B
the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with
a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical
niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form.
[981-FJ
2.2. The expressions "natl!ral justice" and "legal justice" do not
present a water-tight classification. It is the substance of justice which is
c
to be secured by both and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this
solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural
justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical
pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated D
law. No form of procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the
presentation of a litigants' defence. [981-H; 982-AJ
2.3. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognized by
all civilized States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body
embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any E
administrative action involving civil consequences is in issue. These
principles are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what is
commonly known as audi alteram par/em rule. It says that no one should
be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must
be precise and unambiguous. It should appraise the party determinatively F
the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate
so as to enable him to make his representation. hi the absence of a notice
of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes
wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on notice
of the case before any adverse order is passed against him. This is one of
the most important principles of nature justice. It is after all an approved G
rule of fair play. [982-B-D[
Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works, [1963) 143 ER 414, referred
to.
2.4. Principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid H
972
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2003) 2 S.C.R.
A down by the courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the
individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a
judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making an order
affecting those rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority
from doing injustice. Justice should not only be done, but should be seen
B to be done. 1982-G; 984-Df
Ray v. local Government Board, 1191411 KB 160; General Council of
Medical Education and Registration of U.K. v. Sanckman, 119431 AC 627:
119481 2 All ER 337; Board of Education v. Rice (191 l) AC 179:80 LJKB
796 and Spackman v. Plumstead District Board of Works, 11985] lO AC 229:
C 54 LJMC 81, referred to.
2.5. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly
in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the
nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule
of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a
D given case must depend to a great extent on the fact and circumstances of
that case, and the framework of the statute under which the enquiry is
held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act
has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil
consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice.
Expression 'civil consequences' encompasses infraction of not merely
E property of personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations, and
non-pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects
a citizen in his civil life. 1984-E, Fl
Drew v. Drew and lebura, 118551 2 Ma cg.; James Dunber Smith v. Her
F Majesty the Queen, (1877-78) 3 App. Case 614,623 JC; Arthur John Specman
v. Plumstead District Board of Works, (1884-85) 10 App. Case 229, 240;
Vionet v. Barrett, 1885 (55) LJRD 39,41; Hookings v. Smethwick local Board
of Health, (1890) 24 QBD 712; Ridge v. Baldwin (1963) l WB 569, 578; Re.
R.N. (An lnfaot), 119671 2 8617, 530; Fairmoul71 investments ltd. v. Secretaiy
to State for Environment, 1976 WLR 1255 and Regina v. Secreta1y of State
G for Home Affairs Ex Parle Hosenball, (1977) I WLR 766, referred to.
Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1197812SCR621, referred to.
2.6. Over the years by a process of judicial interpretation two rules
have been evolved as representing the principles of natural justice in
H judicial process, including therein quasi judicial and administrative
CANARA BANK 1•. DEBASIS DAS
973
process. They constitute the basic elements of a fair hearing, having their A
roots in the innate sense of man f(lr fair-play and justice which is not the
preserve of any particular race or country but is shared in common by
all men. The first rule is 'nemo judex in causa sua' or 'nemo debet esse judex
in propria causa sua' that is 'no man shall be a judge in his own cause'.
'Aliquis non debet esse judex in propria cause quia non pates/ esse judex at B
pars', that is, 'no man ought to be a judge in his own case, because he
cannot act as Judge and at the same time be a party'. The form 'nemo
palest esse simul actor at judex ', that is, 'no one can be at once suitor and
judge' is also at times used. The second rule is 'audi alteram partem ', that
is, 'hear the other side'. At times and particularly in continental countries,
the form 'audietur at altera pars' is used, meaning very much the same C
thing. A corollary has been deduced from the above two rules and
particularly the audi alteram partem rule, namely, 'qui aliquid statuerit parte
inaudits alteram actquam licet dixerit, haud acquwn facerit ', that is, 'he who
shall decide anything without tbe other side having been heard, although
he may have said what is right, will not have been what is right' or in
other words, as it is now expressed, 'justice should not only be done but D
should manifestly be seen to be done'. Whenever an order is struck down
as invalid being in violation of principles of natural justice, there is no
final decision of the case and fresh proceedings are left upon. All that is
done is to vacate the order assailed by virtue of its inherent defect, but
the proceedings are not tnminated. 1985-D-H; 986-Aj
E
2.7. It is to be noted that legal formulations cannot be divorced from
the fact situation of the case. Personal hearing was granted by the
Appellate Authority, though not statutorily prescribed. In a given case
post-decisional hearing can obliterate the procedural deficiency of a predecisional hearing. 1988-B, Cl
F
Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Govt. of A.P. and Ors., AIR 119661 SC
828; Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India etc., AIR 11990) SC 1480; Managing
Director, EC/l, Hyderabad and Ors. v. B. Karunakara and Ors., 119931 4
SCC 727; Union Bank of India v. Vishwa Mohan, 119981 4 SCC 310 and
Punjab National Bank and Ors. v. Kun) Behari Misra, 119981 7 SCC 84, G
referred to.
