# Ch. Joseph v. The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other

- **Citation:** 2025 INSC 920
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2025-08-01
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 9986 of 2025
- **Bench:** J.K. Maheshwari, Aravind Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ch-joseph-v-the-telangana-state-road-transport-corporation-other-38981
- **Pages:** 25

## Headnote

i) Whether the retirement of the appellant on medical grounds
due to colour blindness, without offering alternative employment,
is legally sustainable in light of applicable service regulations and
binding settlements; ii) whether Clause 14 of the Memorandum of
Settlement dated 17.12.1979, executed u/s.12(3) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, remains valid, binding, and enforceable
despite the subsequent 1986 settlement and internal administrative
circulars; iii) whether the respondents complied with their duty to
make a bona fide assessment of alternative employment options
for the appellant, as required by law, policy, and principles of
natural justice; iv) whether the reliance placed by the High Court
on B.S. Reddy was legally tenable in the context of the appellant's
independent rights under a binding industrial settlement.
Headnotes†
Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of
Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 - APSRTC Employees
(Service) Regulations, 1964 - Regn. 6A(5)(b) - Appellantdriver was found to be colour blind and was declared unfit
to hold the post of driver - The appellant's representation
seeking alternate employment came to be rejected by the
respondent-corporation - The corporation passed an order
retiring the appellant - Whether the retirement of the appellant
on medical grounds due to colour blindness, without offering
alternative employment, is legally sustainable in light of
applicable service regulations and binding settlements:
Held: 1. The appellant's retirement from service on the ground of
colour blindness was effected without any demonstrable effort by
the respondent-corporation to identify or assess the feasibility of
* Author
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
321
Ch. Joseph v.
The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other
alternative employment, despite the appellant having expressed
willingness to be reassigned to a non-driving post - Such inaction
violates both statutory obligation and administrative fairness.
[Para 10.1]
2. The primary legal flaw lies in the assumption that medical
unfitness for a particular post automatically entails incapacity
for public service altogether - Colour blindness, though a
disqualification for driving, does not render the appellant unfit to
serve in any other non-driving role - There is no evidence that
he was declared wholly incapacitated or incapable of performing
other duties. [Para 13]
3. The MOS dated 17.12.1979 entered into u/s.12 (3) of Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 between the employer and the union representing
the workmen under Clause 14 would indicate that the drivers found
with "colour blindness" would be provided an alternate job and all
service benefits would stand protected - However, the Corporation
has relied upon the subsequent agreement, namely Memorandum
of Settlement (MOS) dated 22.12.1986 to stave off the claim
for alternate employment raised by the appellant in the instant
case - A plea has been raised in the Counter affidavit filed by the
Corporation that the MOS dated 17.12.1979 has been superseded
by the agreement of 1986 - The said contention is rejected - The
agreement dated 22.12.1986 does not refer to the agreement dated
17.12.1979 - In fact, Clause 5 (d) of the settlement agreement
22.12.1986 would indicate, suitable alternate jobs would have to be
identified and only in the event of not being possible to identify such
job, recourse to payment of additional monetary benefit as per the
proposal sent to the government will be given after government's
approval - The Settlement dated 22.12.1986 does not specifically
supersede the settlement agreement of 17.12.1979 - It is only by
way of a communication dated 10.11.2014, the benefit of alternate
employment given to the drivers declared unfit due to "colour
blindness" has been sought to be taken away which benefit was
extended till that date. [Paras 14, 16, 16.1, 16.2, 16.3]
4. Retirement on medical grounds must be a measure of last
resort, only after the employer exha

## Text

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[2025] 8 S.C.R. 320 : 2025 INSC 920
Ch. Joseph
v.
The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other
(Civil Appeal No. 9986 of 2025)
01 August 2025
[J.K. Maheshwari and Aravind Kumar,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
i) Whether the retirement of the appellant on medical grounds
due to colour blindness, without offering alternative employment,
is legally sustainable in light of applicable service regulations and
binding settlements; ii) whether Clause 14 of the Memorandum of
Settlement dated 17.12.1979, executed u/s.12(3) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, remains valid, binding, and enforceable
despite the subsequent 1986 settlement and internal administrative
circulars; iii) whether the respondents complied with their duty to
make a bona fide assessment of alternative employment options
for the appellant, as required by law, policy, and principles of
natural justice; iv) whether the reliance placed by the High Court
on B.S. Reddy was legally tenable in the context of the appellant's
independent rights under a binding industrial settlement.
