# CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION & ANOTHER v. JASMINE KAUR & OTHERS

- **Citation:** [2014] 9 S.C.R. 1122
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2014-09-01
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal Nos.8377-8378 of 2014
- **Bench:** Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, Shiva Kirti Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/chandigarh-administration-another-v-jasmine-kaur-others-30045
- **Pages:** 35

## Headnote

Education -
MBBS course - Admission - Eligibility -
C NRI Category quota -
Prospectus issued by appellants
challenged by respondent on ground that she being a
Canadian Citizen was an NRI, that, therefore, she was entitled
to seek admission to the MBBS course in the NRI category
quota but yet the definition of NRI as specified in the
D prospectus would denude her of such status and, therefdre, it
was liable to be struck down - Entitlement to relief - Held:
There was total lack of diligence on the part of respondent in
her decision to work out her remedies in the Court of law - In
such of those cases where the Court or Board is not in a
E position to grant relief within the time schedule due to fault
attributable to the candidate concerned, like the case on
hand, there should be no hesitation to deny the relief as was
done by the Single Judge of High Court - Ultimate direction
of the Division Bench of the High Court in having directed the
F appellants to provide admission to respondent without her
participation in the admission process and thereby causing
prejudice to the rightful claims of the candidates who validly
made their applications cannot be countenanced as that would
amount to setting up a bad precedent in all future cases - If
G the direction of Division Bench is allowed to operate, it would
amount to paying a premium for respondent's inexplicable
delay in working out her remedies.
Equity - Entitlement to equitable relief - Conduct of the
H
1122
CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION v. JASMINE KAUR 1123
party - Inexplicable delay in working out remedies - Effect
A
of.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD:1.1. The contesting Respondent knew full well
when the prospectus was issued in April 2013 that she
did not fulfill the criteria for making an application under
the first category of NRI quota as prescribed in paragraph
2 of the prospectus. But yet there was no immediate
challenge to the said provision before the High Court.
There was total lack of diligence on the part of the
contesting Respondent in her decision to work out her
remedies in the Court of law. [Para 33] [1149-D-E]
B
c
1.2. The prospectus which was issued in April, 2013
and the offending clause in the prospectus was not
D
challenged promptly while knowing full well that under
the said clause the candidate was not eligible, but yet for
reason best known to the respondent, an application was
filed and that too three days prior to the last date notified
for submission of such application. There was no reason,
much less justifiable reason, for not challenging the
relevant clause before the filing of the application. There
was no reason for the contesting Respondent to wait for
any reply from the Chandigarh Administration. After the
order of the Single Judge also, the contesting
Respondent took her own time to approach the Division
Bench for preferring the Letters Patent Appeal. A
cumulative effect of the conduct of the contesting
Respondent has only resulted in disentitling her to claim
any equitable relief prejudicial to the interest of other
eligible candidates of the year 2014-15 and whose rights
G
came to be crystallized based on the process of selection
made for the academic year 2014-15. If the direction of the
Division Bench in the above stated background is
allowed to operate, it would amount to paying a premium
E
F
for the contesting Respondent's inexplicable delay in
H
1124
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014) 9 S.C.R.
A working out her remedies. Such a recalcitrant attitude
displayed by the contesting Respondent should not be
encouraged at the cost of the rights of the other
candidates for the year 2014-15 against whom the
contesting Respondent had no axe to grind. [Paras 39,
B 40] [1154-D-H; 1115-A-B]
1.3. Unless claims of exceptional nature are brought
before the Court within the time schedule fixed by this
Court, Court or Board should not pass orders for granting
admission into any particular course out of time. In such
C of those cases where the Court or Board

## Text

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A
B
[2014] 9 S.C.R. 1122
CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION & ANOTHER
v.
JASMINE KAUR & OTHERS
(Civil Appeal Nos.8377-8378 of 2014)
SEPTEMBER 01, 2014
[FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA AND
SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, JJ.]
Education -
MBBS course - Admission - Eligibility -
C NRI Category quota -
Prospectus issued by appellants
challenged by respondent on ground that she being a
Canadian Citizen was an NRI, that, therefore, she was entitled
to seek admission to the MBBS course in the NRI category
quota but yet the definition of NRI as specified in the
D prospectus would denude her of such status and, therefdre, it
was liable to be struck down - Entitlement to relief - Held:
There was total lack of diligence on the part of respondent in
her decision to work out her remedies in the Court of law - In
such of those cases where the Court or Board is not in a
E position to grant relief within the time schedule due to fault
attributable to the candidate concerned, like the case on
hand, there should be no hesitation to deny the relief as was
done by the Single Judge of High Court - Ultimate direction
of the Division Bench of the High Court in having directed the
F appellants to provide admission to respondent without her
participation in the admission process and thereby causing
prejudice to the rightful claims of the candidates who validly
made their applications cannot be countenanced as that would
amount to setting up a bad precedent in all future cases - If
G the direction of Division Bench is allowed to operate, it would
amount to paying a premium for respondent's inexplicable
delay in working out her remedies.