2.8. At no stage the employee pleaded prejudice. Both Single Judge
and the Division Bench proceeded on the basis that there was no
compliance of the requirement of Regulation 6(18) and, therefore, H
974
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2003] 2 S.C.R.
A prejudice was caused. In view of the finding that Regulation 6(18) has not
been correctly interpreted, the conclusions regarding prejudice are
indefensible. 1990-H; 991-AI
3. The matter is remitted to the High Court. It would be in the fitness
of things to direct examination of the documents by the expert in terms
B of Single Judge's order. The employee shall file originals of the documents
on which he relies upon, of which copies were placed before the High
Court. The appellant-Bank shall file originals of the documents on which
reliance was placed, if not already done. If the government expert is of
the view that documents produced by the employee are forged/fabricated
C or not authentic the order of dismissal shall stand. If, however, the report
of the expert is that the documents produced by the employee are genuine,
the order of dismissal has to be vacated. In case the originals are not filed
by the employee or the Bank, then the High Court shall pass necessary
orders, upholding the order of dismissal or setting aside the order of
dismissal, as the case may be. No other point shall be considered by the
D High Court. 1991-C-E]
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 11999) 6 SCC 237, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7539 of 1999.
E
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.4.1999 of the Kolkata High
Court in F.M.A.T. No. 11 of 1999.
P.P. Rao, Mukesh K. Giri, G. Balaji and R.C. Jha for the Appellants.
Jaideep Gupta, Rana Mukhe1jee, Siddharth Gautam, for Goodwill
F lndeevar, with him for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Cou11 was delivered by
ARIJIT PASAYA T, J. Scope and ambit of Regulation 6( 18) and 6(21)
of the Canara Bank Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations 1976
G (hereinafter referred to as 'the Regulations') fall for determination in this
appeal.
Filtering out unnecessary details, the factual background relevant for
adjudication for the present dispute is as follows:-
H
Four charge-sheets dated 12.12.1987, 5.ll.1987, 23.3.1989 and
•
-
CANARA BANK r. DEBASIS DAS [ARIJITPASAYAT,J.]
975
25.5. I 989 were issued to respondent no. 1-Debasis Das (hereinafter referred A
to as 'the employee') by the functionaries of the Canara bank, a Government
of India undertaking. Disciplinary proceedings were commenced. Chargesheet dated 5. I I. 1987 related to the non-vacation of residential quarter by the
employee after expiry of the lease period. On completion of inquiry in respect
of the said charge, disciplinary authority directed dismissal of the employee B
from the services of the Bank by order dated 28.8. 1989. The disciplinary
authority thereafter passed an order on I 3.9. I 989 which is the bone. of
contention of the parties. Details of the said order shall be dealt with infra
and after the recital of the factual position is completed. Order of dismissal
was challenged by the employee before the Calcutta High Court. By order
dated 14.12.1990 in writ petition CO No. 10514(W)/1989, the order of C
dismissal was set aside. Employee was reinstated on 28. LI 99 I. After
reinstatement three office orders were issued to proceed with the inquiries
relating to the other three charge-sheets. According to the employer-Bank the
proceedings were earlier suspended. Enquiry Officers and Presiding Officers
were aprointed in those proceedings. By letter dated 6.4.1991 employee D
requested to drop the proceedings in the said charge-sheets and to exonerate
him from the charges contained. On 23.4. I 991 he was advised by the authority
to attend the inquiry proceedings. On 30.9.1991 list of the documents along
with the copies were sent to the employee. On 24. I 1.1992 employee for the
first time took the stand that he had been exonerated of the charges contained
in the three charge-sheets and all proceedings in connection therewith had E
been dropped. Along with his letter, a photocopy purporting to be a copy of
letter dated 13.9.1989 written by one Shri K.V. Nayak, officer of the Bank
was sent. According to the appellant the enclosure to employee's letter dated
24. I I .92 was a fabricated document and contents of the actual letter ·dated
13.9.1989 sent by the Bank had been interpolated. Treating the letter to be
a fabricated document further charge-sheet dated 21.5.1994 was issued where F
it was stated that during the progress of the pending three enquiries employee
had produced certain forged/fabricated documents before the disciplinary
authority and thus constituted misconduct. The charge-sheet along with
statement of imputation were served on the employee. On 7.6.1994 employee
wrote to the Acting Dy. General Manager that the proceedings dated 13.9. 1989 G
received by him from the Bank was singed by the Dy. General Manager and
not by the Acting General Manager or Shri K.V. Nayak as alleged or at all.