Headnotes†
Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of
Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 - APSRTC Employees
(Service) Regulations, 1964 - Regn. 6A(5)(b) - Appellantdriver was found to be colour blind and was declared unfit
to hold the post of driver - The appellant's representation
seeking alternate employment came to be rejected by the
respondent-corporation - The corporation passed an order
retiring the appellant - Whether the retirement of the appellant
on medical grounds due to colour blindness, without offering
alternative employment, is legally sustainable in light of
applicable service regulations and binding settlements:
Held: 1. The appellant's retirement from service on the ground of
colour blindness was effected without any demonstrable effort by
the respondent-corporation to identify or assess the feasibility of
* Author
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
321
Ch. Joseph v.
The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other
alternative employment, despite the appellant having expressed
willingness to be reassigned to a non-driving post - Such inaction
violates both statutory obligation and administrative fairness.
[Para 10.1]
2. The primary legal flaw lies in the assumption that medical
unfitness for a particular post automatically entails incapacity
for public service altogether - Colour blindness, though a
disqualification for driving, does not render the appellant unfit to
serve in any other non-driving role - There is no evidence that
he was declared wholly incapacitated or incapable of performing
other duties. [Para 13]
3. The MOS dated 17.12.1979 entered into u/s.12 (3) of Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 between the employer and the union representing
the workmen under Clause 14 would indicate that the drivers found
with "colour blindness" would be provided an alternate job and all
service benefits would stand protected - However, the Corporation
has relied upon the subsequent agreement, namely Memorandum
of Settlement (MOS) dated 22.12.1986 to stave off the claim
for alternate employment raised by the appellant in the instant
case - A plea has been raised in the Counter affidavit filed by the
Corporation that the MOS dated 17.12.1979 has been superseded
by the agreement of 1986 - The said contention is rejected - The
agreement dated 22.12.1986 does not refer to the agreement dated
17.12.1979 - In fact, Clause 5 (d) of the settlement agreement
22.12.1986 would indicate, suitable alternate jobs would have to be
identified and only in the event of not being possible to identify such
job, recourse to payment of additional monetary benefit as per the
proposal sent to the government will be given after government's
approval - The Settlement dated 22.12.1986 does not specifically
supersede the settlement agreement of 17.12.1979 - It is only by
way of a communication dated 10.11.2014, the benefit of alternate
employment given to the drivers declared unfit due to "colour
blindness" has been sought to be taken away which benefit was
extended till that date. [Paras 14, 16, 16.1, 16.2, 16.3]
4. Retirement on medical grounds must be a measure of last
resort, only after the employer exhausts all reasonable avenues
for redeployment - This principle is inherent in the concept of
"reasonable accommodation", which is now recognised as an
aspect of substantive equality under Articles 14 and 21 - The
failure to explore alternate employment before resorting to medical
322
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
retirement is not merely a procedural lapse-it is a substantive
illegality that violates the appellant's right to livelihood and equal
treatment. [Para 17]
Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection
of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 - Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 - s.12(3) - APSRTC Employees (Service)
Regulations, 1964 - Regn. 6A(5)(b) - Whether Clause 14 of
the Memorandum of Settlement dated 17.12.1979, executed
u/s.12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, remains valid,
binding, and enforceable despite the subsequent 1986
settlement and internal administrative circulars:
Held: 1. The appellant's entitlement to re-deployment arises
from Clause 14 of the binding Memorandum of Settlement dated
17.12.1979, executed u/s.12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, which specifically provides for alternate employment to
drivers declared colour blind, with pay protection and continuity of
service - This clause remains valid and enforceable. [Para 10.2]
2. The Memorandum of Settlement dated 17.12.1979, was executed
between the Corporation and its recognised union u/s.12(3) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - The Memorandum of Settlement is
not a mere administrative circular-it is a binding statutory contract
forged between labour and management. [Para 18]
3. The enforceability of this settlement is not diminished by the
subsequent settlement dated 22.12.1986, which the Corporation
claims to be governing the field - Clause 5(d) of the 1986 settlement
provides that drivers who are medically unfit may, "to the extent
possible", be provided alternative employment, and where not
feasible, will be granted Additional Monetary Benefit (AMB) -
Crucially, this clause does not contain any express language
annulling or modifying Clause 14 of the 1979 agreement - Also,
the absence of a termination clause in the 1986 settlement,
coupled with the Corporation's continued adherence to Clause 14
in other cases even after 1986, confirms that the earlier agreement
remained operational - Accordingly, this Court finds that 1986
settlement does not explicitly abrogate or nullify Clause 14 of the
1979 settlement. [Para 21]
Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of
Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 - Industrial Disputes
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
323
Ch. Joseph v.
