# CHANDER SEKHAR SINGH BOI ETC v. THE STATE OF ORISSA ETC

- **Citation:** [1972] 2 S.C.R. 279
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1971-11-05
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 854, 1028, 1033 and 1097 of 1966
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/chander-sekhar-singh-boi-etc-v-the-state-of-orissa-etc-5646
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

279
A
CHANDER SEKHAR SINGH BOI ETC.
v.
THE STATE OF ORISSA ETC.
November 5, 1971
[S. M. SIKRI, C.J., J. M. SHELAT, I. D. DUA, S. C. Roy
ANO
B
G. K. MITTER, JJ.J
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Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 3 JA-'Modification', scope of-Applicability of second proviso when provisions regarding ceiling limit--are not
in force.
Courts-Jurisdiction to go into vires of provisions not brought into•
force.
·
Bhagchar tenure, nieaning of.
By the Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1965. the Ori~sa Land Rtforms Act,
1960, was amen<ji:d by substituting new Chaps. III and IV for tile original
Chaps. JII and IV.
By notifications issued under s. 1(3) of the Act,
under which different dates may be appointed by notification for the
coming into force of different provisions of the Act, the Act and Chap. Ill,
as amended, were brought into force; but no notification bringing into
force the provisions of Chap. IV dealing with
ceiling was issued.
The
appellant challenged the validity of the Act.
The High Court held that
Chap. llJ was ·1 valid piece of legislation but that Chap. IV was unconstitutional and invalid.
In appeal to this Court it was contendeJ : (I) that the provisions of
Chap. III were invalid because they were not protected by the provisions
of Art. 31(A)ll) of the Constitution as they do not provide for the
acquisition by t.he State of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights; (2) if the 11rovisions of
Chap. Jll amounted to acquisition market value was payable as
compensation under the second proviso to the Art_icfe and not the compen~
sation as fixed in s. 28 of the Act; (3) Chap. IV was
ultra vir_, the
provisions of the second proviso to Art. 31-A(l) of the Constitution.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : ( 1) The provisions of Chap. III of the Act modify the landlord's substantive ri,,ghts in various respects inasmuch as they enable the
determination of resumable land which the land owner would be entitled
to cultivate himself, and reg3.rding non-resumable land, the tl.!nant is
given a right to acquire it on payment of compensatio~. Therefore, these
provisions fall within the protection given by Art. 31-A(l) of the Constitution. f286 D·F]
Atma Ram v. State of Puniab, [19591 Supp. 1 S.C.R. 748 753; 767,
followed.
(2) The second proviso to Art.. 31A(l) is not applicable because .. no
ceiling limit within the meaning of the proviso to Art. 31-A(l) has been
fixecl.
Till a notification under s. 1 (3) of the Act is issued bringing in
force the provisions of Chap. IV it cannot be said that there is any ceiling
limit applicable to the appellant under any law for the ,time being in
force.
Moreover the essence of personal cu1tivation as used in the proviso
is cultivation by or on hehalf of the owner of the land. The appellant is
the owner of Bbagchar lands, , and under· this tenure the cultivator shares
his crop with the owner.
A crop-sharer does not cultivate on bem!f of
the landlord and therefore the Bhagchar lands are not undelr the appellant'•
person cultiva!fon. [287 B-D; 288 A-Bl
280
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972] 2 S.C.R.
(3) The High Court should not have gone into question of
the
validity of Chap. IV Courts ordinarily ought not to go into ti>, question
.if the validity of an Act or a provision of an Act unless it has been
brought into force. Till then such a question would be academic, because.
no body could be aggrieved by a provision of Jaw wh_ich is dormant and
which cannot be enforcod.
Therefore, this Court would not go into the
question whether the provisions of Chap. IV were ultra vires or not /,282 OF].
State of Orissa y. Chander Sekhar, [1970] I S.C.R. 593, referred to.

## Text

279
A
CHANDER SEKHAR SINGH BOI ETC.
v.
THE STATE OF ORISSA ETC.
November 5, 1971
[S. M. SIKRI, C.J., J. M. SHELAT, I. D. DUA, S. C. Roy
ANO
B
G. K. MITTER, JJ.J
c
D
E
F
G
H
Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 3 JA-'Modification', scope of-Applicability of second proviso when provisions regarding ceiling limit--are not
in force.
