# CASE DETAILS THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS v. BHUPENDRA YADAV

- **Citation:** 2023 INSC 837
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2023-09-20
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 5984 of 2023
- **Bench:** Hima Kohli, Rajesh Bindal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/case-details-the-state-of-madhya-pradesh-and-others-v-bhupendra-yadav-36666
- **Pages:** 19

## Headnote

Issue for consideration: Whether the appellants have erred in rejecting
the candidature of the respondent to the post of Constable, despite the latter
having truthfully disclosed in his affi davit the fact that he had faced trial in
a criminal case which had resulted in his acquittal.
Service Law - Rejection of candidature by the departmental
authorities on basis of moral turpitude - Propriety:
Held: An employer has the discretion to terminate or condone an
omission in the disclosure made by a candidate - While doing so, the
employer must act with prudence, keep in mind the nature of the post
and the duties required to be discharged - Higher the post, more stringent
ought to be the standards to be applied - Even if a truthful disclosure has
been made, the employer is well within its right to examine the fi tness of a
candidate and in a concluded criminal case, keep in mind the nature of the
off ence and verify whether the acquittal is honourable or benefi t has been
extended on technical reasons - If the employer arrives at a conclusion
that the incumbent is of a suspect character or unfi t for the post, he may
not be appointed or continued in service - In the instant case, even though
the respondent had truthfully declared that he was involved in a criminal
case which was decided by the trial Court, on perusing the facts of the said
case, it is clear that it was not a case of clean acquittal - It is evident from
the facts narrated that after the charge-sheet was fi led, the respondent had
arrived at a compromise with the complainant, based on which the off ence
u/s. 341 IPC was compounded - As for the remaining off ences for which
the respondent was charged i.e. s.354(D) of the IPC and s.11 (D)/12 of the
439
POCSO Act, they were non compoundable and therefore, the matter was
taken to trial - The respondent was acquitted by the trial Court primarily on
account of the fact that the complainant did not support the case set up by
the prosecution and the other prosecution witnesses had turned hostile - In
such circumstances, the respondent's plea that he had been given a clean
acquittal in the criminal case, is found to be devoid of merits - Mere acquittal
of the respondent in the criminal case would not automatically entitle him
to being declared fi t for appointment to the subject post. [Paras 10, 16, 19]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Avatar Singh v. Union of India and Others (2016) 8 SCC 471 : [2016]
7 SCR 445; Daya Shankar Yadav. v. Union of India and Others (2010) 14
SCC 103 : [2010] 13 SCR 1076; Rajasthan Rajya Vidhut Prasaran Nigam
Limited and Another v. Anil Kanwaria (2021) 10 SCC 136 - relied on.
Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and Another v. Mehar Singh
(2013) 7 SCC 685 : [2013] 13 SCR 432; Union Territory, Chandigarh
Administration and Others v. Pradeep Kumar and Others (2018) 1 SCC
797 : [2018] 1 SCR 112; Pawan Kumar v. Union of India and Another 2022
SCC Online SC 532; Ashutosh Pawar v. High Court of M.P and Another
2018 SCC Online MP 72; Jainendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2012)
8 SCC 748 : [2012] 6 SCR 1047; State of Madhya Pradesh and Others v.
Abhijit Singh Pawar (2018) 18 SCC 733: [2018] 13 SCR 1133; R.K. Kapur
v. Union of Indian and Another AIR 1964 SC 787 : [1964] SCR 431; State
of Madhya Pradesh and Others v. Parvez Khan (2015) 2 SCC 591 : [2014]
14 SCR 520 - referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES

## Text

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[2023] 14 S.C.R. 438 : 2023 INSC 837
438
CASE DETAILS
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
v.
BHUPENDRA YADAV
(Civil Appeal No. 5984 of 2023)
SEPTEMBER 20, 2023
[HIMA KOHLI AND RAJESH BINDAL, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: Whether the appellants have erred in rejecting
the candidature of the respondent to the post of Constable, despite the latter
having truthfully disclosed in his affi davit the fact that he had faced trial in
a criminal case which had resulted in his acquittal.