The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other
Act, 1947 - APSRTC Employees (Service) Regulations, 1964 -
Whether the respondents complied with their duty to make
a bona fide assessment of alternative employment options
for the appellant, as required by law, policy, and principles
of natural justice:
Held: 1. From the record, it is evident that the Corporation made
no effort whatsoever to assess the feasibility of assigning the
appellant to a non-driving post - There is no file noting, committee
report, vacancy statement, or suitability assessment relating to
the appellant - His representation requesting the post of Shramik
remained unanswered - No comparative evaluation was conducted,
and no individualized inquiry was held - The only justification offered
is that the Corporation's circulars bar such alternate employment.
[Para 24]
2. In the instant case, there is no evidence that the respondents
examined even the most basic parameters-availability of
vacancies, suitability of tasks, or the appellant's qualifications - This
total failure undermines the Corporation's claim of compliance with
either the 1979 or 1986 framework, and renders the retirement
order void for non-consideration of appellant's claim in proper
perspective. [Para 27]
Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of
Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 - Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 - s.47 - APSRTC Employees (Service) Regulations,
1964 - Whether the reliance placed by the High Court on B.S.
Reddy was legally tenable in the context of the appellant's
independent rights under a binding industrial settlement:
Held: 1. The Division Bench of the High Court erred in applying the
judgment in B.S. Reddy, which dealt with the limited scope of s.47
of the 1995 Act, and did not consider claims arising independently
under industrial settlements - The present case stands on an
entirely different legal footing. [Para 10.5]
2. The B.S. Reddy judgment did not deal with the enforceability
of a clause in an agreement/settlement entered into u/s.12(3)
of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 or the Corporation's obligations
under bilateral agreements with its workers - The High Court
overlooked the fundamental distinction between statutory rights
under disability law and contractual service conditions enforceable
through settlements. [Para 29]
324
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
3. The Court in Mohamed Ibrahim clarified that employees with
conditions like colour blindness, although not falling within the
defined categories of the statute, must still be accommodated
wherever their functional capacity permits - To do otherwise would
result in a regressive interpretation of the law, undermining the very
foundation of equal opportunity in public employment. [Para 36]
4. Even though in the present case the appellant had an enforceable
right under a statutory industrial settlement-placing his claim on
firmer footing-this Court finds it necessary to reaffirm that even
in the absence of such contractual rights, employees who acquire
disabilities during service must not be abandoned or prematurely
retired without being afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity
for reassignment. [Para 37]
Case Law Cited
Kunal Singh v. Union of India and Another [2003] 1 SCR 1059 :
(2003) 4 SCC 524; Mohamed Ibrahim v. The Chairman and
Managing Director and Others [2023] 13 SCR 924 - relied on.
Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Represented
by its Managing Director and Others v. B.S. Reddy (2018) 12
SCC 704; Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission and
Others [2021] 12 SCR 311 : (2021) 5 SCC 370; Ravinder Kumar
Dhariwal and Another v. Union of India and Others [2021] 13 SCR
823 - referred to.
List of Acts
Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights
and Full Participation) Act, 1995; Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
List of Keywords
Service Law; Retirement; Medical grounds; Retirement on medical
grounds; Colour blind; Post of driver; Alternative employment;
Service regulations; Binding settlements; Internal administrative
circulars; Principles of Natural Justice; Statutory obligation;
Administrative fairness; Incapacity for public service; Additional
monetary benefit; Concept of reasonable accommodation;
Termination clause; Right to livelihood; Equal treatment; Article 14
of Constitution; Article 21 of Constitution; Statutory rights under
disability law; Reasonable opportunity for reassignment.
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
325
Ch. Joseph v.
The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 9986 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.08.2017 of the High Court
Of Judicature at Hyderabad for The State of Telangana and The
State of Andhra Pradesh in WA No. 1343 of 2017
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
C. Mohan Rao, Sr. Adv., R. Santhana Krishnan, Lokesh Kumar
Sharma, Dharmendra Kumar Sinha.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Satyam Reddy Sarasani, Sr. Adv. Ms. Sri Ruma Sarasani, Shishir
Pinaki.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Aravind Kumar, J.
1.
Leave granted.
2.