Courts-Jurisdiction to go into vires of provisions not brought into•
force.
·
Bhagchar tenure, nieaning of.
By the Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1965. the Ori~sa Land Rtforms Act,
1960, was amen<ji:d by substituting new Chaps. III and IV for tile original
Chaps. JII and IV.
By notifications issued under s. 1(3) of the Act,
under which different dates may be appointed by notification for the
coming into force of different provisions of the Act, the Act and Chap. Ill,
as amended, were brought into force; but no notification bringing into
force the provisions of Chap. IV dealing with
ceiling was issued.
The
appellant challenged the validity of the Act.
The High Court held that
Chap. llJ was ·1 valid piece of legislation but that Chap. IV was unconstitutional and invalid.
In appeal to this Court it was contendeJ : (I) that the provisions of
Chap. III were invalid because they were not protected by the provisions
of Art. 31(A)ll) of the Constitution as they do not provide for the
acquisition by t.he State of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights; (2) if the 11rovisions of
Chap. Jll amounted to acquisition market value was payable as
compensation under the second proviso to the Art_icfe and not the compen~
sation as fixed in s. 28 of the Act; (3) Chap. IV was
ultra vir_, the
provisions of the second proviso to Art. 31-A(l) of the Constitution.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : ( 1) The provisions of Chap. III of the Act modify the landlord's substantive ri,,ghts in various respects inasmuch as they enable the
determination of resumable land which the land owner would be entitled
to cultivate himself, and reg3.rding non-resumable land, the tl.!nant is
given a right to acquire it on payment of compensatio~. Therefore, these
provisions fall within the protection given by Art. 31-A(l) of the Constitution. f286 D·F]
Atma Ram v. State of Puniab, [19591 Supp. 1 S.C.R. 748 753; 767,
followed.
(2) The second proviso to Art.. 31A(l) is not applicable because .. no
ceiling limit within the meaning of the proviso to Art. 31-A(l) has been
fixecl.
Till a notification under s. 1 (3) of the Act is issued bringing in
force the provisions of Chap. IV it cannot be said that there is any ceiling
limit applicable to the appellant under any law for the ,time being in
force.
Moreover the essence of personal cu1tivation as used in the proviso
is cultivation by or on hehalf of the owner of the land. The appellant is
the owner of Bbagchar lands, , and under· this tenure the cultivator shares
his crop with the owner.
A crop-sharer does not cultivate on bem!f of
the landlord and therefore the Bhagchar lands are not undelr the appellant'•
person cultiva!fon. [287 B-D; 288 A-Bl
280
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972] 2 S.C.R.
(3) The High Court should not have gone into question of
the
validity of Chap. IV Courts ordinarily ought not to go into ti>, question
.if the validity of an Act or a provision of an Act unless it has been
brought into force. Till then such a question would be academic, because.
no body could be aggrieved by a provision of Jaw wh_ich is dormant and
which cannot be enforcod.
Therefore, this Court would not go into the
question whether the provisions of Chap. IV were ultra vires or not /,282 OF].
State of Orissa y. Chander Sekhar, [1970] I S.C.R. 593, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 854,
1028, 1033 and 1097 of 1966, 1866 to
1867 and 2487
of
1969.
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B
Appeals from the judgment and order dated January 30, 1967
C
.of the Orissa High Court in O.J.C. Nos. 329 of 1965 etc.
Somnath Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee, for the appellant
(in C.A. No. 854 of 1968) and respondent no. 2
(in C.A. No.
1867 of 1969).
C. B. Agqrwa/a, S. P. Nayar for R. N. Sachthey, for the resD
-pondent (in C.A. No. 854 of 1968) and the apJl'~llant (in C.As.
Nos. 1028, 1033 and 1097 of 1968, 1865 to 1867 and 2487 of
1969).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Sikri, C.J. The appellan~, Chander Sekhar Singh Bhoi,
in
Civil Appeal No. 854 of 1968, filed a petition under Art. 226.
of the Constitution (No. O.J.C. 329/1965) in the Orissa High
Court, challenging the Orissa Land Reforms Act of 1960. herein-
.after referred 1to as the Principal Act (Act XVI of 1960) as
amended by the Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1965 (Act XIII of
1965) hereinafter referred to as tho~ Amending Act. He alleged
that he owned about 220 acres of self-cultivated land and that
he had about 5 acres of Bhagchar !<ind.
