# CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF MINING EXAMINATION & ANOTHER v. RAM JEE

- **Citation:** [1977] 2 S.C.R. 904
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1977-02-03
- **Bench:** V. R. Krishna Iyer, A. C. Gupta
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/chairman-board-of-mining-examination-another-v-ram-jee-7120
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Coal Mines Regulations-Regulation 26-lnterpretation of.
Rules of natural justice-Concept of reasonably opportunity cannot be fitted
into a rigid 111011/d-Need for a strict liability-Code for subterranean occupa·
__,
lions.
Under regulation 26(1) if, in the opm1on of the Regional
Inspector,
a
person to whom an Overman's, Sirdar's, Engine-driver's, Shot-firer's, or Gastesting Certificate bas been granted is incompetent or is guilty of negligence or
misconduct in the performance of his duties, he may, after giving th<' person
an opportunity to give a written expla·nation, suspend his certificate by an order
in writing. U/r 26(2) he shall within a week of such suspension report the fact
to the Board together with all connected papen; including the explanation, if
any received from the person concerned. U/r 26(3) the Board may, after such
inquiry as it thinks fit, either confirm or modify or reduce the period of suspension of the certificate, or cancel the certificate.
The respondent, a shot-firer in a colliery, violated the provisions of the Coal
Mines Regulations by entrusting his risky, technical work to an unauthorised
person which resulted .in an accident
injuring
one
Bhadu.
The
Regional
Inspector u/r 26(1) gave him an opportunity for an explanation in writing and
after· considering the materials before him
forwarded
the
papers
to
the
Chairman of the Board together with a recommendation for cancellatll)n ef. the
certificate under Regulation 26(3 ).
The Board bestowed its judgment on !he
materials gathered which included the delinquent's admission, and cancelled the
shot-firing certificate. · The High Court allowed the writ petition assai.ling
the
said orders of cancellation of the licence and held : (1) The Board had
no
jurisdiction since the Regional Inspector did not suspend the
certificate
first
before reporting (2) The Regional Inspector had no power to recomme.n_d but
only to report and so the Board's order influenced by the recommendation was
bad in law and (iii) the Board should have given a fresh opportunity to be
-?---
hcanl before cancellation of the certificate and its absence
violated
nau:.ral
'
justice, voiding the order.
Accepting the Court,
HELD : (1) Law is meant to serve the living and does not beat its abstract
wings in the jural void. Its functional fulfilment a~ 'social engineering' depends
on its scrutinized response to situation, subject-matter and the complex of
realities which require ordered control. A holistic understanding is simple justice
to the meaning of all legislations.
F1:agmentary grasp of rules ca•n misfire or
even backfire, as in this case. [906 H, 907 A]
(2) The judicial key to construction is the composite perception of the daha
and the dalli of the provision. To be literal in meaning is to see the skin and
miss the soul of the Regulation. [909 A-BJ
(3) Over-judicialisation can be subversive of the justice of the
law. To
invalidate the Board's order because the Regional Inspector did not suspend the
certificate is a fallacy.· Tbe Board's vower is independent and is ignited by
' 1
CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF MINING v. RAMJEE (Krishna Iyer, !.)
905
!he report, which. exists in this case, of the Regional Inspector. There is an
A
overall duty of oversight vested in the board to enforce observance of mies of
safety. [909 DJ
( <:) To set aside the order on ihe ground that the Regional Inspector had
no power to recommend but only to S!'Spend and report that his recommenda·
lion influenced the Board's order is to enthrone a processual nicety do dcihrone
plain justice. Suspension, on a-n enquiry, predicates a prior prima-facie finding
of guilt and to make that known to the Board implicitly conveys a recommenB
dation. The difference between suspension plus report and
recommendatory
report is little more than between Tweedledum and Tweedledee.
Recommendations are not binding but are merely raw materials for consideration.
Where
there is no surrender of judgement by the Board to the recommending Regional
Ins

## Text

A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
904
CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF MINING EXAMINATION &
ANOTHER
v.
RAM JEE
February 3, 1977
[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND A. C. GUPTA, JJ.]