Appellant herein is aggrieved by the judgment passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and
the State of Andhra Pradesh (hereinafter referred to as High Court)
in Writ Appeal No. 1343 of 2017 dated 21.08.2017, whereunder the
writ appeal filed by Telangana State Road Transport Corporation
[hereinafter referred to as "TSRTC"] i.e., Respondent No. 1, came to
be allowed and the judgment of the single Judge dated 10.03.2016
passed in Writ Petition No. 5164 of 2016 directing the Respondent
No.1 to provide the appellant an alternate employment came to be setaside and permitted the appellant to make a detailed representation
to the respondent-corporation to seek alternate employment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND:
3.
Appellant herein was selected and appointed as a 'driver' in the
Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation ("APSRTC" -i.e.,
the predecessor-in-title of the respondent-corporation) on 01.05.2014,
after fulfilling the eligibility criteria fixed for the post. On a periodical
326
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
medical examination conducted by the medical officer of the
dispensary belonging to the respondent-corporation, it was found
that the appellant was 'colour blind' and was declared unfit to hold
the post of 'driver'. The appellant preferred an appeal challenging the
observation regarding his fitness for the post of 'driver', alternatively,
the appellant also sought for alternate employment in the event, he
was declared 'medically unfit'. The appellate authority dismissed
the appeal filed by the appellant, upon which appellant made a
representation to the Medical Board, to consider his case by the
hospital belonging to the corporation. The Medical Board after
considering the case of the appellant, reiterated the findings of the
medical officer and the Appellate Authority.
4.
The appellant's representation seeking alternate employment came
to be rejected by the corporation on the ground that extant rules
do not provide for granting alternate employment to colour blind
drivers. The corporation, vide order dated 27.01.2016, passed an
order retiring the appellant w.e.f. 06.01.2016 and directed him to
avail the additional monetary benefits provided under the policy
governing the same.
5.
The appellant approached the High Court by filing a Writ Petition
No. 5164/2016, impugning the order dated 27.01.2016 and
sought for a direction to the corporation to provide him alternate
employment contending his disability falls under the category of
disablement under the provisions of the Persons with Disabilities
(Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act,
1995 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and therefore he cannot
be discriminated; it was also contended that such discrimination
would be in violation of Section 47 of the Act and Article 14 and
Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The appellant also relied on
a Memorandum of Settlement (hereinafter referred to as "MOS")
dated 17.12.1979 entered between the respondent-corporation and
the recognized union, which had a provision, namely, Clause 14 of
the MOS, which stated that the 'drivers' would be provided with an
alternate employment.
6.
The Single Judge vide order dated 10.03.2016, allowed the Writ
Petition. No. 25577/2014 wherein it was held that the category
of 'colour also falls within the category of disablement within the
provisions of the Act. Aggrieved by the direction of the Single Judge,
the corporation filed an appeal and the Division Bench relying on the
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
327
Ch. Joseph v.
The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other
judgment of this Court in Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport
Corporation Represented by its Managing Director and Others v.
B.S. Reddy1 and connected matters set-aside the order of the Single
Judge and directed the appellant to make a representation to the
corporation seeking the benefit as prescribed under the regulations
and the scheme governing the corporation.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES:
7.
Mr. C. Mohan Rao, learned Senior Advocate representing the
Appellant contends as follows:
7.1. The Memorandum of Settlement (MOS) entered between
the APSRTC and the recognized unions u/s 12(3) of the
Industrial Disputes Act,1947 dated 17.12.1979 is binding on
the respondent-corporation and according to the same, the
appellant herein being the 'driver' of the corporation is entitled
for an alternate employment and therefore, the appellant has
the right to seek alternate employment.
7.2. The High Court ought to have considered the case of the
appellant positively and has failed to appreciate that the case
of the Appellant falls within the category of people who have
acquired the disability during service and thus appellant would
be entitled for alternate employment.
7.3. The High Court failed to appreciate the principles enunciated
in the case of Kunal Singh v. Union of India and Another2
by this Court wherein this Court differentiated between the
disability of a person and acquired disability while in service
and contended that appellant having acquired disability while
in service is entitled to alternate employment.
7.4. The High Court ought to have considered that the Appellant
herein is entitled to the benefit of Section 47 of the Act and
therefore has the right to alternate employment.
7.5. The appellant also relied on the judgment of this Court in
Mohamed Ibrahim v. The Chairman and Managing Director
and Others in Civil Appeal No. 6785 of 2023, wherein this court
1
(2018) 12 SCC 704
2
(2003) 4 SCC 524
328
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
directed Respondent-Corporation therein to give the appellant,
who was colour blind, an alternate employment.