This petition was heard alongwith a number ol other petitions
by the High Court, and the l;Iigh Court by its common judgment
datr...d 30th January, 1967 disposed of all these petitions.
The
High Court came to ~he conclusion that "Chapter III of the
Amending Act is a valid piece of legislation or in other words,
·1t does not suffor from any invalidity; but Chapter IV of the
Amending Act is unconstitutional and invalid and accordingly it
is struck down." The High Court accordingly allowed the petitions in part and directed the State not to give effect to the provisions of Chapter IV of the Amending Act.
.
Th~ State filed a numbe; ?f. appeals against that judgment
:and this Court (Shah and Va1dialmgam, JJ.) allowed 1the appeals
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CHANDER SEKHAR v. ORISSA (Sikri, C.J.)
281
and set aside the order passed by the High Court declaring Chapter
IV of Act XIII of 1965 amending Act XVI of 1960 ul1ra vires
(State of Orissa v. Chander Sekhar)(1). Civil Appeals No. 1028,
1033 & 1907/1968, 1865-67 & 248711969 are by the State of
Orissa (hereinafter referred to as the State apl?e~ls) but these
could not be heard by this ~ourt (Shah and Va1d1almgam, JJ.).
The present appeal ( C.A. No. 854 of 1968) was also not heard
with the other appeals.
Jn Civil appeal No. 854 of 1968 the appellant urged:
(ll
(2)
That the High Court erred in holding Chapter III of
the Act as inserted by AC't XIII of 1965 in Act XVI
of 1960 intra vires; and
That Chapter IV as inserted by Act XIII of 1965
in Act XVI of 1960 is ultra vires the provisions
of the second proviso to Art. 31-A( 1) of the Constitution.
In the other appeals the State urged that the previous decision
be followed and the judgment of the High Court sei aside. On
behalf of the respondent in C.A. No. 1867 of 1969 it is urged
that the judgment of this Court is erroneous and needs reconsideration. We may mention that the respondents in the other appeals
have noi entered appearance.
The Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1960, received the assent of
the President on October 17, 1960 and was published first in the
extraordinary issue of the Orissa Gazette dated November 11,
1960. The object of the legislation is given in the preamble which
reads:
"WHEREAS it is necessary to enact a progressive
legislation relating tq agrarian reforms and land tenures
consequent on the gradual abolition of inter-mediary
interest;
AND WHEREAS it is expedient to confer better
rights on agriculturists to ensur:e increase in food production in the manner hereinafter appearing."
Section 1 (3) of the .Act provides :
"It shall come into force in whole or in part, on such
date or dates as the Govern!Ilent may from time to time
by notification appoint; and different dates may be appointed for different provisions of this Act."
On June 20, 1964 'by virtue of Constitution
(Seventeenth
Amendment) Act, 1964, the Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1960 was
(I) [1970} I S.C.R. 593.
282
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972] 2 S.C.R ..
included in the 9th Schedule to the Constitution as entry 52.
On August 11, 1965 the Orissa Land Reforms Amending Act
1965 (Act XIII of 1965) received the assent of ~he President and
was first published in the extraordinary issue of the Orissa Gazette
dated 17th August, 1965.
By the Amending Act various provisions of the Principal Act were amended and in particular for
the original Chapters III and IV of the Principal Act new Chapters III and IV were substituted.
On September 25, 1965, a notification under Sec. 1(3) of the
Principal Act was issued bringing the Act into fqrce except Chapters III and IV. A further notification was issued under Section
1(3) of the Act bringing Chapter III of the Act as amended into
force. No notification has as yet been issued under Section 1 (3)
of the Act bringing 'the provisions of Chapter IV into force. This
fact was also noticed in the judgment of this Court in State of
Orissa v. Chander Sekhar( 1) but the Court nevertheless went into
the question of validity of Chapter IV of the Act as amended
because the High Court had held Chapter IV to be ultra vires.