Enquiry into the charge-sheet was conducted, the documents relied upon by
the management were produced and the office copy of the letter issued under
the signature of Mr. K.V. Nayak, Acting General Manager was produced.
Certain witnesses were examined. During the inquiry employee was asked to H
976
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2003] 2 S.C.R.
A produce the original letter claimed to have been received by him, but his
stand was that he did not desire to part custody of the defence documents
since the same are very much required at a later stage. On 1.4.1995 the
minutes were accordingly recorded. The employee on that date made a
statement that he wanted to make further submissions in his written briefs
which he would be submitting in terms of Rule 6(18) and he was closing his
B evidence/defence. The Presenting Officer was directed by the Inquiry Officer
to submit his written briefs within 10 days i.e. before 12.4.1995. He was also
instructed to send a copy of his written briefs to the charged officer
simultaneously. Employee was further directed to submit his written briefs
within 10 days of the receipt of the written briefs from the Presenting Officer.
C The Presenting Officer subn:iitted his written briefs on 19.4.1995. Since no
written briefs were sent by the employee, the inquiry officer sent his report
to the disciplinary authority on 2.5.1995. On 19.5.1995 disciplinary authority
sent copy of the enquiry ceport to the employee and asked for his submission
in relation to the findings recorded by the Inquiry Authority. Employee took
the stand that he could not submit written briefs as he had not received copy
D of the Presenting Officer's written briefs. He requested for a copy. The
Disciplinary Authority on 2.7.1995 wrote to the employee that Presenting
Officer's briefs was sent to him on 2.5.1995 and as such he could make his
submission based on the findings of the enquiry officer and also on the oral/
documentary evidence which were recorded during the course of inquiry. He
E further informed that such submissions would be taken into account for final
decision in the matter. Employee by his letter dated 12.7.1995 stated that
without copy of the Presenting Officer's written briefs no effective submissions
could be made on the findings of the Enquiry Report. The Disciplinary
Authority sent copy of the briefs to the employee and asked him to make his
.submissions on the findings of the enquiry report. Employee asked for time
F till I 0.8.1995. Finally on 4.8.1995 the employee stated that the written briefs
were being sent for consideration of the Enquiry Officer. On 7.8.1995 the
Disciplinary Authority asked the employee to file submissions to the findings
of the Inquiry Authority. On 12.8.1995 the employee took the stand that the
written briefs should be considered by the Inquiry Authority whereafter the
G findings of the Inquiry Officer should be made and he should be permitted
30 davs' time to give his submissions on the findings of the said report. He
J
~
I
¥
did not make or send submissions on the findings of the Inquiry Officer. lly
order dated 29.9.1995 Disciplinary Authority held the employee guilty and
imposed punishment of dismissal from service agreeing with the findings of
the Inquiry Officer. On I I.I 0.1995 Howrah Branch of the appellant-Bank
H received order for effecting service on the employee. But he left the Bank
-
I
{
-'_c.
-
"
'1-··
CANARA BANK 1·. DEBASIS DAS [ARIJITPASAYAT,J.]
