# CASE DETAILS URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. & OTHERS

- **Citation:** 2023 INSC 935
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2023-10-19
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No.8411 of 2014
- **Bench:** Hrishikesh Roy, Manoj Misra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/case-details-urban-improvement-trust-bikaner-v-gordhan-dass-d-through-lrs-others-36676
- **Pages:** 61

## Headnote

Issue for consideration: Whether land acquisition proceedings can be
declared null and void for failure to give notice u/s.52(2) of the Rajasthan
Urban Improvement Act, 1959 to the owners who had purchased the land
two years earlier through registered sale deeds, before the initiation of the
land acquisition proceedings, even though the name of original khatedaar
was refl ected in the Revenue records; whether the civil court has jurisdiction
to grant injunction as s. 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 bars
jurisdiction of civil court in respect of agricultural land; and whether the suit
for injunction was maintainable without seeking declaration in a civil court.
Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 - s. 52 - Rajasthan
Tenancy Act, 1955 - s. 207 - Compulsory acquisition of land -
Requirement of service of notice upon the owners prior to notifi cation
- Jurisdiction of civil court in respect of the said land - On facts, the
respondents purchased the land through registered sale deeds, though
in the Revenue records, the name of original khatedaar-tenure holders
was refl ected - Two years later, initiation of the land acquisition
proceedings wherein notices duly issued to the tenure holders and were
paid compensation - Suit instituted against the appellant-Trust seeking
permanent prohibitory injunction to restrain the Trust from entering or
acquiring the land without adopting due process of law - Matter reached
the High Court wherein it was held that the acquisition notifi cation
was issued without notice to the land owners, thus was null and void;
and that the suit fi led for injunction was maintainable - Issue arising
521
as regards whether the land acquisition proceedings could be declared
null and void for failure to give notice u/s.52(2) to the landowners who
had purchased the land through registered sale deeds, two years before
the initiation of the land acquisition proceedings; whether the civil court
has jurisdiction to grant injunction; and whether the suit for injunction
was maintainable without seeking declaration in a civil court:
Held: Per Hrishikesh Roy, J: Upholding the judgment of the High
Court, it was held that the land acquisition proceedings is held to be void ab
initio for not following the procedure of serving notice; that having regard to
the limited relief that can be obtained from a revenue court under Tenancy
Act, 1955, to deny the land losers access to civil court would aggravate the
injustice, thus, civil court has jurisdiction to grant injunction; and that the
suit for injunction can be fi led without seeking declaration in a civil court
[Paras 10, 21, 38, 39 and 41]
Per Manoj Misra, J: Setting aside the judgment of the High Court
it was held that if the landowners did not get their names mutated in the
record of rights, how would the State come to know of their ownership, thus,
mere non-service of notice, u/s. 52(2) of the 1959 Act, upon non-recorded
owners, would not render the acquisition notifi cation void; that suit before
the civil court was barred by s.207 of the 1955 Act; and that the suit as
framed was not maintainable, not only for not seeking a declaratory relief
but also for not impleading the State as a party - In view of diff erence of
opinion, matter to be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for
referring the matter to a larger Bench - Reference to larger Bench - Land
acquisition. [Paras 51 and 64]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
In the judgment of Hrishikesh Roy, J.
Dhulabhai vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (1968) 3 SCR 662; Firm Seth
Radha Kishan vs. Municipal Committee (1964) 2 SCR 273 - relied on.
Bhola Shanker v. The District Land Acquisition Offi cer, Aligarh and
Ors. (1973) 2 SCC 59; State of Bihar v Dhirendra Kumar (1995) 4 SCC
229; Shri Saurav Jain v M/s ABP Design & Another 2021 SCC OnLine SC
552 - distinguished.
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS.
522
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
Vidya Devi v. State of H.P (2020)

## Text

_Characters 0–39,838 of 137,999. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39838 for what follows._

[2023] 14 S.C.R. 520 : 2023 INSC 935
520
CASE DETAILS
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER
v.
GORDHAN DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. & OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No.8411 of 2014)
OCTOBER 19, 2023
[HRISHIKESH ROY AND MANOJ MISRA, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: Whether land acquisition proceedings can be
declared null and void for failure to give notice u/s.52(2) of the Rajasthan
Urban Improvement Act, 1959 to the owners who had purchased the land
two years earlier through registered sale deeds, before the initiation of the
land acquisition proceedings, even though the name of original khatedaar
was refl ected in the Revenue records; whether the civil court has jurisdiction
to grant injunction as s. 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 bars
jurisdiction of civil court in respect of agricultural land; and whether the suit
for injunction was maintainable without seeking declaration in a civil court.
Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 - s. 52 - Rajasthan
Tenancy Act, 1955 - s. 207 - Compulsory acquisition of land -
Requirement of service of notice upon the owners prior to notifi cation
- Jurisdiction of civil court in respect of the said land - On facts, the
respondents purchased the land through registered sale deeds, though
in the Revenue records, the name of original khatedaar-tenure holders
was refl ected - Two years later, initiation of the land acquisition
proceedings wherein notices duly issued to the tenure holders and were
paid compensation - Suit instituted against the appellant-Trust seeking
permanent prohibitory injunction to restrain the Trust from entering or
acquiring the land without adopting due process of law - Matter reached
the High Court wherein it was held that the acquisition notifi cation
was issued without notice to the land owners, thus was null and void;
and that the suit fi led for injunction was maintainable - Issue arising
521
as regards whether the land acquisition proceedings could be declared
null and void for failure to give notice u/s.52(2) to the landowners who
had purchased the land through registered sale deeds, two years before
the initiation of the land acquisition proceedings; whether the civil court
has jurisdiction to grant injunction; and whether the suit for injunction
was maintainable without seeking declaration in a civil court:
Held: Per Hrishikesh Roy, J: Upholding the judgment of the High
Court, it was held that the land acquisition proceedings is held to be void ab
initio for not following the procedure of serving notice; that having regard to
the limited relief that can be obtained from a revenue court under Tenancy
Act, 1955, to deny the land losers access to civil court would aggravate the
injustice, thus, civil court has jurisdiction to grant injunction; and that the
suit for injunction can be fi led without seeking declaration in a civil court
[Paras 10, 21, 38, 39 and 41]
Per Manoj Misra, J: Setting aside the judgment of the High Court
it was held that if the landowners did not get their names mutated in the
record of rights, how would the State come to know of their ownership, thus,
mere non-service of notice, u/s. 52(2) of the 1959 Act, upon non-recorded
owners, would not render the acquisition notifi cation void; that suit before
the civil court was barred by s.207 of the 1955 Act; and that the suit as
framed was not maintainable, not only for not seeking a declaratory relief
but also for not impleading the State as a party - In view of diff erence of
opinion, matter to be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for
referring the matter to a larger Bench - Reference to larger Bench - Land
acquisition. [Paras 51 and 64]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
In the judgment of Hrishikesh Roy, J.
Dhulabhai vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (1968) 3 SCR 662; Firm Seth
Radha Kishan vs. Municipal Committee (1964) 2 SCR 273 - relied on.
Bhola Shanker v. The District Land Acquisition Offi cer, Aligarh and
Ors. (1973) 2 SCC 59; State of Bihar v Dhirendra Kumar (1995) 4 SCC
229; Shri Saurav Jain v M/s ABP Design & Another 2021 SCC OnLine SC
552 - distinguished.
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS.
522
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
Vidya Devi v. State of H.P (2020) 2 SCC 569; Ahuja Industries Ltd. v.
State of Karnataka & Others (2003) 5 SCC 365: [2003] 3 SCR 351; Sukh
Dutt Ratra v. State of H.P (2022) 7 SCC 508; D.B. Basnett v Collector,
East District, Gangtok, Sikkim (2020) 4 SCC 572; Jagan Singh & Co. v
Ludhiana Improvement Trust 2022 SCC OnLine 1144; M.P. Housing Board
v Mohd. Shaf (1992)2 SCC 168; Ramesh Gobindram v. Sugra Humayun
Mirza (2010) 8 SCC 726; Dewaji v. Ganpatlal, AIR 1969 SC 560; Sree
Kandregula Srinivasa Jagannath Rao Pantulu Bahadur Garu v. State of A.P.,
(1969) 3 SCC 71; Anathula Sudhakar v P. Buchi Reddy (2008) 4 SCC 594;
Laxmi Chand v Gram Panchayat Kararia (1996) 7 SCC 218; Commissioner,
Bangalore Development Authority and another v Brijesh Reddy and another
(2013) 3 SCC 66; Mumbai International Airport Private Limited v. Regency
Convention Centre and Hotels Private Limited (2010) 7 SCC 417; Nagpur
Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao 6 (1973) 1 SCC 500; Urban Improvement
Trust v Shri Padmanand AIR 1980 Raj 176; Urban Improvement Trust v
Mohan Lal (2010) 1 SCC 512 - referred to.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v Mc Grath 341 US 123 (1951)
- referred to.