Service Law - Rejection of candidature by the departmental
authorities on basis of moral turpitude - Propriety:
Held: An employer has the discretion to terminate or condone an
omission in the disclosure made by a candidate - While doing so, the
employer must act with prudence, keep in mind the nature of the post
and the duties required to be discharged - Higher the post, more stringent
ought to be the standards to be applied - Even if a truthful disclosure has
been made, the employer is well within its right to examine the fi tness of a
candidate and in a concluded criminal case, keep in mind the nature of the
off ence and verify whether the acquittal is honourable or benefi t has been
extended on technical reasons - If the employer arrives at a conclusion
that the incumbent is of a suspect character or unfi t for the post, he may
not be appointed or continued in service - In the instant case, even though
the respondent had truthfully declared that he was involved in a criminal
case which was decided by the trial Court, on perusing the facts of the said
case, it is clear that it was not a case of clean acquittal - It is evident from
the facts narrated that after the charge-sheet was fi led, the respondent had
arrived at a compromise with the complainant, based on which the off ence
u/s. 341 IPC was compounded - As for the remaining off ences for which
the respondent was charged i.e. s.354(D) of the IPC and s.11 (D)/12 of the
439
POCSO Act, they were non compoundable and therefore, the matter was
taken to trial - The respondent was acquitted by the trial Court primarily on
account of the fact that the complainant did not support the case set up by
the prosecution and the other prosecution witnesses had turned hostile - In
such circumstances, the respondent's plea that he had been given a clean
acquittal in the criminal case, is found to be devoid of merits - Mere acquittal
of the respondent in the criminal case would not automatically entitle him
to being declared fi t for appointment to the subject post. [Paras 10, 16, 19]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Avatar Singh v. Union of India and Others (2016) 8 SCC 471 : [2016]
7 SCR 445; Daya Shankar Yadav. v. Union of India and Others (2010) 14
SCC 103 : [2010] 13 SCR 1076; Rajasthan Rajya Vidhut Prasaran Nigam
Limited and Another v. Anil Kanwaria (2021) 10 SCC 136 - relied on.
Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and Another v. Mehar Singh
(2013) 7 SCC 685 : [2013] 13 SCR 432; Union Territory, Chandigarh
Administration and Others v. Pradeep Kumar and Others (2018) 1 SCC
797 : [2018] 1 SCR 112; Pawan Kumar v. Union of India and Another 2022
SCC Online SC 532; Ashutosh Pawar v. High Court of M.P and Another
2018 SCC Online MP 72; Jainendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2012)
8 SCC 748 : [2012] 6 SCR 1047; State of Madhya Pradesh and Others v.
Abhijit Singh Pawar (2018) 18 SCC 733: [2018] 13 SCR 1133; R.K. Kapur
v. Union of Indian and Another AIR 1964 SC 787 : [1964] SCR 431; State
of Madhya Pradesh and Others v. Parvez Khan (2015) 2 SCC 591 : [2014]
14 SCR 520 - referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5984 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 24.01.2018 of the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior in WA No.46 of 2018.
Appearances:
Bharat Singh, AAG, Harmeet Singh Ruprah, DAG, Abhimanyu
Singh, Sunny Choudhary, Shashank Shekhar, Sumit Arora, Advs. for the
Appellants.
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS v.
BHUPENDRA YADAV
440
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
Ms. Savitri Pandey, Bhoopesh Pandey, Dr. Sushil Balwada, Srilok
Nath Rath, Ms. Reena Rao, Ms. Akansha Rai, Ms. Apeksha Rai, Pramod
Kumar, Vivekanand Rana, Advs. for the Respondent.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
HIMA KOHLI, J.
1.Leave granted.
2. A challenge has been laid in the present appeal to the judgement
dated 24th January, 2018, passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior, dismissing the appeal1 fi led by the appellant -
State Government against the order dated 17th November, 2017, passed by
the learned Single Judge in a writ petition2 and relegating the matter back
to the competent authority for passing a fresh order.
3. We may fi rst allude to the relevant facts of the case.
3.1 In May, 2015, a criminal case3 was registered against the respondent
who was arrayed as an accused in a Special Sessions Case4 in the Court
of the First Additional Sessions Judge, Ashok Nagar (MP). Charges were
framed against the respondent under Sections 341, 354(D) of the Indian
Penal Code5 and Section 11 (D)/12 of the POCSO Act. The case set up by
the prosecution against the respondent was that on 14th February, 2015, he
along with the other co-accused had wrongfully restrained the complainant
therein (a minor) and tried to outrage her modesty. Despite the complainant
spurring the repeated eff orts made by the respondent to befriend her, he had
persistently stalked her, threw a letter and fl owers at her and insisted that
she speaks to him.
1
Writ Appeal No. 46 of 2018
2
Writ Petition No. 19621 of 2017
3
Vide Crime No.64/2015, registered at PS Isagarh, District Ashoknagar, under Sections
341, 354 (D), 323, 34 IPC and under Sections 7, 8 and 11(d)/12 of the Protection of
Children from Sexual Off ences Act, 2012, for short 'the POCSO Act'.
