# •• CHANDRAKANT SAHA & ORS. ETC v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC

- **Citation:** [1979] 1 S.C.R. 751
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1978-09-14
- **Bench:** Y. V. Chandrachud, P. N. Bhagwati, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, P. N. Shinghal, D. A. Desai
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/chandrakant-saha-ors-etc-v-union-of-india-ors-etc-7532
- **Pages:** 14

## Headnote

Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958, as anwnded by the A111endi11g
Act 29 of 1968--Section 3(d) (i) and (ii), whether to be tear/ co11junctively
in the light of Sec. 3A, 3(gg) of the Act-Interpretation of Sections 3(d),
3(.k'g), 3A, 5 and 6--Whcther classification a,~ Rice Miller & Rice llulfrr discrin-1inatory offending Art. 14 of the Constitut(on-Whether the provisions of the
Act which insi'st on the rice-hullers to take licences is an unreasonable restriction
on their right to carry on the business and violatire of Aritclcs 19 and 301 of
the Constitution.
The Rice Milling Industry (Ilegu1ation) Act was passed in 1958, the object
and reasons of which were to preserve and protect the indigenous and hand
pounding industry of rice growers RO atS to provide sufficient employment to
rural population and to ensure the modernisation of conventional type of rice
mills \Vith a vie\v to producing more rice of better quality and nutritive value.
Since the original Act did not include the rice hullers, by the Amendment Act
29 of 1968, Sec. 3(d) was substitued viz. "Milling rice, with it grammritical
variation, means (i) recovering rice or any produce thereof from paddy; (ii)
poli!hing rice with the a.id of power".
Under Section 5 read with Section 3A,
the petitioners \Vere required to take licences for operating their husling mills.
'The petit;oners, therefore. assailed (a) that the requirement Of t<.·king licences for
operating their n1ills amotmted to complete destruction of their fundamental
rights to carry on business and (b) that the provisions of the Act further contain
unguided nnd uncana1ised powers so as to viola·te the provisions of !\rt. 1-t..
Dismissing the petitions, the Court
Hf:LD: (1) A.n analysis of the provisions of Sections 3(d), 3A, 5, 6 and
7 indicates that the provisions contained sufficient guidelines and do not a1nount
to exercise of an arbitrary power.
[759B]
(2) Having regard to the setting in \Vhich Sec. 3(d) is placed and the
domin&nt object of the Amending Act 29 of 1968, the intention of the Legis·
lature v.1as to widen the purpose and scope of the definition of mi1ling rice.
Tf Clause (i) and (ii) are read conjunctively then, it will defeat the very purpose
of the Act and would in fact become meaningless because claute (i) which
means reco~'ering rice or any product thereof from paddy \Vould include pro~
ducts like chura etc. which do not require polishing and yet if the hvo clauses
~lore read conjunctively chura will have to be polished within the meaning of
Section 3(d), which could not have been contemplated
by
the
legislature.
Furthern1ore, polishing rice under Section 3(gg) includes the process of removal
of bran fro1n the. kernel of rice with
the aid
of power
and that
is what
the rice hullers do. Thus on a true interpretation of Sec. 3(d) clauses (i) and
(ii) and (gg) there can be absolutely no doubt that the section includes tho
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] l s.c.11..
operation carried out by the rice hullers. Though it was not necessary for the
legislature to have added Sec. 3(A), it was done in order to put the mattel'
beyond doubt or controversy.
[760B·D, E, 761D-E]
(3) Rice-ntlllers and rice hullers constitute a separate class and having regard
to the nature of their functions the cla6sification is reasonable, because ( 1) it
is founded upon intelligible ditferentia, (2) the differentia has rational relation
to the objects, sought to be achieved by the Act namely, the protection of the
domestic hand-pounding industry and improvement of the quality of the rice
and ensuring its easy and quick distribution. The contention tha.t the Act by
bringing the rice hullers and rice milters within t·he same fold see1ns to lreat
unequals as equals, because rice hullers cannot be equated with rice-millers is
not correct.
f7~2B·Cl
(4) Sections 5 and 6 of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act .. 1958
do not amount to unreasonable restrictions on the right

## Text

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CHANDRAKANT SAHA & ORS. ETC .
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC.
