# !Cham Chand v. Union o}· India - **Citation:** [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 242 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1963 - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/cham-chand-v-union-o-india-2706 - **Pages:** 25 ## Headnote 1962 !Cham Chand v. Union o}· India Das Gupta, J. 1962 September 25. 242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP. valid and consequently, in rejecting the appellant's revisional application. The appeal is dismissed. But, in view of the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. Though the appellant has failed in this appeal which was brought by him as a pauper, we make no order against him to pay the court-fee which would have been paid by him if he had not been permitted to appeal as a pauper. Appeal dismissed. JASWANT SUGAR MILLS LTD., MEERUT v. LAKSHMICHAND AND OTHERS (B. P. SINHA, c. J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA and J. C. SHAH, JJ.) Indu.•trial Dispute-Dismi.sal of workmen-Application for permi>Bion before Conciliation OJ!ker-Direction of Conciliation Officer-Appeal to Appellate Tribunal, if maintainab/,eGrant of special leave-Competence-U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (U. P. 28 of 1947), 88. 3, 8-Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) A.ct, 1950 (48 of 1950), 88. 2 (c) cl. (iii), 4--Constitution of India, Art. 136. The workmen of the appellant company resorted. to direct action in order to enforce their demands 'for bonus, leave etc. Thereupon, the company served charge sheets upon sixty-three workmen. The enquiry officer who investigated the charges found that all the workmen were guilty of sabotage and slowdown strike and that they were liable to be dismissed. But as at that time a dispute between the company and its workmen relating to payment of bonus was pending before the Industrial Tribunal, the conditions of service of the workmen could not, by virtue of cl. 29 of the order issued in 1954 by the Governor I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 243 ofUttar Pradesh under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, be altered nor the workmen discharged without the previous permission of the Conciliation Offi~er. An application was made to the Conciliation Officer for permission to disri1iss the workmen. The Officer granted permission in respect of only eleven workmen on the ground that the rest of the workmen were mere passive participants in the go-slow campaign. The compat'\" preferred an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal but it was dismissed as incompetent on the ground that the C'.onciliation Officer wa'i not an authority within the meaning of s. 2 (c) (iii) of the Industrial disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. The company then obtained special leave to appeal to the Supre1ne ~ourt against the direction of the Conciliation Officer and also against the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Held, that a Conciliation Officer under cl. 29 of the Order promulgated in 1954 uμder the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, I 94 7, has to act judicially in granting or refusing per~ n1ission to alter the terms of employment of workmen at the instance of the employer, but as he is not invested \Vith the judicial power of the State, he cannot be regarded as a tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136 of the Constitution· of Inurya Shan/.·ar Mehta v. Thakur Ray/1uraj Singh, [1955] l S. C.R. 267, relied on. Held, further, that an "authority" under s. 2 (c) (iii) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, lBion before Conciliation OJ!ker-Direction of Conciliation Officer-Appeal to Appellate Tribunal, if maintainab/,eGrant of special leave-Competence-U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (U. P. 28 of 1947), 88. 3, 8-Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) A.ct, 1950 (48 of 1950), 88. 2 (c) cl. (iii), 4--Constitution of India, Art. 136. The workmen of the appellant company resorted. to direct action in order to enforce their demands 'for bonus, leave etc. Thereupon, the company served charge sheets upon sixty-three workmen. The enquiry officer who investigated the charges found that all the workmen were guilty of sabotage and slowdown strike and that they were liable to be dismissed. But as at that time a dispute between the company and its workmen relating to payment of bonus was pending before the Industrial Tribunal, the conditions of service of the workmen could not, by virtue of cl. 29 of the order issued in 1954 by the Governor I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 243 ofUttar Pradesh under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, be altered nor the workmen discharged without the previous permission of the Conciliation Offi~er. An application was made to the Conciliation Officer for permission to disri1iss the workmen. The Officer granted permission in respect of only eleven workmen on the ground that the rest of the workmen were mere passive participants in the go-slow campaign. The compat'\" preferred an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal but it was dismissed as incompetent on the ground that the C'.onciliation Officer wa'i not an authority within the meaning of s. 2 (c) (iii) of the Industrial disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. The company then obtained special leave to appeal to the Supre1ne ~ourt against the direction of the Conciliation Officer and also against the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Held, that a Conciliation Officer under cl. 29 of the Order promulgated in 1954 uμder the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, I 94 7, has to act judicially in granting or refusing per~ n1ission to alter the terms of employment of workmen at the instance of the employer, but as he is not invested \Vith the judicial power of the State, he cannot be regarded as a tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136 of the Constitution· of Inurya Shan/.