It seems !P us that the Courts ordinarily ought not to go into
the question of the validity of an Act or a provision of an Act
unless it has been brought into force. Till then, such a question
would be academic.
No body can be aggrieved by a provision
of law whic1' is dormant and which cannot be enforced.
The
Constitution has provided for an advisory opinion being given by
the Supreme Court, when llhe question is of such a nature and
of such public importance that it is expedient to obtain the opinion
of the Supreme Court. The High Court should not have embarked
upon an academic question. In view of this we are not inclined
to go into the question whether the provisions of Chapter IV were
rightly held to be intra vires by this Court.
The respondents in
the State appeals can raise this question if so advised when the
notification is issued under Section 1 (3) of the Act bringing Chapter IV into force.
However, the appellant Chander Sekhar Singh
was a party to the decision in State of Orissa v. Chander Sekhar(1)
and thafjudgment is binding on him. He cannot ask us to reviP-w
the judgment in this manner.
In order to appreciate the contentions of the learned counsel
on the question of the validity of the provisions of Chapter ill
of the Act it is necessary to notice the relevant provisions of the
Act bearing on this question.
The following definitions were
brought to our notice :
(I) [1970] 1 S.C.R. 591.
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CHANDER SEKHAR V. ORISSA (Sikri, C.J.)
283
"2(5) 'Ceiling area' means an extent of land equivalent to twent;y standard acres;"
"2(17) 'Landlord' means a person immediately under
whom land is held by a raiyat or a tenant;
Explanation I-A raiyat or a tenant shall be deemed to be a landlord in relation to the tenant or tenants
immediately under him;
Explanation 11-Government shall be deemed to
be the landlord in respect of the lands held directly
under them either by a raiyat or a temporary lessee or
a tenant;"
"2(22) 'personal cultivation' with its grammatical
variations and cognate expressions means to cultivate
on one's own account-
( a) by one's own labour; or
(b) by the labour of any member of one's family;
or
( c) by servants or hired labour on wages, payable
in cash or in kind, but not in crop share, under
one's personal supervision or the personal supervision of any member of one's family;"
"2 ( 30) 'standard acre' means the unit of measurement of land equivalent to one acre of Class I land, or
one acre and a half of Class II land, or three acres of
Class III land, or four acres of Class IV land;"
"2 ( 31) 'tenant' means a person who has no rights
in the land of another but under the system generally
known as Bhag, Sanja or. Kata or such similar expression or under any other system, law, contract, custom
or usage personally cultivates such land on payment of
rent in cash or in kind or in both or on condition of
delivery to that person-
( a) either a share of the produce of such land; or
(b) the estimated value of a portion of the crop
raised on the land; or
( c) a fixed quantity of produce irrespective of the
yield from the land; or
( d) produce or its estimated value partly in any of
the ways described above and partly in another;"
5-L500 Sup C T/72
284
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972] 2 S.C.R.
Chap'.er II deals with Raiyats and Tenants. The heading of
Chapter III is "Resumption of Land for Personal Cultivation."
Section 24 ( 1) gives a right to the landlord and the tenant to
have the resumable and non-resumable lands determined in accordance with the provisions of the Chapter. The expression
"resumable land", by virtue of the Explanation, refers to land
which can be resumed for personal cultivation by a landlord from
a tenant.
We are not concerned with s. 24(2). Section 25
fixes the extent of the resumable land which shall not be more
than one-half of the lands in respect of each tenant, measured in
standard acres only.
Section 26 enables the landlord to make a
selection under s. 25 . and apply on the basis of the selection to
the Revenue Officer in the prescribed manner and form.
It also
enables a tenant to apply to the Revenue Officer within the
pe1iod uf three months in the prescribed form and manner.
Under s. 27 the Revenue Officer determines the particulars of the
resumable lands and the non-resumable lands.
Section 28 provides that while deciding matters under s. 27 the Revenue Officer
shall determin~ the compensation in respect of the non-resumable
lands payable in the prescribed manner by the tenant which shall
be determined in accordance with sub-ss. (2) and (3) of s. 28.
Sub-section (2) enables the compensation to be fixed and paid in
annual instalments mentioned therein.
