# CASE DETAILS STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS v. DINESH SINGH AND ANOTHER

- **Citation:** 2023 INSC 1070
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2023-12-14
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 8142 of 2023
- **Bench:** M.M. Sundresh, Aravind Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/case-details-state-of-haryana-and-others-v-dinesh-singh-and-another-37121
- **Pages:** 28

## Headnote

Issue for consideration: On a reading of r.9, Haryana Civil Service
(Executive Branch) Rules, 2008, letters dated 30.05.2019 and 09.07.2019,
whether 01.11.2018 can be said to be the cut-off period uniformly applicable
qua all the eligibility conditions provided in r.9(1)(a) and (b) or is such date
to be considered as the cut-off date only for the purpose of determining
age-related eligibility and; if 01.11.2018 is to be held as the cut off only for
the limited purpose, whether the respondent satisfi ed the other eligibility
conditions and whether it can be said that there was any disciplinary action
pending or contemplated against him as on date of consideration.
Haryana Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 2008 - rr.79 - Relevant cut-off date qua the eligibility condition of pending
disciplinary proceedings - Determination - Disciplinary proceedings
if were 'contemplated' against Respondent as on date of consideration:
Held: r.9 does not contemplate a uniform cut-off date qua all the
conditions of eligibility - 01.11.2018 was relevant only in so far as r.9(1)(a)
(ii) was considered - For the purpose of r.9(1)(a)(iii), the relevant date for
determining if there was any disciplinary action contemplated or pending
against a candidate "is the date of consideration", which is the date on which
the Committee had recommended names to the Commission u/r.9(2), which,
in the facts of this case would be 31.08.2019 - The reason for declaring
the Respondent ineligible for selection as per r.9 was on the ground that
decision had been taken on fi le to charge sheet him u/r.7 - At no point was it
asserted by him that disciplinary proceedings were not contemplated against
him - His entire case from the very beginning has been that the cut-off date
1047
qua all eligibility conditions must be determined as on 01.11.2018 and since
there was no decision/contemplation to initiate any disciplinary proceedings
as of that date, he ought to have been recommended for appointment - The
main allegation against Respondent was that on 05.01.2019 and 06.01.2019,
he was directed to act as Duty Magistrate during the Haryana Teacher's
Eligibility Test, 2018 and he remained absent from this duty and thus, was
negligent in performing his offi cial duties - The Deputy Commissioner,
Kurukshetra wrote letter dtd.9.01.2019 to the Additional Chief Secretary
and Finance Commissioner, Government of Haryana, Department of
Revenue and Disaster Management in this regard and recommended that
formal inquiry be initiated against the Respondent - In view of the same, a
decision was taken on 05.02.2019 to charge-sheet him - It is not relevant to
consider what happened beyond the date of consideration, that is, 31.08.2019
- However, subsequent to this date, there was a chargesheet issued against
the Respondent and ultimately, the entire proceedings came to be dropped
on 11.12.2019 - Since the eligibility conditions in r.9(1)(a)(iii), the validity
of which is not under challenge, requires this Court to limit the inquiry
into the question of eligibility as on date of consideration, what happens
after that becomes insignifi cant to the inquiry - On facts, as on the date of
consideration, disciplinary action was contemplated against the Respondent,
and therefore he was rightly held to be ineligible for selection of his name
in Register A-1 - Order of the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside
and order of the Single Judge is affi rmed - Service Law. [Paras 47-51]
Words and Phrases - 'contemplation' - Discussed - Service Law.
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
State of M.P. v. Bani Singh, 1990 Supp SCC 738; H. Surendra Shetty
v. Vijaya Bank, MG Road Bangalore & Ors., ILR 2000 Kar 2883; Union of
India Vs. KV Janakiraman, [1991] 3 SCR 790: (1991) 4 SCC 109; Govt. of
India Ministry of Home Aff airs & Ors. v. Tarak Nath Ghosh, [1971] 3 SCR
715 : 1971 AIR SC 823; P.R. Nayak v. Union of India, [1972] 2 SCR 695 :
(1972) 1 SCC 332; Kul Bhusan Chopra v. Punjab National