September 14, 1978
751
[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., P. N. BHAGWATI, S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI,
P. N. SHINGHAL AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.)
Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958, as anwnded by the A111endi11g
Act 29 of 1968--Section 3(d) (i) and (ii), whether to be tear/ co11junctively
in the light of Sec. 3A, 3(gg) of the Act-Interpretation of Sections 3(d),
3(.k'g), 3A, 5 and 6--Whcther classification a,~ Rice Miller & Rice llulfrr discrin-1inatory offending Art. 14 of the Constitut(on-Whether the provisions of the
Act which insi'st on the rice-hullers to take licences is an unreasonable restriction
on their right to carry on the business and violatire of Aritclcs 19 and 301 of
the Constitution.
The Rice Milling Industry (Ilegu1ation) Act was passed in 1958, the object
and reasons of which were to preserve and protect the indigenous and hand
pounding industry of rice growers RO atS to provide sufficient employment to
rural population and to ensure the modernisation of conventional type of rice
mills \Vith a vie\v to producing more rice of better quality and nutritive value.
Since the original Act did not include the rice hullers, by the Amendment Act
29 of 1968, Sec. 3(d) was substitued viz. "Milling rice, with it grammritical
variation, means (i) recovering rice or any produce thereof from paddy; (ii)
poli!hing rice with the a.id of power".
Under Section 5 read with Section 3A,
the petitioners \Vere required to take licences for operating their husling mills.
'The petit;oners, therefore. assailed (a) that the requirement Of t<.·king licences for
operating their n1ills amotmted to complete destruction of their fundamental
rights to carry on business and (b) that the provisions of the Act further contain
unguided nnd uncana1ised powers so as to viola·te the provisions of !\rt. 1-t..
Dismissing the petitions, the Court
Hf:LD: (1) A.n analysis of the provisions of Sections 3(d), 3A, 5, 6 and
7 indicates that the provisions contained sufficient guidelines and do not a1nount
to exercise of an arbitrary power.
[759B]
(2) Having regard to the setting in \Vhich Sec. 3(d) is placed and the
domin&nt object of the Amending Act 29 of 1968, the intention of the Legis·
lature v.1as to widen the purpose and scope of the definition of mi1ling rice.
Tf Clause (i) and (ii) are read conjunctively then, it will defeat the very purpose
of the Act and would in fact become meaningless because claute (i) which
means reco~'ering rice or any product thereof from paddy \Vould include pro~
ducts like chura etc. which do not require polishing and yet if the hvo clauses
~lore read conjunctively chura will have to be polished within the meaning of
Section 3(d), which could not have been contemplated
by
the
legislature.
Furthern1ore, polishing rice under Section 3(gg) includes the process of removal
of bran fro1n the. kernel of rice with
the aid
of power
and that
is what
the rice hullers do. Thus on a true interpretation of Sec. 3(d) clauses (i) and
(ii) and (gg) there can be absolutely no doubt that the section includes tho
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752
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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operation carried out by the rice hullers. Though it was not necessary for the
legislature to have added Sec. 3(A), it was done in order to put the mattel'
beyond doubt or controversy.
[760B·D, E, 761D-E]
(3) Rice-ntlllers and rice hullers constitute a separate class and having regard
to the nature of their functions the cla6sification is reasonable, because ( 1) it
is founded upon intelligible ditferentia, (2) the differentia has rational relation
to the objects, sought to be achieved by the Act namely, the protection of the
domestic hand-pounding industry and improvement of the quality of the rice
and ensuring its easy and quick distribution. The contention tha.t the Act by
bringing the rice hullers and rice milters within t·he same fold see1ns to lreat
unequals as equals, because rice hullers cannot be equated with rice-millers is
not correct.
f7~2B·Cl
(4) Sections 5 and 6 of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act .. 1958
do not amount to unreasonable restrictions on the right of the petitioners to carry
on their trade ood business.
In the first place, the licensing provision is in
public interest and is meant to carry out the purpose of the Act. Secondly,
sections 5 and 6 are purely regulatory "in character and do not amount to
unreasonable restriction. [762C-D, 763C]
,
Narendra Kumar & Ors.
v.
Union of India & Ors., [1960] 2 SCR 375;
Daruka & Co. v. Union of India, [1974] 1 SCR 570; Glass Cltatons Importers
& Users' Association v. Union of India, [1962] 1 SCR 862 referred to.
