# CASE DETAILS N. RAMKUMAR v. THE STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

- **Citation:** 2023 INSC 812
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2023-09-06
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 2006 of 2023
- **Bench:** S. Ravindra Bhat, Aravind Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/case-details-n-ramkumar-v-the-state-rep-by-inspector-of-police-36371
- **Pages:** 16

## Headnote

Issue for consideration: Appellant in fi t of rage, dashed head of the
victim against the wall, resulting in death of victim. Appellant convicted u/s.
302 IPC and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment. Whether judgment,
order and sentence passed by the Sessions Court and affi rmed by the
High Court requires to be affi rmed or the sentence is to be converted and
punishment to be awarded u/s. 304 of IPC and if so, which part of s.304 IPC?
Penal Code, 1860 - s.302 and 304 Part II - Limited question before
the Supreme Court regarding the affi rmation of sentence u/s. 302 IPC
or conversion of sentence to s.304 IPC:
Held: In the instant case it can be noticed that appellant-convict and
the deceased were in love with each other - The fact that deceased had
stopped talking to the appellant and she was talking to her neighbour, had
made the appellant furious and he was upset about this change of attitude
of the deceased - Even according to the testimony of PW-1 (mother of the
deceased), there was altercation between the appellant and the deceased
regarding their love aff air - Appellant got infuriated and in that spur of the
moment he caught hold of her hair and banged her head to the wall which
resulted in blood oozing out and on seeing this he ran away from the scene
of the incident - Thus, the single assault by the appellant coupled with the
duration of the entire period having occurred for about 2-3 minutes would
not be suffi cient to infer that he had the intention to kill the deceased - In the
facts of the case, it is discernible that there was no premeditation to cause
death or the genesis of occurrence and the single assault by the accused and
[2023] 11 S.C.R. 845 : 2023 INSC 812
845
846
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
duration of entire episode, were factors to adjudge the intention - Therefore,
conviction of the appellant u/s. 302 is altered/converted to one u/s. 304 part
II of the IPC and the appellant is sentenced to the imprisonment to the period
already undergone and directed to be released forthwith. [Paras 20 and 21]
Penal Code, 1860 - When accused can be held guilty u/s. 302 and
304 Part-II of IPC:
Held: Where the evidence would not disclose that there was any
intention to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused
had knowledge that his acts were likely to cause death, the accused can
be held guilty under second part of s.304 IPC - It is in this background
that the expression used in Indian Penal Code namely "intention" and
"knowledge" has to be seen as there being a thin line of distinction between
these two expressions - The act to constitute murder, if in given facts and
circumstances, would disclose that the ingredients of Section 300 are not
satisfi ed and such act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not attract the
said Section - In order to bring a case within Part 3 of s.300 IPC, it must
be proved that there was an intention to infl ict that particular bodily injury
which in the ordinary course of nature was suffi cient to cause death. [Para 16]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Basdev Vs. State of Pepsu AIR 1956 SC 488 : [1956] SCR 363;
Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR
2006 SC 3010 : [2006] 4 Suppl. SCR 633; Pratap Singh @ Pikki v. State of
Uttarakhand (2019) 7 SCC 424; Deepak v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2018) 8
SCC 228; Anbazhagan v. The State represented by the Inspector of Police
in Criminal Appeal No. 2043 of 2023 - relied on.
Rampal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2012) 8 SCC 289 : [2012] 7
SCR 160 - referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES

## Text

CASE DETAILS
N. RAMKUMAR
v.
THE STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE
(Criminal Appeal No. 2006 of 2023)
SEPTEMBER 06, 2023
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND ARAVIND KUMAR, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: Appellant in fi t of rage, dashed head of the
victim against the wall, resulting in death of victim. Appellant convicted u/s.
302 IPC and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment. Whether judgment,
order and sentence passed by the Sessions Court and affi rmed by the
High Court requires to be affi rmed or the sentence is to be converted and
punishment to be awarded u/s. 304 of IPC and if so, which part of s.304 IPC?
