# CHANDRAN @ MANICHAN @ MANIYAN v. STATE OF KERALA

- **Citation:** [2011] 8 S.C.R. 273
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2011-04-04
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 1528 of 2005
- **Bench:** V.S. Sirpurkar, Cyriac Joseph
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/chandran-manichan-maniyan-v-state-of-kerala-27912
- **Pages:** 86

## Headnote

A
B
Abkari Act - s.57A - Spurious liquor trade - Improper
mixing of noxious substance (methyl alchohol) with liquor led
to death of 31 persons and blindness and grievous injuries
C
to several persons -
A/legation that the accused were
engaged in the business of manufacture, storing, sale and
supply of illicit liquor which resulted in the said liquor tragedy
-
Conviction of A-7 and his two brothers A-8 and A-4 u/
s.57A(1)(ii), and A-25 and A-30 u/s.57A(2) - All accused D
sentenced to life imprisonment - On appeal, held: Methyl
alcohol was used in mixing the liquor which was under the
control of A-7 who was being helped by his brothers, servants
and relatives -
In order to be convicted uls. 57 A, the
P.rosecution is not required to prove that A-7 physically mixed
E
the methyl alcohol or the injurious substance with the spirit -
If A-7 directed his servants to mix methanol that would also
be covered within the scope of the words 'mixes or permits to
be mixed' in the Section -
The knowledge of A-7 that
methanol was being mixed, the fact that he was running the
F
business along with his hirelings and the further fact that he
used to be present at the time of the mixing are properly
proved by the prosecution - A-8 is the real brother of A-7 and
there are number of other circumstances to suggest that A-8
was actively engaged in the b.usiness - A-8 was an active G
member in carrying the said spurious liquor and the fact that
a vehicle under his possession found from his premises had
the trace of methanol is sufficient to hold that he had the
necessary knowledge that methanol played a major part in the
273
H
274
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[2011] 8 S.C.R.
A business - The frequent calls of A-8 to his brother also show
that he was actively involved in the business - It is not
necessary that A-8 had to mix or permit to be mixed the
noxious substance himself - A-4 was also thoroughly in the
business like his brothers A-7 and A-8 - Conviction of A-8,
B A-7 and A-4 u/s.57A(1)(ii) and sentence of life imprisonment
imposed thereunder accordingly maintained - As regards A25, it is established that he used to take the liquor
manufactured by A-7 and the same used to be supplied to
him by A-4 and the same was distributed by him further - AC 25 does not seem to have taken care that it was not mixed
with methyl alcohol - Once this fact regarding the possession
of methyl alcohol is proved, A-25 cannot argue that the
possession of methyl alcohol was only incidental - The words
"omits to take reasonable precaution" would cast a duty on him
D to see that the liquor that he sells is not mixed with poisonous
substance - Again, under sub-section (5) of s. 57 A, he was
bound to prove that he had taken reasonable precaution, as
contemplated in sub-section (2) - No evidence that the
accused discharged his burden in any manner - Therefore,
E his conviction for offence punishable u/s.57A(2) is justified:-
However, he should not be punished with life imprisonment
- This accused has already undergone more than 10 years
of imprisonment - Sentence brought down to the period
already undergone by him - The case of A-30 more- or less
F
is identical with A-25 - There is enough evidence to show that
A-30 was involved in the procurement of liquor from A-4 - He
then packed it in the covers and supplied it - A-30 was also
behind the bars for more than 10 years -
His life
imprisonment is also set aside and brought down to that
G already undergone by him.
Abkari Act- s.57A - Illicit liquor trade - Burden of proof
- On whom - Held: The prosecution has the initial burden to
suggest that the accused person was involved in the business
of illicit liquor and that he knew the nature thereof - It is only
H then that the burden would shift to the accused to prove that
CHANDRAN @ MANICHAN @ MANIYAN v. STATE 275
OF KERALA
he had no means to know about the nature of the business
A
or the fact that the liquor was being mixed with noxious
substance like methanol -
On facts, the prosecution h

## Text

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[2011] 8 S.C.R. 273
CHANDRAN @ MANICHAN @ MANIYAN
v.