(5) In view of the language of section 6 with which the rice hullers are
concerned, the question of uncanalised powers being conferred on the licensing
E
authority does not arise. Under Section 6(3) once an application is recei~ed
by the licensing officer he shall grant a licence or such conditlon as he may
impose. The staotute does not have any discretion in the licensing officer to
grant or to refuse to grant licence. He has a marulatory duty to perform,
and .• therefore, there is no question of the licensing officer having been conterrcd
or uncanalised powers under the Act. [763D-E]
F
(6) Sub-section (4) of Sec. 5 columns as many as six guidelines for the
\
grant of permit. The power is to be exercised by such a high authority as tbe
\
Central Govt.
Furthermore under S. 12 oo appeal lies against a decision of
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the licensing officer under Sec. 6 or Sec. 7 to an appellate officer nominated
by the Central Government. [763F-G]
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petitions Nos. 1135-1155, 15441758, 1759-1949, 1952-1991,
1993-2199, 2216-2220, 2274-2325
of 1977, 592-607, 849-862 and 1898-1908/78 and 1577-1605/78.
And
Writ Petitions Nos. 955 and 966/77.
And
Writ Petitions Nos. 1222/77 and 4-176 and 2359/78
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c. SAHA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.)
753
And
A
Writ Petitions
Nos. 967,
1128/77,
314-591,
901-950,
1870-1887, 2240-2294, 2367, 2390/78, 3063-3081/78, 1223-1526/
77, 177-313, 871-900, 2319, 2358 & 2326-2430/77, 1807-1869,
1239-1312, 1584-1592, 1737-1749, 2296-2311, 2312-2318, 23922472, 2937-2951, 3380-3464/78, 609-821, 979-1237, 1543-1583,
B
1956-2111, 2810-2936/78, 2986-2998/78, 2953-2968/78 & 2472A•
2472B of 1978.
And
Writ Petitions Nos. 823, 3514-3574, 824-826, 975, 1617-1627,
1628-1725, 1915-1942/78, 2366, 2610, 3088,
3576,
1313-1542,
2112-2203,
3131-3340,
1760-1806/78, 2231-2234, 2235-2236,
2237-2238, 2475, 2476, 2975-2985 of 1978, 3465, 3466-3513/78,
3622-3641 /78, 3766, 3801 & 3786-3788/78.
A. K. Ganguli for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 1135-1155,
1544-1758, 2274-2325 & 966/77, 3622-3641/78, 1898-1908/78,
967-1128/77, 314-591, 901-950, 2240-2294, 2367-2398, 30633081 /78.
N. R. Choudlmry for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 2216-2220,
592-607, 312-318, 2472A, 2472B/78, 849-862/78, 1239-1312,
1584-1592, 1737-1759, 1870-1887, 2296-2318, 2392-2472, 29372951' 3380-3464/78.
A. K. Sen (In W.P. 1759-1949), D. P. Mukherjee (in all W.Ps.),
R. P. Roy and A. K. Ganguli (In 1759-1949) for the Petitioners in
W.P. Nos. 1759-1949 and 955/77.
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Mrs. Veena Devi Khanna for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 1952F
1991/77, 1313-1542, 2112-2203, 3131-3340/'78.
M. M. Kshatriya for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 1993-2199/77.
S.S. Ray (In 1597-1606 and 1760-1806) Dr. Debi Pal (In 1759,
2125-2128/78).
S. R. Agarwal, A. T. Patra, Praveen Kumar (In all Writ Petitions
except 2125-2128) for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 1597-1606/78,
1760-1806 and Applicant/Intervener in W.P.
Nos. 1759-1949/77
and in W.P. Nos. 1222/77 and 2125-2128/78 .
G
Y. S. Chitale (In 1223-1526, 1222) and Prodyot Kumar ChakraR
varty, for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 1222177 and 4/78, 1223-1526,
5-176, 177-313, 871-900, 2319-Z358.
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754
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
fl 979] I s.c.R.
P. K Mukherjee for the Petitioner in W.P. No. 2359/78.
P. K. Gupta for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 2326-2430/77 .md
1807-1869 of 1978.
D. P. Mukherjee for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 609-821, '>791237, 1543-1583, 1956-2111, 2810-2936, 2953-2968,
2986-2998/
78.
Majumdar and Mrs. Laxmi Arvind for the Petitioners in W.P.
Nos. 823, 3514-3574, 824, 826, 975, 1617-1627, 1628-1723, 19151942, 2366, 2610, 3088, 3576/78 and 3766/78.