4
Special Sessions Case No. 16 of 2015 instituted on 21st May, 2015
5
For short 'IPC'
441
3.2 Records reveal that during the course of the trial, the complainant
had turned hostile. On a perusal of the judgement6 passed by the First
Additional Sessions Judge, Ashok Nagar, MP in the Sessions Case4, it
transpires that the parties arrived at a settlement. As a result, not only the
complainant but even her friends who had witnessed the incident, went into
a denial mode and refused to support the case set up by the prosecution.
The trial Court recorded the fact that a compromise was arrived at between
the complainant and the respondent (accused therein) and based on the
compromise application preferred by the parties, the charges framed
against him under Section 341 of the IPC, were compounded. As the other
off ences for which the respondent was charged, were non-compoundable,
the case continued but because the prosecutrix and the witnesses cited by
the prosecution turned hostile, the trial Court passed an order, acquitting
the respondent of the charges framed under Section 354(D) of the IPC and
Section 11 (D)/12 of the POCSO Act.
3.3 In the very next year, i.e., 2016, the appellant - State Government
conducted an entrance examination for fi lling up vacancies of the post of
constables. The respondent participated in the said examination and qualifi ed
the same under the OBC category. Thereafter, a physical test was conducted
which was also cleared by the respondent. Finally, based on his performance,
the respondent was selected and posted at Ujjain. Vide letter dated 22nd
July, 2017, the appellant No.3 - Superintendent of Police, Ujjain directed
the respondent to furnish requisite information in terms of the prescribed
form. In the verifi cation form, the respondent disclosed information about
his involvement in the aforesaid criminal case and the order of acquittal
passed by the trial Court.
3.4 On scrutinizing his verifi cation form, the appellant No. 3 -
Superintendent of Police, Ujjain addressed a communication dated 24th
August, 20177 to the respondent informing him that he was found to be
unfi t for being recruited. For ready reference, the contents of the said letter
are extracted hereinbelow : -
6
Dated 26th October, 2015
7
No./SP/Ujjain/Est./P3756A/17 dated: 24.08.17
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS v.
BHUPENDRA YADAV [HIMA KOHLI, J.]
442
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
"OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,

DISTRICT UJJAIN, MP
No./SP/Ujjain/Est./P3756A/17, Dated: 24.08.17
To,
Bhupendra Yadav
Son of Shri Kalyan Singh Yadav
R/o village Post Parsaul
District Ashok Nagar, MP
Sub: About fi nding to be unfi t in the character verifi cation
Ref.: Letter No. Visha/21/Vaihar/2016-17 (F 515/17) dated 09.08.17
It is to intimate in reference to the subject above that you were
selected in the Constable Selection Examination 2016 and the District
Ujjain has been allotted to you. You have been found to be acquitted
in Crime No. 64/15 Sections 341, 354-D, 323, 34 IPC and 7/8 POCSO
Act, Section 354 (D) IPC and Section 11 (D)/12 Protection of Children
from Sexual Off ences, 2012 registered in the police station Isagarh
District Ashok Nagar because the off ence was not proved 'beyond
doubt In your character verifi cation.
You have been found to be unfi t for the Government Service because
Sections 7 /8, Section 354 IPC and 11 (D) 12 Protection of Children
from Sexual Off ences are related to the moral degradation.
Sd/-
Superintendent of Police
District Ujjain
Copy to:
01. Reserved Inspector Police Line Ujjain with two copies that one
copy be given to the concerned person and the acknowledgement of
the receiving be sent to the offi ce .
Sci/-
Superintendent of Police
District Ujjain"
443
3.5 Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision taken by the appellant No. 3
- Superintendent of Police, Ujjain, the respondent preferred a writ petition2
before the High Court praying inter alia that the order dated 24th August,
2017, passed by the appellant No.3 be quashed and directions be issued to
reinstate him in service with all consequential benefi ts. Vide judgement dated
17th November, 2017, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition2
fi led by the respondent with the following observations:
"From perusal of the impugned order dated 24.08.2017 (Annexure P/1)
it appears that in the light of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India and Ors.