Coal Mines Regulations-Regulation 26-lnterpretation of.
Rules of natural justice-Concept of reasonably opportunity cannot be fitted
into a rigid 111011/d-Need for a strict liability-Code for subterranean occupa·
__,
lions.
Under regulation 26(1) if, in the opm1on of the Regional
Inspector,
a
person to whom an Overman's, Sirdar's, Engine-driver's, Shot-firer's, or Gastesting Certificate bas been granted is incompetent or is guilty of negligence or
misconduct in the performance of his duties, he may, after giving th<' person
an opportunity to give a written expla·nation, suspend his certificate by an order
in writing. U/r 26(2) he shall within a week of such suspension report the fact
to the Board together with all connected papen; including the explanation, if
any received from the person concerned. U/r 26(3) the Board may, after such
inquiry as it thinks fit, either confirm or modify or reduce the period of suspension of the certificate, or cancel the certificate.
The respondent, a shot-firer in a colliery, violated the provisions of the Coal
Mines Regulations by entrusting his risky, technical work to an unauthorised
person which resulted .in an accident
injuring
one
Bhadu.
The
Regional
Inspector u/r 26(1) gave him an opportunity for an explanation in writing and
after· considering the materials before him
forwarded
the
papers
to
the
Chairman of the Board together with a recommendation for cancellatll)n ef. the
certificate under Regulation 26(3 ).
The Board bestowed its judgment on !he
materials gathered which included the delinquent's admission, and cancelled the
shot-firing certificate. · The High Court allowed the writ petition assai.ling
the
said orders of cancellation of the licence and held : (1) The Board had
no
jurisdiction since the Regional Inspector did not suspend the
certificate
first
before reporting (2) The Regional Inspector had no power to recomme.n_d but
only to report and so the Board's order influenced by the recommendation was
bad in law and (iii) the Board should have given a fresh opportunity to be
-?---
hcanl before cancellation of the certificate and its absence
violated
nau:.ral
'
justice, voiding the order.
Accepting the Court,
HELD : (1) Law is meant to serve the living and does not beat its abstract
wings in the jural void. Its functional fulfilment a~ 'social engineering' depends
on its scrutinized response to situation, subject-matter and the complex of
realities which require ordered control. A holistic understanding is simple justice
to the meaning of all legislations.
F1:agmentary grasp of rules ca•n misfire or
even backfire, as in this case. [906 H, 907 A]
(2) The judicial key to construction is the composite perception of the daha
and the dalli of the provision. To be literal in meaning is to see the skin and
miss the soul of the Regulation. [909 A-BJ
(3) Over-judicialisation can be subversive of the justice of the
law. To
invalidate the Board's order because the Regional Inspector did not suspend the
certificate is a fallacy.· Tbe Board's vower is independent and is ignited by
' 1
CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF MINING v. RAMJEE (Krishna Iyer, !.)
905
!he report, which. exists in this case, of the Regional Inspector. There is an
A
overall duty of oversight vested in the board to enforce observance of mies of
safety. [909 DJ
( <:) To set aside the order on ihe ground that the Regional Inspector had
no power to recommend but only to S!'Spend and report that his recommenda·
lion influenced the Board's order is to enthrone a processual nicety do dcihrone
plain justice. Suspension, on a-n enquiry, predicates a prior prima-facie finding
of guilt and to make that known to the Board implicitly conveys a recommenB
dation. The difference between suspension plus report and
recommendatory
report is little more than between Tweedledum and Tweedledee.
Recommendations are not binding but are merely raw materials for consideration.
Where
there is no surrender of judgement by the Board to the recommending Regional
Inspector, there is no contravention of the cannons of natural justice.
[909 E-F, 9100-E]
( 5) Natural justice is no unruly horse, no lurking land mine, nor a judicial
cure-all. If fairness is shown by the decision-maker to the
ma11
proceeded
against, the form features and the fundamentals of such essential processual
propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation,
no breach of natural justice caa be complained of. Unnatural expansion of
natural justice, without reference to the administrative realities and other factors
of a given case, can be exasperating.