Am/an Ghosh and Ravinder Bahl for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos.
2231-2234,. 2235-2236, 2237-2238, 2475 &. 2476,
2975-2985/78,
3744-3768, 3801 and 3840/78.
Rathin Das for the Petitioner in W.P. 3465/78. ·
J. M. Khanna for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 3466-3513. 78.
S. K. Bisaria, for the Petitioners in W.Ps. 3786-3788/78.
S. N. Kacker, Sol. Genl. (In W.P. 1135, 1759, 1943, and 221E/
77) R. N. Sachthey and Miss A. Subhashini for Respondents in W.Ps.
1898-1908, 177-313, 1584-1592, 1313-1542/78 and for Respondents
No. 1 in Rest of the W.P. excepting in W.P. Nos. 1222 and 2?59 /
78,
A. P. Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee for other appearing rc>p<>n-
<lents in all W.P. Nos. excepting 2359 /78.
I
,,
Somnath Chatterjee (In W.P. 2359),
S. S. Reyin (In 22k),
\..
Samir Kumar Ghosh (In 2359 and 2216), Shib Kumar Shahu ond
P. Keshava Pillai, for Respondent No. 5 in
W.P.
2359/78
;n<l
Applicant intervener in 1759/77, 1949/77 and 2216.
G
P. Chatterjee (In W.P. 955), D. Mookerjee
(In
1759)
"nd
Sukumar Ghosh for the applicant/Intervener in W.P.
Nos. I ~591949 and 955/77.
ORDER
Ii
~We discharge the rule in all of these Writ Petitions and dismiss :he
same with costs in one set.
We vacate the Stay orders in all :he
Petitions.
We will give our reasons for this Order later.
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c. SAHA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.)
755
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
FA.ZAL ALI, J.-A large batch of writ petitions has been filed in
this Court challenging the constitutianal validity of the Rice-Milling
Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958 as amended in 1968, on the ground
th$t some of the provisions of the aforesaid Act are clearly violative of
Articles 14 19 and 301 of the Constitution of India.
Serious objecti(l(l appears to have been taken to those provisions of the Act which
require the petitioners who are owners of Rice Husking Mills or Rice
Hullers to take out a licence for husking rice.
We propose to take up the writ petitions of Bijoy Kumar Majhi &
Ors. (Writ Petitions No. 1759-1949 of 1977).
The main contention
of the petitioners has been that there are as many as 18,000 husking
mills owned and operated by varions persons in the State of West
Bengal and each mill employs 4 or 5 persons.
The provisions of the
Act which require the petitioners to take licences for operating the
mills amount to a complete destruction of the fundamental right
of
the petitioners to carry on business and the provisions further contain
unguided and uncanalised powers so as to violate the provisions of Article 14.
In all the other writ petitions the arguments put forward by
the petitioners in the aforesaid petitions have been completely adopted.
Writ Petitions No. 1135 to 1155 of 1977 have been filed
by
Chandra Kanta Saha & Ors. where the
petitioners
have
merely
challenged the validity of Ordinance No. 14 of 1977 dated 9-8-1977
which has repealed portions of Rice Milling Industry (Regulation)
West Bengal Second Amendment Act of 1974 and deleted section 6A
of that Act.
In order to appreciate the contentions raised by counsel for the
parties, it may be necessary to give a brief history of the legislation
on the subject. It appears that as far back as 1958 Parliament after
a declaration as required by the Constitution passed the Rice Milling
Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the 1958
Act). The Act was passed on 18th May, 1958. It would appear
from the object and reasons of the Act that the main purpose for
passing the Act was to preserve and protect the indigenous and handpounding industry of rice growers so as to provide sufficient employment to rural population.
The other object was to ensure the
modernisation of conventional type of rice mills with
a view
to
producing more rice of better quality and nutritive value.
Section 2
of the Act contains a declaration which may be extracted thus:
'"Declaration as to expediency of control by the U11io11 : It
"
hereby declared that it is expedient in the public
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1979] I S.C.R.
interest that the Union should .take under its control the rice
milling industry."
This declaration was obviously made as required by Entry 52 List I
Schedule VII of the Constitution.
In other words, Parliament declared that it was . in public interest to regulate the working of the
Rice Milling Indnstry and accordingly it purported to legislate
under the power contained in Schedule VII List I Entry 52 read with
Entry 24 of List II.