Namita Wahi, 'Property' in Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla, Pratap
Bhanu Mehta (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution
(Oxford University Press 2016); Preeti Sampat, 'Limits to Absolute Power:
Eminent Domain and Right to Land in India' (2013) 48 Economic and
Political Weekly 40; Usha Ramanathan, 'A Word of Eminent Domain' in
Lyla Mehta(ed), Displaced by Development: Confronting Marginalisation
and Gender Injustice. (SAGE 2009); Debjani Bhattacharyya, 'History
of Eminent Domain in Colonial Thought and Legal Practice' (2015) 50
Economic and Political Weekly 45; Law Commission, 'Law of Acquisition
and Requisitioning of Land' (Law Com No. 10, 1977); Sambhav Shrivastava
et al., 'Subversion of Due Process for Seeking the Consent of Communities
in Land Acquisition and Resultant Land Confl icts' (Oxfam 2020); Namita
Wahi, Ankit Bhatia et al, 'Land Acquisition in India: A Review of Supreme
Court Cases 1950-2016'(Centre for Policy Research 2017) - referred to.
Julius L. Sackman, Russell D Van Brunt, 'Nichols on Eminent Domain'
vol 1 (3rd edn, Mathew Bender & co, 1959). § 1.11; Tom Allen, The Right
to Property in Commonwealth Constitutions (Cambridge University Press
2000) 172 - referred to.
523
Access to Justice Survey 2015-16' (Daksh, May 2016) <https://
dakshindia.org/wp- content/uploads/2016/05/Daksh-access-to-justicesurvey.pdf > accessed 19 September 2023 - referred to.
In the judgment of Manoj Misra, J.
Ahuja Industries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka & Others (2003) 5 SCC
365: [2003] 3 SCR 351; Bhola Shanker v. The District Land Acquisition
Offi cer, Aligarh and Ors. (1973) 2 SCC 59; Commissioner, Bangalore
Development Authority and another v. Brijesh Reddy and another (2013)
3 SCC 66: [2013] 1 SCR 853; Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan AIR 1954
SC 340: [1955] SCR 117; Munshi Ram v. Municipal Committee, Chheharta
(1979) 3 SCC 83; Dhulabhai vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (1968) 3 SCR
662; Firm Seth Radha Kishan vs. Municipal Committee (1964) 2 SCR 273;
Nawabkhan Abbaskhan vs. State of Gujarat (1974) 2 SCC 121: [1974] 3
SCR 427; Bharati Reddy vs. State of Karnataka (2018) 6 SCC 162: [2018]
3 SCR 137; Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (2008) 4 SCC 594: [2008]
5 SCR 331; State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar and others (1995) 4 SCC
229: [1995] 3 SCR 857; Laxmi Chand v. Gram Panchayat, Kararia (1996)
7 SCC 218: [1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 774; T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satpal and
another (1977) 4 SCC 467: [1978] 1 SCR 742; Shri Saurav Jain & Another
Vs. M/s A.B.P. Design & Another 2021 SCC OnLine SC 552; Pyarelal v.
Shubhendra Pilania (2019) 3 SCC 692: [2019] 1 SCR 717; Bank of Baroda
v. Moti Bai (1985) 1 SCC 475: [1985] 2 SCR 784 - referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : CIVIL APPEAL NO.8411
OF 2014
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.01.2010 of the High Court of
Rajasthan at Jodhpur in SBCRSA No.114 of 2004
Appearances:
Aruneshwar Gupta, Sr. Adv., Himanshu Chaurvedi, Abhishek Sharma,
Rajeev Singh, Advs. for the Appellant.
Manoj Swaroop Sr. Adv., Achal Singh Bule, Nikhil Kumar Singh,
Sudhanshu Khandelwal, Rishi Matoliya, Advs. for the Respondents.
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS.
524
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
HRISHIKESH ROY, J.
Factual Backdrop
1. The challenge here is to the judgment dated 12.1.2010 by the High
Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in SB Civil Regular Second
Appeal No.114 of 2004 whereby the High Court upheld the verdict of the
fi rst Appellate Court and opined that the acquisition proceeding is null and
void since notice was not given to the owners who were in possession but
was given to original khatedaars whose names were existing in the revenue
record.
2. The respondent Gordhan Dass fi led Regular Civil Suit No. 03/04
projecting the case that the plaintiff and the defendant nos.2 to 4 jointly
purchased 3 bighas of land in Bikaner town in two tranches. Under the
registered sale deed dated 2.3.1970, two and a half bigha land was fi rst
purchased and under the second registered sale deed dated 16.3.1970,
another half bigha land was purchased from one Lal Khan. The plaintiff
and the defendant nos. 2 to 4 thereby became joint khatedars of the said
three bighas of purchased land. While the purchasers were in peaceful
possession of the land bearing Khasra no.211/81 and 239/83, the defendant
no.1 i.e. the Urban Improvement Trust, Bikaner started making claim
over this land projecting that they had acquired the said land. Initially, the
suit was fi led seeking permanent injunction to restrain the defendant no.1
from trespassing into the land and initiating any acquisition process but
later when the defendant no.1 was trying to obtain forceful possession of
the land during the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff amended the suit on
11.11.2002 to secure restoration of possession through mandatory injunction.