STATE OF KERALA
(Criminal Appeal No. 1528 of 2005)
APRIL 4, 2011
[V.S. SIRPURKAR AND CYRIAC JOSEPH, Jj,]
A
B
Abkari Act - s.57A - Spurious liquor trade - Improper
mixing of noxious substance (methyl alchohol) with liquor led
to death of 31 persons and blindness and grievous injuries
C
to several persons -
A/legation that the accused were
engaged in the business of manufacture, storing, sale and
supply of illicit liquor which resulted in the said liquor tragedy
-
Conviction of A-7 and his two brothers A-8 and A-4 u/
s.57A(1)(ii), and A-25 and A-30 u/s.57A(2) - All accused D
sentenced to life imprisonment - On appeal, held: Methyl
alcohol was used in mixing the liquor which was under the
control of A-7 who was being helped by his brothers, servants
and relatives -
In order to be convicted uls. 57 A, the
P.rosecution is not required to prove that A-7 physically mixed
E
the methyl alcohol or the injurious substance with the spirit -
If A-7 directed his servants to mix methanol that would also
be covered within the scope of the words 'mixes or permits to
be mixed' in the Section -
The knowledge of A-7 that
methanol was being mixed, the fact that he was running the
F
business along with his hirelings and the further fact that he
used to be present at the time of the mixing are properly
proved by the prosecution - A-8 is the real brother of A-7 and
there are number of other circumstances to suggest that A-8
was actively engaged in the b.usiness - A-8 was an active G
member in carrying the said spurious liquor and the fact that
a vehicle under his possession found from his premises had
the trace of methanol is sufficient to hold that he had the
necessary knowledge that methanol played a major part in the
273
H
274
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[2011] 8 S.C.R.
A business - The frequent calls of A-8 to his brother also show
that he was actively involved in the business - It is not
necessary that A-8 had to mix or permit to be mixed the
noxious substance himself - A-4 was also thoroughly in the
business like his brothers A-7 and A-8 - Conviction of A-8,
B A-7 and A-4 u/s.57A(1)(ii) and sentence of life imprisonment
imposed thereunder accordingly maintained - As regards A25, it is established that he used to take the liquor
manufactured by A-7 and the same used to be supplied to
him by A-4 and the same was distributed by him further - AC 25 does not seem to have taken care that it was not mixed
with methyl alcohol - Once this fact regarding the possession
of methyl alcohol is proved, A-25 cannot argue that the
possession of methyl alcohol was only incidental - The words
"omits to take reasonable precaution" would cast a duty on him
D to see that the liquor that he sells is not mixed with poisonous
substance - Again, under sub-section (5) of s. 57 A, he was
bound to prove that he had taken reasonable precaution, as
contemplated in sub-section (2) - No evidence that the
accused discharged his burden in any manner - Therefore,
E his conviction for offence punishable u/s.57A(2) is justified:-
However, he should not be punished with life imprisonment
- This accused has already undergone more than 10 years
of imprisonment - Sentence brought down to the period
already undergone by him - The case of A-30 more- or less
F
is identical with A-25 - There is enough evidence to show that
A-30 was involved in the procurement of liquor from A-4 - He
then packed it in the covers and supplied it - A-30 was also
behind the bars for more than 10 years -
His life
imprisonment is also set aside and brought down to that
G already undergone by him.
Abkari Act- s.57A - Illicit liquor trade - Burden of proof
- On whom - Held: The prosecution has the initial burden to
suggest that the accused person was involved in the business
of illicit liquor and that he knew the nature thereof - It is only
H then that the burden would shift to the accused to prove that
CHANDRAN @ MANICHAN @ MANIYAN v. STATE 275
OF KERALA
he had no means to know about the nature of the business
A
or the fact that the liquor was being mixed with noxious
substance like methanol -
On facts, the prosecution had
discharged its primary burden - The accused persons, more
particularly, A-7, A-4 and A-8, did not offer any evidence so
as to discharge the burden put against them..