Courts cannot look at law in the ab~tract or natural justice as a mere artifact.
Nor can they fit into a rigid mould the concept of reasonable opportunity.
If the totality of circumstances satisfies the Court that the party v.isited wilh
D
adverse order has not suffered from denial of reasonable opportunity the Court
will decline to be punctilious or fanatical as if the rules of natural justice were
sacred scriptures. In the instant case, the Board cannot be anathematised as
condemning the man without being heard. The respondent has, in the
form
of an appeal against the report of the Regional Inspector, sent his explanation
to the Chairman of the Board.
He . has thus been heard and compliance with
Regulation 26 in the circumstances is complete. [909 G-H, 910 A-G]
Tereaesai's case (1970] 1 S.C.R. 251; Management of DTU [1973] 2 S.C.R.
E.
114; Tandon's case f!9741 4 SCC 374 referred to.
Observations ; Sensitive occupations demand stern juristic principles
to
reach at sc&pegraces, high and low, and not mere long drawn-out commissions
whose verdicts often prove dilatory 'shelter' for the men in whom Parliament
has entrusted plenary management. Any sensitive jurisprudence of colliery
management must make it cardinal to punish the Board vicariously for
any
major violations and dreadful disasters, on macro-consideratiom·-of responsibility to the community. The Board must quit, as a legal penalty, if any
dreadful deviation. deficiency, default or negligence anywhere in the mine
occurs.
This is a good case for new principles of liability, based on wider
rules of sociological jurisprudence to tighten up the law of omission and commission at the highest levels.
Responsibility and penalty must be the concomitants of highly-paid power vested in the top-brass. Any deviance on
the part of these high-powered authorities must be visited with tortious
or
criminnl liabilities. f908 F-H. 907 D-Fl
F
(The Court emohasised the need for evolving a code of strict liability
G·
calling to utmost care not only the crowd of workers and others but the few
who shall care or quit so that subterranea·n occupations necessary for the
nation are made as risk-proof a-s technology and human vigilance pefmit).
CrvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil
Appeal
No. 2294
of
1968.
Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated 25-9-1967 of the
Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. 595 /66.
L. N. Sinha, Sol. Gen!, B. Datta and Girish Chandra for the
Appellants.
H
F
A
B
906
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S. K. Gambhir, amicus curiae, for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
[1977] 2 s.c.R.
KRISHNA IYER, J.-If the jurisprudence of remedies were understood and applied from the perspective of social efficaciousness,
the
problem raised in this appeal would not have ended the
erroneous
way it did in the High Court.
Judges must never forget that every
Jaw has a social purpose and engineering process without appreciating which justice to the law cannot be done.
Here, the
socio-legal
situation we are faced with is a colliery, an explosive, an accident,
luckily not lcth~l, caused by viobtion of a regulation and consequential cancellation of the certificate of the delinquent shot-firer,
eventually quashed by the High Court, for processual solecisms,
by a
writ of certiorari.
We may state at the outset that the learned
Solicitor
General
agreed that the appellant, the Board of Mining Examination, would
be satisfied if the law, wrong1y laid down by the High Court .. were
set aside and declared a right and he was not insisting on the formal
reversal of the order affecting the respondent (who 1s unrepresented
D
before us). We proceed on that footing.
G
The few necessary facts may be narrated to bring up the
legal
issue in its real setting.
The respondent was a shot-firer in a colliery and being a risky,
technical job, had to possess a certificate for it.
He handed ever an
explosive to an unskilled h~nd who fired it, an accident occurred and
one Bhadu, employed in the mine, was
injμred.
The
Regional
Inspector of Mines immediately enquired into
the
cause
of
the
accident and found, on the respondent's virtual admission, qualified
by some prevarication, that the shots were fired not by himself but
by a cutter, an unauthorised person for shot-firing to whom the respondent had wrongfully entrusted the work.
Thereby he contravened
the relevant Coal Mines Regulations.
The Regional Inspector gave
him an opportunity for explanation and, after considering the materials before him, forwarded the papers to the Chairman of the Board
together 1with a recommendation for cancellation of the
certificate
under Reg. 26.