8.
Mr. Satyam Reddy Sarasani, Senior Advocate appearing on behalf
of the respondent-corporation, supporting the impugned order, has
contended:
8.1. That MOS dated 17.12.1979 was replaced by the Memorandum
of Settlement dated 22.12.1986, and the previous clause relating
to alternate employment to the drivers came to be replaced by
Clause 5(d) under the MOS dated 22.12.1986, which state as
follows:
"5(d) Medically unfit driver- it is agreed that to
the extent possible suitable alternative job will
be identified. In case it is not possible to identify
suitable jobs, additional monetary benefit as per the
proposals sent to the Government will be given after
Government's approval"
8.2. As the appellant being an illiterate person and being a person
without qualification, does not fall in the category of persons
who can be given alternate employment as per clause 5(d)
of the MOS dated 22.12.1986 and therefore, as there is no
suitable post available in the corporation to accommodate
the appellant, the decision of the corporation to terminate the
services of the appellant is correct. The corporation also relied
on the regulations governing the workmen of the corporation
to demonstrate that, no provision is available in the regulation
which imposes an obligation on the corporation to appoint the
appellant by providing an alternate employment.
8.3. The term 'colour blindness' does not fall under the category of
'disability' as defined under Section 2(i) of the Act and therefore
Section 47 of the Act does not apply. It is further contended
that, the judgment passed in Civil Appeal No. 3529 of 2017,
relied on by the High Court is correct and therefore supported
the impugned order passed by the High Court.
8.4. On the bare reading of the definition given in Section 2(i) it can be
seen that, persons who have more than 40% of disability will fall
into the category of 'persons with disability', and appellant's case
therefore does not fall in the category of 'persons with disability'.
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
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Ch. Joseph v.
The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other
8.5. That the corporation has also introduced a scheme for providing
employment to one of the family members of the medically
invalidated workers of the Corporation, therefore appellant
should opt for the same.
9.
Upon hearing the learned counsels appearing for the parties and
perusing the material available on record the following questions
arise for our consideration.
I.
Whether the retirement of the Appellant on medical grounds due
to colour blindness, without offering alternative employment, is
legally sustainable in light of applicable service regulations and
binding settlements?
II.
Whether Clause 14 of the Memorandum of Settlement
dated 17.12.1979, executed under Section 12(3) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, remains valid, binding, and
enforceable despite the subsequent 1986 settlement and internal
administrative circulars?
III.
Whether the Respondents complied with their duty to make a
bona fide assessment of alternative employment options for
the Appellant , as required by law, policy, and principles of
natural justice?
IV.
Whether the reliance placed by the High Court on B.S.
Reddy (supra) was legally tenable in the context of the Appellant's
independent rights under a binding industrial settlement?
FINDINGS:
10. Before we proceed to elaborate on the detailed analysis of the issues
arising in the present case, we deem it appropriate to set out in brief
the principal grounds which compel us to set aside the impugned
order passed by the High Court and to allow the present petition.
We do so for the following reasons:
10.1. Firstly, the Appellant's retirement from service on the ground
of colour blindness was effected without any demonstrable
effort by the Respondent-Corporation to identify or assess
the feasibility of alternative employment, despite the Appellant
having expressed willingness to be reassigned to a nondriving post. Such inaction violates both statutory obligation
and administrative fairness.
330
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
10.2. Secondly, the Appellant's entitlement to redeployment arises
from Clause 14 of the binding Memorandum of Settlement
dated 17.12.1979, executed under Section 12(3) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which specifically provides for
alternate employment to drivers declared colour blind, with
pay protection and continuity of service. This clause remains
valid and enforceable.
10.3. Thirdly, the subsequent settlement dated 22.12.1986 neither
expressly overrides nor impliedly nullifies the 1979 settlement.
Both settlements operate harmoniously, with the latter being
general in scope and the former addressing a specific category
of disability. Hence, the Respondents' reliance on the 1986
settlement to deny relief is misplaced.
10.4. Fourthly, internal circulars issued by the Corporation in 2014
and 2015, which purport to deny alternate employment to
colour-blind drivers, are administrative instructions that cannot
override binding service conditions created by a statutory
settlement under the Industrial Disputes Act.
10.5. Fifthly, the Division Bench of the High Court erred in applying
the judgment in B.S. Reddy (supra), which dealt with the
limited scope of Section 47 of the Act, and did not consider
claims arising independently under industrial settlements.
The present case stands on an entirely different legal footing.