Penal Code, 1860 - s.302 and 304 Part II - Limited question before
the Supreme Court regarding the affi rmation of sentence u/s. 302 IPC
or conversion of sentence to s.304 IPC:
Held: In the instant case it can be noticed that appellant-convict and
the deceased were in love with each other - The fact that deceased had
stopped talking to the appellant and she was talking to her neighbour, had
made the appellant furious and he was upset about this change of attitude
of the deceased - Even according to the testimony of PW-1 (mother of the
deceased), there was altercation between the appellant and the deceased
regarding their love aff air - Appellant got infuriated and in that spur of the
moment he caught hold of her hair and banged her head to the wall which
resulted in blood oozing out and on seeing this he ran away from the scene
of the incident - Thus, the single assault by the appellant coupled with the
duration of the entire period having occurred for about 2-3 minutes would
not be suffi cient to infer that he had the intention to kill the deceased - In the
facts of the case, it is discernible that there was no premeditation to cause
death or the genesis of occurrence and the single assault by the accused and
[2023] 11 S.C.R. 845 : 2023 INSC 812
845
846
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
duration of entire episode, were factors to adjudge the intention - Therefore,
conviction of the appellant u/s. 302 is altered/converted to one u/s. 304 part
II of the IPC and the appellant is sentenced to the imprisonment to the period
already undergone and directed to be released forthwith. [Paras 20 and 21]
Penal Code, 1860 - When accused can be held guilty u/s. 302 and
304 Part-II of IPC:
Held: Where the evidence would not disclose that there was any
intention to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused
had knowledge that his acts were likely to cause death, the accused can
be held guilty under second part of s.304 IPC - It is in this background
that the expression used in Indian Penal Code namely "intention" and
"knowledge" has to be seen as there being a thin line of distinction between
these two expressions - The act to constitute murder, if in given facts and
circumstances, would disclose that the ingredients of Section 300 are not
satisfi ed and such act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not attract the
said Section - In order to bring a case within Part 3 of s.300 IPC, it must
be proved that there was an intention to infl ict that particular bodily injury
which in the ordinary course of nature was suffi cient to cause death. [Para 16]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Basdev Vs. State of Pepsu AIR 1956 SC 488 : [1956] SCR 363;
Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR
2006 SC 3010 : [2006] 4 Suppl. SCR 633; Pratap Singh @ Pikki v. State of
Uttarakhand (2019) 7 SCC 424; Deepak v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2018) 8
SCC 228; Anbazhagan v. The State represented by the Inspector of Police
in Criminal Appeal No. 2043 of 2023 - relied on.
Rampal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2012) 8 SCC 289 : [2012] 7
SCR 160 - referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2006 of 2023.
847
N. RAMKUMAR v. THE STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR
OF POLICE
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.10.2015 of the High Court of
Judicature at Madras at Madurai in CRLA No. 334 of 2013.
Appearances:
M. A. Chinnasamy, Adv. for the Appellant.
V. Krishnamurthy, AAG, Dr. Joseph Aristotle S., Ms. Vaidehi Rastogi,
Ms. Richa Vishwakarma, Advs. for the Respondent.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
ARAVIND KUMAR, J.
1. Heard.
2. This appeal is at the instance of a Convict-Accused and is directed
against the judgement and order passed by the Madurai bench of Madras
High Court dated 28.10.2015 in Criminal Appeal (MD) No.334 of 2013
whereunder the High Court dismissed the appeal fi led by the appellant
herein thereby affi rming the judgement and order of conviction and sentence
passed by the First Additional District Judge (NCR) Tiruchirappalli in Case
No.226 of 2010.
3. The facts in brief, shorn of unnecessary details leading to the fi ling
of this appeal are as under:
4. The case of the prosecution was that the deceased Sangeetha was
in love with the appellant and she was unhappy with the conduct of the
appellant and her mother had also warned them in this regard. It is further
case of prosecution that deceased stopped seeing the appellant and broke her
relationship with the appellant and deceased was talking to her neighbour
one Mr. Sudhakar and being agitated with the said turn of events, appellant
is said to have trespassed into the house of the deceased on 19.06.2010 at
about 10.30 p.m. and questioned her conduct of talking to another person. It
is stated by the prosecution that appellant in a fi t of rage, held the deceased
by her ears and dashed her head against the wall and fl ed away from the spot.