B
Abkari Act - s. 57 A - Mixing of noxious substance with
liquor - Liability under s.57A - Held: S.57-A is extremely
general - Held: Offence under the Section is not limited to
licence holders, but refers to anybody who mixes or permits c
to be mixed any noxious substance or any substance which
is likely to endanger human life with any liquor - In addition
to the mixing or permitting to be mixed, sub-section (2) of
s. 57 A brings in the dragnet of the offence, a person who omits
to take reasonable precaution to prevent the mixing of any 0
noxious substance - For being convicted uls.57A, it is not
necessary that the person concerned must himself do the
mixing.
Penal Code, 1860 - s. 1208 - Spurious liquor trade
involving mixing of noxious substance (methyl alchohol) with
E
liquor - Leading to death of 31 persons and blindness and
grievous injuries to several persons -
Allegations of
conspiracy against accused-appellants - Held: On facts, it
may not have been a conspiracy to mix the noxious
substance but the fact of the matter is that in order to succeed
F
in the business which itself was a conspiracy the accused
mixed or allowed to be mixed methanol and used it so freely
that ultimately 31 persons lost their lives -
Tl1e prosecution
clearly proved that there was a noxious substance which was
likely to endanger the human life - Secondly, they proved that
G
the substance was mixed, permitted to be mixed and was
being regularly mixed with liquor -
They thirdly" proved that
the persons mixing had the knowledge. that methanol was a
dangerous substance that aspect would be clear from the fact
that after the tragedy A-7 went and punished his servants and
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2011] 8 S.C.R.
A remonstrated them for 'not properly' mixing methanol with
ethyl alcohol - Lastly, it is proved that as a result of mixing
of methanol with the liquor and as a result of consuming such
liquor as many as 31 persons Jost their lives and number of
B
others suffered grievous injuries.
Criminal Trial - Evidence of accomplice - Admissibility
- Held: The evidence of an accomplice is admissible subject
to the usual caution - On facts, even if the prosecution did
not prosecute PW53 - a close relative of the accused, and
c used his evidence only as an accomplice, it was perfectly
legal - The evidence of PW-53 was most natural and was not
shaken in any manner in his cross-examination - He gave
complete graphic description of the incident in question.
Spurious liquor trade - Role of the State -
State
D Government to take definite steps for overhauling the system,
by weeding out the corrupt by punishing them.
According to the prosecution, the accusedappellants were engaged in the illegal trade of spurious
E liquor adulterated with methyl alcohol which led to a
tragedy in which 31 persons died, 6 persons lost their
eyesight and 500 persons suffered serious injuries due
to consumption of spurious liquor.
The appellants (A-7, his two brothers-A-4 and A-8, AF 25, A-30 and one other accused, A-1, who died
subsequently) were convicted by the Sessions Judge for
offences punishable under Sections 1208, 302, 307, 326,
328 and 201 read with Section 34 of IPC as also under
Sections 55(a) (g) (h) (i), 57 A and 58 of the Abkari Act (a
G State Act for the State of Kerala) and sentenced to
rigorous imprisonment for life. On appeal, the High Court
set aside the conviction of the appellants under Sections
302 and Section 307, IPC, however, maintained their
convictions under Section 57 A(1 )(ii) under the Abkari Act
H
CHANDRAN @ MANICHAN @ MANIYAN v. STATE 277
OF KERALA
along with convictions under Sections 324, 326, 328 and A
201, JP.C as also Section 55 (tl):and (i) and 58 of the Abkari
Act.