·ar Mehta v. Thakur Ray/1uraj Singh, [1955] l S. C.R. 267, relied on. Held, further, that an "authority" under s. 2 (c) (iii) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, lsed. But at that time a dispute relating to payment of bonus was pending before the U ttar Pradesh State Industrial Tribunal in which the Company and the workmen were concerned, and the conditions of service of the workmen could not, by virtue of cl. 29 of the Order issued in 1954 by the Governor of U ttar Pradesh under the U. P Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, be altered, and the· workmen could not be discharged without the previous permission of the Conciliation Officer. An application was accordingly submitted by the Company to the Regional Conciliation Officer, Meerut, for permission to dismiss the workmen who were, on the finding of the Enquiry Officer, concerned with "slow-down strike and other illegal tactics" adopted by them with a view to cause loss to the 1962 Jaswant 'iugar Mil/1 Ltd., Meerul v, Lakshmichand Shah, J, 1962 Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd., Meerut •• Lakslmzichand 246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP. Company. The Conciliation Officer granted permission in respect of only eleven workmen, for in his view, the remaining fifty-two workmen were mere "passive participants in the go-slow campaign", and that it "would not be fair and justifiable to grant permission-to dismiss those workmen from service". The Company preferred an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lucknow, against the direction of the Conci!iation Officer refusing to grant permission to dismiss fifty-two workmen, but the appeal was rejected, because in the view of the Appellate Tribunal the Conciliation Officer was not an "authority" within the meaning of s. 2 (c) cL (iii) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, and the appeal was therefore incompetent. The Company has, with special leave, preferred appeals against the direction of the Conciliation Officer, and the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The order of the Conciliation Officer is challenged on the ground that in refusing permission to dismiss fifty-two workmen, the Conciliation Officer ignored the principles settled by this Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal in cases dealing with applications for granting permission to discharge employees under s. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In "the appeal against the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, it is submitted that the Conciliation Officer was an "authority" within the meaning of s. 2 (c) cl. (iii) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 and the direction made by the Conciliation Officer was a decision within the meaning of s. 4 of that Act. Counsel for the workmen contended that the appeal against the direction given by the Conciliation Officer is not maintainable because that officer exercising authority under cl. 29 of the Order promulgated in 1954 under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is neither a 'Court' nor a 'Tribunal' within the meaning of Art. 136 of the Constitution and no appeal lies to this Court against the impugned direction. l s.c.R. SUPREM•E COURT REPORTS 247 Article 136(1) of the Constitution provides : "Notwithstanding any/hing in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India". By cl. (2) judgments, determinations, sentences and orders passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces are exempt from the operation of cl. (1). This Court is manifestly invested with jurisdiction to entertain appeals from judgments, decrees, determinations, sentences or orders in causes or matters passed by courts and tribunals except those constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces. It is common ground that a Conciliation Officer exercising authority under cl. 29 of the Order made under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is not a "court", and the impugned direction does not amount to a judgment or decree. In determining whether an appeal still lies against the impugned direction of the Conciliation Officer, two primary questions fall to be considered: ( 1) whether the direction made by the Conciliation Officer is a dete1mination or an order; and (2) ~hether the -Conciliation Officer is a 'tribunal' within the meaning of the Act? Reference to the detailed provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act and Orders made thereunder from time to time, will be made hereafter,. but it may suffice at this stage to observe that the Order made by the Governor ofUttar Pradesh in 1954 authorised the State Government by Notification in the Official Gazettee to appoint Conciliation Officers, and by cl. 29 provided that during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings or proceedings before a Tribunal or an Adjudicator in 1962 Jaswant Sugar Mi· Ltd., Meerut v. Lalcshmiclumd Shah, J. 1962 ·aswant Sugar A1ills Ltd., Aleerut v. Lakshmichand Sha.Ii, J. 248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP. respect of any dispute, an employer shall not alter the conditions of service to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute or discharge or punish any workman concerned in such dispute, save with the express permission of a Conciliation Officer irrespective of whether the dispute is pending before a Board or the Tribunal or an Adjudicator. The Conciliation Officer is bv cl. :W authorised during the pendency of any concilia'tion proceeding or proceedings before a Tribunal or an Adjudicator to permit the employer to alter to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute the conditions of service applicable to them or to discharge or punish the workmen concerned in such disputes. If the direction of the Conciliation Officer which operates proprio dgore to authorise or to deny to the Company the