11. We now proceed to examine each of these issues in detail.
RE: ISSUE - I
12. The undisputed factual position is that the Appellant was appointed
as a driver with the Telangana State Road Transport Corporation
(TSRTC), was medically examined and declared fit at the time of entry
and discharged his duties until he was found colour blind during a
routine medical check-up. Pursuant to the medical report declaring him
unfit for driving duties, he was retired from service under Regulation
6A(5)(b) of the APSRTC Employees (Service) Regulations, 1964.
The Respondents have sought to justify this action by referring to
internal circulars dated 10.11.2014 and 14.05.2015, which stipulate
that employees found medically unfit due to colour blindness shall
not be offered alternate employment, and shall be retired with the
grant of "Additional Monetary Benefit" (AMB).
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
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Ch. Joseph v.
The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other
13. The primary legal flaw in this approach lies in the assumption
that medical unfitness for a particular post automatically entails
incapacity for public service altogether. Colour blindness, though
a disqualification for driving, does not render the Appellant unfit
to serve in any other non-driving role. There is no evidence that
he was declared wholly incapacitated or incapable of performing
other duties. This Court in Kunal Singh (supra), held that when
an employee acquires a disability in the course of service, the
employer must retain the employee by providing suitable alternate
employment, unless no such post exists. In the present case, the
Appellant had requested reassignment to the post of Shramik, which,
by its nature, does not demand normal colour vision. No effort was
made by the Corporation to assess his suitability or to examine the
availability of such posts.
14. Further, it can be seen that, Rule 6A (5) (b) only provides for the
extent of terminal benefits which an employee may be entitled to,
in the case of retirement of a driver on medical grounds. The MOS
dated 17.12.1979 entered into under Section 12 (3) of Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 between the employer and the union representing
the workmen under Clause 14 would indicate that the drivers found
with "colour blindness" would be provided an alternate job and all
service benefits would stand protected.
15. For immediate reference Clause 14 of the said MOS dated 17.12.1979
is extracted below:
"14. Colour Blind Drivers
a) The long pending issue has been decided and it was
agreed to give alternate job to the Drivers found colour
blind during the periodical examination. While giving the
alternate job, the time scale and pay drawn by the Driver
at the time of disqualification would be protected. Circular
instructions would be issued in this regard incorporating the
cases arising after the issue of circular No. P1/210(1)/76PD, dt. 16-8-1976.
b) Having given the alternative job, the seniority of Drivers
will, however, be continued in the Drivers cadre, and they
shall take their further promotions at appropriate time as
per Cadre & Recruitment Regulations.
332
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
c) Drivers who are found Colour Blind during periodical
Medical Examination would be given day duties subject
to availability of such duties in the Depots.
d) Regarding the suggestion of the Union for finding out
an alternate test for Ishara test, the VC & GM agreed to
request the Eye Specialist of RTC Hospital Dr. E. Babu Rao
and after hearing the views of few other eye Specialists, the
decision would be taken whether to continue the Ishara Test
or a suitable alternate test is available for determination of
colour blindness keeping in view the safety of passengers
and the vehicle."
16. However as can be seen from the Counter affidavit, the Corporation
has relied upon the subsequent agreement, namely Memorandum
of Settlement (MOS) dated 22.12.1986 to stave off the claim for
alternate employment raised by the Appellant in the instant case.
A perusal of the said MOS dated 22.12.1986 would indicate that
it was referrable to two earlier agreements dated 9.10.1985 and
10.03.1986. Though a plea has been raised in the Counter affidavit
filed by the Corporation that the MOS dated 17.12.1979 has been
superseded by the agreement of 1986, we are loath in accepting
the said contention for reasons more than one which are as under:
16.1. Firstly, the agreement dated 22.12.1986 does not refer to
the agreement dated 17.12.1979
16.2. Secondly, 17.12.1979 agreement, there is a specific reference
to 'Colour Blind Drivers' (Clause 14) which refers to the same,
has been extracted supra. In fact, Clause 5 (d) of the settlement
agreement 22.12.1986 which has been heavily relied upon by
the Corporation to reject the claim of the Appellant requires
to be noticed to the benefit of the Appellant. It reads thus:
"5.⁠ ⁠Problems of Drivers:
"..... d) MEDICALLY UNFIT DRIVERS : It is agreed
that to the extent possible suitable alternate jobs
will be identified. In case it is not possible to identify
suitable jobs, additional monetary benefit· as per the
proposals sent to the Government will be given after
Govt's approval."