,
. -0"
In the present appeals, the appellants challenged
their conviction contending that the Courts below had B
mis-interpreted the provisions of Abkari Act, more
particularly, Section 57 A(1 )(i) and (ii) as also Section
57 A(2)(ii) and that the Courts below erred in convicting
A-7 and his two brothers A-8 and A-4 u/s.57A(1)(ii), and
in convicting A-25 and A-30 u/s.57 A(2).
c
· Disposing of the appeals, the Court
HELD:1.1. The original Section 57 of the Abkari Act
provided the punishment for adulteration by the licenced
• vendor or manufacturer. Section 57 A was added in the D
· Act by Amendment Act No.21 of 1984. A plain reading of
the Section would mean that now. the offence is not
limited to the licence holders, but refers to anybody who
mixes or permits to be mixed any noxious substance or
any substance which is likely to endanger human life E
with any liquor. The Section, therefore, is extremely
general. In addition to the mixing or permitting to be
mixed, sub-section (2) of Section 57 A brings in the
dragnet of the offence, a person who omits to take
reasonable precaution to prevent the mixing of any F
noxious substance. Significantly if, as a result of such act
of mixing of the liquor with noxious or dangerous
substance death is caused, the extreme penalty of death
also is provided. Imprisonment provided is for a term not
less than three years but which may· extend to
imprisonment for life as also with a fine of Rs.50,000/-. G
Sub-section 3 is the punishment fOr possession of any
liquor or intoxicating drug which is mixed with noxious
substance or dangerous drug knowing it to be so. Sub-
. section (4) prohibits the bail and the conditions for grant
H
278
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 8 S.C.R.
A thereof. Sub-section (5) puts the burden of proving that
. the accused has not mixed or permitted to be mixed or
has not omitted to take reasonable precautions to prevent
the mixing, on the accused himself. Similarly, the burden
would be on the accused to prove that while he was in
B possession of such liquor mixed with noxious or
dangerous substance, he did not know that such
substance-was mixed with such liquor. Section 58 speaks
for the possession of illicit liquor. [Paras 18, 19] [306-D;
308-H; 309-A-E]
c
1.2. Since the burden to prove the offence which
normally lies on the prosecution under the criminal
jurisprudence was shifted to the accused, it was but
natural that the constitutional validity of Section 57 A
came to be challenged. However, in P.N. Krishna Lal, this
D Court proceeded to uphold the same. It held that the
provisions did not violate Article 20 (3) of the Constitution
and thus Section 57A was held to be valid. In this locus
classicus this Court has described complete scope of
section 57 A as a whole with special reference to Section
E 57A (5). It is in this backdrop of this exposition of law that
the Courts below were expected to decide upon the
criminality of the accused involved. It is seen that in the
instant case, the parameters fixed by this Court in the
aforementioned judgment were scrupulously followed by
F
the Courts below. [Paras 20, 22, 23) [309-F-G; 316-C-E]
P.N. Krishna Lal & Ors. v. Govt. of Kera/a & Anr. 1995
Suppl. (2) sec 187: 1994(5) Suppl. SCR 526 - relied on.
R.C. Cooper v. Union of India 1970 (1) SCC 248: 1970
G (3) SCR 530; Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC
569: 1994 (2) SCR 375; Shambu Nath Mehra v. State of
Ajmer [1956] SCR 199; C.S.D. Swamy v. The State, [1960]
1 SCR 461 - referred to.
H
Salabiaku v. Grance 1988 13 EHRR 379; Woolmington
CHANDRAN @ MANICHAN @ MANIYAN v. STATE 279
OF KERALA
v. Director of Public Prosecutions, (1935) A.C. 462; Mancini A
v. Director of Public Prosecutions, (1942) A.C. 1; Reg. v.
Edwards [1975] Q.B. 27; Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor,
(1981) A.C. 648; Queen v. Oakes, 26 D.L.R, (4th) 200; Ed
Tumey v. State of Ohio, (71) L.Ed. 7 49; Morrison v. California,
78 Law. Ed. 664; United States v. Gainey, 13, Law. Ed. 2nd. B
p. 658; Barnes v. United States, 412 US 837; In County
Court of Ulster, New York v. Samuel Allen, 442 US 140;