2016 (4) MPLJ 332 case of the petitioner has been considered and
after considering the same impugned order has been passed treating
the case of the petitioner is of moral turpitude. Once the departmental
authorities have arrived to a conclusion then no interference can be
made by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
because this Court is not sitting as a appellate authority. Even otherwise
the matter pertains to Section 354(d) of IPC and Section 7, 8, 11(D)
and 12 of the POCSO Act which amounts to moral turpitude, therefore,
no case is made out"
3.6. The aforesaid order was challenged by the respondent in an appeal1
fi led under Section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand
Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 which resulted in passing of the
impugned judgment whereby the Division Bench quashed and set aside the
order dated 24th August, 20178, passed by the Competent Authority and the
order dated 17th November, 2017, passed by the learned Single Judge and
remanded the matter back to the Competent Authority to pass a fresh order
in the facts of the instant case. The two factors that weighed with the High
Court for allowing the appeal1 were that the respondent had fairly disclosed
his involvement in the criminal case wherein he had been acquitted and
except for the said case, there was no other criminal case pending against
him. Aggrieved by the said decision, the present appeal has been fi led.
4. Mr. Bharat Singh, learned counsel for the appellants submitted
that the Division Bench of the High Court has erred in interfering with
the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge and overlooked the
fact that a candidate who seeks recruitment in police service, must be of
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS v.
BHUPENDRA YADAV [HIMA KOHLI, J.]
444
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
impeccable character, integrity and clean antecedents; that mere acquittal
in the criminal case did not entitle the respondent for appointment in police
service; that it is always open to an employer to consider the antecedents of
a candidate and examine as to whether he would be suitable for appointment
and such a discretion exercised by the Competent Authority ought not
to be interfered with unless the decision is arbitrary or mala fi de. Lastly,
learned counsel submitted that even though a compromise was entered
into between the respondent and the complainant in the criminal case3 and
he was acquitted on being extended benefi t of doubt, it still lies within the
domain of the employer to decide as to whether the respondent would be
a suitable candidate for appointment to the post, considering the fact that
the off ence for which he was charged involved moral turpitude. In support
of the aforesaid submission, learned counsel has cited Commissioner of
Police, New Delhi and Another v. Mehar Singh8; Avatar Singh v. Union
of India and Others 9; Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration and
Others v. Pradeep Kumar and Others10 and Pawan Kumar v. Union of
India and Another11.
5. Per contra, Ms. Savitri Pandey, learned counsel for the respondent,
submitted that the learned Single Judge of the High Court has committed
an error in dismissing the writ petition2 fi led by the respondent in view of
the fact that while fi lling up the verifi cation form, he had furnished all the
requisite information and duly disclosed the criminal case3 in which he was
involved and its fi nal outcome. Although, the respondent was acquitted of
all the charges levelled against him, the learned Single Judge had dismissed
the writ petition2 which order was rightly overturned by the Division Bench
of the High Court. Referring to the order dated 26th October, 2015, passed
by the learned Sessions Judge, learned counsel for the respondent described
it as a case of clean acquittal and argued that the appellant No. 3 ought not
to have declared the respondent unfi t for being recruited as a Constable.
6. We have heard the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the
parties, perused the records and the relevant judgements cited before us.
8
(2013) 7 SCC 685
9
(2016 8 SCC 471
10 (2018) 1 SCC 797
11 2022 SCC Online SC 532
445
The question that is required to be answered is whether the appellants have
erred in rejecting the candidature of the respondent to the post of Constable,
despite the latter having truthfully disclosed in his affi davit the fact that he
had faced trial in a criminal case3 which had resulted in his acquittal.
7. It is not in dispute that in the verifi cation form required to be fi lled
up by the respondent, he had made a disclosure of the case registered
against him in the year 2015 and the fact that he had faced a trial in the
said case that ended in his acquittal vide judgement dated 26th October,
2015. In the above circumstances, it cannot be said that the respondent
had withheld material information from the appellants while participating
in the selection process for the subject post or at the time of fi lling up
the affi davit/verifi cation form. The point on which there is a diversion of
opinion between the Division Bench and the learned Single Judge is that
while the latter had relied on a decision of this Court in Avatar Singh10
(supra) and observed that the Department could not be faulted for issuing
the letter dated 24th August, 20178 declaring the respondent as unfi t for
appointment in government service on the ground that it was a case of
moral turpitude, the Division Bench held to the contrary and relying on
the very same decision along with one rendered by this Court in Pradeep
Kumar11(supra) and a Full Bench decision of the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh in Ashutosh Pawar v. High Court of M.P and Another12 observed
that in a case like the present one where there was no other criminal case
pending against the respondent, except for the one in which he had been
acquitted and the Department had not undertaken a deeper look at the
respondent's past, it was a fi t case for relegating the matter to the appellants
for fresh consideration.