Equity - Entitlement to equitable relief - Conduct of the
H
1122
CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION v. JASMINE KAUR 1123
party - Inexplicable delay in working out remedies - Effect
A
of.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD:1.1. The contesting Respondent knew full well
when the prospectus was issued in April 2013 that she
did not fulfill the criteria for making an application under
the first category of NRI quota as prescribed in paragraph
2 of the prospectus. But yet there was no immediate
challenge to the said provision before the High Court.
There was total lack of diligence on the part of the
contesting Respondent in her decision to work out her
remedies in the Court of law. [Para 33] [1149-D-E]
B
c
1.2. The prospectus which was issued in April, 2013
and the offending clause in the prospectus was not
D
challenged promptly while knowing full well that under
the said clause the candidate was not eligible, but yet for
reason best known to the respondent, an application was
filed and that too three days prior to the last date notified
for submission of such application. There was no reason,
much less justifiable reason, for not challenging the
relevant clause before the filing of the application. There
was no reason for the contesting Respondent to wait for
any reply from the Chandigarh Administration. After the
order of the Single Judge also, the contesting
Respondent took her own time to approach the Division
Bench for preferring the Letters Patent Appeal. A
cumulative effect of the conduct of the contesting
Respondent has only resulted in disentitling her to claim
any equitable relief prejudicial to the interest of other
eligible candidates of the year 2014-15 and whose rights
G
came to be crystallized based on the process of selection
made for the academic year 2014-15. If the direction of the
Division Bench in the above stated background is
allowed to operate, it would amount to paying a premium
E
F
for the contesting Respondent's inexplicable delay in
H
1124
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014) 9 S.C.R.
A working out her remedies. Such a recalcitrant attitude
displayed by the contesting Respondent should not be
encouraged at the cost of the rights of the other
candidates for the year 2014-15 against whom the
contesting Respondent had no axe to grind. [Paras 39,
B 40] [1154-D-H; 1115-A-B]
1.3. Unless claims of exceptional nature are brought
before the Court within the time schedule fixed by this
Court, Court or Board should not pass orders for granting
admission into any particular course out of time. In such
C of those cases where the Court or Board is not in a
position to grant the relief within the time schedule due to
the fault attributable to the candidate concerned, like the
case on hand, there.should be no hesitation to deny the
relief as was done by the Single Judge. If for any reason,
D such grant of relief is not possible within the time schedule,
due to reasons attributable to other parties, and such
reasons are found to be deliberate or ma/a fide the Court
should only consider any other relief other than direction
for admission, such as compensation, etc. In such
E situations, the Court should ensure that those who were
at fault are appropriately proceeded against and punished
in order to ensure that such deliberate or malicious acts
do not recur. [Para 38] [1153-E-H; 1154-A-B]
F
1.4. The ultimate direction of the Division Bench of
the High Court in having directed the Chandigarh
Administration and the Government Medical College to
provide admission to the contesting Respondent without
her participation in the admissio11 process of the year
G 2014-15 and thereby causing prejudice to the rightful
claims of the candidates who validly made their
applic~tions in the said academic year cannot be
countenanced as that would amount to setting up a bad
precedent in all future cases. [Para 37] [1153-C-D]
H
Asha v. PT. B.D. Sharma University of Health Sciences
CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION v. JASMINE KAUR 1125
and others 2012 (7) sec 389: 2012 (6) SCR 876 and Priya
A
Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh and others (2012) 7 SCC 433:
2012 (5) SCR 768; Parmender Kumar and others v. State
of Haryana and others (2012) 1 sec 177: 2011 (14)
SCR 1065; Madan Lal and Others v. State of J & K and
others (1995) 3 SCC 486: 1995 (1) SCR 908; Ramana
B
Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India and
others (1979) 3 SCC 489: 1979 (3) SCR 1014; Dr. /ndu Kant
v. State of U. P. and others (1993) Suppl. (2) SCC 71; Raj iv
Kapoor and others v. State of Haryana and others (2000) 9
SCC 115: 2000 (2) SCR 629; Aneesh D. Lawande and C
others v. State of Goa and others (2014) 1 SCC 554; Subhash
Chandra and another v. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection
Board and others (2009) 15 SCC 458: 2009 (12) SCR 978;
Faiza Choudhary v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and
another (2012) 10 sec 149: 2012 (7) SCR 528; Shafali
Nandwani v. State of Haryana and others (2002) 8 SCC 152:
D
2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 548 Bhawna Garg & another v.