Herman So/em v. Jerry Buckley Helm, 463 US 277; Timothy
F. Leary v. U.S., 395 US 6 - referred to.
2.1. A-7 appears to be the boss who was running this c
illegal business of liquor along with his family members
including A-4 and A-8 and even their wives were not left
behind which is clear from the fact that they were arrayed
as accused along with others but could not be brought
to book as they were absconding and hence their cases D
were separated. It appears to be an admitted position that
26 shops meant for selling toddy-were being managed
by this accused. He had the licence for running those
toddy shops. He had obtained them in the auction using
his own money. From the statements of the accused and E
from the documents, it is clear that a full-fledged business
in illicit liquor was going on. The High Court referred to
the oral evidence and also referred to number of
documents to show that several buildings were owned,
possessed and controlled by A-7 and his wife wherefrom
F
A-7 conducted his liquor business. The High Court also
made reference to other properties which were used by
A-7 for the purpose of illicit business, which properties
belonged to the mother-in-law of A-7. The High Court
rightly came to the conclusion that it was A-7 who was G
controlling the whole affair. It is clear that methyl alcohol
which was the main culprit, was not only a dangerously
poisonous substance but was also used in mixing the
liquor which was under the control of A-7 who was being
helped by his brothers, servants and relatives. A-7 was H
280
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 8 S.C.R.
A the captain of the whole team. [Paras 24, 25, 27, 28] [316F-H; 318-F-G; 319-G-H; 320-G]
2.2. The reason why accused No.7 had to mix the
methyl alcohol and/or methynol is not far to see. It is
8
clarified from the evidence of PW-96 that A-7 had put the
bid of Rs. 4 crores for the 26 toddy shops and even if all
the toddy shops had worked in their full capacity he
could not have recovered even half the amount and it
was, therefore, that this idea of bringing ethyl alcohol,
C mixing it with methyl alcohol and creating various drinks
like Kalapani etc. was mooted. The result thereof was for
all to see which resulted in death of 31 persons. The High
Court correctly observed that the basic reason for
bidding for 26 shops·for toddy was to get the legitimate
godown for toddy. It is proved that those godowns,
D instead, were used not for storing toddy but for storing
ethyl alcohol and mixing it with methyl alcohol for making
enormous profits. It is not as if A-7 was selling only toddy.
In addition to that he was creating various drinks
preferably by mixing ethyl alcohol with methyl alcohol.
E Thus, there was a full liquor industry going on under his
captainship. [Para 30] [321-C-F]
2.3. The last nail in the coffin is the evidence of PW53, a close relative of A-7. He was supplying spirit to A-7
F
from various places. He has graphically described in his
evidence as to how the spirit business was being done
inasmuch as he deposed that the spirit used to be
brought from the tankers and used to be collected in the
syntex tanks and was filled in 35 litres cans. This spirit
G was used for making a drink called Ka/apani by mixing
with essence and some toddy. It was then filled in the
cans and dispatched in the vehicles. The evidence of this
witness further goes on to show the position of godown
which was used for the storage of ethyl alcohol and
H methyl alcohol. He referred to methyl alcohol as
CHANDRAN @ MANICHAN @ MANIYAN v. STATE 281
OF KERALA
'essence'. He described that the spirit was brought from A
Karnataka ·and essence used to come on Thursdays in
a white Fiat car. The Fiat car had a secret chamber. That
car was identified as M.0.-24. The tank and the platform
were built in the back seat and the front seat of the car.
There were three valves attached to the same and 35 B
litres of methyl alcohol i.e. the essence could be carried
in the said car. He gave a graphic description of mixture
with spirit which ultimately was sold. He specifically
named A-20, A-22, A-23 and A-21 who were supervising
the mixing. In his evidence he has also specifically C
referred that he had seen M.0.-24, the car, importing the
essence i.e. the methyl alcohol precisely two days prior
to the liquor tragedy. He has also named A-16 and
another boy who were the occupants of the said car. He
also suggested that he and the other employees were o
filling up the essence in 10 cans. The High Court has
referred to the further evidence on the part of th is witness
that in the night at about 10.30 p;m. the tanker lorry came
with spirit and the said spirit was filled in the syntex tank
and cans. Those half filled cans were then filled with the E
methyl alcohol meaning thereby it was mixed. He then
went on to depose that the employees of A-4, namely, A5, A-6, A-9 and A-10 came there with three vehicles and
essence and they mixed up the essence with the spirit.