8. The standard for assessing the suitability of a candidate is measured
by the employer based on various factors including the nature of the post,
nature of duties, eff ect of suppression over suitability, etc. However, no
hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard [Refer, Pawan Kumar12
(supra)]. It must be emphasised that a candidate who proposes to participate
in a selection process, must furnish true and correct information in respect
of his character and antecedents in the affi davit/verifi cation form required
12 2018 SCC Online MP 72 (Writ Petition No. 5865 of 2016)
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS v.
BHUPENDRA YADAV [HIMA KOHLI, J.]
446
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
to be fi lled up during the selection process or after induction in the service,
as the case may be. A candidate who makes a false declaration or suppresses
material information or furnishes half-baked information which may not
be the whole truth, can be visited with adverse consequences to the point
of his exclusion even though he may have qualifi ed in the entire selection
process, based on the said falsity/suppression.
9. In view of the cleavage of opinion expressed in several decisions
of this Court, a Division Bench in Jainendra Singh v. State of Uttar
Pradesh13,decided to refer the issue to a larger Bench for an authoritative
pronouncement on the question of suppression of information/submitting
of false information in the verifi cation form by an aspirant of a job when
the incumbent has faced criminal prosecution, been arrested or on account
of pendency of a criminal case. The aforesaid confl icting opinions were
fi nally settled by a three-Judges Bench of this Court in Avtar Singh10 (supra)
where after examining diff erent views expressed by Benches of this Court
from time to time, broad guidelines were laid down as to the yardstick to be
applied for verifi cation of disclosures made by a candidate to the employer
for deciding as to whether the incumbent would be fi t for appointment or
not. In this context, we may usefully extract the following observations
made in Avatar Singh10 (supra) : -
"29. The verifi cation of antecedents is necessary to fi nd out fi tness
of incumbent, in the process if a declarant is found to be of good
moral character on due verifi cation of antecedents, merely by
suppression of involvement in trivial offence which was not
pending on date of fi lling attestation form, whether he may be
deprived of employment? There may be case of involving moral
turpitude/serious off ence in which employee has been acquitted
but due to technical reasons or giving benefi t of doubt. There may
be situation when person has been convicted of an off ence before
fi lling verifi cation form or case is pending and information regarding
it has been suppressed, whether employer should wait till outcome of
pending criminal case to take a decision or in case when action has
been initiated there is already conclusion of criminal case resulting
13 (2012) 8 SCC 748
447
in conviction/acquittal as the case may be. The situation may arise
for consideration of various aspects in a case where disclosure has
been made truthfully of required information, then also authority is
required to consider and verify fi tness for appointment. Similarly in
case of suppression also, if in the process of verifi cation of information,
certain information comes to notice then also employer is required to
take a decision considering various aspects before holding incumbent
as unfi t. If on verifi cation of antecedents a person is found fi t at the
same time authority has to consider eff ect of suppression of a fact that
he was tried for trivial off ence which does not render him unfi t, what
importance to be attached to such non-disclosure. Can there be single
yardstick to deal with all kinds of cases?
×××
×××
×××
36. What yardstick is to be applied has to depend upon the nature
of post, higher post would involve more rigorous criteria for all
services, not only to uniformed service. For lower posts which are
not sensitive, nature of duties, impact of suppression on suitability
has to be considered by authorities concerned considering post/
nature of duties/services and power has to be exercised on due
consideration of various aspects.
×××
×××
×××
38. We have noticed various decisions and tried to explain and
reconcile them as far as possible. In view of the aforesaid discussion,
we summarise our conclusion thus:
38.1. Information given to the employer by a candidate as to conviction,
acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case, whether before
or after entering into service must be true and there should be no
suppression or false mention of required information.
38.2. While passing order of termination of services or cancellation
of candidature for giving false information, the employer may take
notice of special circumstances of the case, if any, while giving such
information.
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS v.
BHUPENDRA YADAV [HIMA KOHLI, J.]
448
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
38.3. The employer shall take into consideration the government
orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the employee, at the time of
taking the decision.
38.4. In case there is suppression or false information of involvement
in a criminal case where conviction or acquittal had already been
recorded before fi lling of the application/verifi cation form and such fact
later comes to knowledge of employer, any of the following recourses
appropriate to the case may be adopted:
38.4.1. In a case trivial in nature in which conviction had been recorded,
such as shouting slogans at young age or for a petty off ence which
if disclosed would not have rendered an incumbent unfi t for post in
question, the employer may, in its discretion, ignore such suppression
of fact or false information by condoning the lapse.
38.4.2. Where conviction has been recorded in case which is not trivial
in nature, employer may cancel candidature or terminate services of
the employee.