In these circumstances, there cannot be any
question of the incompetency of Parliament to legislate on the subject matter of the Act nor was any such question raised before us.
The Act of 1958 before its amendment did not include the rice
hullers and was completely innocuous so far the writ petitioners are
concerned. It was after the amendment of 1968 that the rice hullers
or the owners of the rice husking mills have come forward to
this
Court with the grievance that the Act is constitutionally invalid.
The
rice millers have not filed any petition assailing any provisions of the
Act of 1968.
Section 3(a) of the Act of 1958 defines a 'defunct rice
mill, and section 3(b) defines an "existing rice mill".
The present
Section 3(d) was substituted by the Amendment Act 29 of 1968 and
reads as follows :-
"Milling rice" with its grammatical variation, means-
(i) recovering rice or any produce thereof from paddy;
(ii) polishing rice,
with the aid of power".
The question is whether this definition applies to the petitioners and
takes within its fold not only the rice millers but also the rice hullers.
Section 3 (A) which may be extracted is a provision which applies
expressly to rice hullers attached to or maintained by any flour,
oil,
dal or other mills or pumping sets as they apply to rice mills mutatis
mutandis:
"3A-The provisions of this Act shall apply to ricehullers attached to, or maintained with, any flour, oil dal or
other mill, or pumping set as they apply to rice mills subject
to the modification that any reference to the commencement
of this Act in those provisions shall, in their application to
such rice-hullers, be construed as a reference to the commencement of the Rice-Milling Industry
(Regulation)
Amendment Act, 1968"-
Section 5 requires permits to be taken for a new or defunct rice
mill and sub-sections (4) and (5) which run thus:
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c. SAHA v .. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.)
757
"(4) Before granting any permit under sub-section (3)
the Central Government shall cause a full and complete
investigation to be made in the prescribed manner in respect
of the application and shall have due regard to-
(a) the number of rice mills operating in the locality;
(b) the availability of paddy in the locality;
( c) the availability of power and water supply for the
rice mill in respect of which a permit is applied for;
( d) whether the rice mill in respect of which a permit is
applied for will be of the huller type, sheller type or
combined sheller-huller type;
( e) whether the functioning of the rice mill in respect of
which a permit is applied for would cause substantial
unemployment in the locality;
( f) such other particulars as may be prescribed.
(5) (a) In granting a permit under this section (whether
for the establishment of a new rice mill or for re-commencing
rice.milling operation in a defnnct rice mill), the Central
Government shall give preference--
( i) to a Government company or a corporation owned
or controlled by the Government over every other
applicant;
(ii) to a farmers' co-operative society over every other
applicant, not being a Government Company or a
corporation owned or controlled by the Government,
Notwithstanding that. such other applicant has
applied for the grant of a permit for re.commencing
rice-milling operation in a defunct rice mill.
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(b) Subject to the provisions of clause (a) in granting
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a permit under this section, the Central Government shall
give preference to a defunct rice mill over a new rice mill" .
lay down the various factors and conditions which the licensing authority has to consider before granting permit.
Sub-section (6) provides
that a permit shall be valid for the periods specified therein or for such
H
period as the Central Government may exfend.
The relevant portion
of section 6 runs thus :-
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1979] ] S.C.R.
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"6(1) Any owner of an existing rice mill or of a rice
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mill in respect of which a permit granted under section 5 is
effective may make an application to the licensing officer for
the grant of a licence for carrying on rice-milling operation
in the rice mill.
(2) Every application under sub-section (I) shall
be
made in the prescribed form and shall contain the particulars
regarding the location of the rice mill, the size and type
thereof and such other particulars as may be prescribed.
(3) On receipt of any such application for the grant of
licence, the licensing officer shall grant the licence on such
conditions inclnding such conditions as to improvements to
existing machinery, replacement of existing machinery and
use of improved methods of rice-milling, as may be necessary
to eliminate waste, obtain maximum production and improve
quality and conditions relating to the polishing of rice, on
payment of such fees and on the deposit of such sum, if any,
as security for the due performance of the conditions as
may be prescribed".
This section therefore requires every owner of an existing
rice mill to make an application for obtaining a licence.
The application is to be made to a licensing officer. It may be pertinent to
note here that once an application is filed by an owner of a rice-mill
the licensing officer has no discretion in the matter but has a mandatory duty to grant a licence as will appear from the word "shall" which
follows licensing officer.
