# CHAGANTI SATYANARAYAN & ORS v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

- **Citation:** [1986] 2 S.C.R. 1128
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1986-05-08
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. ~ 278 of 1986
- **Bench:** A.P. Sen Ands. Natarajan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/chaganti-satyanarayan-ors-v-state-of-andhra-pradesh-9381
- **Pages:** 22

## Headnote

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, S. 167(2)(a) - Scope of -
Period of 90 days - Computation of - Whether
from date oft'
remand or date of arrest of accused.
The appellants were arrested in the forenoon of July 19,
>--
C
1985 in connection with a riot which resulted in a toll of
human lives and huge destruction of property. They werer
produced before the Munsiff Magistrate on July 20, 1985 and ..
were remanded to judicl.al custody till October 18, 1985.
The police· ft led a charge-sheet against the appellants
D
on October 17, 1985 that being the 90th day of remand. Even
so, the appellants filed a petition before the Magistrate and
sought enlargement on bail in terms of proviso (a) to s.
167(2)
of the
Code
of Criminal Procedure.
The
learned
Magistrate, overruling the objection of the State, granted
bail to the appellants on the ground that the period of 90_.
E
days stipulated in the proviso had to be reckoned from the
date of arrest and not from the date of remand and so
computed, the charge-sheet had not been filed on the 90th day
...._
but on 9lst day and hence the accused/appellants were entitled
to bail. The respondent-State challenged the order of bail
before the High Court by means of a petition under s. 439(2)~
F
of the Code. A Single Judge of the High Court allowed the
petition holding that the period of 90 days envisaged by
thi:_,-
proviso to s. 167(2) has to be computed only from the date o!f
remand and therefore cancelled the bail and directed the
magistrate to issue warrants of arrest for the appellants.
G
Dismissing the appeal of the appellants-accused.
HELD:
1. The High Court was right in allowing the •
petition filed by the State for cancellation of the
bail~
granted to the appellants. As the Munsiff Magistrate has
granted bail to the appellants before the expiry of 90 days of
H
remand period allowed under law, the order of the Magistrate
C, SATYANARAYAN v. STATE
ll29
will not tantamount to one passed under the provisions of
r' Chapter XXXIII of the Code and hence there is no scope for
contending that re-arrest of the appellants can be ordered
only in terms of sub-s.(5) of s.437. After the appellants
surrender themselves to custody or are taken into custody by
re-arrest,
they will
not
stand precluded
from
seeking
enlargement on bail by filing applications under sub-s.(i) of
s.437 of the Code and satisfying the court that they deserve
~to be enlarged on bail. [1148 G-H; 1149 A-Bl
2. (i) ,On a reading of the sub-ss. (1) a11d (2) it may be
seen that sub-s.(1) is a mandatory provision governing what a
police officer should do when a person i.s arrested and
y detained in custody and it appears that the investigation
cannot be completed within the period of 24 hours fixed by s.
~ 57. Sub-s. (2) on the other hand pertains to the powers of
remand available to a Magistrate and the manner in which such
powers should be exercised. The terms of sub-s. (1) of s. 167
have to be read in conjunction with s. 57.
Section 57
interdicts a police officer from keeping in ·~ustody a person
without warrant for a longer period than 24 hours without
production before a Magistrate, subject to the exception that
the time
taken for performing journey from the place of
• arrest to the Magistrate's court can be excluded from the
prescribed period of 24 hours. Since sub-s. (1) provides that
if the investigation cannot be completed within the period of
24 hours fixed by s. 57 the accused has to be forwarded to the
Magistrate alongwith the entries in the Diary, it follows that
a police officer is entitled to keep an arrested person in
.._. custody for a maximm period of 24 hours for purposes of
investigation. The resultant position is that the initial
period of custody of an arrested person till he is produced
~before a Magistrate is neither referable to nor in pursuance
of an order of remand passed by a Magistrate. In fact the
powers of remand given to a Magistrate become exercisable only
after an accused is produced before him in terms of sub-s. (

## Text

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1128
CHAGANTI SATYANARAYAN & ORS.
v.
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
MAY 8, 1986
[A.P. SEN ANDS. NATARAJAN, JJ.]
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, S. 167(2)(a) - Scope of -
Period of 90 days - Computation of - Whether
from date oft'
remand or date of arrest of accused.
The appellants were arrested in the forenoon of July 19,
>--
C
1985 in connection with a riot which resulted in a toll of
human lives and huge destruction of property. They werer
produced before the Munsiff Magistrate on July 20, 1985 and ..
were remanded to judicl.al custody till October 18, 1985.
The police· ft led a charge-sheet against the appellants
D
on October 17, 1985 that being the 90th day of remand. Even
so, the appellants filed a petition before the Magistrate and
sought enlargement on bail in terms of proviso (a) to s.
167(2)
of the
Code
of Criminal Procedure.