University of Delhi & others (2012) 8 SCALE 504;
Dwarkanath, Hindu Undivided Family v. Income-Tax Officer,
Special Circle, Kanpur and another (1965) 3 SCR 536; State
of Punjab v. Salil Sabhlok and others (2013) 5 sec 1; Miss
E
Neelima Shangla, PH.D. Candidate v. State of Haryana and
others (1986) 4 SCC 268: 1986 (3) SCR 785; Haryana
Urban Development Authority and others v. Sunita Rekhi
(1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 169; Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh
Kumar Shukla and others (1986) Suppl. SCC 285:
1986
F
SCR 855 ; Vijendra Kumar Verma v. Public Service
Commission, Uttarakhand and others (2011) 1 SCC 150:
2010 (12) SCR 944; K.A. Nagamani v. Indian Airlines and
others (2009) 5 SCC 515: 2009 (5) SCR 89; Dhananjay
Malik and others v. State of Uttaranchal and others (2008) 4
G
SCC 171: 2008 (3) SCR 1035; Chandra Prakash Tiwari and
others v. Shankunta/a Shukla and others (2002) 6 SCC 127:
2002 (3) SCR 948 and Nee/u Arora (Ms) and another v.
Union of India and others (2003) 3 SCC 366: 2003 (1) SCR
562 - referred to.
H
1126
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 9 S.C.R.
A
Case Law Reference:
2012 (6) SCR876
referred to
Para 6
2012 (5) SCR 768
referred to
Para 6
B
2011 (14) SCR 1065
referred to
Para 12
1995 (1) SCR 908
referred to
Para 12
1979 (3) SCR 1014
referred to
Para 12
(1993) Suppl. (2) sec 71
referred to
Para 12
c
2000 (2) SCR 629
referred to
Para 12
(2014) 1 sec 554
referred to
Para 12
2009 (12) SCR 978
referred to
Para 12
D
2012 (7) SCR 528
referred to
Para 14
2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 548 referred to
Para 14
(2012) 8 SCALE 504
referred to
Para 14
E
(1965) 3 SCR 536
referred to
Para 14
(2013) 5 sec 1
referred to
Para 14
1986 (3) SCR 785
referred to
Para 14
(1989) Suppl. 2 sec 169
referred to
Para 14
F
1986 SCR 855
referred to
Para 17
2010 (12) SCR 944
referred to
Para 17
2009 (5) SCR89
referred to
Para 17
G
2008 (3) SCR 1035
referred to
Para 17
2002 (3) SCR 948
referred to
Para 17
2003 (1) SCR 562
referred to
Para 21
H
CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION v. JASMINE KAUR 1127
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.
A
8377-8378 of 2014.
From the Jugment & Order dated 13.01.2014 in LPA. No.
2051/2013, 21.02.2014 in RA No. 9/2014 in LPA 2051/2013
of by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh.
B
WITH
C.A. No. 8376 of 2014.
Nidhesh Gupta, Tarun Gupta, Shubham Bhalla, Ritesh c
Khatri for the Appellants.
Guru Krishna Kumar, Narender Hooda, Pradeep Dahiya
(for Sheil Sethi), Banc Deswal (for Kamal Mohan Gupta),
Gaurav Sharma, Amandeep Kaur, Ashok Mahajan for the
Respondents.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J. 1. Leave
granted.
E
2. These appeals have been preferred against the orders
passed by the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High
Court at Chandigarh in LPA No.2051 of 2013 dated
13.01.2014 and C.M. No.623 of 2014 in RA No.9 of 2014 in
LPA No.2051 of 2013. The Appellants in SLP(C) No.18137F
18138 of 2014 are the Chandigarh Administration and the
Government Medical College & Hospital, Chandigarh. The
Appellant in SLP(C) No.18099 of 2014 has filed the Special
Leave Petition with the permission of this Court, who was not
a party, either before the Single Judge or before the Division
G
Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court.
3. Leave to file Special Leave Petition was granted in
SLP(C) No.18099/2014 considering the grievances expressed
by the said Appellant contending that in the event of the
H
1128
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2014] 9 S.C.R.
A impugned orders of the Division Bench being implemented, her
chance of getting admission to the course of M.B.B.S. for the
academic year 2014-15 under the Non-Resident Indian (NRI)
category would be impinged.
B
4. The present impugned orders of the Division Bench
came to be passed at the instance of the contesting
Respondent in both the Civil Appeals who was really aggrieved
of a clause in the prospectus issued by the Appellants in
SLP(C) No.18137-18138 of 2014 (hereinafter called "the
Chandigarh Administration and the Government Medical
C College Chandigarh"), which according to her was not valid.