He claimed that in all 60 cans were filled up and were
F
dispatched in three cars for transporting to various
places for sale. According to him after the tragedy, on the
instructions of A-7, what was left in the syntex tank was
poured in the river, un-used cans were removed and
plastic covers were disposed of by setting fire and that
A-7 had also taken adequate care to send away the G
employees for sometime and it was through him that the
witness came to know that people had died by drinking
the spirit supplied by A-4 and his employees due to a
mistake in mixing by A-20 and A-22. (Para 31) (321-G-H;
322-A-H; 323-A-B]
.
H
A
282
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011) 8 S.C.R.
2.4. For being convicted under Section 57 A, it is not
necessary that the person concerned must himself do the
mixing. It is obvious that A-7 was the boss. In fact PW-53
describes him as the boss. It is, therefore, obvious that
everything was done as per his command and if it was
B so, then in order to be convicted under Section 57 A, the
prosecution Is not required to prove that A-7 physically
mixed the methyl alcohol or the injurious substance with
the spirit. Even if A-7 commanded his servants to mix up,
he is equally guilty under the Section. In fact illegally
C importing ethyl alcohol and mixing the same with
methanol was a regular trading activity on the part of A7. The licences for running the toddy shops was merely
a facade. He had undoubtedly put a very tall bid for those
licences and could not have afforded to continue merely
D on the basis of those 26 toddy shops. Therefore, he gave
his business a complete new turn, that is, instead of
selling toddy through those outlets he started selling
alcoholic drink prepared from ethyl alcohol and methanol
and that illegally imported both and all this was going on
E with the corrupt cooperation of those who could have
checked it. Therefore, it is a proved position from the
evidence of PW-53 that A-7 was the boss of the illegal
trade. He got the methanol imported and used his
godown which he rightfully possessed on account of his
F
licences for 26 shops. Therefore, his knowledge that
methanol was being mixed, the fact that he. was running
the business along with his hirelings and the further fact
that he used to be present at the time of the mixing are
properly proved by the prosecution with the aid of
testimony of PW-53 and are enough for a finding about
G Section 57A(1)(ii). It was not necessary that A-7 had
physically mixed the methyl alcohol for his being
convicted. It was actually done on his command and
within his knowlege. His offence could also come within
the definition on account of the other words of the
H Section 'or permits to be mixed'. While interpreting these
CHANDRAN @ MANICHAN @ MANIYAN v. STATE 283
OF KERALA
words, namely, 'whoever mixes or permits to be mixed' the A
real import of the words would have to be taken into
consideration and thereby if A-7 directed his servants to
mix methanol with methyl alcohol that would also be
covered within the scope of the words 'mixes or permits
to be mixed' in the Section. It has already come in the B
evidence that all this mixing was done at the instance of,
with the direction of and to the knowledge of the accused
No.7. He was the king pin or the main actor on whom the
huge business of liquor trade rested. It cannot, therefore,
be said that the conviction under section 57A (1) (ii) was c
in any manner incorrect. [Paras 32, 34] [323-D-H; 324-AB-G-H; 325-A-C]
2.5. There is no .reason to discard the testimony of
PW-53; The evidence was most natural and was not
shaken in any manner in his cross-examination. He has D
given a complete graphic description of what happened.
He has also spoken as to what happened when A-15 and
A-7 came and A-7 gave a beating to A-20 asking him as
to how mixing was not properly done. He then directed
the whole remaining material to be poured into the river E
and to destroythe cans. Accordingly, as per the direction,
the concoction in the Syntex tank was poured in the river
and the cans and the covers were burnt and buried
under the sand. He pointed out that the essence mixed
spirit was taken to the shed belonging to A-7. He spoke F
about the electronic machine, hand machine and the
process of filling the concoction in the plastic cans. He
pointed out that on that day all the plastic covers were
burnt by them. A-7 had also directed the witness and the
other servants to remain absconding. In his crossG
examination, he not only identified A-7 but called him
Boss and Annan, elder brother. Some irrelevant
questions were put to him which he answered suggesting
that the property belonged to · A-7 and the god own also
belonged to him and the mixing used to be done there H
284
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 8 S.C.R.