## Text

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[2023] 16 S.C.R. 1046 : 2023 INSC 1070
1046
CASE DETAILS
STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS
v.
DINESH SINGH AND ANOTHER
(Civil Appeal No. 8142 of 2023)
DECEMBER 14, 2023
[M.M. SUNDRESH AND ARAVIND KUMAR, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: On a reading of r.9, Haryana Civil Service
(Executive Branch) Rules, 2008, letters dated 30.05.2019 and 09.07.2019,
whether 01.11.2018 can be said to be the cut-off period uniformly applicable
qua all the eligibility conditions provided in r.9(1)(a) and (b) or is such date
to be considered as the cut-off date only for the purpose of determining
age-related eligibility and; if 01.11.2018 is to be held as the cut off only for
the limited purpose, whether the respondent satisfi ed the other eligibility
conditions and whether it can be said that there was any disciplinary action
pending or contemplated against him as on date of consideration.
Haryana Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 2008 - rr.79 - Relevant cut-off date qua the eligibility condition of pending
disciplinary proceedings - Determination - Disciplinary proceedings
if were 'contemplated' against Respondent as on date of consideration:
Held: r.9 does not contemplate a uniform cut-off date qua all the
conditions of eligibility - 01.11.2018 was relevant only in so far as r.9(1)(a)
(ii) was considered - For the purpose of r.9(1)(a)(iii), the relevant date for
determining if there was any disciplinary action contemplated or pending
against a candidate "is the date of consideration", which is the date on which
the Committee had recommended names to the Commission u/r.9(2), which,
in the facts of this case would be 31.08.2019 - The reason for declaring
the Respondent ineligible for selection as per r.9 was on the ground that
decision had been taken on fi le to charge sheet him u/r.7 - At no point was it
asserted by him that disciplinary proceedings were not contemplated against
him - His entire case from the very beginning has been that the cut-off date
1047
qua all eligibility conditions must be determined as on 01.11.2018 and since
there was no decision/contemplation to initiate any disciplinary proceedings
as of that date, he ought to have been recommended for appointment - The
main allegation against Respondent was that on 05.01.2019 and 06.01.2019,
he was directed to act as Duty Magistrate during the Haryana Teacher's
Eligibility Test, 2018 and he remained absent from this duty and thus, was
negligent in performing his offi cial duties - The Deputy Commissioner,
Kurukshetra wrote letter dtd.9.01.2019 to the Additional Chief Secretary
and Finance Commissioner, Government of Haryana, Department of
Revenue and Disaster Management in this regard and recommended that
formal inquiry be initiated against the Respondent - In view of the same, a
decision was taken on 05.02.2019 to charge-sheet him - It is not relevant to
consider what happened beyond the date of consideration, that is, 31.08.2019
- However, subsequent to this date, there was a chargesheet issued against
the Respondent and ultimately, the entire proceedings came to be dropped
on 11.12.2019 - Since the eligibility conditions in r.9(1)(a)(iii), the validity
of which is not under challenge, requires this Court to limit the inquiry
into the question of eligibility as on date of consideration, what happens
after that becomes insignifi cant to the inquiry - On facts, as on the date of
consideration, disciplinary action was contemplated against the Respondent,
and therefore he was rightly held to be ineligible for selection of his name
in Register A-1 - Order of the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside
and order of the Single Judge is affi rmed - Service Law. [Paras 47-51]
Words and Phrases - 'contemplation' - Discussed - Service Law.
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
State of M.P. v. Bani Singh, 1990 Supp SCC 738; H. Surendra Shetty
v. Vijaya Bank, MG Road Bangalore & Ors., ILR 2000 Kar 2883; Union of
India Vs. KV Janakiraman, [1991] 3 SCR 790: (1991) 4 SCC 109; Govt. of
India Ministry of Home Aff airs & Ors. v. Tarak Nath Ghosh, [1971] 3 SCR
715 : 1971 AIR SC 823; P.R. Nayak v. Union of India, [1972] 2 SCR 695 :
(1972) 1 SCC 332; Kul Bhusan Chopra v. Punjab National Bank and Ors.,
(1979) IILLJ 86; State Of U.P v. Jai Singh Dixit and Others (1976) ILLJ
246; Santi Kumar Ganguly v. The State of Tripura and Ors. (1982 GLR 1
21); Champaklal Chimanlal Shah vs The Union of India, [1964] 6 SCR 190 :
1964 AIR SC 1854; S. Govinda Menon v. Union of India [1967] 2 SCR 566 :
STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS v. DINESH SINGH
AND ANOTHER
1048
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
1967 AIR SC 1274; Shahroj Anwar Khan v. State of U.P., 2007 SCC OnLine
All 389; Rajendra Shenkar Nigam v. State of U.P., 1973 SCC OnLine All
381; Dr. Subash Chand v. State of U.P., 2005 SCC OnLine All 1712; State
of U.P. v. Jawahar Lal Bhargava, 1974 SCC OnLine All 45 - referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.8142 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.03.2022 of the High Court of
Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in LPA No.737 of 2021.
Appearances:
Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, A.S.G., Alok Sangwan, Sr. A.A.G., Sumit Kumar
Sharma, Rajat Sangwan, Vishnu Tallapragada, Samar Vijay Singh, Keshav
Mittal, Ms. Sabarni Som, Advs. for the Appellants.
Rameshwar Singh Malik, Sr. Adv., Jitesh Malik, Yogendra Kumar
Verma, N D Kaushik, Satish Kumar, D. S. Chauhan, Ms. Ruchi Singh,
Shikher Badial, Advs. for the Respondents.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
JUSTICE ARAVIND KUMAR, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The broad issue at hand relates to recruitment and appointment to
the posts in the Haryana Civil Service (Executive Branch)1. The process
of recruitment to the posts in the Service are governed by Haryana Civil
Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 2008 [for short, 'the Rules'].
3. Part II2 of the Rules is titled 'Recruitment to Service'. For a person
to be appointed in the Service, Rule 73 requires that such person's name
1
Hereinafter referred to as 'Service'
2
Part II runs from Rule 3 to Rule 34.
3
Rule 7 - Members of the Service shall be appointed from time to time as required from
amongst accepted candidates whose names have been duly entered in accordance with
1049
must be found in 'one or other of the registers of Accepted Candidates to
be maintained under these rules. Rule 84 requires the Chief Secretary to
maintain 'Registers of Accepted Candidates'. From among the various
Registers to be maintained, what is of relevance to us for adjudicating this
dispute is the one found in Rule 8 (a): 'Register A-I of District Revenue
Offi cer/Tehsildars accepted as candidates;'
4. Rule 9 deals with the selection of candidates for inclusion of their
names in Register A-1. According to this Rule, the Financial Commissioner
and Principal Secretary to Government (hereinafter referred as, the
Commissioner) is required to prepare a list of District Revenue Offi cer/
Tehsildars not more than fi ve times the number of vacancies and submit
this list to the Committee5 for its consideration. Only such names are to be
forwarded to the Commission who satisfy the conditions set out in clauses
(a) and (b) of Rule 9. Clause (a) of Rule 9 contains four sub clauses. In
that sense, the conditions set out in clauses (a) and (b) of Rule 9 provide
the eligibility criteria for selection of candidates in Register A-1. We shall
advert to the relevant clauses in due course.
5. Once the names are entered in the Register, Rule 17 provides that
the Government of Haryana shall make appointments to the Service from
amongst the candidates whose names are entered in the various registers
on a rotational basis.
these rules in one or other of the registers of Accepted Candidates to be maintained
under these rules:

Provided that if in the opinion of the Government the exigencies of the Service so
require, the Government may make special recruitment to the Service by such methods
as it may by notifi cation specify, after consultation with the Commission.
4
Rule 8- The following Registers of Accepted Candidates shall be maintained by the
Chief Secretary, namely:-

(a) Register A-I of District Revenue Offi cers/Tahsildars accepted as candidates;

(b) Register A-II of members of Group C Service accepted as candidates;

(c) Register B of Persons accepted as candidates as a result of a competitive
examination for the post of the Haryana Civil Services (Executive Branch) ; and

(d) Register C of District Development and Panchayat Offi cer/Block Development
and Panchayat Offi cers.
5
Rule 9 of 2008 Rules states that the Committee shall comprise of a Chief Sectary as
the Chairman and two such other offi cers as members, as may be nominated by the
Government from time to time.
STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS v. DINESH SINGH
AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
1050
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
6. Dinesh Singh (Respondent no. 1) was one among several candidates,
who was seeking appointment to the post in the Service. He was appointed
in the Department of Revenue and Disaster Management (Appellant no.
3; hereinafter, 'the Department') on 12.08.2008 as a Naib Tehsildar, and
at the time of fi ling the original Writ Petition, was serving in the post of
Tehsildar. The Department has found Dinesh Singh, among several others,
to be ineligible for selection to Register A-1 on the ground that he did not
satisfy the eligibility condition set out in sub clause (iii) of clause (a) of
Rule 9. Rule 9 (a)(iii) reads as follows:
"is not facing disciplinary proceedings and against whom action is
not being contemplated".
7. According to the Department, Dinesh Singh, though was not facing
any disciplinary proceedings, there was action being contemplated against
him as on date of consideration, which resulted in him being declared
ineligible for selection. However, it is Dinesh Singh's case that he was neither
facing disciplinary proceedings, nor was any action being contemplated
against him, and therefore, the action of declaring him ineligible was
erroneous and being excluded, resulted in same being challenged before
the High Court. The Ld. Single Judge dismissed the writ petition fi led by
Dinesh Singh and other similarly situated persons. On appeal, the High
Court has set aside the order of the Ld. Single Judge and directed the State
to take steps to consider the case of Dinesh Singh for appointment from
Register A-1.
8. Therefore, the crux of the litigation comes down to the question as
to whether Dinesh Singh was eligible for selection to be made in Register
A-1. In order to determine his eligibility, it will be necessary to identify the
relevant cut-off date as on which the eligibility is to be determined.
Submissions of Appellant's Counsel:
9. The Division Bench of the High Court has erred in treating
01.11.2018 as the uniform cut-off date for the purpose of determining
eligibility qua all conditions set out under Rule 9 (a) and (b).
10. A literal reading of Rule 9 would make it clear that 01.11.2018
was the cut-off date only in so far as the condition provided in Rule 9 (a)
(ii); that date was relevant only to determine if the candidate was within
1051
the age limit of fi fty years and nothing else; this was, in fact, clarifi ed by
the Government through its letter dated 09.07.2019, in which it was made
clear that the said date was relevant only for purpose of determining the
age-related eligibility criterion; and the other conditions of eligibility were
to be tested as on 'date of consideration'.
11. Treating the said date as a uniform cut-off date vis-a-vis all the
eligibility conditions set out in Rule 9 would result in an anomaly. This is
because a candidate against whom no disciplinary action was contemplated
or pending as on 01.11.2018, but became pending subsequently as on date
of consideration, would still remain eligible under the Rules. Such could
not have been the intention of the Rule-maker.
12. In this case, the date of consideration is the date on which the
Committee had recommended names to the Commission under Rule 9 (2),
that is, 30.09.2018 and as on such date, there cannot be any dispute about
the fact that disciplinary action, though not same contemplated pending
against the Respondent.
Submissions of Respondent's Counsel:
13. Per Contra, it is the Respondent's case that Rule 9 contemplates