According to the contesting Respondent, she being a Canadian
Citizen is an NRI, that, therefore, she was entitled to seek
admission to the M.B.B.S. course in the NRI category quota but
yet the definition of NRI as specified in the prospectus issued
D, by the Chandigarh Administration and the Government Medical
College, Chandigarh for the academic year 2014-15 would
denude her of such status and, therefore, it was liable to be
struck down. The said definition, which was contained in
E
F
G
H
paragraph 2 of the prospectus of 2013-14, was as under:
"2. Eligibility and Merit for NRI seats (03 Seats) for
MBBS Course:
In addition to the general conditions above, under the
NRI Category 03 seats shall be filled up as per
preference order of Category 1 and 2, given as under:-
First preference will be given to those NRI candidates who
have ancestral background of Chandigarh (Category 1):
For ancestral background of Chandigarh, the
grandparents/parents of the candidates should be
resident of Chandigarh for a minimum period of 5 years
at anytime since the origin of Chandigarh and should
have immovable property in his/her name in Chandigarh
for the last at least 5 years. A certificate to this effect is
CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION v. JASMINE KAUR 1129
[FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
required from DC-cum-Estate Officer or Municipal
A
Corporation of Chandigarh.
Second preferenc~ will be given to those NRI candidates
who have ancestral background of States/UTs other than
UT Chandigarh (Category 2). A certificate regarding
8
ancestral background of the other State/UT from the
competent authority is to be submitted in case of students
with ancestral background of °'ther States!UTs.
There will be no separate test/entrance test for the
candidates applying for NRl/Foreign Indian Student.
C
These candidates will have to obtain the eligibility &
equivalence certificate for their qualifying examination
from the Punjab University, Chandigar~: (as mentioned
in general condition point no.f)"
5. The contesting Respondent claimed that her grandD
father retired as an Under Secretary in the year 1994, that when
he was in the services of the State of Chandigarh he resided
in a Government house from 1965 to 1984 and shifted to
another Government accommodation provided by the
Chandigarh Administration from 1984 to 1994, that third set of
E
government accommodation was provided by the Government
to the father of the contesting Respondent which was occupied
till December 2003 and that thereafter, her father started living
in the house of her grandfather in Mohali. The contesting
Respondent claimed that she passed as a regular student from
Mohali, that the prescription contained. in paragraph 2 of the
prospectus providing for eligibility and merit for NRI seats for
M.B.B.S. course stipulating that the grandparents/parents of the
candidates should be resident of Chandigarh for a minimum
period of 5 years at any time since the origin of Chandigarh
G
and should have immovable property in his/her name in
Chandigarh for the last at least 5 years and a certificate to that
effect issued by DC- cum-Estate Officer or Municipal
Corporation of Chandigarh was not valid. It was on that footing
that a challenge came to be made by the contesting
F
H
1130
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2014] 9 S.C.R.
A Respondent in the High Court in CWP No.14320 of 2013
(O&M). The learned Single Judge by order dated27.09.2013
held that the impugned clause was totally impracticable, illegal,
illogical and declared as such. However, the learned Single
Judge went further into the question as to whether the contesting
B Respondent can be granted admission at that stage when she
was already admitted into the B.D.S course in Chandigarh itself
and that when the contesting Respondent did not challenge the
eligibility criteria before submitting her application for the
M.B.B.S. course, ultimately held that the contesting Respondent
C was not entitled to any relief for getting admission into M.B.B.S.
course.
6. The order of the learned Single Judge was not
challenged by the Chandigarh Administration or the Government
Medical College of Chandigarh. The contesting Respondent
D filed Letters Patent Appeal in LPA No.2051 of 2013 as against
that part of _the judgment by which she was denied admission
to the M.B.B.S. course. The Division Bench by its Order dated
13.01.2014 held that when once the definition clause of NRI
was found to be invalid by the learned Single Judge, the
E contesting Respondent ought to have been granted admission
into M.B.B.S. course. By the time the Division Bench passed
its order on 13.01.2014, since the process of admission to th
M.B.B.S. course had already come to an end and all seats were
filled up, th
F
Division Bench held that in order to do substant
ve justice to the contesting Respondent and at the same time withe
t causing any disadvantage to the already admitted candidates
under the NRI category held that the contesting Respo
dent should, however, be held to be entitled to admission in t
G e M.B.B.S. course without displacing any other candidate by stati
g that such admission should be granted even if it required c
eation of an additional seat and a direction to that effect was
accordingly made.
H
CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION v. JASMINE KAUR 1131
[FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
7. A review was filed at the instance of the Chandigarh
A
Administration contending that when the administration took
steps to implement the direction of the Division Bench by
approaching the Medical Council of India (MCI) for creating an
additional seat, the said requisition of the administration was
turned down by the MCI and, therefore, it was not in a position
B
to accommodate the contesting Respgooent. The Chandigarh
Administration, therefore, sought for review of the order of the
Division Bench, insofar as it related to the grant of admission
to the contesting Respondent by creating an additional seat.