The
learned
Magistrate, overruling the objection of the State, granted
bail to the appellants on the ground that the period of 90_.
E
days stipulated in the proviso had to be reckoned from the
date of arrest and not from the date of remand and so
computed, the charge-sheet had not been filed on the 90th day
...._
but on 9lst day and hence the accused/appellants were entitled
to bail. The respondent-State challenged the order of bail
before the High Court by means of a petition under s. 439(2)~
F
of the Code. A Single Judge of the High Court allowed the
petition holding that the period of 90 days envisaged by
thi:_,-
proviso to s. 167(2) has to be computed only from the date o!f
remand and therefore cancelled the bail and directed the
magistrate to issue warrants of arrest for the appellants.
G
Dismissing the appeal of the appellants-accused.
HELD:
1. The High Court was right in allowing the •
petition filed by the State for cancellation of the
bail~
granted to the appellants. As the Munsiff Magistrate has
granted bail to the appellants before the expiry of 90 days of
H
remand period allowed under law, the order of the Magistrate
C, SATYANARAYAN v. STATE
ll29
will not tantamount to one passed under the provisions of
r' Chapter XXXIII of the Code and hence there is no scope for
contending that re-arrest of the appellants can be ordered
only in terms of sub-s.(5) of s.437. After the appellants
surrender themselves to custody or are taken into custody by
re-arrest,
they will
not
stand precluded
from
seeking
enlargement on bail by filing applications under sub-s.(i) of
s.437 of the Code and satisfying the court that they deserve
~to be enlarged on bail. [1148 G-H; 1149 A-Bl
2. (i) ,On a reading of the sub-ss. (1) a11d (2) it may be
seen that sub-s.(1) is a mandatory provision governing what a
police officer should do when a person i.s arrested and
y detained in custody and it appears that the investigation
cannot be completed within the period of 24 hours fixed by s.
~ 57. Sub-s. (2) on the other hand pertains to the powers of
remand available to a Magistrate and the manner in which such
powers should be exercised. The terms of sub-s. (1) of s. 167
have to be read in conjunction with s. 57.
Section 57
interdicts a police officer from keeping in ·~ustody a person
without warrant for a longer period than 24 hours without
production before a Magistrate, subject to the exception that
the time
taken for performing journey from the place of
• arrest to the Magistrate's court can be excluded from the
prescribed period of 24 hours. Since sub-s. (1) provides that
if the investigation cannot be completed within the period of
24 hours fixed by s. 57 the accused has to be forwarded to the
Magistrate alongwith the entries in the Diary, it follows that
a police officer is entitled to keep an arrested person in
.._. custody for a maximm period of 24 hours for purposes of
investigation. The resultant position is that the initial
period of custody of an arrested person till he is produced
~before a Magistrate is neither referable to nor in pursuance
of an order of remand passed by a Magistrate. In fact the
powers of remand given to a Magistrate become exercisable only
after an accused is produced before him in terms of sub-s. (1)
of s. 167, [1138 B-C]
•
2,(ii) Sub-s. (2) of s.
167 empowers
the Magistrate
... before whom an accused is produced for purpose of remand,
whether he has jurisdiction or not to try the case, to order
the detention of the accus~d, P.ither in policy custody or in
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judicial custody, for a term not exceeding 15 days in the
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1986] 2 s.c.R.
whole. In the first place, if the initial order of remand is ·
to be made with reference to the date of arrest then the order ~
will have retrospective coverage for the period of custody
,
prior to the production of the accused before the Magistrate,
i.e. the period of 24 hours' custody which a police officer is
entitled to have under s. 57 besides the. time taken for the
journey. Such a construction will not only be in discord with
the terms of s. 57 but will also be at variance with the terms
of sub-s. (2) itself, The operative words in sub-s. (2) viz. r
"authorise the detention of the accused... for a term not
exceeding 15 days in the whole" will have .to be read
differently in so far as the first order of remand is
concerned so as to read as "for a term not exceeding 15 days
in the whole from the date of arrest". This would necessitatey
the adding of m>re words to the section than what the I
legislature has provided. Another anomaly that would occur is~
that while sub-s. (2) empowers the Magistrate to order the
detention of an accused "in such custody as such Magistrate
thinks fit, for a term not exceeding 15 days in the whole" the
Magistrate will be disentitled to placing an accused in police
custody for a full period of 15 days if the period of custody
is to be reckoned from the date of arrest because the period
of custody prior to the production of the accused will have to
be excluded from the total period of 15 days. [1138 G-H;
1139 A-F]
~
Apart from these anomalous features, if an accused were
to contend that he was taken into custody m>re than 24 hours
before his production before the Magistrate and the police
officer refutes the statement, the Magistrate will have
to~.
indulge in a fact finding inquiry to determine when exactly
the accused was arrested and from what point of time the
remand period of 15 days is to be reckoned. Such an exercisef
by a Magistrate ordering remand is not contemplated or
provided for in the Code. It would, therefore, be proper to
give the plain meaning of the words occurring in sub-s. (2)
and holding that a Magistrate is empowered to authorise the
detention of an accused produced before him for a full period
of 15 days from the date of production of the accused. [1139 ,
F-H; 1140 A]
3. Reference may also be made to another provision in
the Code, viz. the first proviso to sub-s. (2) of s. 309 for
construing the period of 15 days referred to in sub-s. 2 of s.