only one cut-off date. There cannot be separate cut off dates qua the diff erent
conditions of eligibility. That Rule 9 contemplated only one uniform cutoff date qua all eligibility conditions is evidenced by notifi cation dated
30.05.2019 in which it had been specifi ed that 'The DRO's/Tehsildars
whose names are to be recommended should fulfi l the following conditions
as on 01.11.2018'. This included condition qua pendency/contemplation of
disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, the subsequent clarifi cation6 brought out
by the Government through its letter dated 09.07.2018 amounts to nothing
but changing the rules of the game. It is further contended that at the previous
stages of the litigation, that is before the Single Judge and Division Bench,
it was never the pleaded stance of the State that the date of consideration
was 31.08.2019. In fact, there it was contended that 01.11.2018 was the
cut-off date qua all eligible conditions.
6
It was clarifi ed therein that 01.11.2018 was the cut-off date in order to determine the
age-related criterion while other conditions of eligibility was to be tested as on date of
consideration.
STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS v. DINESH SINGH
AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
1052
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
14. Even if 31.08.2019 is taken as the relevant cut-off date for
determining eligibility qua the pendency of disciplinary proceeding, in the
facts of the present case, it cannot be said that any disciplinary action was
contemplated against the Respondent.
ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION :
15. In this factual background, the following issues fall for
consideration: -
"1. On a reading of Rule 9, letter dated 30.05.2019 and letter dated
09.07.2019, whether 01.11.2018 can be said to be the cut-off period
uniformly applicable qua all the eligibility conditions provided in Rule
9(1)(a) and (b) or is such date to be considered as the cut-off date only
for the purpose of determining age-related eligibility?
2. If we are to hold that 01.11.2018 was the cut off only for the
limited purpose, whether Dinesh Singh satisfi ed the other eligibility
conditions? Most importantly, whether it can be said that there was
any disciplinary action pending or contemplated against him as on
date of consideration?7
ANALYSIS :
16. Rule 9 of the 2008 Rules, as it originally stood provided as follows:
"9. Selection of candidates for Register A-I:- (1) The Financial
Commissioner and Principal Secretary to Government, Haryana
Revenue and Disaster Management shall, by a date to be determined by
the Government prepare a list of District Revenue Offi cers/Tehsildars
not more than fi ve times of the number of vacancies and submit the
same for the consideration of a Committee with Chief Secretary
as Chairman and two such other offi cers as members, as may be
nominated by the government from time to time provided that unless
the Government other directs regarding the age, the name of a person
shall be submitted who7
The answer to the second question would turn on the offi cial noting dating 05.02.2019
in which a decision was taken proposing to fi le a chargesheet against Dinesh Singh - in
connection with him having absented himself from some invigilation duty.
1053
(a)
(i)
has completed eight years continuous Government service;

(ii) has not attained the age of forty-fi ve years; on or before
the date on which the names are required to be submitted
before the Committee;

(iii) is not facing disciplinary proceedings against whom action
is being contemplated and

(iv) is clear from vigilance angle;
(b) is a graduate of a recognized University."
17. Rule 9 came to be amended by notifi cation8 dated 16th February
2017 and the amended Rule read as follows:
"9. Selection of Candidates for Register A-I:-
(1) The Additional Chief Secretary and Financial Commissioner
to Government, Haryana, Revenue and Disaster Management
shall, by a date to be determined by the Government, prepare
a list of District Revenue Offi cers/Tehsildars not more than
fi ve times of the number of vacancies and submit the same
for the consideration of a Committee with Chief Secretary as
Chairman and two such other offi cers as members, as may be
nominated by the Government from time to time, the name of
a person shall be submitted who-
(a) (i) has completed eight years continuous Government
service including service rendered as Naib-Tehsildar;

(ii) has not attained the age of fi fty years on the fi rst day of
November immediately preceding the date of submission
of names by the concerned authority;