Sub-section ( 4) again lays down the period
of licence etc.
Section 7 provides the ground on which the. licensing
officer can revoke or suspend the licence after giving the licencee an
opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken.
This section runs thus :-
"7 (I) If the licensing officer is satisfied, either on
a
reference made to him in this behalf or otherwise, that,-
( a) a licence granted under section 6 has been obtained
by misrepresentation as to an essential fact, or
(b) the bolder of licence has, without reasonable cause,
failed to comply with the conditions subject to which the
licence has been granted or has contravened any of the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder.
then without prejudice to any other penalty to which the
holder of licence may be liable under this Act, the licensing
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c. SAHA v. UNION (Fazal Ali. J.)
officer may, after giving the holder of the licence an opportunity of showing cause, revoke or suspend the licence or
forfeit the sum, if any, or any portion thereof deposited as
security for the due performance of the conditions subject to
which the licence has been granted.,.
759
A
Thus the provisions contain sufficient guidelines and do not amount to
B
exercise of an arbitrary power.
As the Amending Act 29 of 1968 had made vital and substantial
chang~s in the Act of 1958 by brin!,>ing the rice hullers also within the
do1m1in of the Act.
We might like to consider some of the amended
prm·isions whose constitutional validity has been challenged on various
grounds.
To begin with, the relevant part of the object and reasons
of the Amending Act runs thus :-
"First, several ditliculties have been experienced with
regard to the control over small hullers.
These hullers arc
scattered all over the country-side far away from importaut
markets and, in many cases, are run along with other powerdriven plants like flour, oil and dall mills or pumping sets,
etc. without obtaining requisite permits or licences under the
Act. These hullers sometimes operate clandestinely at night
making it ditlicult to check their activities.
lt is, therefore,
proposed to make it clear that the attachment of hullers with
other power-driven units mentioned above would amount to
establishment of rice-mills and to tighten at the same time
the penal provisions in respect of running of unlicensed
hullers.
Secondly, it is possible nnder the Act for existing
or new rice mills to stop rice-milling operations for a considerable period and thereby affect the supply position.
It
is, therefore, proposed to provide that if any mill ceases to
operate for a continuous period of exceeding one year,
it
would become a defunct rice-mill and would require a fresh
permit for recommencing rice-milling
operations ....... .
. . . . . . . . . . . Moreover, removal of bran popularly known as
polishing of rice after its recovery from paddy is also proposed to be covered by the term 'milling rice' which at
present covers recovery of rice from paddy.
This will check
unauthorised milling which is done in the name of polishing
of rice".
c
D
E
F
G
It would thus appear that the rice hullers were practically performing
H
the same functions as rice millers but without any control having been
exercised on them, as a result of which the poor rice growers were
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
760
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 1 s.c.R.
exploited and the hand-pounding industry suffered.
Sometimes
the
supply position of the rice also suffered.
Coming now to the merits of the amendments of 1968, it was
argued in the first place that the introduction of section 3A unmistakably shows that the definition in section 3(d) & (gg) did not include
the rice hullers. It was also argued that clauses '(i)
and
(ii)
of
section 3(d) must be read conjunctively and not disjunctively.
We
are however unable to agree with these arguments.
Having regard to
the setting in which section 3 ( d) is placed and the dominant object of
the Amendment Act the intention of the Legislature was to widen the
purport and scope of the definition of milling rice. If clauses (i) and
(ii) are read conjunctively then it will defeat the very purpose of the
Act and would in fact become meaningless because clause (i) which
means recovering rice or any product thereof from paddy would include
products like chura etc. which do not require polishing and yet if we
have to read the two clauses conjunctively chura will have to be polished
to fall within the meaning of section 3 ( d) which, in our opinion, could
not have been contemplated by the Legislature.
Furthermore, the
definition of polishing in section 3 (gg) runs thus :-
.. ~polishing' in relation to rice n1eans the
removal
of
bran from the kernel of rice."
Polishing rice therefore includes the process of removal of bran from
the kernel of rice with the aid of power in what the rice hullers do.
In this connection, we might mention that the process of removing
husk from the rice as defined in Encyclopaedia Britannica Col.
19
Page 284 which is as follows :-
"Preparation of rice : The kernel of rice as it leaves the
thresher is enclosed by the hull or husk, and is known as
paddy or rough rice.