167. As sub"'B. (2) of s. 167 as well as proviso (1) of sub-s.
...
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C. SATYANARAYAN v. STATE
1131
(2) of s. 309 relate to the powers of remand of a Magistrate,
though under different situations, the two provisions call for
a harmonious reading in so far as the periods of remand are
concerned. It would, therefore, follow that the words "15 days
in the whole" occurring in sub--s. (2) of s. 167 would be
tantruoount to a period of "15 days at a time" but subject to
the condition that if the accused is to be remanded to police
custody
the
remand
should
be
for
such
period
as
is
--+ conmensurate with the requirements of a case with provisions
for further extensions for restricted periods, if need be, but
in no case should be total period of remand to police custody
exc,eed 15 days. Where an accused is placed in police custody
for the maxilllllll period of 15 days allowed under law either
y pursuant to a single order of remand or to more than one
ord,er, when the remand is restricted on each occassion to a
~ lesser number of days, further detention of the accused, if
warranted, has to be necessarily to judicial custody and not
otherwise. The Legislature having provided for an accused
being placed under police custody under orders of remand for
effective investigation of cases has at the same time taken
care to see tha.t the interests of the accused are not
jeopardised by his being placed under police custody beyond a
total period of 15 days, under any circumstances, irrespective
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'I of the gravity of the
offence or the serious nature of the
case. Thus, there i's no merit or force in the contention of E
the appellants' counsel that the
words
"for a term not
exceeding 15 days in the whole" occurring in sub--s. (2) of s •
167 should be construed as to include also the period of
custody of the accused frOlll the time of arrest till the time
·~ of production before the Magistrate.
A Magistrate can,
therefore, authorise the detention of the accused for a F
maxillUll period of 15 days from the date of remand and place
\
the accused either in police custody or in judicial custody
during the period of 15 days' remand. [1140 B-H; 1141 A-<:]
4.(i) Construing proviso (a) either in conjunction with
sub--s.(2) of s. 167 or aa an independent paragraph, the total G
period of 90 days under clause (i) and the total period of 60
days under clause (ii) has to be calculated only from the date
of remand and not from the date of arrest.
4. (ii) The words used in proviso (a) are "no Magistrate
shall authorise the detention .. of the accused person in I'
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1132
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1986) 2 s.c.R.
custody",
"under
this
paragraph",
"for a
total period
exceeding i.e. 90 days/60 days". Detention can be authorised
by the Magistrate only from the time the order of remand is
passed. The earlier period when the accused is in the custody
of a police officer in exercise of his powers under s. 57
cannot constitute detention pursuant to an authorisation
issued by the Magistrate. It, therefore, stands to reason that
the total period of 90 days or 60 days can begin to run only
from the date of order of remand. Moreover, as per sub-s. (2A)
?>
of s. 167 a Magistrate is obliged to take into consideration
only the period of detention actually undergone by the accused
pursuant to the orders of remand passed by the Executive
Magistrate. The earlier period of custody till the production
of the accused before the Executive Magistrate is not directed y
to be taken into consideration by sub-s. (2A). Such being the I
case, there cannot be different modes of computation of the +
period of remand
depending upon whether accused person is
forwarded to a Judicial Magistrate or an Executive Magistrate
for purposes of remand. [1141 G-H; 1142 A-G)
4. (iii) The change of wording in the proviso has to be
given its due significance because the Legislature would not.
have effected the change without any purpose or objective.