(iii) is not facing disciplinary proceedings and against
whom action is being contemplated and
(b) is a graduate of a recognised University."
18. On 17.04.2017, the Department issued a communication, in which
it was stated that the State Government was looking to fi ll up vacancies (9
8
Notifi cation No. G.S.R.3/Const./Art.309/2017 dated 16th February 2017
STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS v. DINESH SINGH
AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
1054
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
vacancies) up to 2016, in the Service from the quota of Register A-1. The
relevant part of this communication is extracted below:
" It is intimated that State Government has decided to fi ll up nine
vacancies of HCS(Executive Branch) from Register A-I of District
Revenue Offi cer/Tehsildars upto the vacancies of the year 2016 in
terms of rule 9 of Haryana Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules,
2008. The offi cers should fulfi ll the following conditions of eligibility
as on 01.11.2016:-
(a) (i) has completed eight years continuous Government service
including service rendered as Naib-Tehsildar;

(ii) has not attained the age of fi fty years;

(iii) is not facing disciplinary proceedings and against whom
action is not being contemplated.

(iv) is clear from vigilance angle;
(b) is a graduate from a recognized University.
It is, therefore, requested to bring the same in the notice of all
concerned Offi cers under your control. All the eligible and interested
Offi cers should send their application in this regard along with certifi ed
documents regarding education to the Government either directly or
through proper channel latest by 24.04.2017. The applications received
after 24.04.2017 will not be entertained."
19. It was clearly indicated therein that offi cers should fulfi ll the
conditions of eligibility as on 01.11.2016 as prescribed in clause(a)(i) to
(iv) therein (referred to supra): -
It was also indicated in the said letter to the following eff ect: -
"It is, therefore, requested to bring the same in the notice of
all concerned Offi cers under your control. All the eligible and
interested Offi cers should send their application in this regard
along with certified documents regarding education to the
Government either directly or through proper channel latest by
24.04.2017. The applications received after 24.04.2017 will not
be entertained."
1055
20. It appears that there was no action taken in the direction of fi lling
up vacancies pursuant to communication dated 17.04.2017. Nearly two years
later, on 30th May, 2019, a fresh communication was issued from the Chief
Secretary's Offi ce requesting the Commissioner to forward 'a list of eligible
District Revenue Offi cers/ Tehsildars not more than fi ve times the number
of vacancies as per rules for the aforesaid recruitment'. The relevant part
of this communication is extracted below:
"2. The DROs/Tehsildars whose names are to be recommended should
fulfi ll the following conditions of eligibility as on 01.11.2018:-
(a)
(i) has completed eight years continuous Government service.
However, the services rendered as Naib Tehsildars shall not be
included while determining the eligibility as per interim orders/
directions dated 26.04.2017 of Hon'ble High Court of Punjab and
Haryana, Chandigarh passed in CWP No. 8502 of 2017-Joginder
Sharma and others versus State of Haryana and others.

(ii) has not attained the age of fi fty years;

(iii) is not facing disciplinary proceedings and against whom
action is not being contemplated; and