PW-1 and PW-2 had admitted the deceased to the hospital and after three
days the complaint was lodged resulting in registration of FIR No.1659 of
2010 for the off ence punishable under Sections 294(b), 448, 323 and 506(1)
848
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as "IPC") and Section 4
of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act against the
appellant.
5. It is stated by the prosecution that on 28.06.2010 deceased who
was under treatment started vomiting blood and struggled to breathe and
expired on 29.06.2010 at 3.30 a.m. On her demise the Investigating Offi cer
(PW-12) altered the charge to one under Sections 294(b), 448, 323, 506(1)
IPC, and 302 IPC and Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment
of Woman Act.
6. The appellant - accused came to be tried for the said off ence and
on the basis of the testimony of the mother of the deceased (PW-1) and also
taking into consideration the deposition of neighbour (PW-2) who claimed to
have seen the accused fl eeing away from the scene of off ence by taking into
consideration the attendant circumstance, learned First Additional District
Judge convicted the accused for the off ence punishable under Sections 450
& 302 IPC. The accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for fi ve years and to pay a fi ne of Rs.50,000/- and in default to undergo
simple imprisonment for six months for the off ence under Section 450 and
sentenced him and to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fi ne of
Rs.60,000/- and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for six months
for the off ence under Section 302 IPC. The sentences were ordered to run
concurrently.
7. The legality of the said judgment was questioned before the High
Court of Madras in Criminal Appeal (MD) No.334 of 2013 and on reappreciation of the entire evidence, the High Court affi rmed the judgment
of the Sessions Court by arriving at a conclusion that it was the appellant
who had caused the injury to the deceased resulting in her death and the act
of accused in trespassing to the house of the deceased was for committing
the murder, had been clearly established. It was also opined by the High
Court that deceased had given up her love for the accused and she had
developed relationship with one Mr. Sudhakar which enraged the accused
to wreak vengeance and for this reason he had gone all the way to the house
of the deceased with a determination to eliminate her and as such it would
fall within the fi rst limb of Section 300 IPC and thus, he was liable to be
punished under Section 302 IPC. Hence, this appeal.
849
N. RAMKUMAR v. THE STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR
OF POLICE [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
8. We have heard the arguments of learned Advocates. It is the
contention of Shri M. A. Chinnasamy, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant, that there has been delay in fi ling the complaint and on this ground
alone the theory of the prosecution cannot be considered as trustworthy.
He would also contend that conviction of the accused is based on the sole
testimony of PW-1 and the contradictions in her testimony is manifestly
clear and is not trustworthy and cannot be relied on to convict the appellant.
The very fact that PW-1 was against the love aff air of her daughter with the
accused having been admitted by her would disclose the inimical attitude
against the accused. With regard to there being blood in the fl oor of the
kitchen is belied by the statement of PW-12 (investigating offi cer) and so
also the statement of PW-5 who have not whispered a word in that regard.
He would also draw the attention of the Court that theory of the prosecution
as put forth in the complaint lodged by PW-1 is that the accused had punched
her daughter on the face and she fell on the kitchen slab. However, in her
evidence she has deposed that accused held the ears of the victim and dashed
her against the wall. Though, PW-1 claimed that deceased was taken in an
auto rickshaw, non-examination of the driver of auto rickshaw would create
a doubt in the prosecution theory. Neither the clothes of the accused nor of
the victim was sent for chemical analysis. He would also contend that in the
event this Court were to affi rm the fi ndings of the courts below, he would
pray for sentence being converted to the one under second part of Section
304 of the IPC in as much as the accused had no knowledge that his act is
likely to cause death, as such it would be culpable homicide not amounting
to murder.
9. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent would support
the impugned order and has prayed for affi rming the same. He would also
contend that the evidence tendered by the prosecution has not been impeached
and the prosecution witnesses have stood the test of cross-examination and as
such the impugned order deserves to be affi rmed. He would further contend
that the accused having been in love with the deceased was unable to digest the
fact that she had developed intimacy with her neighbour Sudhakar and being
dejected the accused had taken the extreme step of eliminating the deceased
and the reasons assigned by the High Court while affi rming the judgment and
sentence awarded by the Sessions Court would not be required to be interfered
with. Hence, he has prayed for rejection of the appeal.