Significant changes have been made in s. 167 as well as to the
proviso by Act 45 of 1978 such as increasing the period for
investigation in grave cases from 60 to 90 days, conferring of
powers
of
remand
on
Executive
Magistrates
in certain
situations etc. Therefore, it can be legitimately contended
that the words occurring in proviso (a) should be construed
within the frame work of the proviso itself Without any t-·
reference to s. 167(2). If such a construction is made, it may
be seen that the proviso forbids the extension of remands only j
beyond a total period of 90 days under clause (i) and beyond a
total period of 60 days under clause (ii). Thus if proviso (a)
is treated as a separate paragraph it necessarily follows that
the period of 90 days or 60 days as the case may be, will
commence running only from the date of·remand and not from any
anterior date in spite of the fact that the accused may have
been taken into custody earlier by a police officer and
deprived of his liberty. [1143 F-H; 1144 A-Bl
5. The intention of the Legislature can also be gathered
by comparing proviso (a) with sub-s. (5) of s. 167. The
'
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C. SATYANARAYAN v. STATE
1133
Legislature has consciously referred to the date of arrest in
s. 167(5) but has made no such reference l.n s. 167 (2) or
povlso (a) thereto. If it was the intention of the Legislature
that the period of remand of 15 days in the whole envisaged in
sub-s. (2) or the total period of 90 days/60 days prescribed
in proviso(a) should be calculated from the date of arrest
then the Legislature would have expressly said so as it had
done under s. 167(5). [1143 C-0]
Paltira Naik v. State of Orissa, [1983] Crl. L.J. 1336;
!bbd. Shafi & Anr. v. The State, [1975] Crl. L.J. 1309; State
of lajasthan v. BbaJllfaru Khan & Ors., [1975] Crl. L.J. 1981;
Khf.nvdan v. The State of lajastban, [1975] Crl. L.J., 1984;
f Prell laj & Anr. v. State of lajasthan, [1976] Crl. L.J., 455;
C,anu Madhu J8*handi & Ors. v. The State of Karnatalta, [1977]
~ Cr1. L.J. 632; State of Baryana v. Mehal Singh & Anr., (FB)
[1!178] Crl. L.J. 1810 and Paltira Nai1t & Ors. v. State of
Orissa, (1983] Crl. L.J. 1336, disapproved.
IUssainara Xhatoon & Ors. v. Home Secretary, State of
Bihar, Patna, [1979] Crl. L.J. 1052; lajoo Alias laj Ki.shore
Singh & Anr. v. State of Bihar & Anr., 55 [1976] l.L.R. Patna
1021; laj ltullar v. The State of Punjab, A.l.R. 1979 Punjab &
_..,
Haryana 80; Batna llaa v. State of B:l.mchal Pradesh, [ 1980]
Crl. L.J. 748; Jagdiah & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh,
(1984] Crl. L.J. 79; H. Sureya Reddy & Anr. v. State of
Oriasa, [1985] Crl. L.J. 939; Bashir & Ora. v. State of
Baryana, (1978] l S.C.R. 585 and State of U.P. v. Lalllll.
Brahamn & Anr., (1983] 2 S.C.R. 537, referred to.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
~ 278 of 1986.
From the Judgment and Order da~ed 31st December, 1985 of
the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Crl. Misc. Petition No. 4049
of 1985.
S. Madhusudan Rao and A. Subba Rao for the Appellants.
P. Ram Reddy, T.V.S.N. Chari and Ms. Vrinda Grover for
the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
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1134
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1986] 2 S.C.R.
NATARA.JAN, J. This appeal by special leave against an
order of a learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High
~
Court in a petition filed under Section 439(2) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code')
calls for a critical examination of the scope and effect of
proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Code. Several High Courts
have rendered decisions construing differently the terms of
the proviso but a need for the examination of the terms of the
proviso by this Court had not arisen till now.
The circumstances which form the prefactory for this
appeal can be summarised as under.
The hamlet of Madigawada in Village Karamchedu in Andhra y
Pradesh was the scene of a horrendous riot on the morning of I
July 17, 1985. The riot culminated in a toll of human lives +
and huge destruction of property. Five persons were left dead,
twenty others were victims of injuries of varying degrees,
properties were looted and hutments were damaged or destroyed.
In connection with the macabre events the police
authorities arrested 94 persons including the appellants
herein and had them remanded to custody, The appellants were
arrested in the forenoon of July 19, 1985 and were produced
before the IIIrd Additional Munsif Magistrate, Chirala on the
next day, i.e. July 20, 1985. They were initially remanded to
judicial custody for a period of 15 days and thereafter the
remand was extended from time to time till October 18, 1985.
The investigating officer filed a
charge-she~t in the
~
case at 10. 30 A.M. on October 17, 1985, that being the 90th
day of remand. Even so, the appellants filed a petition before j
the Magistrate and sought enlargement on bail in term<r of
proviso
(a)
to Section 167(2).
The
learned Magistrate,
overruling the objection of the State, granted bail to the
appellants on the ground that the period of 90 days stipulated
in the proviso had to be reckoned from the date of arrest and
not from the date of remand and so co~uted the charge-sheet
had not been filed on the 90th day but on the 91st day and
hence the accused were entitled to bsil. The State challenged >-
the order of bail before the High Court by means of a petition
under Section 439(2) of the Code. A learned Single Judge of
the High Court allowed the petition holding that the period of
(
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C. Sl\TYANARAYAN v. STATE
[NATARAJAN, J.]
1135
90 days en~isaged by the proviso to Section 167(2) has to be
computed
only from
the date of
remand
and,
therefore,
cancelled the bail and directed the Magistrate to issue
warrants of arrest for the appellants. It is the correctness
of the order of the learned Judge which is challenged in this
appeal.