It was also pleaded that on the basis of a judgment dated 26.2.1998(WP
2243/95) in Bhanwarlal v State of Rajasthan, concerning some other land,
the defendant no. 1 had taken possession of the plaintiff 's land and that the
plaintiff was enjoying possession till 9.6.1998 during the pendency of civil
suit. In the written statement, the Urban Improvement Trust admitted that
the plaintiff together with the defendant nos.2 to 4 purchased total 3 bighas
525
of land through 2 sale deeds dated 2.3.1970 and 16.3.1970, and those sale
deeds are registered in the offi ce of Sub-Registrar, Bikaner. The defendant
no.1 also admitted that the plaintiff submitted an application before District
Magistrate to convert one bigha land to non-agricultural category on which
the District Magistrate issued NOC since the said land was needed to set up
a petrol pump. Projecting their right over the concerned land, the defendant
no.1 in the written statement claimed that they had acquired 24 Bigha 12
Biswa land comprising Khasra No.294/82 and requisite compensation was
paid to the original khatedar. Therefore, no compensation is payable to either
the plaintiff or the defendant nos.2 to 4 who had purchased the 3 Bigha land.
3. The Trial Court on the basis of the rival contentions framed the
following issues:
"(i) Whether properties mentioned in paras 1, 1 (a), 1 (b) of the
plaint are under the ownership of plaintiff and defendant no.2 to 4?
(ii) Whether out of the above-stated lands, two bigha land has been
wrongly acquired by the defendant no.1?
(iii) Whether defendant no.1 has wrongly got possession over
suit land according to para no.9 of the plaint, plaintiff is entitled
to get the same restored?
(iv) Whether compensation has already been paid to the
concerning people having acquired 24 Bigha 12 Biswa suit
land comprising Khasra No.294/83 adopting lawful process
according to para No.115 of written statement?
(v) Relief (s) ?"
4. The learned Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Division) Bikaner partially
decreed the suit against the defendant no.1 by holding that the plaintiff is
entitled to get possession of 1 Bigha land meant for petrol pump in Khasra
No.284/83. However, for the balance suit land, it was held that the defendant
no.1 had acquired the said land and accordingly the suit of the plaintiff for
the 2 Bighas land, was dismissed. While granting relief for the 1 Bigha land,
the learned Trial Judge noted that possession of the same was restored to
the plaintiff after due permission from the State Government and therefore
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [HRISHIKESH ROY, J.]
526
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
his ownership remained undisturbed. For the balance 2 Bighas land, relief
was refused and it was held that even though the said land was purchased in
1970 through registered sale deeds, the names of the new owners were not
mutated in the revenue records which continued to refl ect the name of the
previous owner (seller), to whom compensation was paid. It was further held
that the onus was on the plaintiff to prove ownership, claim compensation,
and get his name recorded in jamabandi.
5. The plaintiff then fi led an appeal before the District Judge, Bikaner
and the learned Appellate Court by its judgment dated 16.4.2004 decreed
the entire suit land in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant
no.1 and the defendant was restrained from interfering with the plaintiff 's
peaceful possession, use and occupation of the suit land. The Appellate
Court concluded in favour of the plaintiff after noting that no opportunity
of hearing was provided to the plaintiff for acquisition of the land and
furthermore, the plaintiff, Gordhan Dass was enjoying undisturbed
possession of the land until 10.6.1988. Notwithstanding the mutation
correction not being carried out in the revenue records by the purchasers,
the Appellate Court noted that the plaintiff had already applied before the
District Magistrate for conversion of 1 Bigha land for establishing petrol
pump and NOC for the said purpose was issued in favour of the plaintiff
with the active cooperation by the defendants and it was thus concluded that
despite knowledge of the plaintiff 's ownership and possession, the defendant
no.1 did not discharge its duty to issue notice to the land owner/plaintiff
and accordingly the land acquisition proceedings were held to be invalid.
Moreover, since during the pendency of the suit the plaintiff was forcefully
evicted from the land on 10.6.1988 under cover of some other judgment
of the High Court, the Court opined that without proper acquisition
proceedings with notice to the owner, the possession of the plaintiff (who
was enjoying uninterrupted possession till 10.6.1988), could not have been
disturbed. It was further noted that neither was any acquisition notice issued
to the plaintiff nor they were paid any acquisition compensation although
they were the actual owners of the land. On the claim that the compensation
was paid, the Court opined that it was a vague contention in the written
statement and it was not categorically mentioned to whom compensation
was paid nor any evidence on such payment was produced by the defendant
527
No. 1. It was also found that the defendant no.1 had forcibly evicted the
plaintiff from his property during the pendency of the suit without due legal
process i.e. without service of notice, without providing the opportunity
of hearing and without payment of compensation to the plaintiff , and thus,
the proceedings of the defendant no.1 were declared to be invalid. The
decree of the Trial Court dated 23.2.2004 was thus set aside allowing the
plaintiff 's appeal. The decree of permanent injunction was accordingly
granted favouring the plaintiff against the defendant no.1 and it was further
ordered that defendant no.1 is to restore the suit land mentioned in para
no.1 (a) & 1 (b) of the plaint and they were restrained from interfering with
the use and occupation of the said land by the plaintiff .