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
333
Ch. Joseph v.
The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other
A perusal of the above clause would indicate, suitable alternate
jobs would have to be identified and only in the event of not
being possible to identify such job, recourse to payment of
additional monetary benefit as per the proposal sent to the
government will be given after government's approval.
16.3. Thirdly, the Settlement dated 22.12.1986 does not specifically
supersede the settlement agreement of 17.12.1979. It is only
by way of a communication dated 10.11.2014, the benefit of
alternate employment given to the drivers declared unfit due
to "colour blindness" has been sought to be taken away which
benefit was extended till that date. The only ground on which
the aforesaid communication 10.11.2014 came to be issued is
on account of the reliance on the dicta laid down by this Court
in Union of India v. Devendra Kumar Pant and Others3.
17. The Respondents' defence based solely on internal circulars and
a mechanical reading of Regulation 6A(5)(b) cannot override this
obligation. Retirement on medical grounds must be a measure of last
resort, only after the employer exhausts all reasonable avenues for
redeployment. This principle is inherent in the concept of "reasonable
accommodation", which is now recognised as an aspect of substantive
equality under Articles 14 and 21. The failure to explore alternate
employment before resorting to medical retirement is not merely
a procedural lapse-it is a substantive illegality that violates the
Appellant's right to livelihood and equal treatment.
RE: ISSUE - II
18. The Appellant relies upon the Memorandum of Settlement dated
17.12.1979, executed between the Corporation and its recognised
union under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The
Memorandum of Settlement is not a mere administrative circular-it is
a binding statutory contract forged between labour and management.
19. Clause 14 of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 17.12.1979
provides as follows:
"(a)...It was agreed to give alternate job to the Drivers found
colour blind during the periodical examination. While giving
3
(2009) 14 SCC 546
334
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the alternate job, the time scale and pay drawn by the
Driver at the time of disqualification would be protected..."
20. This provision was incorporated into a settlement concluded under
Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, during conciliation
proceedings before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour. By virtue
of Section 18(3) of the Act, such a settlement binds not only the
parties to the dispute but also all workmen of the establishment and
their successors.
21. The enforceability of this settlement is not diminished by the
subsequent settlement dated 22.12.1986, which the Corporation
claims to be governing the field. Clause 5(d) of the 1986 settlement
provides that drivers who are medically unfit may, "to the extent
possible", be provided alternative employment, and where not
feasible, will be granted AMB. Crucially, this clause does not contain
any express language annulling or modifying Clause 14 of the 1979
agreement. Clause 14 of the 1979 Settlement specifically provides
for alternative employment in cases of colour blindness, with pay
protection and continuity of seniority. It is neither time-barred nor
ambiguous. The Corporation's submission that this was superseded
by the later settlement dated 22.12.1986 is both misplaced and
misconceived. This industrial settlement, being a bilateral agreement
between employer and workmen, has statutory force and is binding.
In industrial law, a beneficial provision in a prior settlement cannot
be deemed overridden unless there is an express revocation or
contradiction. No such conflict exists in the present case. Additionally,
the 1986 clause is general in nature, addressing medically unfit
drivers as a class. The 1979 clause is specific, dealing solely with
colour blindness. Applying the principle of generalia specialibus
non derogant [A general provision does not override a specific
provision], the 1979 clause continues to govern the case of colourblind drivers. The absence of a termination clause in the 1986
settlement, coupled with the Corporation's continued adherence to
Clause 14 in other cases even after 1986, confirms that the earlier
agreement remained operational. Accordingly, we find that 1986
settlement does not explicitly abrogate or nullify Clause 14 of the
1979 settlement.
22. Settlements entered under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes
Act are not administrative conveniences. They are quasi-statutory
instruments reflecting negotiated justice, and they bind both employer
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
335
Ch. Joseph v.
The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other
and employee with the force of law. Where such settlements create
specific entitlements, courts must give them purposive effect, unless
expressly rescinded or demonstrably superseded. Their terms are not
to be overridden by internal policy or circulars issued in contravention
thereof.
23. Further, the Corporation's internal circulars dated 10.11.2014 and
14.05.2015, which purport to deny alternate employment to colourblind drivers and limit them to AMB, are administrative in nature
and cannot override the binding effect of a statutory settlement
under Section 12(3). Therefore, the Respondents' reliance on
internal instructions in disregard Clause 14 is both procedurally and
substantively invalid.