exercise of its powers under the common law to terminate the employment of its workmen, amounts to an order or determination within the meaning of Art. 136, an appeal with special leave would be maintainaple in this Court. The expression '!determination" in the context in which it occurs in Art. 136 signifies an effective expression of opinion which ends a controversy or a dispute by some authority to whom it is submitted under a valid law for disposal. The expression "order" must have also a similar meaning, except that it need not operate to end the dispute. Determination or order must be judicial or quasi-judicial : purely administrative or executive direction is not contemplated to be made the subject-matter of appeal to this Court. The essence of the authority of this Court being judicial, this Court does not exercise administrative or executive powers i.e. character of the power conferred upon this Court, original or appellate, by its constitution being judicial, the determination or order sought to be appealed from must have the character of a judicial adjudication. The Conciliation Officer is authorised by cl. 29 to grant or withhold I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 249 perm1ss10n to determine the employment of a workman concerned in a pending dispute or to alter to his prejudice conditions of his service. Clause 29 severely restricts the right of the employer to terminate employment according to the terms of the contract of employment, and the right is made exercisable upon. the direction of the Conciliation Officer if at the time when the right is sought to be exercised, a dispute .in which the employer and the employees are concerned, is pending before the Conciliation Officer or in an Industrial Tribunal. The true character of this direction must be. examined in the light of the nature of the authority vested in the Conciliation Officer and its impact upon the rights of the parties. If the direction is purely administrative, it will not be subject to appeal to this Court. Q~estion whether, a decision is judicial or is purely admini.strative, often arises when jurisdiction of the superior courts to issue writs of certiorari is invoked. Often the line of distinction between decisions judicial and administrative is thin : but. the principles for ascertaining the true character of the decisions are well-settled. A judicial decision is not always the act of a judge or a tribunal invested with power to determine questions of law or fact : it must however be the act of a body or authority invested by law with authority to determine questions or disputes affecting the rights of citizens and under a duty to act judicially. A judicial decision a.lways postulates the existence of a duty laid upon the authority to act judicially. Administrative authorities are often invested with authority or power to determine questions, which affect the rights of citizens. The authority may have to invite objections to the course of action proposed by him, he may be under a duty to hear the objectors, and his decision may seriously affect the rights of citizens but unless in arriving at . his decision he is required to act judicially, his decision 1962 Jaswant Sugar 1Vfilis Ltd., Mcerut v. Lakshmichand Shah, J. 1962 want Sugar M.ills Ltd., Meerut v. Lakshmichand Shah, J. 250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963) SUPP. will be executive or administrative. Legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of citizens, does not make the determination judicial : it is the duty to act judicially which invests it with that character. What distinguishes an act judicial from administrative is therefore the duty imposed upon the authority to act judicially. Mukherjea, J., in The Province of Bombay v. K. S. Advani (1) observed at p. 670 "there cannot indeed be a judicial act which does not create o,r imposes obligations ; but an act, x x x x x x is not necessarily judicial because it affects the rights 0f subjects. Every judicial act presupposes the application of judicial process. There is well marked distinction between forming a personal or private opinion about a matter, and determining it judicially. In the performance of an executive act, the authority has certainly to apply his mind to the materials before him ; but the opinion he forms is a purely subjective matter which depends entirely upon his state of mind. It is of course necessary that he must act in good faith, and if it is established that he was not influenced by any extraneous consideration, there is nothing further to be said about it. In a judicial proceeding, on the othrr hand, the process or method of application is different. "The judicial process involves the application of a body of rules or principles by the technique of a particular psychological method", vide Robson's Jt!stice and Administrative Law, p. 33. It involves a proposal and an opposition, and arriving at a decision upon the same on comideration of facts and circumstances according to the rules of reason and justice, vide R. v. London County Council('). It is not necessary that the strict rules of evidence should be followed : the procedure for investigation of facts or for reception of evidence may vary according to the requirements of a particular case. There need not be any hard and fast rule on such matters~ but the decision which the authority arrives at, must not be his 'subjective', 'personal' or 'private' opinion. (1) [1950] s.c.R. 621. (2) [1931] 2 K. B. 215, 2SS. l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 251 It must be something which conforms to an objective standard or criterion laid down or recognised by law, and the soundness or otherwise of the determination must be capable of being trstcd by the same external standard. This is the essence of a judicial function which differentiates it from an administrative function ; and whether an authority is required to exercise one kind of function or the other depends entirely upon the