850
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
10. At the outset, it requires to be noticed that while issuing notice of
this appeal on 21.11.2016, it was restricted for the purpose of conversion of
the off ence. Hence, within this limited sphere this appeal has to be examined,
namely, as to whether judgement, order and sentence passed by the Sessions
Court and affi rmed by the High Court requires to be affi rmed or the sentence
is to be converted and punishment to be awarded under Section 304 of IPC
and if so, which part of Section 304 IPC?
11. In the aforesaid background, it would be necessary to discern the
evidence available on record. The fi nal opinion given by the doctor for the
cause of death as evident from exhibit P-9 reads as under:
"The deceased would appear to have died of "head injury". (viscera
report enclosed-alcohol in other format was not detected").
12. The doctor (PW-11) who conducted the post-mortem of the
deceased has deposed that he is the author of the report Ex. P-9. He has
also deposed that injuries found therein can be infl icted when a person slips
and falls on the kitchen slab. He has admitted that two injuries which he
had identifi ed had been infl icted a week before, and were in the process
of healing. PW-10 who is the doctor at Cauvery Hospital, Trichy and had
examined the deceased, has deposed that deceased was conscious when
he examined her on 26.06.2010. He has also deposed that deceased was
in a good speaking condition. In the teeth of aforesaid medical evidence
available on record, the testimony of eye-witness, namely, mother of the
deceased-PW-1 requires to be examined. A perusal of the same would
indicate she has deposed that on 19.06.2010 at 10:30 pm when she and
her deceased daughter were at home, accused had visited their house
and questioned her daughter as to why she was talking to the neighbour
Sudhakar and not talking to him. She further deposes that after saying
so, he punched on her daughter's face and held both her ears and dashed
her hard against the kitchen wall and immediately her daughter fell down
and her head was broken and right ear was cut. It is thereafter she is said
to have shifted her daughter to Geetanjali hospital and next day to KMC
Hospital. The testimony of the uncle of the deceased - PW-2 which is
on record would disclose that he was returning from work at 10:45 pm
on 19.06.2010 and he saw the accused coming out of his mother in law's
house and heard her cry and as such he rushed to her house and saw the
851
deceased lying in a fainted condition. On enquiry, PW-1 is said to have
informed him (PW2) about the attack made by the accused.
13. Having given our anxious consideration as regards the genesis of
the incident and the role attributed to the appellant herein and testimony
of the doctors who treated her and also who performed the post-mortem of
the deceased, discloses that doctor has noted two injuries on the deceased:
(i) cut injury in the left ear measuring 3 centimetres and; (ii) Two wounds
in left head roughly measuring 7 centimetres and near to that another small
injury. The injuries, as noted in Post-Mortem Report Ex.P-9 are as under:
"(i) Sutured wounds: - On the lobule of right ear 2 cm in length. On
removal of the sutures, edges are irregular, 0.5 cm in breadth and
muscle deep, on the left temporal region of the scalp, 7 cm in length.
On removal of the sutures, edges are irregular, 2 cm in breadth and
bone deep, on the left parietal region of the scalp, 2 cm in length. On
removal of the sutures, edges are irregular, 1 cm in breadth and bone
deep.
(ii) Resolving bruising of left temporal, left parietal and left side of
occipital regions of scalp. Sub-dural haemorrhage and Sub arachnoid
haemorrhage on both cerebral and cerebellar hemi-spheres. Fracture
base of skull-left middle cranial fossa present."
14. The cause of death assigned in the post-mortem report as already
noticed is "died of head injury". It is a trite law that "culpable homicide" is a
genus and "murder" is its species and all "murders" are "culpable homicides,
but all "culpable homicides" are not "murders" as held by this court in
Rampal Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2012) 8 SCC 289. The intention
of the accused must be judged not in the light of actual circumstances, but
in the light of what is supposed to be the circumstances.