Mr. Madhus·1dan Rao, learned counsel for the appellants,
strenuously contended that the liberty of the citizen is the
~ paramount factor for consideration while construing the terms
of proviso (a) of Section 167(2) and as such the period of 90
days, in the case of grave offences, and the period of 60
days, in the case of other offences set out as outer limits
for detention of accused persons should be computed from the
1 very day the accused ·•as arrested and taken into custody by a
t police officer and not from the day he was produced before the
Magistrate and remanded to custody. In fact Mr. Rao went so
far as to say, placing reliance on a decision rendered in
Faltlra Naik v. State of Orlssa, [1983] Crl. L,J, 1336 that
even the detention during the fraction of a day should also be
counted as detention for a day since a calendar day as a unit
of time is the interval between one midnight and another. In
support of his contention Mr. Rao placed reliance on some
decisions where the time limits set out in the proviso have
-1'- been held to run from the date of arrest itself.
Mr. Ram Reddy, learned counsel for the State of Andhra
Pradesh, advanced arguments to the contrary and submitted that
the period of detention contemplated under the proviso is
--f exclusively
referable
to
the
detentions
ordered
by
a
Magistrate and there is no scope for tagging on to this period
any anterior period of custody by a police officer, who is
+permitted under Section 57 of the Code to detain in custody a
\ person arrested without warrant for a maximum period of 24
hours. Alternately, it was contended that a significant change
in the terms of the proviso has been made by the Legislature
under Amendment Act 45 of 1978 and by reason of that change
the periods of 90 days/60 days prescribed under the proviso
,
are to be computed solely within the framework of the proviso
and not with reference to any other provision in the Code.
""' Besides these submissions the learned counsel also placed
reliance on another set of decisions wherein the calculation
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1986] 2 S.C.R.
of the total number of days of custody under remand has been
made with reference to the date of remand.
Before making a scrutiny of the ternlB of the proviso in
question it will be of use to have a glimpse of the historical
background of this legislative provision. Originally, the Code
provided only a period of 15 days for remand. As the period
was too short for investigation in cases of serious nature the
police were forc<!d to resort to filing before the Magistrates
a preliminary or incomplete report and seek extension of +-
remand under Section 344 of the Old Code. This device was
resorted to as an inevitable necessity, even though Section
344 of the Old Code could be invoked only after a Magistrate
had taken cognizance
of an offence which in turn could be
only after a report under Section 173 had been received and r
not while the investigation was in progress. The course )
followed for obtaining orders of remand beyond 15 days very -t
often led to lethargy in the investigation of cases resulting
in scores of accused persons languishing in custody for long
periods. To remedy the situation the Legislature deemed it fit
to put a time limit on the powers of the police to obtain
remand while the investigation was in progress after taking
care to provide a longer period of remand so that investigations are not affected. Consequently, a time limit of 60 days
with a provision for its extension under certain circumstances ,.._
was fixed by addl.ng proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of Section
167 of the Code of 1973. In the working of the provision it
came to be realised that a celling limit of 60 days for
completion of investigation
in all cases including serious
cases involving sentence of death, imprisonment for life etc. ~
was hampering full and effective investigation in serious
cases and affected the interests of the State. Consequently,
certain amendments were effected to the proviso to
section~·
167(2) by means of Act 45 of 1978. By reason of the amendment I
the ceiling limit: for remand period for cases, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less
than 10 years was raised to 90 days, while in other cases the
earlier limit of 60 days was retained. Apart from this,
,
another significant change made was that instead of the words
"under this section" occurring in the old proviso, the words >-
"under this paragraph", were substituted. A third change was
the addition of Explanation 1 to the proviso to highlight the
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C. SATYANARAYAN v. STATE
[NATARAJAN, J.]
1137
- .
position that the statutory right of bail under clause (a) of
the proviso will stand restricted only to those accused
persons who are in a position to furnish ball. Another
important change made by the Amendment Act is the provision of
Section (2A) whereby Executive Magistrates, on whom the powers
of a Judicial Magistrate have been conferred, have also been
empowered to order remand for a term not exceeding 7 days in
the
aggregate,
wherever
Judicial
Magistrates
are
not
avaJ.lable.
I
Our
reference to the historical background of the
proviso is for two reasons. The first reason is for presenting
a perspective of the proviso in its entire conspectus; the
second reason is to focus attention on the fact that the
¥proviso has been enacted to not only safeguard the liberty of
I the citizens but also to safeguard the interests of the State
tor in other words the public. We feel it necessary to advert
to this feature because some
of the decisions cited before us
have proceeded on the basis that the only factor underlying
the legislative provision is the anxiety of the Legislature to
safeguard the liberty of the citizen
by providing for the
restoration of his liberty at the earliest possible moment
after the maximum period of custody is over.
-.