(iv) is clear from vigilance angle;
(b) is a graduate from a recognized University."
21. What needs to be noted at the very outset is that the Respondent has
not challenged the validity of Rule 9 (1)(a)(iii), which requires, as a matter
of eligibility for selection, that no disciplinary proceeding be pending, or
action be contemplated against him. This is signifi cant because, normally, in
the context of promotion-related disputes, this Court has consistently held9
that mere pendency or contemplated initiation of disciplinary proceedings
against a candidate must be considered to have absolutely no impact upon his
right to be considered. Resort is often taken to the 'sealed cover' procedure
in cases where a candidate/employee seeking promotion to a higher grade
is facing disciplinary proceedings. As per this procedure, the candidate is
allowed to participate in the merit-based selection process, and the results
9
State of M.P. v. Bani Singh, 1990 Supp SCC 738.
STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS v. DINESH SINGH
AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
1056
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
of such candidate's selection is kept in a sealed cover and opened in the
event where the disciplinary proceedings are dropped/ or a fi nding of not
guilty is passed.
22. Since the rule disentitling a candidate for selection if disciplinary
proceeding is pending or contemplated is not under challenge in these
proceedings, we must apply it as it is.
Determination of the cut-off date qua the eligibility condition of
pending disciplinary proceedings
23. In order to fi nd an answer as to whether there was any disciplinary
proceeding contemplated/pending against Dinesh Singh, we are necessarily
required to determine the applicable cut-off date against which the eligibility
is to be tested. In that sense, the fi nding on the latter question has a direct
bearing on the outcome of the former question. Perhaps, this also explains
why the Ld. Single Judge and Ld. Division Bench have reached opposite
conclusions. According to the Ld. Single Judge, 01.11.2018 was to operate
as the cut-off period only in so far as Clause (2) of Rule 9(1)(a) is concerned
- that is to say eligibility in so far as age of the candidate is concerned.
The date 01.11.2018 was not to be treated as the cut-off date for all the
eligibility conditions set out in Rule 9. However, the Division Bench was of
the opinion that 01.11.2018 operated as the cut-off date qua all the clauses
found in Rule 9(1)(a).
24. If the Division Bench is right in its fi nding, then we need not
enter into the follow-up question as to whether any disciplinary proceeding
was pending/contemplated against Dinesh Singh, since, admittedly, as
on 1.11.2018, even as per the appellant-State, no case was pending or
contemplated against him. On the other hand, if we hold the cut-off date to
be the date of consideration, then it needs to be further examined if there
was any action contemplated against the Respondent as on that date.
25. We are of the view that Ld. Single Judge was correct in concluding
that 01.11.2018 was meant only for the purpose of determining the agerelated eligibility as provided for in Rule 9(1)(a)(ii). The cut off for the
purpose of determining eligibility in so far as Rule 9(1)(a)(iii) has to be
determined as on date of consideration.
26. The fi nding of the Division Bench to the contrary was on the
premise that the subject rule in itself had provided for 01.11.2018 to operate
1057
as the cut-off date qua all conditions of eligibility found in Rule 9. The
relevant observation of the High Court is extracted herein below -
"the cut-off date, thus, has to be seen from the date which is provided
in the rules, which would be 01.11.2018 as per Rule 9(1)(a)(iii) of
the 2008 Rules, as the process was set into motion on 30.05.2019. It
is, thus, does not lie in the mouth of the State as such to say that on
account of the pending litigation and on account of the orders of the
Division Bench dated 21.08.2019 and 29.08.2019, a diff erent cut-off
date would come into play and there was a distinction as such qua the
names which had been sent later. The eligibility as such has to be seen
as provided in the rule itself and fi nding of the learned Single Judge
that the cut-off date is 12.07.2019 is based on a wrong presumption.''
27. As could be seen from the above, the Ld. Division Bench opines
that the cut-off date has to be seen from the date provided in the Rules, which
according to it, is 01.11.2018. Rule 9(1)(a)(iii) does not contain any such
date; it merely provides that a candidate facing disciplinary proceedings or
against whom action is contemplated becomes ineligible for selection. Only
clause (2) in Rule 9(1)(a) fi nds the mention of a date (1st day of November
immediately preceding the date of submission of names by the concerned
authority) as such. Therefore, the fi nding that the rule itself clearly provides
for a cut-off date qua all the clauses in Rule 9(1)(a) appears to be perverse
and without any basis. The Ld. Single Judge has rightly relied on the letter
date 09.07.2019 in arriving at the conclusion that 01.11.2018 was the cut-off
date only for a limited purpose. That limited purpose can be understood if one
were to read the clarifi cation provided for in the said letter. The clarifi cation
is extracted herein below for easy reference: -
"2. The State Government has re-considered the matter and it has been
decided that the DROs/Tehsildars whose names are to be recommended
should fulfi l the following conditions of eligibility:-
(a)
(i)
has completed eight years continuous Government Service.

(ii) has not attained the age of fi fty years as on 01.11.2018.

(iii) is not facing disciplinary proceedings and against whom
action is not being contemplated; and
STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS v. DINESH SINGH
AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
1058
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 16 S.C.R.