38.4.3. If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving
moral turpitude or off ence of heinous/serious nature, on technical
ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefi t of reasonable
doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts
available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as
to the continuance of the employee.
38.5. In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully
of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to
consider antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the
candidate.
38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully declared in character
verifi cation form regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial
nature, employer, in facts and circumstances of the case, in its
discretion, may appoint the candidate subject to decision of such
case.
38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with respect to multiple
pending cases such false information by itself will assume signifi cance
449
and an employer may pass appropriate order cancelling candidature or
terminating services as appointment of a person against whom multiple
criminal cases were pending may not be proper.
38.8. If criminal case was pending but not known to the candidate
at the time of fi lling the form, still it may have adverse impact and
the appointing authority would take decision after considering the
seriousness of the crime.
38.9. In case the employee is confi rmed in service, holding departmental
enquiry would be necessary before passing order of termination/
removal or dismissal on the ground of suppression or submitting false
information in verifi cation form.
38.10. For determining suppression or false information attestation/
verifi cation form has to be specifi c, not vague. Only such information
which was required to be specifi cally mentioned has to be disclosed.
If information not asked for but is relevant comes to knowledge of the
employer the same can be considered in an objective manner while
addressing the question of fi tness. However, in such cases action cannot
be taken on basis of suppression or submitting false information as to
a fact which was not even asked for.
38.11. Before a person is held guilty of suppressio veri or suggestio
falsi, knowledge of the fact must be attributable to him."
(emphasis added)
10. As can be discerned from the above decision, an employer has the
discretion to terminate or condone an omission in the disclosure made by
a candidate. While doing so, the employer must act with prudence, keep in
mind the nature of the post and the duties required to be discharged. Higher
the post, more stringent ought to be the standards to be applied. Even if a
truthful disclosure has been made, the employer is well within its right to
examine the fi tness of a candidate and in a concluded criminal case, keep in
mind the nature of the off ence and verify whether the acquittal is honourable
or benefi t has been extended on technical reasons. If the employer arrives
at a conclusion that the incumbent is of a suspect character or unfi t for the
post, he may not be appointed or continued in service.
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS v.
BHUPENDRA YADAV [HIMA KOHLI, J.]
450
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
11. In Daya Shankar Yadav. v. Union of India and Others14, where
this Court was called upon to examine the purpose of seeking information
with respect to the antecedents of a candidate, it was observed that the same
were essential so as to ascertain the suitability for the post and the disclosures
made in the verifi cation form relating to the character and antecedents of
the candidate can result in the following consequences:
"15. When an employee or a prospective employee declares in a
verifi cation form, answers to the queries relating to character and
antecedents, the verifi cation thereof can therefore lead to any of the
following consequences:
(a) If the declarant has answered the questions in the affi rmative
and furnished the details of any criminal case (wherein he was
convicted or acquitted by giving benefi t of doubt for want of
evidence), the employer may refuse to off er him employment (or
if already employed on probation, discharge him from service), if
he is found to be unfi t having regard to the nature and gravity of
the off ence/crime in which he was involved.
(b) On the other hand, if the employer fi nds that the criminal case
disclosed by the declarant related to off ences which were technical, or
of a nature that would not aff ect the declarant's fi tness for employment,
or where the declarant had been honourably acquitted and exonerated,
the employer may ignore the fact that the declarant had been prosecuted
in a criminal case and proceed to appoint him or continue him in
employment.
(c) Where the declarant has answered the questions in the negative and
on verifi cation it is found that the answers were false, the employer
may refuse to employ the declarant (or discharge him, if already
employed), even if the declarant had been cleared of the charges or is
acquitted. This is because when there is suppression or non-disclosure
of material information bearing on his character, that itself becomes a
reason for not employing the declarant.
14 (2010) 14 SCC 103
451
(d) Where the attestation form or verifi cation form does not contain
proper or adequate queries requiring the declarant to disclose his
involvement in any criminal proceedings, or where the candidate
was unaware of initiation of criminal proceedings when he gave
the declarations in the verifi cation roll/attestation form, then the
candidate cannot be found fault with, for not furnishing the relevant
information. But if the employer by other means (say police
verifi cation or complaints, etc.) learns about the involvement of
the declarant, the employer can have recourse to courses (a) or (b)
above."
(emphasis added)
12. In State of Madhya Pradesh and Others v. Abhijit Singh Pawar15
where the State Government had invited applications for fi lling up the
post of Subedars, Platoon Commanders and Inspectors of Police, the
respondent candidate who participated in the selection process, fi led an
affi davit disclosing pendency of a criminal case against him which was
subsequently compounded on a compromise arrived at between him and
the complainant under Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure16.