8. The Division Bench realizing the predicament in which
C
the Chandigarh Administration was placed, felt that the case
of the contesting Respondent was a rarest of rare one in which
the relief of admission to the M.B.B.S. course should be
provided to her by relying upon the decisions of this Court in
Asha v. PT. B.D. Sharma University of Health Sciences
D
and others reported in 2012 (7) sec 389 and Priya Gupta
v. State of Chhattisgarh and others reported in (2012) 7
SCC 433 and directed that the contesting Respondent be
accommodated in the academic session 2014-15 instead of
2013-14, with a condition that she should pursue her M.B.B.S.
E
course right from the beginning without claiming any advantage
of the course which she undertook in the B.D.S. in the year
2013-14. The Division Bench was conscious of the fact that by
issuing such a direction to be implemented in the academic
session 2014-15, it would result in reduction of one seat for the
F
applicants of that Academic Session under the NRI category.
9. The Chandigarh Administration and the Government
Medical College, Chandigarh were aggrieved by the said
direction and preferred SLP(C) No.18137-18138 of 2014. The
G
Appellant in SLP(C) No.18099 of 2014 was aggrieved
inasmuch as she is an applicant of the Academic Session
2014-2015 and but for the direction issued by the Division
Bench under the impugned order dated 21.02.2014, she would
get the admission in the M.B.B.S. course, as she is ranked in . H
1132
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 9 S.C.R.
A the sixth place. Because of the admission of the contesting
Respondent by way of implementation of the order of the
Division Bench, the said Appellant has been deprived of the
seat.
B
10. One other candidate who got himself impleaded in I.A.
Nos.2-3 of 2014 who supported the stand of the Appellant in
SLP(C) No.18099 of 2014 is in the fifth place of the merit list
of NRI category. According to the said newly added
Respondent, after the decision of the Division Bench dated
21.02.2014, a corrigendum came to be issued by the
C Chandigarh Administration wherein a provision has been made
to the effect that one NRI seat is reserved for Scheduled Caste
NRI and that if it could not be filled up by a Scheduled Caste
NRI, then only the said seat would revert to the Scheduled Caste
Union Territory Resident Pool. The grievance of the said
D impleaded Respondent is that if the said corrigendum is given
effect to, the total number of seats under NRI quota for the open
category would get reduced to five and as a sequel to it, the
implementation of the direction of the Division Bench under the
orders impugned in these appeals would directly affect the said
E newly added Respondent. It is, however, submitted that the said
newly added Respondent has challenged the corrigendum
issued on 19.06.2014 before the High Court and that the same
has also been stayed by the High Court by order dated
09.07.2014. It is further submitted that after granting stay, the
F High Court also issued directions for the admission of newly
added Respondent as per the list of successful candidates
declared in the proceedings of the Chandigarh Administration
and the Government Medical College, Chandigarh dated
23.06.2014, in which the name of the said impleaded
G Respondent found place at serial No.5.
11. In the above stated background, we heard Mr. Nidhesh
Gupta, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant in SLP(C)
No.18099 of 2014, Mr. Shubham Bhalla, learned Counsel for
H the Appellant in SLP(C) Nos.18137-18138 of 2014, Mr. Guru
CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION v. JASMINE KAUR 1133
[FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
Krishna Kumar, Senior Counsel for the contesting Respondent
A
in SLP(C) No.18137-18138 of 2014 & Respondent No.4 in
SLP(C) No.18099 of 2014, Mr. Narender Hooda, learned
Senior Counsel for Respondent No.2 in SLP(C) Nos.1813718138 of 2014 & Respondent No.5 in SLP(C) No.18099 of
2014, Mr. Gaurav Sharma, Advocate-on-Record (AOR) for MCI
B
and Mr. Ashok Mahajan, AOR for the newly impleaded
Respondents.
12. Mr. Nidhesh Gupta, learned Senior Counsel for the
Appellant in SLP(C) No.18099 of 2014 prefaced his
submissions by referring to the belated point of time at which
C
the contesting Respondent approached the High Court seeking
for the relief and, therefore, even though the learned Single
Judge held that the condition prescribed in paragraph 2 of the
prospectus for the first category of NRI quota was invalid, the
relief was not rightly granted. In fact, the entire submission of
D
learned Senior Counsel was mainly premised on the belated
approach of the contesting Respondent in seeking for the relief
and that to knowing full well that she was not entitled to seek
for admission under the first category of NRI. Based on the
above submission, the learned Senior Counsel by relying upon
E
various decisions of this Court contended that the principles
laid down in those decisions certainly did not entitle the
contesting Respondent to get any admission out of turn either
in the relevant year in which she applied, namely, 2013-14 or
in the academic session 2014-15. According to the learned
F
Senior Counsel, when the contesting Respondent knew full well
that she did not satisfy the criteria prescribed in relation to
category I of NRI quota as stipulated in paragraph 2 of the
prospectus, which was published in April 2013, for no
comprehensible reason she waited almost till the last date for
G
filing the application, whereas in actuality, to challenge the
stipulation contained in the said paragraph on the ground of
invalidity, there was no necessity to file the application nor wait
for any response from the Chandigarh Administration or the
Government Medical College. The contention of the learned
H
1134
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 9 S.C.R.