15. In the case of Basdev Vs. State of Pepsu AIR 1956 SC 488 at page
490 the following observations have been made:
"Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and
knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an
intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the
act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and
mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from
N. RAMKUMAR v. THE STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR
OF POLICE [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
852
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention
is no doubt thin but it is not diffi cult to perceive that they connote
diff erent things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are
used interchangeably and this has led to a certain amount of confusion."
16. It requires to be borne in mind that the test suggested in the
aforesaid decision and the fact that the legislature has used two diff erent
terminologies, 'intent' and 'knowledge' and separate punishments are
provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which
is likely to cause death and for an act committed with a knowledge that his
act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death, it would be unsafe to treat 'intent' and 'knowledge' in
equal terms. They are not diff erent things. Knowledge would be one of the
circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or inferring
the requisite intent. Where the evidence would not disclose that there was any
intention to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused had
knowledge that his acts were likely to cause death, the accused can be held
guilty under second part of Section 304 IPC. It is in this background that the
expression used in Indian Penal Code namely "intention" and "knowledge"
has to be seen as there being a thin line of distinction between these two
expressions. The act to constitute murder, if in given facts and circumstances,
would disclose that the ingredients of Section 300 are not satisfi ed and such
act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not attract the said Section. In
order to bring a case within Part 3 of Section 300 IPC, it must be proved
that there was an intention to infl ict that particular bodily injury which in
the ordinary course of nature was suffi cient to cause death. In other words,
that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be
infl icted. This Court in the case of Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy
vs State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2006 SC 3010 has observed:
 "Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the pivotal question of
intention, with care and caution, as that will decide whether the case
falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. Many petty or
insignifi cant matters - plucking of a fruit, straying of cattle, quarrel
of children, utterance of a rude word or even an objectionable glance,
may lead to altercations and group clashes culminating in deaths.
Usual motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be
totally absent in such cases. There may be no intention. There may
853
be no premeditation. In fact, there may not even be criminality. At
the other end of the spectrum, there may be cases of murder where
the accused attempts to avoid the penalty for murder by attempting
to put forth a case that there was no intention to cause death. It is for
the courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable under Section
302, are not converted into off ences punishable under Section 304
Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder,
are treated as murder punishable under Section 302. The intention to
cause death can be gathered generally from a combination of a few
or several of the following, among other, circumstances: (i) nature of
the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused
or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a
vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of force employed in causing
injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or
sudden fi ght or free for all fi ght; (vi) whether the incident occurs by
chance or whether there was any premeditation; (vii) whether there
was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii)
whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the
cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion;
(x) whether the person infl icting the injury has taken undue advantage
or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the accused
dealt a single blow or several blows. The above list of circumstances
is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be several other special
circumstances with reference to individual cases which may throw
light on the question of intention. Be that as it may.
17. This Court in the case of Pratap Singh @ Pikki v. State of Uttarakhand
(2019) 7 SCC 424 had noticed that the deceased-victim had suff ered total 11
injuries and had been convicted for off ences under Section 304 Part-II/Section
34 IPC apart from other off ences. It was noticed that some altercation took place
and the groups entered into scuffl e without any premeditation and convicted
accused for the off ence punishable under Section 304 Part-II/Section 34 IPC.
Taking into consideration that the appellants therein were young boys and had
served sentence of more than three years and fi ve months and there was no
previous enmity, persuaded this Court that the quantum of sentence is excessive
and accordingly sentenced them to the period already undergone for the off ence
under Section 304 Part-II/ Section 34 IPC by observing thus:
N. RAMKUMAR v. THE STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR
OF POLICE [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
854
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
"27. We do fi nd substance in what being submitted by the learned
counsel for the appellant and in the fi rst place, it is to be noted that the
trial Court, while awarding sentence to the appellant has not made any
analysis of the relevant facts as can be discerned from the judgment
(page 96-97 of the paper book) dated 12th January, 1998. Even the
High Court has not considered the issue of quantum of sentence.