Though the respondent was selected on clearing the written examination
his candidature was rejected. The reasons off ered for declining him an
appointment were that the candidate selected is required to maintain law
and order of the State and it was considered improper to appoint a person
having a criminal record. The said decision was overturned by the learned
Single Judge of the High Court and the view taken was affi rmed by the
Division Bench. When the State Government approached this Court
in appeal, citing the decisions in Mehar Singh9(supra); R.K. Kapur v.
Union of Indian and Another17; State of Madhya Pradesh and Others
v. Parvez Khan18; Pradeep Kumar11 (supra); and Avatar Singh10(supra),
the following observations were made :-
15 (2018) 18 SCC 733
16 For short 'the Cr.P.C'
17 AIR 1964 SC 787
18 (2015) 2 SCC 591
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS v.
BHUPENDRA YADAV [HIMA KOHLI, J.]
452
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
13. In Avtar Singh [Avtar Singh v. Union of India, (2016) 8 SCC
471 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 425] , though this Court was principally
concerned with the question as to non-disclosure or wrong disclosure
of information, it was observed in para 38.5 that even in cases where
a truthful disclosure about a concluded case was made, the employer
would still have a right to consider antecedents of the candidate and
could not be compelled to appoint such candidate.
×××
×××
×××
16. We must observe at this stage that there is nothing on record to
suggest that the decision taken by the authorities concerned in rejecting
the candidature of the respondent was in any way actuated by mala
fi des or suff ered on any other count. The decision on the question of
suitability of the respondent, in our considered view, was absolutely
correct and did not call for any interference. We, therefore, allow this
appeal, set aside the decisions rendered by the Single Judge [Abhijit
Singh Pawar v. State of M.P., WP No. 9412 of 2013, order dated 31-72014 (MP)] as well as by the Division Bench [State of M.P. v. Abhijit
Singh Pawar, 2015 SCC OnLine MP 7517] and dismiss Writ Petition
No. 9412 of 2013 preferred by the respondent. No costs.
13. In Rajasthan Rajya Vidhut Prasaran Nigam Limited and Another
v. Anil Kanwaria19, where the employer had invited applications for the post
of a Technical Helper and on qualifying for the said post, the respondent
therein was appointed as a probationer trainee, in the course of his police
verifi cation which was a pre-condition for confi rming him to the post, it
had transpired that he had been convicted by the trial Court for off ences
under Sections 323 and 341 of the IPC but was extended benefi t under the
Probation of Off enders Act, 1958 and released on good conduct. This Court
observed that at the time of submitting an application for appointment,
the respondent had already suff ered a conviction by the competent Court
which fact was withheld by him and he had fi led a false declaration. These
facts emerged only after receiving the police verifi cation report. After
distilling the law on appointments obtained by fraud or misrepresentation/
by suppression of material facts, this Court proceeded to quash and set aside
19 (2021) 10 SCC 136
453
the order passed by the learned Single Judge and upheld the order passed
by the Division Bench of the High Court, directing reinstatement of the
respondent - employee and held that said decision was unsustainable in
view of the fact that the employee had not disclosed/suppressed material
facts and had fi led a false declaration.
14. In the captioned case, this Court expressed a view that even where
there was a subsequent acquittal, the employee having furnished false
information/indulged in suppression of material fact of a pending criminal
case, cannot claim appointment as a matter of right. Following are the
observations made regarding the credibility of such an employee from the
perspective of the employer:
"14. The issue/question may be considered from another angle, from
the employer's point of view. The question is not about whether an
employee was involved in a dispute of trivial nature and whether he
has been subsequently acquitted or not. The question is about the
credibility and/or trustworthiness of such an employee who at the
initial stage of the employment i.e. while submitting the declaration/
verifi cation and/or applying for a post made false declaration and/or
not disclosing and/or suppressing material fact of having involved
in a criminal case. If the correct facts would have been disclosed,
the employer might not have appointed him. Then the question is of
trust. Therefore, in such a situation, where the employer feels that an
employee who at the initial stage itself has made a false statement
and/or not disclosed the material facts and/or suppressed the material
facts and therefore he cannot be continued in service because such an
employee cannot be relied upon even in future, the employer cannot
be forced to continue such an employee. The choice/option whether
to continue or not to continue such an employee always must be
given to the employer. At the cost of repetition, it is observed and
as observed hereinabove in catena of decision such an employee
cannot claim the appointment and/or continue to be in service as a
matter of right."