Rough rice is used for seed and feed
for livestock, but most of it is milled for human consumption.
Rice is a good energy food, and is consumed in vast quantities in the orient.
In the western hemisphere, however, rice
is not the staple cereal food, except in certain Caribbean and
South Pacific Islands.
A diet limited largely to well milled
rice renders eastern people on a restricted diet liable
to
beri-beri, a deficiency disease caused by a shortage of essential thiamin (Vitamin Bl) and minerals. This disease, however, can be avoided by adding legumes, fish,
fruits
and
vegetables to the diet.
Rough rice that is preboiled
and
dried prior to milling retains more thiamin and minerals than
untreated rice, and hence is less apt to cause beri-beri. It
)
•
..
\
c. SAHA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, !.)
appears that in preboiling the thiamin, which is largely in
the germ and bran layers of the kernel, diffuses into and is
fixed in the starchy endosperm.
Most of the rice is milled in or near the areas in which
it is produced. In modern mills, special machines are used
for removing the hull from the kernel, for removing the bran
layers by attrition, for polishing, for coating and for grading.
The object in milling is to remove the hull and the bran
. layers of the kernel with as little breakage as possible for the
most valuable product is the whole kernel.
Milled rice often
is coated with glucose and talc, or with vegetable oils, to
improve its appearance.
The by-products, bran and polish,
are used as feed for livestock, the broken rice for brewing,
distilling, and the manufacturing of starch and rice flour.
The hulls are used for fuel or packing, and the straw is used
for feed, for bedding livestock, for thatching roofs, and for
mats, garments, packing and broom straws".
761
Thus, on a true interpretation of section 3(d) clauses (i) and (ii) and
(gg) there can be absolutetly no doubt that the section includes the
operation carried out by the rice hullers.
Jn view of this interpretation it was not necessary for the Legislature to have added section
3(A) but this was done in order to put the matter beyond doubt or
controversy.
Counsel for the petitioners assailed these provisions of the Act on
three grounds, viz., (l) that the Act by bringing the rice hullers and
rice millers within the same fold seems to treat unequlils as equals,
b>ecause rice hullers cannot be equated with rice millers,
(2)
that
)iections 5 and 6 contained uncanalised and unguided powers so as to
be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, and (3) that the
provisions compelling the petitioners to take licences is too harsh in
nature and is an unreasonable restriction on the right of the petitioners
w carry on their business.
So far as the first contention is concerned, it is absolutely without
A
B
c
D
E
F
any substance.
Having regard to the process in which the rice
is
G
' ' milled or dehusked by machine there is not much of a difference between a rice miller and a rice hnller.
Both resort to machines driven
, ;
by power to effectuate the result. In fact, a husking mill with one
huller not only dehusks paddy but simultaneously polishes it by suitable adjustment of the blade, a function which is almost siruilar to that
performed by the rice millers.
Having regard to the object contained
B
in the statement and reasons mentioned above it cannot be said that
there is any discrimination between the rice millers and the rice hullers
A
B
762
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1979 J I s.c.R.
both of whom are obliged to take licences before conducting their
business.
The whole idea is that the indigenous hand pounding industry may not be wiped out by allowing rice hnller to take all the licences
of de-husking so as to render the hand-pounding industry completely
nugatory. Thus, in our opinion, in the first place, rice millers and rice
hullers constitute a separate class and secondly, having regard to the
nature of their functions the classification is reasonable, because (1) it
is founded upon intelligible differentia, (2) the defferentia has rational
relation to the objects sought to be achieved by the Act, namely, the
protection of the domestic hand pounding industry and improvement I
/
of the quality of the rice and ensuring its easy and quick distribution.'
c The first contention raised by the writ petitioners is, therefore, over-
•
ruled.
It was next contended that the provisions of the Act which insist
on the rice hullers to take licences is an unreasonable restriction
on
their right to carry on the business. In the first place, the licensing
D
provision is in public interest and is meant to carry out the purpose of
the Act.
Secondly, sections 5 and 6 are purely regulatory in character
and do not amount to unreasonable restriction. It has been helcj. by
this Court that canalisation of export through selected licences causing
elimination of other traders amounts to a reasonable restriction. In
this connection, in the case of Narendra Kumar and Ors. v. Union of
E
India & Ors.(') this Court observed as follows :-
F
"The first evil sought to be remedied by the law being
thus the rise in price. . . . . . . . . . . . The essential subsidiary
step therefore was to introduce a system of permits so that
the persons acquiring copper could be known.