From the factual position which emerge from the record, it is to be
noticed that they were young boys having no previous enmity and
were collectively sitting and watching Jagjit Singh night. On some
comments made to the girls sitting in front of the deceased, some
altercation took place and they entered into a scuffl e and without any
pre-meditation, the alleged unfortunate incident took place between
two group of young boys and it is informed to this Court that the
appellant has served the sentence of more than three years and fi ve
months. Taking into consideration in totality that the incident is of
June 1995 and no other criminal antecedents has been brought to
our notice, and taking overall view of the matter, we fi nd force in the
submission of the appellant that the quantum of sentence is excessive
and deserves to be interfered by this Court."
18. In the case of Deepak v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2018)
8 SCC 228 it came to be noticed by this Court that incident had taken place
in the heat of the moment and the assault was by a single sword blow in the
rib cage was without any premeditation and incident had occurred at the
spur of the moment, and thus inferred there was no intention to kill and as
such the off ence was converted from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part
II IPC and the appellant was ordered to be released forthwith by sentencing
them to the period of conviction already undergone. It was held:
"7. On consideration of the entirety of the evidence, it can safely be
concluded that the occurrence took place in the heat of the moment
and the assault was made without premeditation on the spur of time.
The fact that the appellant may have rushed to his house across the
road and returned with a sword, is not suffi cient to infer an intention
to kill, both because of the genesis of the occurrence and the single
assault by the appellant, coupled with the duration of the entire episode
for 11⁄2 to 2 minutes. Had there been any intention to do away with the
855
life of the deceased, nothing prevented the appellant from making a
second assault to ensure his death, rather than to have run away. The
intention appears more to have been to teach a lesson by the venting
of ire by an irked neighbour, due to loud playing of the tape recorder.
But in the nature of weapon used, the assault made in the rib-cage area,
knowledge that death was likely to ensue will have to be attributed
to the appellant.
8. In the entirety of the evidence, the facts and circumstances of the
case, we are unable to sustain the conviction of the appellant under
Section 302 IPC and are satisfi ed that it deserves to be altered to Section
304 Part II IPC. It is ordered accordingly. Considering the period of
custody undergone after his conviction, we alter the sentence to the
period of custody already undergone. The appellant may be released
forthwith if not required in any other case.
9. The appeal is therefore allowed in part with the aforesaid
modifi cation of the conviction and sentence."
19. This Court in a recent judgement in the case of Anbazhagan
vs. The State represented by the Inspector of Police in Criminal Appeal
No.2043 of 2023 disposed of on 20.07.2023 has defi ned the context of the
true test to be adopted to fi nd out the intention or knowledge of the accused
in doing the act as under:
"60. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid
discussion may be summed up thus:
(1) When the court is confronted with the question, what off ence
the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to fi nd
out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the
intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4)
of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a
single injury was caused. To illustrate: 'A' is bound hand and foot. 'B'
comes and placing his revolver against the head of 'A', shoots 'A' in
his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be no diffi culty
in holding that the intention of 'B' in shooting 'A' was to kill him,
though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be
of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking
N. RAMKUMAR v. THE STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR
OF POLICE [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
856
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
another instance, 'B' sneaks into the bed room of his enemy 'A' while
the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of 'A', 'B'
forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of 'A' and runs away. 'A'
dies shortly thereafter. The injury to 'A' was found to be suffi cient in
ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no diffi culty
in holding that 'B' intentionally infl icted the particular injury found
to be caused and that the said injury was objectively suffi cient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of
'B' within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty
of the off ence of murder although only single injury was caused.
(2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall
within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the
accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the
purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the fi ve
exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling
within any of those exceptions, the off ence would be culpable homicide
not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the
IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1)
to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be off ence under Part II of
Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section
300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may
be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be
attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that
situation also, the off ence would be culpable homicide not amounting
to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an off ence under
Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299,
while it would be an off ence under Part II of Section 304 if the case
fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC.
(3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within
the fi rst two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in
Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the fi rst part of Section
304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under
the second part of Section 304. In eff ect, therefore, the fi rst part of
this section would apply when there is 'guilty intention,' whereas the
second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is
'guilty knowledge'.
857
(4) Even if single injury is infl icted, if that particular injury was
intended, and objectively that injury was suffi cient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to
Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfi lled and the off ence would be murder.