15. On applying the law expounded by this Court in a series of
decisions to the facts of the instant case, we fi nd that the Division Bench of
the High Court has dismissed the appeal1 preferred by the appellant - State
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS v.
BHUPENDRA YADAV [HIMA KOHLI, J.]
454
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
Government and set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge who
had upheld the order passed by the Competent Authority8, terminating the
services of the respondent on the ground that he was candid enough to make
a disclosure in his verifi cation form stating that he had been chargesheeted
in a criminal case3 wherein he was later on acquitted and there was no other
criminal case pending against him at the relevant time.
16. We are, however, unable to concur with the aforesaid view. Even
though the respondent had truthfully declared that he was involved in a
criminal case which was decided by the trial Court vide judgement 26th
October, 2015, on perusing the facts of the said case as noted hereinabove
and the observations made in the judgement, quite clearly, this was not a
case of clean acquittal. It is evident from the facts narrated that after the
chargesheet was fi led, the respondent had arrived at a compromise with
the complainant and fi led an application under Section 320 of the CrPC,
based on which the off ence under Section 341 IPC was compounded. As for
the remaining off ences for which the respondent was charged i.e. Section
354(D) of the IPC and Section 11 (D)/12 of the POCSO Act, they were non
compoundable and therefore, the matter was taken to trial. The respondent
was acquitted by the trial Court primarily on account of the fact that the
complainant did not support the case set up by the prosecution and the
other prosecution witnesses had turned hostile. In such circumstances, the
respondent's plea that he had been given a clean acquittal in the criminal
case, is found to be devoid of merits.
17. This is a classic example of the situation contemplated in para
38.4.3 of Avatar Singh10 (supra)where the charges framed against the
respondent herein involved moral turpitude and though he was acquitted
on the prosecution witnesses having turned hostile, but given the facts
and circumstances of the case which led to his acquittal, we are of the
view that the appellant - State Government was well within its right to
exercise its discretion against the respondent and terminate his services
on the ground that he was unfi t for appointment in the police department.
Here was a case where the complainant had reneged from the statement
made to the police in view of a settlement arrived at with the respondent.
It is noteworthy that the incident, subject matter of the criminal case3 had
occurred on 14th February, 2015, and judgement was pronounced by the
455
trial Court on 26th October, 2015. In the very next year, when the appellant
- State Government invited applications for appointment to the post of
Constable, the respondent had submitted his application. Even though
this is a case of candid disclosure of the criminal case3 on the part of the
respondent, which had culminated in an acquittal, but having regard to the
fact that the prosecution could not succeed in proving the case against the
respondent for the reasons noted hereinabove and further, being mindful
of the fact that the case involved moral turpitude and the respondent was
charged with non-compoundable off ences of a serious nature, we are of
the fi rm view that the judgment of the trial Court cannot be treated as a
clean acquittal.
18. The aforesaid aspects were rightly factored in by the appellant
- State Government while issuing the communication dated 24th August,
20178 and declaring that the respondent was unfi t for appointment to the
said post. The yardstick to be applied in cases where the appointment
sought relates to a Law Enforcement Agency, ought to be much more
stringent than those applied to a routine vacancy. One must be mindful of
the fact that once appointed to such a post, a responsibility would be cast
on the respondent of maintaining law and order in the society, enforcing the
law, dealing with arms and ammunitions, apprehending suspected criminals
and protecting the life and property of the public at large. Therefore, the
standard of rectitude to be applied to any person seeking appointment in
a Law Enforcement Agency must always be higher and more rigourous
for the simple reason that possession of a higher moral conduct is one of
the basic requirements for appointment to a post as sensitive as that in
the police service.
19. We are, therefore, of the opinion that mere acquittal of the
respondent in the criminal case3 would not automatically entitle him to
being declared fi t for appointment to the subject post. The appellant-State
Government has judiciously exercised its discretion after taking note of
all the relevant factors relating to the antecedents of the respondent. In
such a case, even one criminal case faced by the respondent in which
he was ultimately acquitted, apparently on the basis of being extended
benefi t of doubt, can make him unsuitable for appointment to the post of
a Constable. The said decision taken by the appellant-State Government
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS v.
BHUPENDRA YADAV [HIMA KOHLI, J.]
456
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
is not tainted by any malafi des or arbitrariness for the High Court to have
interfered therewith. As a result, the judgement dated 17th November,
2017, passed by the learned Single Judge is upheld while quashing and
setting aside the impugned judgment dated 24th January, 2018, passed by
the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is allowed.