Sub-s. (3) provides for
compensation for wells, tanks and structures of a permanent
nature at the market value thereof to be paid along with the compensation under sub-s. (2). Under s. 29, after the disposal of
appeal, if any, the Revenue Officer has to issue a certificate in
the prescribed form to the landlord and also to the tenant specifying all matters to be determined under ss. 27 and 28. He is
further directed to send a copy of such certificate to the authority
competent to maintain the record-of-rights.
Section 30 provides
that the tenant shall with effect from the beginning of the year
next following the date of the issue of the certificate under section
29 become a raiyat in respect of the land for which compensation has been determined under section 28. Sub-section (2)
provides that the instalments of the compensation amount together
with interest due thereon shall remain a first charge on the land
to which it relates and shall be recoverable to the Revenue Officer
by the person entitled thereto. Section 31 (1) deals with the
persons entitled to receive compensation, and under sub-s. (2),
with effect from the date the tenant becomes a raiyat under s. 30,
he holds the land free from all encumbrances, and. the rights of
all persons (not being Government or a landholder) mediately
or immediately under whom the land was being held shall st.and
extinguished and the encumbrances, if any, created by such persons in respect of t:Jie land shall thereafter attach to the other
lands of the landlord. Section 32 provides that the certificate
issued under s. 29 shall be conch,1sive proof the correctness of
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CHANDER SEKHAR Ji. ORISSA (Sikri, C.1.)
285
the contents thereof in respect of all disputes between the tenant
and the persons whose rights stand extinguished in pursuance of
s. 31. Section 33 provides for detennination of fair and equitable rent for non-resumable land and the persons to whom it is
payable.
Section 34 provides that on the detennination of · the
resumable lands the tenant on such land shall cease to have the
right to continue in cultivation thereof with effect from the date
of expiry of· the year next following the date of issue of the certificate Ul_!der s. 29.
Section 35 provides for the contingency
when both the landlord and the tenant in respect of any land fail
to apply in accordance with the provisions of s. 26, and enables
the Revenue Officer to detennine resumable and non-resumable
lands and other matters required to be determined under ss. 27
and 28.
Section 36 provides for eviction of a landlord and a
tenant who fail to personally cultivate the land without sufficient
cause.
The learned counsel challenged the provisions of Chapter III
on the ground that they are not protected by the provisions of
Art. 31A(l) because they do not provide for the acquisition by
the State_ of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights.
He said that the creation_of a similar and identical right in another person does not
amount to extinguishment of such rights.
According to him, a
right must vanish by the provisions of the Act before it can be
~aid .to be extinguished.
We see no force in this contention,
A
similar argument was addressed to this Court in Atma Ram v.
State of Punjab ( 1). This Court was then dealing with the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenure Act, 1953. The
provisions of the Punjab Act were summarised by this Court
thus:
"Thus, the Act seeks to limit the area which may
be held by a land-owner for the purpose of self-cultivation, thereby, releasing "surplus area" which may be
utilized for the purpose of re~ettfing ejected tenants,
and affording an opportunity to the tenant . to become
the land-owner himself on .payment of the purchaseprice which, if anything, would be less than the market
value."
The argument addressed to us was answered by Sinha, J .•
as he then was, thus :
"In this connection, it was further argued that
extinguishment of a right does not mean substitution of
another person in• that right, but total annihilation of
that riizht. In our opinion, it is not necessary to discuss
this rather metaphysical argument, because, in our
(1) [1959] Supp, (I) S.C.R. 748; 753; 767.
286
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1972] 2 S.C.l{.
opinion, it is enough for the purpose of this case. to hold
that the ~revisions of the Act, amount to modification
of the Jantlowner's rights in the lands comprised in his
"estate"· or "holding"'.
The Act modifies
the
landowner's substantive rights, particularly, in three
respects, as indicated above, namely, (l) it modifies his
right of settling his lands on any terms and to any one
he chooses: (2) it modifies, if it does not altogether
extinguish, his right to cultivate the "surplus area" as
understood under the Act; and ( 3) it modifies his right
of transfer in so far as it obliges him to sell lands not
at his own price but at a price fixed under the statute,
and not to any one but to specified persons, in accordance with the provisions of the Act, set out above.