977
along with certain keys. Complaint was. lodged before the police on 13. I 0.1995 A
regarding the removal of the keys. On 6.11.1995 employee filed writ petition
before the Calcutta High Cou1t. Learned Single Judge of the High Court
passed interim order restraining the Bank from giving effect to the final
order. Thereafter on 8.11.1995 the employee attended the Bank. An appeal
was preferred against the interim order by the Bank and the Appellate Court B
vacated the interim order. Employee filed a Special Leave Petition before this
Court which was dismissed. The order of dismissal was given effect on
5.2.1996 operative from 29.1.1996. Employee filed an appeal before the
prescribed departmental appellate authority. On 8.1.1997 the employee was
informed that the Appellate Authority would give personal hearing to him on
27.1.1997. During personal hearing, employee submitted a written statement C
and submitted some documents, one of them purported to be copy of letter
dated 13.9.1989, which was at variance with one which was produced by the
employee earlier and was also at variance with the original letter produced
by the management during the inquiry. According to the appellant, this letter
was another forged and fabricated document and this tim·e the letter was
claimed to have been signed by the Dy. General Manager and not by the D
Acting General Manager. In any event, it is not necessary to deal with the
aspect in detail. The Appellate Authority passed an order upholding the order
of dismissal. Employee filed a writ petition No. 9707 (W) of 1997, with
application for return of the documents produced by him before the Appellate
Authority. Learned Single Judge disposed of the interim application directing E
the appellant-Bank to return the original documents produced by the employee
before the Appellate_ Authority. When these documents were returned to the
employee he refused to accept them stating that he had not filed them before
the Appellate Authority. The Learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition
holding that Inquiry Officer had given an opportunity to the Presenting Officer
to file his written briefs and similar opportunity ought to have been given to F
the employee and thus there has been violation of principles of natural justice.
Further direction was given to send the disputed documents to the Government
Handwriting and Questioned Documents' Expert. It was observed that, if so
desired, the parties may pray for adducing fresh evidence before the Enquiry
Officer which shall be considered. The said order was challenged before the G
Division Bench. The appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench, inter alia,
with the conclusion that provisions of Regulation 6(18) are mandatory in
nature and the employee did not get an opportunity to file his written briefs
before the Inquiry Officer. Prejudice is patent as the author of the disputed
documents was not produced to prove or disprove his signature and contents
of the letters in question. Written briefs had to be considered by the Inquiry H
I
978
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2003] 2 S.C.R.
A Officer in terms of Regulation 6( 18), and order of dismissal shows that written
briefs of the employee had not been considered. An unfair trial cannot be
cured by a fair appeal. There was no question of directing the proceedings
to commence de novo from the inquiry report stage. Though Learned Single
Judge had not given specific directions regarding payment of back wages
B upon quashing of disciplinary proceedings, the consequences had to follow.
In support of the appeal, Mr. P.P. Rao, learned counsel for the appellant
submitted that the true import of Regulation 6(18) has not been considered
by the High Court. As no prejudice was caused to the employee by the action
taken by the Disciplinary Authority, and there was full compliance with the
C principles of audi alteram partem. Even if it is conceded for the sake of
argument that there was any deficiency in the order passed by the Disciplinary
Authority, same was abundantly made good by the Appellate Authority which
granted personal hearing to the employee. Post decisional hearing is permissible
and in fact personal hearing was granted though there was no such requirement.
No prejudice has been shown.
D
E
F
G
In response learned counsel for the employee submitted that the Inquiry
Officer had permitted filing of the written briefs by the employee after written
briefs was submitted by the Presenting Officer. As the employee had not
received the copy of written briefs, therefore, there was delay and the Inquiry
Officer was duty bound to consider the written briefs of the employee. Merely
because the Appellate Authority granted opportunity of personal hearing that
did not cure the incurable defect in the proceedings. Furthermore, the directions
of the Learned Single Judge for sending the disputed documents to the expert
stand and the Bank is not prejudiced in any manner. He in essence supported
the High Court's judgment.
Since Regulation 6(18) is the provision round which the controversy
centers, it would be appropriate to quote the same. So far relevant it reads as
follows:
"Regulation 6(18): The Inquiring Authority may, after the completion
of production of evidence hear the Presenting Officer, if any, appointed
and the Officer employee, or perm it them to file written briefs of the
respective cases within 15 days of the date of completion of the
production of evidence if they so desire."