Besides a reference to the historical background of the
proviso and the objective underlying it we uust also refer to
another notable feature falling within the field of relevance.
The right o·f bail granted to remand prisoners at the end of 90
days or 60 days as the case may be does not have the effect of
rendering the subsequent period of detention ipso facto
~illegal or unlawful. This is evident from the fact that the
right to bail conferred under the proviso is subject to the
~condition that the accused in custody should furnish bail. For
\Clearance of doubts in the matter, Explanat:ion I has been
expressly provided and the Explanation obligates the accused
being detained in custody in spite of the expiry of the
prescribed peri~d of 90 days or 60 days as the case may be so
long as he does not furnish bail. It wi 11 thus be seen that
the anxiety of
the Legislature to secure to the remand
'
prisoners their release from custody is circumscribed by its
~concern in equal measure ·to safeguard the interests of the
State as well.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1986] 2 S.C.R.
It is in the light of the contours set out above we have.
to examine Section 167 and proviso (a) to sub-section (2). The
marginal note for Section 167 is as under
"Procedure when investigation cannot be completed
in twenty-four hours".
On a reading of the sub-sections (1) and (2) it may be
seen that sub-section ( l) is a mandatory provision governing
what a police officer should do when a person is arrested and~
detained in custody and it appears that the investigation
cannot be
compl,~ted within the period of 24 hours fixed by
Section 57. Sub-section (2) on the other hand pertains to the
powers of remand available to a Magistrate and the manner in
which
such
powers
should
be
exercised.
The
terms
of 1
sub-section (1) of Section 167 have to be read ln conjunction 1
with Section 57. Section 57 interdicts a police officer from-t
keeping in custody a person without warrant for a longer
period than 24 hours without production before a Magistrate,
subject to the exception that the ti.me taken for performing
the journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate's Court
can be excluded from the prescribed period of 24 hours. Since
sub-section (1) provides that if that investigation cannot be
completed within the period of 24 hours fixed by Section 57
the accused has to be forwarded to the Magistrate along with~
the entries in the Diary, it follows that a police officer ts
entitled to keep an arrested person in custody for a maximum
period
of
24
hours
for
purposes
of
investigation.
The
resultant position is that the initial period of custody of an
arrested person till he is produced before a Magistrate is!-
neither referable to nor in pursuance of an order of remand
passed by a Magistrate. In fact the powers of remand given to
a Magistrate become e'xecisable only after an accused lst
produced before him in terms of sub-section (1) of Section
167.
Keeping proviso (a) out of mind for some time let us look
at the wording of sub-section (2) of Section 167.
This
sub-section empowers the Magistrate before whom an accused is
'
produced for purpose of remand, whether he has jurisdiction or
not to try the case, to order the detention of the accused,;....
either in poli.ce custody or in judicial custody, for a term
not exceeding 15 days in the whole. It was argued by Mr. Rao
\
:>-.ii'
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C. SATYANARAYAN v. STATE
[NATARAJAN, J.]
1139
A
that the words "in the whole" would govern the words "for a
-j term
not
exceeding
15
days'
and,
therefore,
the
only
•
,
interpretation that can be made is that the detention period
would coomence from the date of arrest itself and not from the
date of production of the accused before the Magistrate.
Attractive as the contention may be, we find that it cannot B
stand the test of scrutiny. In the fir§t place, if the initial
order of remand is to be made with reference to the date of
arrest then the order will have retrospective coverage for the
't period of custody prior to the production of the accused
before the Magistrate, i.e. the period of 24 hours' custody
which a police officer is entitled to have under section 57
besides the time taken for the journey. Such a construction C
will not only be in discord 'with the terms of ~ection 57 but
't will also be at variance with the terms of sub-section (2)
\_itself. The operative words in sub-section (2) viz. "authorise
~the detention of the accused •••• for a term not exceeding 15
days in the whole" will have to be read differently in so far
as the first order of remand is concerned so as to read as D
"for a term not exceeding 15 days in the whole from the date
of arrest". This would necessitate the adding of more words to
the section than what the Legislature has provided. Another
anomaly that would
occur is that while sub-section (2)
empowers the Magistrate to order the detention of an accused
-+ "in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not E
exceeding 15 days in the whole" the Magistrate wi 11 be diseiltitled to placing an accused in police custody for a full
period of 15 days or in judicial custody for a full period of
15 days if the period of custody is to be reckoned from the
~ date of arrest because the period of custody prior to the
production of the accused will have to be excluded from the F
total period of 15 days.
+
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Apart from these anomalous features, if an accused were
to contend that he was taken into custody more than 24 hours
before his production before the Magistrate and the police
officer reiutes the statement, the Magistrate will have to G
indulge in a fact finding inquiry to determine when exactly
,
the accused was arrested and from what point of time the
remand period of 15 days is to be reckoned. Such an exercise
'""" by a Magistrate ordering remand is not contemplated or
provided for in the Code. It would, therefore, be proper to
give the plain meaning of the words occurring in sub-section H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[I986J 2 s.c.R.