Thus, there cannot be the least doubt that the provisions of the Act, very substantially modify the landowner's rights to hold and dispose of his property in
any estate or a. portion thereof.
It is, therefore, clear
that the provisions of Art. 3 lA save the impugned Act
from any attack based on the provisions of Arts. 14,
19 and 31 of the Constitution."
It seems to us that this Act also modifies the landlord's substantive rights in various respects inasmuch as it enables the determination ot resumable land which the land-owner would be
entitled to cultivate himself and regarding
the non-resumable
lantl the tenant is given the right to acquire it on payment of
compensation. This falls within the protection given by
Art.
31All).
The leamed counsel then referred to the second proviso
to
Art. 31 A (1) which reads :
"Provided further that where any law makes
any
provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate
and where any land comprised therein is held by a
person under his personal cultivation, it shall not be
lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land
as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under
any law for the time being in force or any building or
structure standing thereon
or appurtenant
thereto,
unless the Jaw relating to the acquisition of such land,
building or structure provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market
value thereof."
Relying on the majority judgment in Ajit Singh v. State of
Punjab('), he said that the provisions of Chapter Ill amounted
(1) [1967] 2 S.C.R. 14~.
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CHANDER SEKHAR v: ORISSA (Sikri, C.J.)
287
to acquisition and accordingly the niarket value was payable as
compensation under the second proviso and not the compensation as fixed in s. 28.
He urged that five acres of Bhagchar land
are lands under his personal' cultivation within the meaning of
the words "personal cultivation" in the
second
proviso.
He
further said that although no notification under s. 1 (3) of the
Act had been issued bringing the provisions of Chapter N,
which dealt with ceiling, the' ceiling limit applicable to him
would be the ceiling limit as provided in Chapter IV.
It seems to us that there: is no ceiling limit applicable to him
within the meaning of the pcoviso because till a notification
under s. I (3) is issued it cannot be said that there is any ceiling
limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in
force.
Further it does not ~eem to us that the 5 acres of .land
inentioned above are under his personal cultivation.
We have
already set out the definition of the words "personal cultivation".
Mr. C. B. Agarwala has drawn our attention to similar definitions in various Acts.
'
In 'The United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1959 "Khudkasht"
means land (other than Sir) cultivated by a landlord, as underproprietor or a pemrnnent, tenure-holder as such either himself
or by servants or by.hired labour.
In the Delhi Land Reforms Act, I 954, "Khudkasht" has been
defined thus :
"'Khudkasht' means land (other than Sir) cultivated by a proprietor either by himself or by servants or
by hired labour,-
( a) at the comme.ncement of this Act, or
( b) at any time during the period of five years
immediately before the commencement of this
Act, whether or not it was so cultivated at
such conunericement, provided that it has not,
at any time after having been so cultivated, been
let out to a tenant."
'
In the Bihar Land Refonns Act, 1950 "Khas
possession"
.means:
" 'Khas possessiqn' used with reference to the po.-
session of a proprietor or to tenure-holder of any land
used for agricultural or horticultural purposes means
the .pos.session of such prop~etor or tenure-holder by
c.uluvatmg such. land or. carrymg on horticultural operations thereon himself with his own stock or by his own
servants or b)I hired labour or with hired stock."
288
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
(1972] 2 S.C.R.
In 9ur view the words 'personal cultivation" in the Second
proviso·to Art. 31A(l) must bear a similar meaning.
The
essence of "personal cultivation" seems to be cultivation by or on
behalf of the owner of the land.
It is quite clear that under the
\enure known as Bhagchar, the cultivator shares his crop with
the owner.
So, when he grows the crop he grows it in bis own
right and not on behalf of any person.
Therefore, it is difficult
to hold that a crop-sharer cultivates on behalf of the landlord.
A
In the result we hold that the High Court was right in holding
that Chapter III of the Act is valid.
We further hold that the
High Court should not have gone into the question of the validity
of Chapter IV and we accordingly set aside that part of the
~~~.
c
In the result, Civil Appeal No. 854 of 1968 is dismissed, but
there will by no order as to costs. The other appeals are allowed, and the writ petitions filed by the responde.nts in the State
appeals are dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs in
these appeals.
V.P.S.
•