A Senior Counsel was on the footing that since the contesting
Respondent did not display the required promptness in
approaching the Court, the various decisions of this Court by
which it has laid down that the schedule relating to admission
to the professional colleges, should be strictly adhered to and
B should not be deviated under any circumstances had to be
scrupulously followed, which thereby persuaded the learned
Single Judge not to grant the relief of admission to the college
after 30.09.2013. The learned Senior Counsel, therefore,
contended that this was not a case where any of the situations
c wherein admission to a candidate was directed to be given for
certain stated reasons by this Court after the expiry of the
prescribed admission scheduled or for any admission whicli
was directed to be given in the subsequent academi~,year
could be followed. In other words, the learned Senior Counsel
0 contended that there was no exceptional circumstance th;:it was
existing in the case of the contesting respondent in order to
deviate from the schedule fixed in the matter of admission to
the professional courses, which was time and again directed
to be adhered to scrupulously by this Court without any
deviation. In support of the above submissions learned Senior
E Counsel relied upon the decisions in Parmender Kumar and
others v. State of Haryana and others - (2012) 1 SCC 177,
Madan Lal and Others v. State of J & Kand others - (1995)
3 SCC 486, Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International
Airport Authority of India and others - (1979) 3 SCC 489,
F Dr. lndu Kant v. State of U.P. and others - (1993) Suppl.
(2) SCC 71, Asha (supra), Rajiv Kapoor and others v.
State of Haryana and others - (2000) 9 SCC 115, Aneesh
D. Lawande and others v. State of Goa and others - (2014)
1 SCC 554, Subhash Chandra and another v. Delhi
G Subordinate Services Selection Board and others - (2009)
15 sec 458.
13. As against the above submissions, Mr. Guru Krishna
Kumar, learned Senior Counsel who ,appeared for the
H contesting Respondent in his submissions contended that the
CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION v. JASMINE KAUR 1135
[FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
B
direction of the Division Bench of the High Court has to be
A
considered in light of the prindple of moulding of the relief when
injustice was found. According to him, a distinction must be
drawn in the peculiar undisputed facts of this case wherein, the
challenge made by the contesting Respondent was held to be
valid in so far as the prescription of the condition to seek
admission under the first category of NRI quota and, therefore,
when the learned Single Judge failed to grant the relief, the
Division Bench took into account the extraordinary
circumstance which" was prevailing in the interest of justice and
gave the directions without causing any prejudice to other c
candidates of the relevant academic year, as well as, in the
present academic year where the merit of ttie contesting
Respondent was far superior to the candidates who have been
enlisted for admission under NRI quota of the first category. It
was then submitted that while issuing such directions, the
D
Division Bench ensured that there was no carry forward nor any
telescoping into the seats of the subsequent year. The learned
Senior Counsel submitted that the question of telescoping
would arise only if the unfilled seats of the previous year are to
be accommodated in the subsequent year and that in the case
on hand, it did not relate to any unfilled seat of the previous year
E
and, therefore, the direction of the Division Bench cannot be
held to fall under the category of telescoping into the seats of
the subsequent year. The learned Senior Counsel contended
that the same principle will apply even to the carry forward
principle and, therefore, when none of the said allegations are
levelled against the contesting Respondent or directed against
the judgment of the Division Bench, the Civil Appeal does not
. merit any consideration. The learned Senior Counsel pointed
F
out that the decision of the learned Single Judge in having
declared the relevant clause as invalid has become final and
-G
neither the Chandigarh Administration nor the Government
Medical College or for that matter the Appellant in SLP(C)
No.18099 of 2014 have raised any challenge. According to him,
the only other aspect to be examined was the entitlement of the
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[2014] 9 S.C.R.
A contesting Respondent for M.8.8.S. seat under the NRI quota
under which category the said contesting Respondent secured
the highest marks based on which her rank can be fixed in the
third place in the order of merit for the year 2014-15 and,
therefore, allotment of seat ought to have been granted without
s any hassle. The learned Senior Counsel further pointed out that
the contesting Respondent had the benefit of her application
to be entertained by way of an interim direction pending her
writ petition apart from permitting her to participate in. the
counselling, though subject to the result of the writ petition. The
c learned Senior Counsel, therefore, contended that when the
substantive challenge of the contesting Respondent was
accepted by the learned Single Judge, the only other order that
could have been passed was to direct the Chandigarh
Administration and the Government Medical College to
0 consider the claim of the contesting Respondent on merits for
the grant of the seat. The learned Senior Counsel, therefore,
contended that when the learned Single Judge committed a
grave error in not granting the relief, the Division Bench had to
staple and issue necessary directions.