6. The defendant no.1 i.e. Urban Improvement Trust, Bikaner
assailed the judgment and decree dated 16.4.2004 in Appeal Decree
No.30/04. The High Court in the second appeal noted that the defendant
no.1 in the written statement had admitted that the plaintiff together with
the defendant nos.2 to 4 are the owners of the suit land. Therefore, it was
held that suit for injunction without seeking relief of title declaration is
maintainable as even the defendant no.1 does not claim any title over
land purchased by the plaintiff and the defendant nos.2 to 4, by way of
two registered sale deeds in the year 1970. Since the plaintiff together
with the defendant nos.2 to 4 had obtained valid title by purchase in the
year 1970 and were in peaceful possession, they were not required to
seek relief of declaration of title, particularly when the title has not been
disputed by the defendant no.1.
7. The High Court adverted to the provisions of The Rajasthan Urban
Improvement Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the "1959 Act") and
observed that for compulsory acquisition of land under Section 52, the
procedure to be followed is prescribed in the sub-Sections under Section
52 such as giving notice and providing opportunity of hearing to the owner
and/or any other interested person and compensation must also be paid to
the owner under Section 53. However, since the defendant no.1 failed to
comply with the mandatory provisions under Section 52 and 53 of the 1959
Act and that acquisition process was initiated much after the purchase of the
land by the plaintiff , the acquisition proceeding in the absence of notice and
compensation was declared to be void and a nullity. It was specifi cally noted
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [HRISHIKESH ROY, J.]
528
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
that the defendant no. 1 admitted the possession and title of the plaintiff in
their written statement and thus it was opined that the plaintiff is entitled
to protect their property. As the defendant no.1 had also raised an issue
questioning the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, it was held that a suit in a
civil Court will always lie to question the order of the tribunal created by a
statute even if its order is expressly or by necessary implication made fi nal,
if the said tribunal abuses its power or acts in violation of its provisions.
Consequently, the second appeal fi led by the defendant no.1 was dismissed
upholding the decree passed in favour of the plaintiff by the fi rst Appellate
Court.
B. Submissions
8. Challenging the above judgment of the High Court, Mr.
Aruneshwar Gupta, Learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellant
argued that pursuant to the notifi cation dated 22.8.1974, public notice
and personal notices were duly issued to the original Khatedars whose
names were in the revenue records. The amount of compensation was
also duly paid. Service of notice to the original khatedars in the record
of rights was suffi cient notice as State Government is not liable to make
a roving or fi shing inquiry about the ownership of land. Secondly, the
purchaser of acquired land is 'any other person interested' and could
have raised objections under Section 52(3) of the 1959 Act. There is no
right to challenge the acquisition of land after expiry of 23 years as the
suit for permanent injunction was fi led on 21.4.1997. (Ahuja Industries
Ltd. v State of Karnataka1; Bhola Shanker v The Disst. Land Acquisition
Offi cer2). Thirdly, it was argued that the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is
a complete code in itself and thus, by necessary implication Civil Court
has no jurisdiction to pass injunction for a land which is already acquired.
Finally, it was argued that the nature of land acquired under the 1959 Act
was 'agricultural land' as the same was not converted for 'non-agricultural
use' u/s 90-A of Land Revenue Act,1956. Owing to Section 207 of the
Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (hereinafter "Tenancy Act,1955")read with
1
2003 5 SCC 365
2
(1973) 2 SCC 59
529
entry 8A and entry 23C of third Schedule, matter relating to temporary
and permanent injunction in respect of agricultural land could be heard
and determined only by a revenue Court. No civil suit is maintainable for
permanent injunction w.r.t agricultural land.
9. Projecting the contrary view, Mr. Manoj Swarup, learned Senior
Counsel for the Respondents argued that revenue authorities i.e. Patwari,
Tehsildar and Collector had knowledge of the rights and interests of the
plaintiff s. As per the requirements under Section 52(2) of the 1959 Act,
notice should be given not only to the owner of the land but also any other
person who in the opinion of State Government would be interested therein.
The Learned Counsel has placed on record letters from Tehsildar, Bikaner
acknowledging the sale deeds, thereby indicating that they had knowledge
of plaintiff s being in possession of the land. Reliance was also placed on
the decision of this Court in Ahuja Industries Limited v State of Karnataka3.
On the aspect of maintainability, it was canvassed that the civil suit was not
barred in law to adjudicate on the dispute. To substantiate the same, Mr.