(iv) is clear from vigilance angle;
(b) is a graduate from a recognised University.
It is clarifi ed for the condition (a) (i) that services rendered
as Naib Tehsildars shall not to be included while determining the
eligibility as per interim orders/directions dated 26.04.2017 of Hon'ble
High Court of Punjab and Haryana Chandigarh passed in CWP No.
8502 of 2017- Joginder Sharma and others versus State of Haryana
and others.
It is further clarifi ed that DROs/Tehsildars, who are otherwise
eligible being less than 50 years of age on and after 01.11.2018, their
ACRs be considered upto year 2018-2019 and experience be taken
into consideration upto the date of recommendation. The DROs/
Tehsildars, who had not attained the age of 50 years as on 01.11.2018
but attained the age of more than 50 years on and after 01.11.2018
till the date of recommendation their experience and ACRs record
be considered only upto 01.11.2018. However, pending disciplinary
proceedings, vigilance clearance and integrity be considered upto the
date of consideration in both cases."
28. From this clarifi catory note, it becomes clear that if a candidate was
less than 50 years of age as on 01.11.2018 and continued to be so till the date
of recommendation, then his ACR and experience was to be counted till the
date of recommendation. However, if the candidate was less than fi fty years
as on 01.11.2018 but exceeded such age as on the date of recommendation,
such candidates ACR and experience was to be accounted for only till
01.11.2018. In that sense, the cut-off date (01.11.2018) was relevant only
to decide the question of how much of the ACR and experience had to be
considered and till what period. Such date was never meant to operate as the
date against which all the eligibility criteria had to be measured against. This
fact stands clarifi ed from the last paragraph of the letter dated 09.07.2019,
whereunder it has been stated that the eligibility criteria concerning
'pending disciplinary proceedings, vigilance clearance and integrity'
was to be considered up to the date of consideration in both cases. This
aside, according to us fi xing 01.11.2018 as the cut-off date for determining
eligibility qua all conditions can bring about undesirable outcomes. For
example, if a candidate had a clean service record, had completed 8 years
1059
continuous government service, had no disciplinary proceedings pending
or contemplated against him, was clear from the vigilance angle but in
between 01.11.2018 and the date of consideration if he were to be facing
disciplinary action concerning serious misconduct, such a candidate would
remain eligible for selection. It is in this background the communication
dated 9th July, 2019 has to be read and understood.
29. The Respondent had relied on letter dated 30.05.2019 to contend
that 01.11.2018 was to operate as a cut-off date qua all eligibility conditions.
In order to deal with this submission, we may have to refer to the contents
of the letter dated 30.05.2019 and the letter dated 09.07.2019.
30. The State Government vide letter dated 30.05.2019 showed interest
in fi lling up the 23 vacancies of HCS(EB) and in this regard informed the
Additional Chief Secretary and Financial Commissioner, requesting him to
send a list of eligible candidates as contemplated under Rule 9 Paragraph
2 of this letter stated that the DROs/Tehsildars whose names are to be
recommended should fulfi l the eligibility conditions provided for in Rule
9 as on 01.11.2018. What is interesting to note here is that the cut-off date
has not been confi ned to apply only to the eligibility criteria pertaining to
the age but to all the four criteria uniformly. This letter was followed up
by another letter dated 09.07.2019, in which the State Government appears
to have reconsidered the matter. According to this letter, the names had to
be recommended as per the conditions of eligibility found in the amended
Rule 9(1)(a) and (b). It was requested therein that the recommended names
be sent to the Committee by 12.07.2019. What we notice here is that the
uniform application of the cut-off qua all eligibility conditions was deleted
and the cut-off was restricted to the condition relating to the age of the
candidate. Thus, the Respondent cannot take umbrage under the contents
of letter dated 30.05.2019, when it had been followed up with another letter
on the same subject and with specifi c clarifi cation regarding the scope and
relevance of the date 01.11.2018.
31. Therefore, it cannot be held that Rule 9 contemplated a uniform
cut-off date qua all the conditions of eligibility. 01.11.2018 was relevant only
in so far as Rule 9(1)(a)(ii) was considered. For the purpose of Rule 9(1)(a)
(iii), the relevant date for determining if there was any disciplinary action
contemplated or pending against a candidate "is the date of consideration,"
STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS v. DINESH SINGH
AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
1060
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
which is the date on which the Committee had recommended names to
the Commission under Rule 9(2), which, in the facts of this case would be
31.08.2019.
Whether disciplinary proceedings were 'contemplated' against Mr.
Dinesh Singh as on date of consideration, that is, 31.08.2019
32. What does the word 'contemplate' entail in the context of Rule
9(1)(a)(iii)? Said rule provides for two conditions, both of which have to
be satisfi ed since the two conditions are separated by the conjunction 'and'
instead of 'or'. To put it diff erently, what Rule 9 (1)(a)(iii) mandates is that
not only there must be no pending disciplinary proceeding but there must
also not be any action contemplated against the candidate as on date of
consideration.
33. It is now trite that a disciplinary proceeding is said to be pending
when a formal charge-sheet is issued to the employee.10 The stage at which
action can be contemplated has to, quite obviously, come before the time
at which a disciplinary proceeding becomes pending (i.e. at the time of
issuing a formal chargesheet). At what point between the employer having
received information/knowledge of an alleged misconduct committed by the
employee and the ultimate initiation of disciplinary proceedings by issuing
chargesheet, can it be said that disciplinary proceedings are contemplated?
The entire challenge before us is to fi nd that point.
34. The word contemplate has diff erent meanings in the English
Dictionary. It can mean 'to think deeply at length'; 'to have in view as a
probable intention'; to think about. According to us, the second meaning
comes closest to the sense in which the rule-maker intended the rule to
operate. Probability is a step ahead of possibility but falls short of certainty.