E
14. In support of the above submissions, the learned
Senior Counsel relied upon the decisions reported in Faiza
Choudhary v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and another
- (2012) 10 SCC 149, Madhu Singh (supra), Shafali
Nandwani v. State of Haryana and others - (2002) 8 SCC
F 152, Rajiv Kapoor (supra), Shawna Garg & another v.
University of Delhi & others - (2012) 8 SCALE 504,
Dwarkanath, Hindu Undivided Family v. Income-Tax
Officer, Special Circle, Kanpur and another - (1965) 3 SCR
536, State of Punjab v. Salil Sabhlok and others - (2013)
G 5 SCC 1, Miss Neelima Shangla, PH.D. Candidate v. State
of Haryana and others - (1986) 4 SCC 268 and Haryana
Urban Development Authority and others v. Sunita Rekhi
- (1989j Suppl. 2 sec 169.
H
15. Having heard learned counsel for the respective
CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION v. JASMINE KAUR 1137
[FAKKIR MOHAMED IB~AHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
contesting parties, namely, the Appellant in SLP(C) No.18099
A
of 2014 and the contesting Respondent in both the Civil
Appeals who is the contesting Respondent, since heavy
reliance was placed upon by both the respective counsel on
the earlier decisions of this Court to support their respective
contentions that the case of the contesting Respondent would
B
either fall under one or the other principles laid down in those
decisions or that the facts of those cases are clearly
distinguishable, we feel it appropriate to refer to the relevant
principles contained in those decisions before venturing to
express our decision as regards the correctness or otherwise
C
of the direction issued by the Division Bench in favour of the
contesting Respondent.
16. In the decision reported in Parmender Kumar
(supra), it was held that once the process of selection of
candidates for admission had commenced on the basis of the
prospectus, no change could thereafter be effected by
government orders to alter the provisions contained in the
prospectus. In the decision reported in Madan Lal (supra), it
was held that if a candidate takes a calculated chance and
appears at the interview then 9nly because the result of the
interview is not palatable to )'fim he cannot turn around and
subsequently contend that the process of interview was unfair
and the selection committee was not properly constituted. By
relying upon the above referred to decisions, the contention
raised on behalf of ~he Appellant in SLP(C) No.18099 of 2014
was that the condftion relating to the NRI quota under the first
category was prevalent at the time when the contesting
Respondent submitted her application and having submitted
D
E
F
the said application and participated in the selection process,
merely because the said clause was subsequently found to be
G
not valid, would not, on that ground, validate the contesting
respondent's right to claim admission.
17. In fact, the other decisions, namely, Om Prakash
Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla and others - (1986)
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014) 9 S.C.R.
A Suppl. SCC 285, Vijendra Kumar Verma v. Public Service
Commission, Uttarakhand and others - (2011) 1 SCC 150,
K.A. Nagamani v. Indian Airlines and others - (2009) 5 SCC
515, Dhananjay Malik and others v. State of Uttaranchal
and others - (2008) 4 SCC 171 and Chandra Prakash
8 Tiwari and others v. Shankuntala Shukla and others -
(2002) 6 sec 127 were all referred to by the learned Senior
Counsel for the Appellant in SLP(C) No.18099 of 2014 to show
that the statement made in Madan Lal was relied upon in those
decisions.
C
18. Mr. Nidhesh Gupta, learned Senior Counsel, therefore,
contended that the effect of the directions of the Division Bench
was that the contesting Respondent was to be admitted into
the M.B.B.S. course in the academic year 2014-15 without
competing with the claims of the other candidates who applied
D for the said course in the said academic year. It was also
contended that even in the academic year 2013-14, she did
not compete along with the other similarly placed candidates
but was allowed to participate in the counselling pursuant to the
interim direction issued by the learned Single Judge during the
E pendency of the writ petition and that to was subject to the
outcome of the writ petition. The learned senior counsel,
therefore, contended that the contesting Respondent was not
entitled for any equitable relief. The learned Senior Counsel,
therefore, contended that the direction of the Division Bench
F cannot be sustained.
19. In this context, reliance was placed upon the threeJudge Bench decision of this Court reported in Rajiv Kapoor
(supra), wherein in paragraph 16 this Court has held as under:
G
"16. The dispute relates to the academic session of the
year 1997 and we are in 2000. To utilise the seats meant
for the next academic year by accommodating those
candidates of 1997 vintage would amount to deprivation
of the legitimate rights of those who would be in the fray
H
of contest for selection, on the basis of their inter se merit
CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION v. JASMINE KAUR 1139
[FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
for the session of 2000, taking into account the
A
performance of the candidates of 1997 in that year ...... "
20. It was submitted that the selection of candidates should
be based on the inter se merits of the candidates of that year
and, therefore, entertaining the claim of a candidate who
B
applied in any previous year would cause grave injustice, as
those who were not in the fray of competence would thus be
permitted to compete with the lawfully eligible applicants of the
subsequent years, which would certainly cause serious
prejudice to those candidates.