Swarup cites the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Dhulabai and
others v State of Madhya Pradesh4(hereinafter referred to as "Dhulabai")
and Firm Seth Radha Kishan v The Administrator5.
C. Issues
10. Having summarised the contentions of the respective parties, the
following questions fall for our consideration:
a)
Whether land acquisition proceedings can be declared null and
void for failure to give notice to the owners who had purchased
the land two years earlier through registered sale deeds, before
the initiation of the land acquisition proceedings, even though
the name of original khatedaar was refl ected in the Revenue
records?
b)
Whether Civil Court has jurisdiction to grant injunction as Section
207 of the Tenancy Act,1955 bars jurisdiction of Civil Court in
respect of agricultural land?
3
(2003)5 SCC 365
4
(1968) 3 SCR 3 662
5
(1964) 2 SCR 2 273
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [HRISHIKESH ROY, J.]
530
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
c)
Whether plaintiff 's suit for injunction is maintainable without
seeking Declaration in a Civil Court?
D. Notice requirements in land acquisition proceedings
i) Constitutional right to property and procedural justice
11. This is a case of compulsory acquisition of land where the land
owner has no choice in the matter. The respondent purchased the concerned
land for valuable consideration and was in peaceful possession of the
land. At that stage, the appellant attempted to dispossess the respondent.
Acquisition of land for public purpose is permitted by law, but the
acquiring authority is required to ensure adherence to the statutory regime
for compulsory acquisition. Only by strict adherence to the procedure, a
measure of protection is aff orded to the landowners and the interested
persons, and implicit therein is fairness in the procedure. After all, one is
concerned with protection of constitutional rights under Article 300A of
the Constitution.
12. In the context, the recent observations of this Court in Sukh Dutt
Ratra v. State of H.P6., would bear consideration where the Court traced the
recognition of the right to property since the 1700s and reiterated the high
threshold of legality that ought to be satisfi ed, to dispossess an individual
of their property:
"13. While the right to property is no longer a fundamental right
["Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978"], it is pertinent
to note that at the time of dispossession of the subject land, this
right was still included in Part III of the Constitution. The right
against deprivation of property unless in accordance with procedure
established by law, continues to be a constitutional right under Article
300-A.
14. It is the cardinal principle of the rule of law, that nobody can be
deprived of liberty or property without due process, or authorisation of
law. The recognition of this dates back to the 1700s to the decision of
the King's Bench in Entick v. Carrington [Entick v. Carrington, 1765
6
(2022) 7 SCC 508
531
EWHC (KB) J98 : 95 ER 807] and by this Court in Wazir Chand v.
State of H.P. [Wazir Chand v. State of H.P., (1955) 1 SCR 408 : AIR
1954 SC 415] Further, in several judgments, this Court has repeatedly
held that rather than enjoying a wider bandwidth of lenience, the State
often has a higher responsibility in demonstrating that it has acted
within the confi nes of legality, and therefore, not tarnished the basic
principle of the rule of law.
15. When it comes to the subject of private property, this Court has
upheld the high threshold of legality that must be met, to dispossess an
individual of their property, and even more so when done by the State."
13. The Land acquisition laws in India have their origins in British
colonial law. Compulsory acquisition of land is based on the principle of
eminent domain which can be understood as the State's power to acquire
private property without the owner's consent for a 'public purpose'7.
Thus, when the State acquires property while exercising its eminent
domain powers, the economic loss suff ered by the owner is followed by a
corresponding economic gain to the State. The State deals with the property
as if it is the owner of the property8. Scholarly writings on the principle
of eminent domain have shed light on this subject9. In an article titled,
"History of Eminent Domain in Colonial Thought and Legal Practice"
published in the Economic and Political Weekly10, the author, while
critiquing the principle of eminent domain refl ects on the need to rethink
compulsory acquisition from the lens of ethics and justice. Referring to the
opening paragraph in the Tenth Report of the Law Commission of India:
7
 Julius L. Sackman, Russell D Van Brunt, 'Nichols on Eminent Domain' vol 1 (3rd edn,
Mathew Bender & co, 1959). § 1.11
8
Namita Wahi, 'Property' in Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla, Pratap Bhanu Mehta
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution (Oxford University Press
2016)
9
Tom Allen, The Right to Property in Commonwealth Constitutions (Cambridge
University Press 2000) 172; Preeti Sampat, 'Limits to Absolute Power: Eminent
Domain and Right to Land in India' (2013) 48 Economic and Political Weekly 40;
Usha Ramanathan, 'A Word of Eminent Domain' in Lyla Mehta(ed), Displaced by
Development: Confronting Marginalisation and Gender Injustice. (SAGE 2009)
10 Debjani Bhattacharyya, 'History of Eminent Domain in Colonial Thought and Legal
Practice' (2015) 50 Economic and Political Weekly 45.