provisions of the particular enactment. x x x x x Generally speaking where the language of a statute indicates with ~ufficient clearness that the personal satisfaction of the authority on certain matters about which he has to form an opinion finds his jurisdiction to do certain acts or make certain orders, the function should be regarded as an executive function." It may be observed that Mukherjea, J., was on the ultimate decision in the case, in the minority, but the principle enunciated by him had substantially the approval of the Court. Das, J., in the same case at p. 719 observed: "a person entrusted to do an administrative act has often to determine questions of fact to enable him to exercise his power. He has to consider facts and circumstances and to weigh pros and cons in his mind before he makes up his mind to exercise his power just as a person exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial function has to do. Both have to act in good faith. A good and valid administratiw or executive act binds the subject and affects his rights or imposes liability on him just as effectively as a quasi-judicial act does. The exercise of an administrative or executive act may well be and is freque~t!y made dependent by. the Legislature upon a. condition or contmgency.wh1ch may involve a question of fact, but the question of fulfilment of which may, nevertheless, be left to the subjective opinion or satisfaction of the .::xecutive authority". To make a decision or an act judicial, the following criteria must be satisfied: 1962 Jaswant .Sligar Afills ltd., Meirul v. Lakshmichand Shah, J. 1962 Jaswanl Sugar .NfillJ Ltd., lltfeerut v. Lakshmichand Shah, J. 252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP. ( 1) it is in substance a determination upon investigation of a question by the application of objective standards to facts found in the light of pre-existing legal rule; (2) it declares rights or imposes upon parties obligations affecting. their civil rights; and (3) that the investigation is subject to certain procedural attributes contemplating an opportunity of presenting its case to a party, ascertainmant of facts by means of evidence if a dispute be on questions of· fact, an~ if the dispute be on question of law on the presentation of legal argument, and a decision resulting in the disposal of the matter on findings based upon those questions of law and fact. Applying these tests, there is little doubt that the Conciliation Officer in granting or refusing pennission to alt.er the terms of employment of workmen, at the instance of the employer, has to act judicially. His decision is not made to depend upon any subjective satisfaction; he is required to investigate and ascertain facts, apply objective standards to facts found, and to declare whether the employer makes out a case for granting permission to alter the terms of employment of his employees. The U. P. Indus• trial Disputes Act and the Order framed thereunder do not lay down any specific procedure, but the duty cast upon him to decide after investigating facts by the application of objective standards involves an obligation to evolve a procedure consistent with the purpose and nature of the enquiry, which assures to the disputing parties an opportunity to present their respective cases, and to substantiate the same by evidence and argument. Therefore the direction of the Conciliation Officer under cl. 29 of the Order, cannot be said to be purely administrative. 1 S.C.R. SUPREM.E COURT REPORTS 253 But every decision or order by an authority under a duty to act judicially is not subject to appeal to this Court. Under Art. 136, an appeal lies to this Court from adjudications of courts and tribunals only. Adjudication of a court or tribunal must doubtless be judicial: but every authority which by its constitution or authority specially conferred upon it is required to act judicially, is not necessarily a tribunal for the purpose of Art. 136. A tribunal, adjudication whereof is subject to appeal, must beside being under a duty to act judicially, be a body invested with the judicial power of the State. For" the purpose of ascertaining whether the Conc.iliatior Officer exercising powers under cl. 29 is investee with the judicial powers of the State, it is necessary to set out the nature of the powers and functions of the Conciliation Officer and the procedure, if any, prescribed for the exercise of those powers and functions under the Order .issued by the Governor, and which was in force at the material time. A historical review of the emergence of the powers and functions of the Conciliation Officer in operation at the date when he passed the order impugned in these appeals has an important bearing. The Legislature of the United Provinces enacted the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, XXVIII of 1947, to provide "for powers to prevent strikes and lock-outs, to settle industrial disputes and for other incidental matters". By s. 3 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, the Local Government was authorised, if in its opinion it was necessary or expedient so to do for certain specified ~urpo~es to rr_iake by gei;ier~l or . special order, provision, inter alia for appomtmg mdustrial courts and for referring any industrial dispute for conciliation or adjudication in the manner provided in the Order. The Governor ofUttar Pradesh on March 10 1948, issued an Order in exercise of the power~ conferred under ss. 3 and 8 of the U. P. Industrial 1962 Jaewant Sugar Afit Ltd. Afeerut . v. Lakshmidiand Shah, J. 1962 :Jant Sugar Mills Ltd., Meerul v. :akrhmichand Shah, J. 254 SUPREME COURT REP ORTS [1963] SUPP. Disputes Act, 1947. By cl. 1 of the Order power was conferred upon the Provincial Government to constitute Conciliation Boards for settlement of industrial disputes under the chairmanship of Conciliation Officers, and by cl. 2 the Provincial Government was authorised to appoint Conciliation Officers. By cl. 6 the Conciliation