21. To the very same effect was the decision reported in
Neelu Arora (Ms) and another v. Union of India and others
- (2003) 3 sec 366, which was also by a three Judge Bench
c
of this Court. The learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant in
SLP(C) No.18099 of 2014 sought to distinguish the decision
D
relied upon by the Division Bench reported in Asha (supra)
by pointing out that the said decision turns upon the special
facts of that case, where this Court reached a finding of fact
that the candidate concerned was not at fault and the whole fault
was on the authorities concerned in not allowing the said
E
candidate to participate in the counselling for admission to the
M.B.B.S. course in spite of the fact that her merit as compared
to other candidates who were granted admission was far
superior and that she approached the Court for the redressal
of her grievance at the earliest. The learned Senior Counsel
F
by drawing our attention to paragraphs 32, 34 and 37 of the
decision submitted that the said decision cannot be simply
followed as a matter of course as has been done by the Division
Bench in the case on hand. The learned Senior Counsel also
once again brought to our notice the manner in which the G
contesting Respondent herein approached the Court, made the
application and filed the writ petition after a considerable length
of delay and thereby disentitled her to seek for any relief much
less there was any scope for moulding the relief as had been
done by the Division Bench by the impugned order.
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[2014] 9 S.C.R.
A
22. The recent decision of this Court reported in Aneesh
D. Lawande (supra) was relied upon by the learned counsel
for the Appellant wherein this Court has culled out two main
principles to be kept in mind in such cases. In paragraph 30,
the said principles have been laid down and in paragraph 35,
8
this Court has reiterated as to why it will not be proper to issue
directions to adjust the students of one academic year in any
subsequent academic year by pointing out that such a course
would affect the other meritorious candidates who would be
aspiring to get admissions in the subsequent years. It was
C stated that for bringing equity to some in praesenti, this Court
cannot afford to do injustice to others in future. The said
paragraph 35 can be usefully referred to which reads as under:
"35. The next submission relates to the issue whether the
students who cannot be adjusted in the seats of All-India
D
quota that have been transferred to the State quota of this
year can be adjusted next year. During the course of
hearing though there was some debate with regard to
giving of admissions to such students in the academic
year 2014-2015, Mr. Amit Kumar, learned counsel for the
E
Medical Council of India, has seriously opposed the
same and, thereafter, has cited the authorities which we
have referred to hereinbefore. We are bound by the said
precedents. In certain individual cases where there is
defective counselling and merit has become a casualty,
F
this Court has directed for adjustment in the next
academic session but in the case at hand, it is not
exactly so. Though we are at pains. vet we must express
that it will not be appropriate to issue directions to adiust
them in respect of the subsequent academic year. for
G
taking recourse to the same would affect the other
meritorious candidates who would be aspirant to get
admissions next year. For doing equity to some in
praesenti we cannot afford to do in;ustice to others in
future. Therefore. the submission stands repelled."
H
(underlining is ours)
CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION v. JASMINE KAUR 1141
[FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
23. The decision relied upon by the contesting Respondent
A
reported in Faiza Choudhary (supra), rather than supporting
the case of the said contesting Respondent only clarifies the
legal position without any ambiguity. The principles have been
succinctly explained in paragraphs 14 and 15 to the effect that
there cannot be any telescoping of unfilled seats of one year
B
with the permitted seats of the subsequent year. It was also
highlighted that a medical seat has life only in the year it falls
that to only till the cut-off date fixed by this Court i.e. 30th
September in the respective year and carry forward principle
is unknown to the professional courses like medical,
C
· engineering, dental etc. It was also stated that there is no power
with the Board to carry forward a vacancy to a succeeding year
and that if the Board or the Court indulges in such an exercise,
in the absence of any rule or regulation, that will be at the
expense of other meritorious candidates waiting for admissions
D
in the succeeding years. The principles laid down in the said
decisions have to be, therefore, understood in the abovesaid
manner and those principles can be applied to the facts of this
case while examining the correctness of the impugned
judgment of the Division Bench.
24. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the
Appellant upon the decision reported in Madhu Singh (supra)
apparently to draw our attention to the effect that even if the
course adopted by the High Court while directing admission
E
to the unfilled seats after the last scheduled date for admission,
F
this Court directed that such admission granted to a candidate
will not be affected even if this Court were to set at naught the
direction given by the High Court. We do not find any ratio or
principle t<1 be followed based on the said fact noted in
paragraph 8 of the judgment, but in paragraph 23 this Court
G
made it clear that a necessity for specifically providing for a time
schedule for the course and fixing the period during which
admissions can take place in order to ensure that no admission
can be granted after the scheduled date, essentially should be
the date for commencement of the course. By stating the said
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[2014] 9 S.C.R.
A
principle in no uncertain terms, this Court has reiterated the
position that there should be strict adherence to the schedule
of dates relating to admission and there cannot be any
deviation in adhering to the said schedule.
25. Mr.