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [HRISHIKESH ROY, J.]
532
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
Law of Acquisition and Requisitioning of Land (1958)11 dealing with land
acquisition as per which "critical examination of the various stages of
evolution of this(compulsory land acquisition) power and its ethical basis
will serve no useful purpose as the power has been established in all civilised
countries", the author questions the precedence given to customary practices
over ethics. There ought to be substantive limits on the power of eminent
domain in order to avoid arbitrary action. Strict adherence to procedure
is an essential safeguard towards achieving fairness and transparency in
the land acquisition process. Such procedures provide land owners and
interested persons a fair opportunity to say why their land should not be
acquired and also whether the compensation assessed for their lands is
adequate. To deny procedural safeguards to the land loser would mean that
the doors of justice are shut for him. Such an interpretation, in my view,
should be avoided.
ii) International Legal Framework on Compulsory Land Acquisition
14. Before proceeding to deal with the issue of the legitimacy of
the land acquisition proceeding, it would be appropriate to set out the
international legal framework on compulsory land acquisition. The right
to self-determination is enshrined within the Charter of the United Nations,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), amongst other instruments which is defi ned as the right of all
people to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources, and that no
person may be deprived of its own means of subsistence. Article 17 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that, "Everyone has
the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. No
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property." Self-determination also
includes obligation for states to refrain from any forcible actions that deprive
people of enjoying such rights. The concept of Free, Prior and Informed
Consent(FPIC) within international development law is most clearly stated
in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in
11 Law Commission, 'Law of Acquisition and Requisitioning of Land' (Law Com No. 10,
1977).
533
Articles 10, 11, 19, 28 and 29 which prescribes situations in which FPIC
must be obtained before granting compensation, taking of indigenous
property etc. Development experts have recognized that FPIC is not only
important for Indigenous people but can also be used as a positive approach
to involve local communities in decision-making about any proposed
development. Engaging them in such processes fosters a greater sense of
ownership and engagement and, moreover, helps safeguard their right to
development as a basic human rights principle12. These principles are not to
be found under the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 but the concept of acquiring
land through consent and Social Impact Assessment (SIA) on whether a
project serves "public purpose" has been added in the 2013 avatar of the
Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, The Right To Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013 is found to be more attuned to the notion of fairness and is progressive
to this extent.
15. While there are many instances of authorities failing to adhere to
the acquisition regime, this Court has the benefi t of a study conducted by
the Lands Rights Initiative of the Centre for Policy Research13. The outcome
of the extensive study of around 1269 judgments of the Supreme Court of
India between 1950 to 2016 on the legal trajectory of land acquisition cases
in India lead to the following comments:
"The process of land acquisition in India has been the source of
increasing political and legal contestation for almost two hundred
years. This stems from the inherently coercive nature of the process,
which creates a severe imbalance in power between the state and land
losers. Our review of Supreme Court litigation since the time India
became a constitutional republic in 1950 shows that while much of this
imbalance was created within the very text of the Land Acquisition
12 Sambhav Shrivastava et al., 'Subversion of Due Process for Seeking the Consent
of Communities in Land Acquisition and Resultant Land Confl icts' (Oxfam 2020)
<https://policy-practice.oxfam.org/resources/subversion-of-due-process-for-seekingthe-consent-of-communities-in-land-acquis-621109/> accessed 19 September 2023.
13 Namita Wahi, Ankit Bhatia et al, 'Land Acquisition in India: A Review of Supreme
Court Cases 1950-2016'(Centre for Policy Research 2017)
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [HRISHIKESH ROY, J.]
534
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
Act, a considerable part of it could also be attributed to executive
non-compliance with the rule of law. The result was a situation of
great inequity for the land losers"
[emphasis supplied]
 16. The Supreme Court in a recent judgment had the occasion to look
at the process of compulsory land acquisition where the landowners had
practically no means to oppose the proposed acquisition. A two judge bench
in Vidya Devi v. State of H.P14 speaking through Indu Malhotra J. made the
following signifi cant observation:
"12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by
the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it
continued to be a human right (Tukaram Kana Joshi v. Maharashtra
Industrial Development Corpn. [Tukaram Kana Joshi v. Maharashtra
Industrial Development Corpn., (2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC
(Civ) 491] ) in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article
300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no person shall
be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot
dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the
procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation,
though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be inferred in that
Article [K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka [K.T. Plantation
(P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ)
414] ].
12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private property, without
following due process of law, would be violative of a human right, as
also the constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution."