(2) and holding that a Magistrate is empowered to authorise
the detention of an accused produced before him for a full ~
period of IS days from the date of production of the accused.
~
We may also refer to another provision in the Code, viz.
the first proviso to sub-section (2) of section 309 for
construing the period' of IS days referred to in sub-section
(2) of Section I67. Section 309, while prescribing expeditious
conduct of enquiries and trials also provides for adjournments
of cases for valid reasons and for remanding the accused if het--
is in custody. The first proviso restricts the period of
remand.to IS days and is worded as under :-
"Provided
that no
Magistrate shall remand an1
accused person to custody under this section for a
term exceeding I 5 days at a time".
As sub-section (2) of Section I67 as well as proviso (I)
of sub-section (2) of Section 309 relate to the powers of
remand of a Magistrate, though under different situations, the
)
two provisions call for a harmonious reading in so far as the
~
periods of remand are concerned. It would, therefore, follow
that the words "IS days in the whole" occurring in sub-section
(2) of Section I67 would be tantamount to a period of "IS days
at a time" but subject to the condition that if the accused is~
to be remanded to police custody the remand should be for such
period as is commensurate with the requirements of a case with
provision for further extensions for restricted periods, if
need be, but in no case should the total period of remand to
police custody exceed IS days. Where an accused is placed in._...
police custody for the maximum period of IS days allowed under
law either pursuant to a single order of remand or to more
than one order, when the remand is restricted on each occasion'f
to a lesser number of days, further detention of the accused,,
if warranted, has to be necessarily to judicial custody and
not otherwise. The Legislature having provided for an accused
being placed under police custody under orders of remand for
effective investigation of cases has at the same time taken
care to see that the interests of the accused are not
,
jeopardised by his being placed under police custody beyond a
total period of IS days, under any circumstances, irrespective,._
of the gravity of the offence or the serious Mture of the
case.
11
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C. SATYANARAYAN v. STATE
[NATARAJAN, J,]
1141
Thus in the light of our discussion and conclusions
reached we do not find merit or force in the contention of the
appellants' counsel that the words 'for a term not exceeding
15 days in the whole" occurring in sub-section (2) of Section
167 should be so construed as to include also the period of
custody of the accused from the time of arrest till the time
of
production before the Magistrate. A Magistrate can,
therefore, authorise the detention of the accused for a
maxillllllll period of 15 days from the date of remand and place
,.. the accused either in police custody or in judicial custody
during the period of 15 days' remand. It has, however, to be
borne in mind that if an accused is remanded to police custody
the maxillllllll period during which he can be placed in police
custody is only 15 days. Beyond that period no Magistrate can
r authorise the detention of the accused in police custody •
.+
Further remands, to fecilitate the investigation, can
only be for the detention of the accused in judicial custody.
A
B
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The restriction of the Magistrate's powers in this behalf is
D
to be found in the words "otherwise than in the custody of the
police beyond the period of 15 days" in proviso (a).
Now coming to proviso (a) itself, the proviso authorises
a Magistrate to order further detention of an accused person,
_. otherwise than in police custody which as already stated means
E
that the maxillllllll period under which a Magistrate can place an
accused in po lice custody is only 15 days. A limitation to the
,...
powers of further remand is, however, placed by interdicting
the Magistrate from authorising the detention of an accused
person in custody beyond a total period of 90 days where the
..._.
offence is punishable with death, imprisonment for life or for
F
a term of not less than 10 years and beyond a total period of
t· 60 days in other cases. The interdiction will, however,
operate only in those cases where the accused persons are in a
position to furnish bail.
The words used in proviso (a) are "no Magistrate shall
authorise the detention of the accused person in custody",
"under this paragraph", "for a total period exceeding i.e. 90
days/60 days". Detention can be authorised by the Magistrate
only from the time the order of remand is passed. The earlier
period when the accused is in the custody of a police officer
in exercise of his powers under Section 57 cannot constitute
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19861 2 s.c.R.
detention pursuant
to
an
authorisation
issued
by
the
Magistrate. It, therefore, stands to reason that the total
period of 90 days or 60 days can begin to run only from the
date of order of remand.
Approaching the matter from another angle also we find it
necessary to construe the proviso in the manner set out above.