It would be also relevant to extract Regulation 6(21) which reads as
H follows:
·~
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CANARA BANK"· DEBASIS DAS [ARlnTPASAYAT,J]
979
"Regulation 6(2 /): (i) On the conclusion of the inquiry the inquiring A
authority shall prepare a report which shall contain the following:
(a) a gist of the article of charge and the statement of the imputations
of misconduct or misbehaviour;
(b) a gist of t~e defence of the officer employee in respect of each B
article of charge;
( c) an assessment of the evidence in respect of each article of charge; ·
( d) the findings on each article of charge and the reasons therefor.
Explanation:. If, in the opinion of the Inquiring authority, the C
proceedings of the inquiry establish any article of charge different
from the original article of charge, it may record its findings on such
article of charge:
Provided that the findings on such article of charge shall not be
recorded unless the officer employee has either admitted the facts on D
which such article of charge is based or has had a reasonable
opportunity of defending himself against such article of charge.
(ii) The inquiring authority, where it is not itself the Disciplinary
Authority, shall forward to the Disciplinary Authority, the records of
. inquiry which shall include.
(a) the report of the inquiry prepared by it under clause (i); ·
(b) the written statement of defence, if any, submitted by the
officer employee referred to in sub-regulation (I 5);
(c) the oral and documentary evidence produced in the course
of the inquiry;
(d) written briefs referred to in sub-regulation ( 18) if any; and
(e) the orders, if any, made by the Disciplinary Authority and
the inquiring authority in regard to the inquiry."
It is to be noted that the Disciplinary Authority can himself be the
!~quiring Authority. In that sense the Inquiry Officer is an agent of the
Disciplinary Authority. The regulations make this position crystal clear in
Regulation (7). It reads as follows:
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2003] 2 S.C.R.
"Regulation 7: Action on the fnquily Report:
(l) The Disciplinary Authority, if it is not itself the inquiring
authority may for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, rem it the
case to the inquiring au.thority for fresh or further inquiry and report
and the inquiring authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the further
inquiry according to the provisions of regulation 6 as far as may be.
(2) The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it disagrees with the
findings of the inquiring authority on any article of charge, record its
reasons for such disagreement and record its own findings on such
charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose.
(3) If the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to its findings on
all or any of the articles of charge is of the opinion that any of the
penalties specified in regulatior , 3hould be imposed on the officer
employee it shall notwithstanding anything contained in regulation 8,
make an order imposing such penalty.
(4) If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its findings on
all or any ofthe articles of charge is of the opinion that no penalty
is called for, it may pass an order exonerating the officer employee
concerned."
It is to be noted that both the expressions "may" and "shall" appear in
Regulation (7). The former expression is used when the Disciplinary Authority,
if it is not the Inquiring Authority can remit the case to the Inquiring Authority
for fresh or further inquiry and report and the latter expression is used visa-vis the Inquiring Authority who is required to proceed to conduct further
inquiry according to provision of Regulation (6) as far as may be applicable.
Regulation 6(2 l)(ii) deals with the documents which are to be forwarded
to the Disciplinary Authority _in case it is not the Inquiring Authority. The
documents to be forwarded include the written briefs referred to in subregulation ( 18).
A bare reading of sub-regulation ( 18) of Regulation 6 makes the position
clear that there is no requirement of the employee being granted an opportunity
to file written briefs after the Presenting Officer files written briefs. On the
contrary, as the provisions postulate, after completion of production of evidence
two options are open to the Inquiry Officer. It may hear the Presenting
H Officer appointed and the concerned employee or in the alternative permit
r
t
'
f •·
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CANARA BANK 1•. DEBASIS DAS [ARIJITPASAYAT,J.]
981
them to file written briefs within 15 days of the date of completion of the A
production of evidence if they so desire. The written briefs are relatable to
the cases of the party concerned; otherwise the expression 'respective case'
would be meaningless. In other words, the written briefs must contain what
his case is. There is no requirement of filing written briefs one after the other.
It is not required that one party has to wait till filing of written briefs by the B
other. The expression "respectively", means belonging or relating separately
to each of several people. It is a word of severance.