17. The signifi cance of complying with procedural requirements
cannot, therefore, be overstated.
iii) Burden is on the Authority to fulfi l procedural requirements under
Section 52 of the 1959 Act
14 (2020) 2 SCC 569
535
18. Returning to the facts of the present case, let us now consider the
implication of Section 52 of the 1959 Act. The provision having a bearing
in this discussion, is extracted below:
"52. Compulsory Acquisition of Land-
(1) Where on a representation from the Trust it appears to the State
Government that any land is required for the purpose of improvement
or for any other purpose under this Act, the State Government may
acquire such land by publishing in the offi cial Gazette a notice
specifying the particular purpose for which land is required and stating
that the State Government has decided to acquire the land in pursuance
of this Section.
(2) Before publishing a notice under sub-section (1), the State
Government shall by another notice call upon the owner of the land
and any other person who in the opinion of the State Government
may be interested therein to show cause, within such time as may be
specifi ed in the notice, why the land should not be acquired.
(3) After considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner of the land
and by any other person interested therein and after giving such owner
and person an opportunity of being heard, the State Government may
pass such orders as it deems fi t.
(4) When a notice under sub-section (1) is published in the offi cial
gazette, the land shall on and from the date of such publication, vest
absolutely in the State Government free from all encumberances.
(5) Where any land is vested in the State Government under sub-section
(4), the State Government may by notice in writing order any person
who may be in possession of the land to surrender or deliver possession
thereof to the State Government or any person duly authorised by it
in this behalf within thirty days of the service of notice.
****
****
****
****
****"
19. The implication of Section 52 of the 1959 Act, is that notice is
required to be served not only to the owner but also to "any other person
interested" thereby covering everyone interested in the concerned land.
To avoid the rigour of this Section, the appellant- Trust have given their
URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BIKANER v. GORDHAN
DASS (D) THROUGH LRS. [HRISHIKESH ROY, J.]
536
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 14 S.C.R.
version by saying that the plaintiff , Gordhan Dass intentionally did not
receive compensation so as to make it a ground thereafter and that the
onus would lie on the plaintiff as found by the trial Court. Gordhan Dass
was indisputably the actual owner and hence, as per the mandate of the
law, it was the responsibility of the concerned Authority15 to adhere to
the due statutory process before depriving the landowner or interested
persons, of their property. The burden is on the defendant No. 1 i.e. the
Urban Improvement Trust to satisfy the high procedural threshold before
acquiring any private property. Moreover, the defendant no. 1 was also
unable to produce any evidence to indicate whether compensation was ever
paid to the original khatedaars as was vaguely claimed by them. This fact
was also noted by the First Appellate Court in para 20 of the decision that,
despite a vague contention, there is no proof of payment of compensation
even to the original khatedars. On the other hand, the plaintiff s have
produced a letter wherein the original khatedaar is seeking compensation
as on 10.1.1990. Be that as it may, neither was notice issued to the actual
owners nor any compensation was paid to them by defendant no. 1. As
already noted, Section 52 of the 1959 Act requires the Government to
issue notice to the owner of the land and to any other person, who may be
interested therein to seek protection of their land from acquisition. Only
after consideration of the response to the notice, the concerned land is to
vest on the State Government. The land owner or interested persons are
also required to be given the opportunity of being heard. In the present
case, neither any notice was issued nor any compensation was paid to
the land owner. Moreover, it has been alleged that even after initiation
of land acquisition proceedings in 1972, the plaintiff continued to enjoy
possession till 10.6.1998 during the pendency of the civil suit. The plaintiff
was forcefully dispossessed under the cover of a judgment concerning
some other land. The said judgment has nothing to do with the land of
respondents. This further points towards glaring procedural irregularities
in the entire land acquisition process.
15 D.B. Basnett v Collector, East District, Gangtok, Sikkim (2020) 4 SCC 572; Jagan
Singh & Co. v Ludhiana Improvement Trust 2022 SCCOnLine 1144
537
20. The observations in M.P. Housing Board v Mohd. Shafi 16 are
relevant in this context where the signifi cance of giving proper notice was
noted as under:
"8.....The object of issuing a notifi cation under Section 4 of the Act is
two- fold. First, it is a public announcement by the Government and
a public notice by the Collector to the eff ect that the land, as specifi ed
therein, is needed or is likely to be needed by the Government for
the «public purpose» mentioned therein; and secondly, it authorises
the departmental offi cers or offi cers of the local authority, as the case
may be to do all such acts as are mentioned in Section 4(2) of the Act.
The notifi cation has to be published in the locality and particularly
persons likely to be aff ected by the proposal have to be put on notice
that such an activity is afoot. The notifi cation is, thus, required to give
with suffi cient clarity not only the «public purpose» for which the
acquisition proceedings are being commenced but also the «locality»
where the land is situate with as full a description as possible of the
land proposed to be acquired to enable the «interested» persons to
know as to which land is being acquired and for what purpose and to
take further steps under the Act by fi ling objections etc., since it is
open to such persons to canvass the non-suitability of the land for the
alleged "public purpose" also.