(5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases
: (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section
300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when
the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is
covered by the expression 'suffi cient in the ordinary course of nature
to cause death' but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is generally
spoken of as an injury 'likely to cause death' and the case does not fall
under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done
with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention
to cause death or an injury likely to cause death.
To put it more succinctly, the diff erence between the two parts of
Section 304 of the IPC is that under the fi rst part, the crime of murder
is fi rst established and the accused is then given the benefi t of one
of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second
part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the
purpose of holding an accused guilty of the off ence punishable under
the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring
his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC.
(6) The word 'likely' means probably and it is distinguished from more
'possibly'. When chances of happening are even or greater than its
not happening, we may say that the thing will 'probably happen'. In
reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation
of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge
that by the act he was likely to cause death.
(7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC)
and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne
in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC.
Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable
homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder
would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought
within the fi ve exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though
N. RAMKUMAR v. THE STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR
OF POLICE [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
858
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
none of the said fi ve exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established
on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under
the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300
of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails
to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of
Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder
would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide
not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC.
(8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause
thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the
particular injury infl icted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely
be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to
be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must
necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the
body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the
injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant
on the attack.
(9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable
homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries suffi cient
in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable
homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention
to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts
resulting in the injury or injuries.
(10) When single injury infl icted by the accused results in the death of
the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the
accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular
injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused
had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has
to be determined on the facts of each case.
(11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention
to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the
intended injury is suffi cient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death, then, even if he infl icts a single injury which results in the death
of the victim, the off ence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section
300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies.
859
(12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty
intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is
infl icted by him and that injury is suffi cient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation
in a sudden fi ght or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the
injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple
injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the off ence
would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC."
20. Thus, it emerges from the case law analysed herein-above for
converting the sentence imposed under Section 302 to Section 304 Part II
the facts unravelled during trial will have to be seen. In the facts of the case
on hand, it is discernible that there was no premeditation to cause death or
the genesis of occurrence and the single assault by the accused and duration
of entire episode, were factors to adjudge the intention. The off ence can be
brought clearly within the ambit of Section 304 Part-II IPC. In the instant
case it can be noticed that appellant and the deceased were in love with each
other. The fact that deceased had stopped talking to the appellant and she was
talking to her neighbour Mr. Sudhakar had ignited the mind of the appellant
to be furious about the conduct of the deceased and he was upset about
this change of attitude of the deceased. Even according to the testimony of
PW-1, who is none other than mother of the deceased there was altercation
between the appellant and the deceased and exchange of words between
appellant and deceased with regard to their love aff air. On being confronted
by the appellant as to why the accused had stopped talking to him and as
to why she was trying to develop friendship with Sudhakar and the answer
given by the deceased had resulted in appellant's getting infuriated and in
that spur of the moment he caught hold of her hair and banged her head to
the wall which resulted in blood oozing out and on seeing this he ran away
from the scene of the incident. Thus, the single assault by the appellant
coupled with the duration of the entire period having occurred for about
2-3 minutes would not be suffi cient to infer that he had the intention to kill
the deceased. Had there been any intention to do away with the life of the
deceased, obviously the appellant would have come prepared and would
have assaulted the deceased with pre-meditation. Yet another factor which
cannot go unnoticed, the appellant had obviously approached the deceased
and intended to confront her as to why she was not talking to him though
N. RAMKUMAR v. THE STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR
OF POLICE [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
860
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 11 S.C.R.
they were in love and also to clear the doubts about she being friendly with
Mr. Sudhakar (neighbour) and in this factual scenario, heated exchange of
words have taken place and enraged by her reply the appellant has banged
her head on the wall in a fi t of fury, which cannot be inferred that he had any
intention to take away her life, particularly when he was in love with her.
21. In the aforesaid analysis of law and facts, we are of the considered
view that the present appeal deserves to be allowed in part. The conviction
of the appellant under 302 is altered/converted to one under Section 304
part II of the Indian Penal Code for the altered conviction, the appellant is
sentenced to the imprisonment to the period already undergone and shall
be released forthwith if not required in any other case.
22. The appeal is partly allowed, in the above terms.
Headnotes prepared by:
Appeal partly allowed.
Ankit Gyan