A system of
permits would also be of great help in ensuring that the raw
material would go to those industries where it was needed
most and distributed in such quantities to several industries
in different parts of the country as would procure the greatest
benefit to the general public".
G
To the same effect is the decision of this Court in the case of
Daruka & Co. v. Union of India(') where Ray, C.J. speaking for ·'
the Court observed as follows :-
H
"This Court in Glass Chatol!S
case (1962) I S.C.R.
862 held that if the scheme of canalisation of imports is in
the interest of the general public the refusal of licence to out-
(ll [1960] 2 S-.-R. 375.
(2) [1974] l S.C.R. 570.
.·
\
' .
. !
c. SAHA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, !.)
siders would also be in the interest of the general public. The
canalisation of import was held to be per se not an unreasonable restriction in the interest of the general public.
763
A
Policies of imports or exports are fashioned
not only
with reference to internal or international trade but also on
monetary policy, the development of agriculture and industries and even on the political policies.
If the Government
decides an economic policy that import or export should be
by a selected channel or through selected agencies the court
would proceed on the assumption that the decision is in the
interest of the general public unless the contrary is shown".
·B
For these reasons, therefore, we are unable to hold that sections 5 and
6 alllOllilt to unreasonable restrictions on the right of the petitioners to
carry on their trade and business.
It was next argued that sections 5 and 6 contain unguided and
uncanalised power and suffer from the vice of excessive delegation or
powers.
In the first place, in view of the language of section 6 with
which the existing rice hullers are concerned, the question of uncanalised powers being coilferred on the licensing authority does not arise.
It would be seen that under section 6(3) once an application is received by the licensing officer he shall grant a licence on such conditions
as he may impooe.
The statute does not leave any discretion in the
licensing officer to grant or to refuse to grant a licence.
He has a
mandatory duty to perform, and, therefore, there is no question of the
licensing officer having been conf~rred unrestricted
or uncanalised
powers under the Act.
It was, however, submitted that although the
Jgrant of licence is mandatory under sub-section (3) of :Section 6 yet
this can be granted only if a permit has been granted under section 5
sub-section (6). There is no pleading before this Court that any
of the petitioners was not granted permits at all.
Even so, as indicated above, sub-section ( 4) of section 5 contains as many as six guidelines for the grant of perm.it.
The power is to be exercised by such a
high authority as
the Central Government.
Furthermore,
under
section 12 an appeal lies against a decision of the licensing officer
under section 6 or section 7 to an appellate officer nominated by the
Central Government.
c
D
E
F
G
For the reasons, given above Writ Petitions No. 1135 to 1155 and
H
1759 to 1949 of 1977 are dismissed, but in the circumstances with
costs, ooe set.
764
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] l s.c.R.
A
For the reasons given in Writ Petitions No. 1135 to 1155 and 1759
to 1949 of 1977, Writ Petitions No. 1544-1758, 1952-1991, 19932199, 2216-2220, 2274-2325 of 1977, 592-607, 849-862,
18981908/78, 1597_-1606/78, 955-956/77, 1222/77, 4-176 & 2359/78,
967-1128/77, 314-591, 901-950, 1870-1887, 2240-2294, 2367-2390,
3063-3081/78, 1223-1526/77, 177-313, 871-900, 2319-2358/78,
B
2326-2430/77, 1807-1869, 1239-1312, 1584-1592, 1737-1759, 229(i...
2311, 2312-2318, 2392-2472, 2937-2951, 3380-3464, 609-821, 9791237, 1543-1583, 1956-2111, 2810-2936, 2986-2998, 2953-2968/73,
2472A-2472B/78, 823, 3514-3574, 824-826, 975, 1617-1627, 16281725, 1915-1942178, 2366, 2610, 3088, 3576, 1313-1542, 2112-2203, I
3131-3340, 1760-1806/78,
2231-2234,
2235-2236,
2237-2238,
c 2475, 2476, 2975-2985/78, 3465,
3466-3513/78,
3622-3641/78,
3766, 3801 & 3786-3788/78 are dismissed but without any order as to
costs. These are the reasons for our orders pronounced on 5-5-1978.
S.R.
Petitions dismissed.
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..
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