RE: ISSUE - III
24. From the record, it is evident that the Corporation made no effort
whatsoever to assess the feasibility of assigning the Appellant to a
non-driving post. There is no file noting, committee report, vacancy
statement, or suitability assessment relating to the Appellant. His
representation requesting the post of Shramik remained unanswered.
No comparative evaluation was conducted, and no individualized
inquiry was held. The only justification offered is that the Corporation's
circulars bar such alternate employment.
25. Such inaction is wholly unjustified. Even assuming the applicability
of the 1986 settlement, it expressly mandates that alternate jobs
be identified "to the extent possible". The phrase itself presumes
an active, documented effort to explore available posts. The failure to
discharge this obligation violates not only the terms of the settlement
but also the principle of natural justice, which demands that before
depriving a person of livelihood, relevant material be gathered and
considered.
26. The burden lies on the Corporation-not the employee-to establish
that no suitable alternate post was available or could reasonably be
created. Mere invocation of a medical certificate, or the silence of a
circular, cannot constitute compliance. Inaction is not neutrality; in
such cases, it is a form of institutional exclusion.
27. In the present case, there is no evidence that the Respondents
examined even the most basic parameters-availability of vacancies,
suitability of tasks, or the Appellant's qualifications. This total failure
336
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
undermines the Corporation's claim of compliance with either the
1979 or 1986 framework, and renders the retirement order void for
non-consideration of Appellant's claim in proper perspective.
RE: ISSUE - IV
28. The Division Bench of the High Court reversed the relief granted by
the learned Single Judge by placing reliance on the decision in B.S.
Reddy (supra), where this Court held that the protection of Section
47 of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 is limited to disabilities
enumerated under Section 2(i) of that Act4. However, the Division
Bench erred in applying that ruling to the present case, as the
Appellant's rights do not solely emanate from Section 475, but rather
from a contractual settlement which carries independent statutory
force under Section 18(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947.
29. The B.S. Reddy (supra) judgment did not deal with the enforceability
of a clause in an agreement/settlement entered into under Section
12(3)6 or the Corporation's obligations under bilateral agreements with
its workers. The High Court overlooked the fundamental distinction
between statutory rights under disability law and contractual service
conditions enforceable through settlements. The correct line of
precedent is that found in Kunal Singh (supra) and Vikash Kumar v.
Union Public Service Commission and Others7, which recognise
that even beyond codified statutes, constitutional obligations of nondiscrimination and fairness demand that employers seek to retain
employees with acquired impairments through accommodation and
redeployment. In this case, where a specific settlement exists and
a broad practice of redeployment was followed for similarly placed
employees, the denial of relief to the Appellant amounts to arbitrary
discrimination and failure of equal protection.
30. While we have, in the preceding analysis, demonstrated sufficient and
independent grounds to set aside the impugned action on the basis of
binding industrial obligations and procedural infirmities, we consider it
necessary to also reaffirm the broader legal framework that governs
4
Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995
5
Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995
6
Industrial Disputes Act,1947
7
(2021) 5 SCC 370
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
337
Ch. Joseph v.
The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other
cases involving employees who acquire disability during service. Our
concern is not confined to the facts of the present case but extends
to the systemic risk that employers, particularly public sector entities,
may attempt to bypass their obligation to offer alternate employment
by drawing rigid distinctions between recognised and unrecognised
disabilities under statutory frameworks. To safeguard against such
evasion, and to reinforce the constitutional and statutory principles
of non-discrimination, reasonable accommodation, and substantive
equality, we draw guidance from a consistent line of precedent that
interprets such protections not narrowly, but purposively.
In Kunal Singh (supra), this Court made a clear distinction between
"disability" and "person with disability" under the 1995 Act, and
emphasised the mandatory obligation imposed by Section 47 to
protect the employment of persons who acquire a disability during
their tenure. The Court held:
"9. ...It must be remembered that a person does not
acquire or suffer disability by choice. An employee, who
acquires disability during his service, is sought to be
protected under Section 47 of the Act specifically. Such
employee, acquiring disability, if not protected, would not
only suffer himself, but possibly all those who depend
on him would also suffer. The very frame and contents
of Section 47 clearly indicate its mandatory nature. The
very opening part of the Section reads "no establishment
shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who
acquires a disability during his service".
The Section further provides that if an employee after
acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was
holding, could be shifted to some other post with the
same pay scale and service benefits; if it is not possible
to adjust the employee against any post he will be kept
on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available
or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is
earlier. Added to this no promotion shall be denied to a
person merely on the ground of his disability as is evident
from sub-section (2) of Section 47.