It is to be further noted that in the appeal before the Appellate Authority
findings of the Inquiry Officer were challenged and, therefore, the question
of any prejudice does not arise. Since employe·e had the opportunity to meet C
the stand of the Bank, it was to his advantage, and opportunity for personal
hearing was also granted, though Regulation 6( 18) does not even speak to
grant such an opportunity. Keeping in view what was observed in B.
Karunakara 's case (supra) there was no question of violation of principles of
natural justice.
On that score the conclusion arrived at by the Learned Single Judge
and the Division Bench that there was violation of principles of natural
justice cannot be maintained.
D
Residual and crucial question that remains to be adjudicated is whe.ther
principles of natural justice have been violated; and if so, what ex.tent any E
prejudice has been caused. It may be noted at this juncture that in soine cases
it has been observed that where grant of opportunity in terms of principles
of natural justice do not improve the situation, "useless formality theory" can
be pressed into service.
Natural justice is another name for commonsense justice. Rules of F
natural justice are not codified canons. But they are principles ingrained into
the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration. of justice in a
commonsense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and
human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow
and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated G
law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the
'substance of justice which has to determine its form.
The expressions "natural justice;, and "legal justice" do not present a
water-tight classification. It is the substance of justice which is to be secured
by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose,· H
982
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2003] 2 S.C.R.
A natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural justice relieves legal
justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical
prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated law. As Lord
Buckmaster said, no form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude
the presentation of a litigants' defence.
B
. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognized by all
civilized States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks
on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action
involving civil consequences is in issue. These principles are well settled.
The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alteram
C · partem rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the
·first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should
appraise the party determinatively the case he has to meet. Time given for the
purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation.
In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the
order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential that a party
D should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against
him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. It is after
all an approved rule of fair play. The concept has gained significance and
shades with time. When the historic document was made at Runnymede in
1215, the first statutory recognition of this principle found its way into the
E "Magna Carta". The classic exposition of Sir Edward Coke of natural justice
requires to "vocate interrogate and adjudicate". In the celebrated case of
Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works, (1963) 143 ER 414, the principle
was thus stated:
"Even God did not pass a sentence upon Adam, before he was
p
called upon to make his defence. "Adam" says God, "where art thou
has thou not eaten of the tree whereof 1 commanded thee that though
should not eat".
Since then the principle has been chiselled, honed and refined, enriching
its content. Judicial treatment has added light and luminosity to the concept,
G like polishing of a diamond.
Principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down
by the Courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual
against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasijudicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those
H rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing injustice.
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CANARA BANK 1•. DEBASIS DAS [ARIJITPASAYAT,J.]
983
What is meant by the term 'principles of natural justice' is not easy to A
determine. Lord Summer (then Hamilton, L.J.) in Ray v. Local Government
Board, (1914) 1 KB 160 at p.199:83 LJKB 86) described the phrase as sadly
lacking in precision. Jn General Council of Medical Education & Registration
of UK. v. Sanckman, (1943) AC 627: ( 1948) 2 All ER 337, Lord Wright
observed that it was not desirable to attempt 'to force it into any procusteam B
bed' and mentioned that one essential requirement was that the Tribunal
should be impartial and have no personal interest in the controversy, and
further that it should give 'a full and fair opportunity' to every party of being
heard.
Lord Wright referred to the leading cases on. the subject. The most C
important of them is the Board of Education v. Rice, (1911) AC 179:80
LJKB 796, where Lord Loreburn, L.C. observed as follows:
"Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they have.
originated, the practice of imposing upon d~artments or offices of
State the duty of deciding or determining questions of various kinds. D
It will, I suppose usually be of an administrative kind, but sometimes,
it will involve matter of law as well as matter of fact, or even depend
upon matter of law alone. In such cases, the Board of Education will
have to ascertain the law and also to ascertain the facts. I need not
and that in doing either they must act in good faith and fairly listen E
to both sides for that is a duty lying upon everyone who decides
anything. But I do not think they are bound to treat such a question
as though it were a trial.. .. The Board is in the nature of the arbitral
tribunal, and a Court of law has no jurisdiction to hear appeals from
the determination either upon law or upon fact.