The Board bestowed its judgment on the materials
gathered by the Regional Inspector at the enquiry, whicb
included
the delinquent's admission, and cancelled the shot-firing
certificate.
The said cancellation was shot down by a writ of the Court on the
ground of violation of Reg. 26.
Was Regulation 26, in the context and setting of the Mines Act,
misinterpreted by the High. Court at all?
This is the short question
canvassed before us.
W<e permit ourselves a few observations which
II
serve as perspective-setters.
Law is meant to serve the living
and
does not beat its abstract wings in the jural void.
Its
functional
fulfilment as social engineering depends or its sensitized response to
situation, subject-matter and the complex of realities which
require
' •
~.
•
• •
9,07
"'
<irdered control.
A holistic ,understanding is simple justice to
th~
meaniqg,.of all ;legi,slatfo!ls:
:f~agffien~ary grasp of rules can misfire
or even backfire,'· as in this case. It is· a - notorious
fact
that
<:ollieiieis--:fodian collieries, both before . and after ' nationalisation-
. are strategic sources' of the natiqn's ~e( itP,d, oper,ati\}nally, areas of
tragic human hazards.
We need coal, we want miners to bring it
from the ~O\V.els of the earth.
The da1rnerous te".hnology is not yet
·so perfect in India as to ensure risk-free extraction.
And, after
many lives· have been lq_st.by tge _qeglect of operatives or .supervisors
or supine bosses, follows the scenario of tears and tom-down· homes,
a little monetary compensation, a flutter in Parliament,
a
longdrawn-out Commission, a routine Report about lapses and recipes
and the little man's .life-or death lot continuing to receive callous
~onsi<leration at the hands of the law, law-matter, law-enforcer-this
sombre colliery disaster .sequence must educate and inform the jurispru_dence of hlgh-rislq operations. In short, the M1nes Act (and
Regulations) i'!iust receive its judicial construction in the total setting,
teleclogically approached, not fragmentarily dissected.
The relevant
regulation is only a tiny inset in the farger justice of the statute.
The Mines Act has a scheme designed to avoid accidents
and
.ensure safety.
A system of certificates, supervisions and penalties
is part of this scheme.
The broad responsibility for due enforcement of the Act rests on the Board and the relevant regulation casts
liabilities on' the lesser men.
Any sensitive jurisprudence of colliery
maI)agement must make it cardinal to .punish the Board yicariously
for any major violations and dreadful disasters, on macro-considerations of responsibility to the community.
The Board must quit; as
, a ,legal penalty, if any dreadful deviation, deficiency, default or negl_igence anywhere in the mine occurs.
In the present case a microbreach is peii:g .punished, but when major mishaps occur the
top
echelons, on account of inadequacies in colliery codes, escape and
make others the scapego,ats.
Although, in this case, only injury, not
death, has occurred, there is a good case for new
principles ot
. !~ability, based on wider rules
of
sociological
jurisprudence,
to
tighten up the law of omission and commission,
at
the
highest
.levels.
Responsibility and penalty must be the
concomitants
of
highly~paid power v.ested in the top-brass. ·
.Back to .th~ pe<lestrjan statement of, facts.
The
r~spondent's
{:_unous contention, accepted by the learned Judge, is best understood
after rea~i~g Regulation 26 :
"26. Suspension of an
Overman's,
Sirdar's,
Engine-
.
Driver's, shot-firer's, or Gas-testing Cert·ificate-
(l) If, .in ,the opinion of the Regional Inspector,
a
person to whom an Overman's, . Sirdar's,
Engine-driver's,
~hot-firer'_s, or Gas-~esting Certificate has been granted
is
mcompetent or is guilty of negligence or misconduct in the
.p~r~ormance of.his duties, the Regional Inspector may, after
~vmg the person an opportunity to give a written explanation, suspend his certificate by an order in writing.
10-206SCT /77
A
B
c
D
E
.F
G
H
A
B
968
SUPREME COU!tT ll.EPORTS
[1977] 2 s.C.R.