Board had to commence an inquiry into a dispute or matter brought before it and to endeavour to bring about a settlement of the same. Clause 7 prescribed the procedure to be followed by the Board in the course of the inquiry : the Board had to frame issues on points on which the parties were at variance and to endeavour to secure a settlement, of the dispute. If no amicable settlement was reached, the Board investigated the dispute and recorded an award together with the reasons thereof on the issues on which the parties were at issue. The award made by the Conciliation Board was subject to appeal to the Industrial Court constituted under cl. 10 of the Order. By cl. 18 the Conciliation Board was invested with certain powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1903, such as enforcing attendance of witnesses, compelling production of documents, inspection of any property or thing, including machinery etc. By cl. 19 provision was made for service of notice, summons, process or order issued by the Board in the manner prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. But these were the powers of the Conciliation Board, and not of the Conciliation Officer. The only statutory authority conferred upon the Conciliation Officer independently of the Board was authority under cl. 23 to permit modification of terms of employment or dismissal or discharge of workmen during the continuance of an enquiry under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act or appeal therefrom and pending the issue of the orders of the State Government upon the findings of the Board of Court. Under the, ~i1er promulgated in J 948, therefore, the Concihauon Board was invested with authority analogous to that l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 255 of an Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. But the power to sanction discharge or dismissal of workmen during the continuance of the enquiry was vested exclusively in the Conciliation Officer, irrespective of whether the enquiry was pending before a Conciliation Board, or in appeal before the Industrial Court. This Order was superseded by fresh Order which was promulgated in 1951. It was presumably because of the enactment d the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, by the Parliament which conferred authority upon the Labour Appellate Tribunal to entertain appeals in certain matters against the awards and decisions of the Industrial Tribunals that the necessity of reorientation of the scheme for adjudication of labour disputes under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act arose. By the fresh Order rules were prescribed for constitution of Conciliation Boards, Industrial Tribunals and Adjudicators. By this Order a Conciliation Board of which the Conciliation Officer was to be the Chairman was only to endeavour to bring about a settlement of dispute before it. If a settlement was brought about; the Conciliation Board prepared a memorandum of terms of the settlement arrived at and the same was submitted to the Labour Commissioner of the State. Where no amicable settlement was secured, the Board made a report setting forth the steps taken for ascertaining the facts and circumstances relating to the disJ?ute and the attempts made for bringing about an amicable settlement. Power to make an award was taken ~way fron. the Conciliation Board, and was vested m the Industrial Tribunal. Powers exercisable. under the Code of Civil Procedure under the p;:v1?us Order were also taken away from the Conc1hat10~ Board.bμt the authority to alter conditions of serv1c~. d~mng the pendency of proceeding before the Conohation Offi.cer or. a Tribunal or an' Adjudicator by cl. 23 remamed with the Conciliation Offi. fth d . cer o e area concemc irrespective of the fact whether 1962 Jruwant Sugar Mills Ltd., Meerut v. Lakshmichand Shah, J. 1962 Jaswant Sugar Mills l.td., /1/eerur v. Lak!·hmichand Shuh, J. 256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP. a dispute was pending before a Board, Tribunal or an Adjudicator. This Order was superseded by a fresh Order made in 1954. The scheme of the Order made in 1954 was similar to the scheme of the Order made in 1951. Disputes could be referred under this Order to the Conciliation Board which was to consist of the Conciliation Officer appointed by the State Government and two members-one representing each of the parties to the dispute-appointed by the Conciliation Officer on the recommendation of the parties. The function of the Board was to prepare a memorandum of a settlement, if any, reached before the Board or to report about the failure to bring about a settlement, but it had no power to make an award. By cl. 24 the Tribunal or the Adjndicator, bnt not the Board nor the Conciliation Officer, were vested with certain powers as were vested in the Civil Courts under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, such as summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses, requiring the discovery and production of documents, issuing commissions in the examination of witnesses and inspection of any property or thing. Clause 29 (omitting the proviso thereto which is not material) was enacted as follows :- "During the pendency . of any conciliation proceedings or proceedings before the Tribunal or an Adjudicator in respect of any dispute and, where sub-clause (3) of clause 5 applies, for a further period of 30 days (excluding holidays but not annual vacations observed bv courts subordinate to the High Court), an employer shall not- ( a) alter to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute th~ conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceedings, or 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 257 (b) discharge or punish, whether such punishment is by dismissal or otherwise, any workman concerned in such dispute, save with the express permission in writing of a Conciliation Officer of the area concerned, irrespective of the fact whether the