With this basic logic in mind, we can glance through some of the rulings
which have interpreted the word 'contemplate' in similar contexts.
Meaning of the term "Contemplation" :
35. In H.Surendra Shetty v. Vijaya Bank, MG Road Bangalore &
Ors., ILR 2000 Kar 2883 wherein the disciplinary proceedings were initiated
10 Union of India Vs. KV Janakiraman (1991) 4 SCC 109.
1061
against the petitioner with respect to certain irregularities. The Karnataka
High Court explained the meaning "contemplation" and made the following
observations:
"20. The meaning given in Black's Law Dictionary, 5th edition (1979)
for the word 'contemplation' is as follows: "The act of the mind in
considering with attention. Continued attention of the mind to a
particular subject. Consideration of an act or series of acts with the
intention of doing or adopting them. The consideration of an event
or state of facts with the expectation that it will transpire". Thus,
contemplation is a process that goes on in the mind and falls far
short of a 'decision' which refers to the culmination of the process
of contemplation in arriving at a defi nite conclusion as to the next
course of action to be taken under a set of facts with the intention of
carrying out a certain act. Thus, mere contemplation cannot serve as
the basis for adopting the sealed cover procedure as it does not answer
to the tests adopted in the decisions relied upon by learned Counsel
Ramadass to justify the adoption of the sealed cover procedure."
21. ...If the petitioner is denied promotion merely on the basis that a
charge-sheet is contemplated or some investigation is ordered by the
bank, it would amount to interfering with or denying a right to which
the petitioner was rightfully entitled to which is per se improper and
opposed to principles of natural justice. No man can be denied his
due without even letting him have an inkling as to why he is being
denied it."
36. In Govt. of India Ministry of Home Aff airs & ors. v. Tarak Nath
Ghosh 1971 AIR SC 823 this Court while dealing with the disciplinary
proceedings initiated against the respondent, an IPS offi cer, made the
following remarks:
"13. In substance, disciplinary proceedings can be said to be started
against an offi cer when complaints about his integrity or honesty
are entertained and followed by a preliminary enquiry into them
culminating in the satisfaction of the Govt. that a prima facie case
has been made out against him for the framing of charges. When the
order of suspension itself shows that the Govt. was of the view that
such a prima facie case for departmental proceedings had been made
STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS v. DINESH SINGH
AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
1062
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 16 S.C.R.
out the fact that the order also mentions that such proceedings were
contemplated makes no diff erence. Again, the fact that in other rules
of service an order of suspension may be made when 'disciplinary
proceedings were contemplated' should not lead us to take the view
that a member of an All-India Service should be dealt with diff erently."
37. Similarly, in P.R. Nayak v. Union of India, (1972) 1 SCC 332
this Court had the opportunity to consider the meaning of contemplation
of disciplinary proceedings under the All-India Services (Discipline and
Appeal) Rules, 1969 and while doing so, this Court made the following
observations:
"69. ...Rule 3 of the All-India Services (Discipline and Appeal)
Rules, 1969, which has already been set out in extenso, provides
for suspension during disciplinary proceedings. Sub-rule (1) of this
rule on its plain reading...does not suggest that suspension can be
ordered merely when disciplinary proceedings are contemplated.
The language used in sub-rules (4) to (7) also suggests that these
rules do not authorise order of suspension of the delinquent member
of the Service merely because disciplinary proceedings against him
are contemplated. Suspension under those sub-rules may be ordered
only either after conviction [deeming provision under sub-rule (4)]
or when criminal proceedings are actually in progress [sub-rule (5)]
or when after the penalty imposed on him having been set aside,
the disciplinary authority decides to hold further enquiry [deeming
provision under sub-rule (6)]... The legislative scheme underlying Rule
3 is thus clearly indicative of the intention of the rule-making authority
to restrict its operation only to those cases in which the Government
concerned is possessed of suffi cient material whether after preliminary
investigation or otherwise and the disciplinary proceedings have
in fact commenced and not merely when they are contemplated. An
order of suspension before the actual initiation or commencement of
disciplinary proceedings appears to us therefore, to be clearly outside
the ambit of Rule 3 and we fi nd no cogent ground for straining the plain
language of Rule 3(1) so as to extend it to cases in which disciplinary
proceedings are merely contemplated and not actually initiated or
commenced. It is no doubt true that this Court (G.K. Mitter and A.N.
1063
Ray, JJ.) has in Government of India, Ministry of Home Aff airs v. Tarak
Nath Ghosh, [(1971) 1 SCC 734 : AIR 1971 SC 823] 'expressed the
view that under Rule 7(1) of the All India Services (Discipline and
Appeal) Rules, 1955 [replaced in 1969 by Rule 3(1) with which we
are concerned] the Government is entitled to place an offi cer under
suspension even before defi nite charges are communicated to him when
preliminary investigation has been made into his conduct following
allegations of corrupt or malpractice levelled against him. In support
of this view, reliance in that decision was placed on S. Govinda Menon
v. Union of India, [(1967) 2 SCR 566 : AIR 1967 SC 1274] ' an earlier
decision by a bench of two Judges."
38. In Kul Bhusan Chopra v. Punjab National Bank and Ors. (1979)
IILLJ 86 Del the Delhi High Court while considering the suspension of the
petitioner under Clause 12 of the Punjab National Bank Offi cer Employees
(Discipline and Appeal) Regulation 1977 elucidated the meaning of the
term contemplation as follows:
"11. When can the disciplinary proceedings be said to be "contemplated"
must then be determined. Can an offi cer be suspended merely during
the investigation by the Bank or during the pendency of some sort of
a preliminary of confi dential enquiry by it and must the suspension be
resorted to, if at all, only after a formal charge or accusation has been
made against an offi cer? What does the expression "contemplated"
connote? Does it merely mean that proceedings are likely in the
foreseeable future or are imminent in the near future or are about
to be initiated. These are some of the questions that were posed
in the course of arguments.