(2) Where the Regional Inspector has
suspended a
certificate under sub-regulation (1) he shall writhin a week
of such suspension report the fact to the Board together
with all connected papers including the explanation if any
received from the person concerned.
(3) The Board may, after such inquiry as it thinks fit,
either confirm or modify or reduce the period of suspem;ion
of the certificate, or cancel the certificate."
The plain purpose of the regulation is to pre-empt further harm by
suspending the certificate of the shot-firer 'if in the opinion of the
Regional Inspector' he 'is incompetent or is guilty of negligence or
misconduct in the performance of his duties ... after giving the P'~rson
C
an opportunity to give a written explanation'.
This
suspension is
itself a punishment liable to confirmation, modification, reduction of
the period of suspension or, by way of enhancement, cancellation ot
the certificate by the Board.
Before taking such action by way ot
cessation, as it were, the Board gets a report from
the Regional
Inspector of the fact of suspension and makes 'such enquiry as it
thinks fit'.
In the present case, the Board had
an
explanation
D
(styled an appeal) from the re~pondent, and also a recommendation
by the Regional Inspector for cancellation of the
certificate.
The
latter had not suspended the delinquent but had merely
held
an
enquiry, reached the prima facie view .of guilt and and instead of
suspension at once, only made a recommendation to the Board for
cancellation.
E
F
G
H
The Regional Inspector has, among his statutory
duties,
the
supervision of the observance of the safety rules and the holding of
enquiries (see sections 7 & 14). He has to report to the Board on
breaches of regulations and conditions.
The Board, in its turn, has
the over-all charge of the safe management o:E the
mine.
Derelictions and violations must reach its vigilant eye! and be viiited
with
prompt action.
Jurisprudentially speaking, there is need to cast an
obligation on the Board and the higher inspectorate not to be negligent,
indifferent or insoucient in the discharge
of its overall
responsibility which includes anticipation
of
likely
miihaps
and
introduction of' the latest measures to promote safety for the men
working in the dark depths at the mercy of the wicked mood of Yama.
Any deviance on the part of these high-powered authoriti1!s must be
visited with tortious or criminal liability.
Such is the price
which
high position must pay for the consequences of calamitous failures.
Sensitive occupations demand stern juristic principles to
reach at
scapegraces, high and low, and not mere long-grown-out 1:ommissions
whose verdicts often prove dilatory 'shelter' for the men in whom
Parliament has entrusted plenary management.
We emphasize this
matter to awaken the law-makers to evolve a code of strict liability
calling to utmost care not only the crowd of workers an:! others but
the few who "shall care or quit so that subterranean occupations
necessary for the nation are made as risk-proof as technology and
human vigilance permit.
,
CHAllU..tAN, BOARD OP MINING v. llAMJEE (Krishna lyl!r, !.)
909
Unfortunat~ly, the High Court surren?ered
to·
n.ar~owness ot
interpretation of Regulation 26 by acceptmg the subm1ss1on of
t?e
respondent.
To be literal in meaning is to see the skin and miss
the soul of the Regulation.
The judicial key to construction is the
. composite perception of th~ deha and the dehi of the provision.
So
viewed, Reg. 26 is easy of comprehension.
The High Court held that the order of cancellation was illegal
for a few reasons which strike us as untenable.
The argument nms
thus.
Without first suspending the certificate, the Regional Inspector
cannot report to the Board and without such a report following upon
a suspension the latter cannot take seisin of the matter.
Since the
Regional Inspector did not suspend the respondent, the Board had
no jurisdiction.
Secondly, the Regional Inspector had no power to
recomml!nd, but only to report and so the Board's order, influenced
by the recommendation, was bad in law.
Thirdly, the lloard should
have given a fresh opportunity. to be heard before cancellation of the
certificate and its absence in the present case violated natural justice,
voiding the order.
All the three points serve to warn the courts how over-judicialisation can be subversive of the justice of the. law.
Now, how can the
cancellation order by the Board be bad for failure to suspend the
certificate by the Regional Inspector ? The Board's power is independent and is ignited by the report of the Regional Inspector.