We have earlier referred to sub-section (2A) newly introduced
by Act 45 of 1978 to Section 167. This sub-section has been
introduced for pragmatic reasons. In order that the production ~
of an accused, arrested under Section 57, before a Magistrate
is not delayed on account of the non-availability of a
Judicial Magistrate, the Legislature has deemed it necessary
to confer powers of remand on such of those Executive f
Magistrates on whom the powers of a Judicial Magistrate have
\
been conferred. The sub-section states that if an arrested J
person is produced before an Executive Magistrate for remand
the said Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused
"for a term not exceeding 7 days ln the aggregate", It is
further provided that the period of remand ordered by an
Executive Magistrate should also be taken into account for
computing the period specified in paragraph (a) of the proviso
to sub-section (2). Let us assume a case where a person
arrested under Section 57 on the previous day is produced
before an Executive Magistrate on the next day, but within the
expiry of 24 hours and the remand order is obtained for a
period of 7 days. How is the Judicial Magistrate, whs> is
competent to make further orders of detention to calculate the
period of detention so as to conform to the requirements of
proviso (a)? As per sub-section (2A) he is obliged to take·
~
into consideration only the period of detention actually
undergone by the accused pursuant to the orders of remand
passed by the Executive Magistrrate. The earlier period of ·f
custody till the producton of the accused before the Executive
Magistrate is not directed to be taken into consideration by
sub-section (2A).
Such being the case, there cannot be
different JDJdes of computation of the period of lemand
depending upon whether the accused person is forwarded to a
Judicial Magistrate or an Executive Magistrate for purposes of
remand.
The intention of the Legislature can also be gathered by
coqiaring proviso (a) of sub-section (5) of Section 167.
Sub-section (5) of Section 167 is in the following terms :
-
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C. SATYANARAYAN V• STATE
[NATARAJAN, J,]
1143
A
"If in any case triable by a Magistr"te as a
sunmons case, the investigatiop is not concluded
within a period of sh: llDllths '\frcm the ,date on .
which the accused was
arrest~, the Magistrate
shall make an order stopping further investigation
into the offence unless the officer making the
B
investigation beyond the period of six months is
, /
necessary".
•
(Exphasis supplied)
~
The Legislature has consciously referred to the date of
arrest in Section 167 (5) but has made no $UCh reference in
C
1
Section 167(2) or proviso (a) thereto. If it was the intention
.of the Legislature that the period of remand of 15 days in the
.~ole envisaged in sub-section (2) or the total period of 90
ilays/60 days prescribed in proviso (a) should be calculated
from the date of arrest then the Legislature would have
expressly said so as it had done under Section 167(5).
0
Turning now to the alternate argument of Mr. Ram Reddy,
the contention is that even if there is scope for contending
that the total period of detention should be reckoned from the
pate of arrest there is no room at all for any such contention
"being raised after the amendment of the proviso by Act 45 of
1978. We have already referred to the fact that the amending
Act has substituted the words "under this paragraph" for the
.,...
words "under this section" in proviso (a). We have also
adverted to Explanation 1 .and sub-section (2A) which also
4efer to "the period specified in paragraph (a)", The change
of wording in the proviso has to be given its due significance
~cause the Legislature would not have effected the change
~thout any purpose or objective. We wst bear in mind that
significant changes have been made in Section 167 as well as
to the proviso by Act 45 of 1978 such as increasing the period
for investigation in grave cases
from
60 to
90
days,
conferring of powers of remand on Executive Magistrates in
certain situations etc. Therefore, it can be
legitimately
> contended that the words occurring in proviso (a) should be
~onstrued within the frame work of the proviso itself without
any reference to Section 167(2). If "Su-:h a construction is
made, it may be seen that the proviso forbids the extension of
remands only beyond a total period of 90 days under clause (i)
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1986] 2 s.c.R.
and beyond a total period of 60 days under clause (ii). Thus
if proviso (a) is treated as a
separate paragraph it ·1; 4
necessarily follows that the period of 90 days or 60 days as
the case may be, will coanence running only from the date of
remand and not from any anterior date in spite of the fact
that the accused may have been taken into custody earlier by a
police officer and deprived of his liberty.
Thus in any view of the matter i.e. construing proviso
(a) either in conjunction with sub-section (2) of Section 167~
or as an independent paragraph, we find that the total period
of 90 days under clause (i) and the total period of 60 days
under clause (ii) ha~ to be calculated only from the date of
remand and not from the date of arrest.
We may now consider the decisions cited before us by thef
learned counsel for the appellants and the respondent.
J.
n
The judgments relied upon by Mr. Rao in support of his
E
F
contentions are the following :
liJhd. Shafi & Anr. v. 1be State, [1975] Crt. L.J.
1309, State of Rajast:han v. mi-aru Khan & Ors.,
[1975] Crl. L.J. 1981, Kbinvclan v. 1be State of
Rajastban, [1975] Crl. L.J. 1984, Prea ltaj & Anro.+-
v. State of Rajastban, [1976] Crl. L.J. 455, <ly8Dl
lfadbu Ja1*hanc!i & Ors. v. 1be State of Karnataka,
[1977] Crl. L.J. 632,
State of Haryana v. Mehal
..-
Singh & Anr., (FB) [1978] Crl. L.J. 1810,
Paltira
Naik & Ors. v. State of Orlssa, [ 1983] Crl.