Such
a report exists here.
There is an overall duty of over sight vested
iR the Board to enforce observance of rules of safety.
To invalidate
the Board's order because. the Regional Inspector did not suspend the
certificate is a fallacy.
Now to the next point.
The vice that vitiates the Board's order
is stated to be the recommendation contained in the Regional Inspector's report.
Had he suspended and reported, he would have been
A
B
c
Cl
E
in order.
But suspension, on an enquiry, predicates ,a prior prima
facie finding of guilt and to make that known to the Board imphcity
conveys a recommendation.
The difference between suspension plus
F
report and recommendatory report is little more
than
between
Tweedledum and Tweedledee.
And to set aside an order on such a
ground is to enthrone a processual nicety to dethrone plain justice.
The last violation regarded as a lethal objection is
that Board
did not enquire of the respondent, independently of the one Jone by
the Regional Inspector.
Assmning it to be
necessary,
here
the
respondent has, in the form of an appeal against the report of the
Regional Inspector, sent his explanation to the Chainnan
of
the
Board.
He has thus been heard and compfonce with Reg. 26, in
the circumstances, is complete.
Natural justice is no unruly horse,
no lurking land mine, nor a judicial cure-all. If fairness is shown by
the decision-maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features
and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety
being
conditioned by the facts and circumstances of
each
situation
no
breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural exp~nsion
G
H
910
1lUPR,EME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 2 s.c.R ..
A
of natural justice, without reference to the administrative realities
and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating.
We
can
neither be finical nor fanatical but should be flexible yet firm in this
jurisdiction.
No man shall be hit below the belt-that is the conscience of the matter.
B
Shri Gambir, who appeared as amicus curiae and industriously
helped the Court by citing several decisions bearing on natural justice,
could not convince us to reach a contrary conclusion. It is true that
in the context of Art. 311 of the Constitution this Court :~as interpreted the quality and amplitude of the opportunity to be extended
to an affected public servant.
Certainly we agree with the principles
expounded therein.
But then 'we cannot· look at law in the abstract
or natural iustice as a mere artifact. Nor can we fit into a rig;id mould
c . the concept of reasonable opportunity.
Shri Gambhir cited before
us the decisions in Teredesai('); Management of DTU(2 )
and
Tandon( 3); and one or two other rulings.
The ratio theNin hardly
militates against the realism which must inform 'reasonable opportunity' or the rule against bias. If the authority which take:; th1! final
decision acts mechanically and without applying its own mind,
the
D
E
F
H
order may be bad, but if the decision-making body, after fair and
independent consideration, reaches a conclusion vJhich tallies
with
the recommendations of the subordinate authority whch
held
the
preliminary enquiry, there is no error in law.
Recommendations are
not binding but are merely raw material for
consideration.
Where
there is no surrender of judgment by the Board to the recommending
Regional Inspector, there is no contravention of
the
canons
of
natural justice.
We agree with Shri Gambhir that the adjudicating
agency must indicate in the order, at least briefly, why it takes the
decision it does unless the circumstances are so clear that the concluding or decretal part of the order speaks for ito,elf even regarding the
reasons which have led to it. It is desiratie also to
ccmmunicate
the report of the Inquiry Officer, including that part which relates to
the recommendation in the matter of punishment, so that the repre8entation of the delinquent may be pointed and meaningful.
These general observations must be tested on the concrete facts
of each case and every miniscule violation does not spe:tl illegality.
If the totality of circumstances satisfies the Court that
the
party
visited with adverse order has not suffered from denial of reasonable
opportunity the Court will decline to be punctilious or fanatical as if
the rules of natural justice were sacred scriptures.
We are satisfied that the order of the Board cannot be anathematised as condemning the man without being heard.
The appeal, on the point of law, must be allowed but, in the light
of the conc€ssion made, as stated earlier, we leave the formal order
of the High Court undisturbed. No costs.
S.R.
High Court orders maintained.
<ll [1970J 1 s.c.R. 2s1.
(2) [1973] 2. s.c.R. 114.
(3) [1974] 4 s.c.c. 374.