A only. Though he was subjected to lengthy crossexamination, the main story about the mixing has not
suffered any dent. On the other hand, the operation of
mixing was explained again in the cross-examination. He
owned up that he himself carried Kalapani on number of
B occasions to the various shops of A-7. The evidence
given by this witness sounds truthful because he has not
tried to justify himself nor has he made any efforts to save
himself. Considering the whole evidence, this witness is
creditworthy. [Paras 35, 36] (326-C-H; 327-A-C]
c
2.6. The evidence of PW-60 provides complete
corroboration to the evidence of PW-53. This is apart from
the fact that there is another piece of evidence which
corroborates the evidence of PW-53 which is to be found
in the evidence of the Investigating Officer, PW-270. The
D description given by PW-270 on his searches of the
places and, more particularly, of the places as described
by PW-53 completely tallies. These are also material
particulars which would lend support to the testimony of
PW-53. On the whole there are number of other
E corroborations to the evidence of PW-53. [Para 41] (331C-E]
2.7. It cannot be said that th;, evidence of PW-53
could not be taken into consideration because this
F witness, though an accomplice, was neither granted
pardon under Section 306 Cr.P.C. nor was he
prosecuted. Even if the prosecution did not prosecute
PW-53 and used his evidence only as an accomplice, it
was perfectly legal. The evidence of such witness subject
G to the usual caution was admissible evidence. [Para 42]
(332-E-G]
H
2.8. The Trial Court and the appellate Court were right
in convicting A-7. The High Court rightly confirmed the
same. [Para 46] [339-G-H]
CHANDRAN @ MANICHAN @ MANIYAN ·v. STATE 285
OF KERALA
Laxmipat Choraria & · Ors. v. State of Maharashtra AIR A
1968 SC 938: 1968 SCR 624 - relied on.
Shankar @ Gauri Shankar v. State of Tamil Nadu 1994
(4) SCC 478; Rampa/ Pithwa Rahidas v.State of Maharashtra
(1994) Suppl. (2) SCC 73: 1994 (2) SCR 179; Rattan Singh B
v. State of Himachal Pradesh 1997 (4) SCC 161: 1996 (9)
Suppl. SCR 938; Smt. Laxmi v. Om Prakash AIR 2001 SC
2383: 2001 (3) SCR 777 - referred to.
3. The prosecution has the initial burden to suggest
that the accused person was involved in the business of c
illicit liquor and that he knew the nature thereof. It is only
then that the burden would shift to the accused to prove
that he had no means to know about the nature of the
business or the fact that the liquor was being mixed with
noxious substance like methanol. In the present case, A- o
8 is the real brother of A-7 and there are number of other
circumstances to suggest that A-8 was actively engaged
in the business. It is clear from the evidence of discovery
regarding the fake car number plates that A-8 was neck
deep Into the business of spurious liquor. He was an E
active member in carrying the said spurious liquor and
the fact that a vehicle under his possession found from
his premises had the trace of methanol is sufficient to
hold that he had the necessary knowledge that methanol
played a major part in the business which was headed F
by his real brother A-7 and in which he was an active
partner. The contentions raised that he may at the most
be booked for transporting the spurious liquor is also not
acceptable because if that is established then his active
participation in the business also comes to the forefront.
Thereby his knowledge that the liquor was being mixed G
with methanol has also to be presumed. There was no
necessity for keeping the fake unattached number plates
in his premises and the whole objective is clear of
shielding the cars by attaching fake number plates to
them. The High Court thoroughly discussed about the H
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[2011] 8 S.C.R.
A vehicle which was sold by PW-68 and was found in the
possession of this accused. The High Court also
discussed about the transaction of his house, which was
in front of the half built house where obnoxious liquor
trade was going on. A-8 had taken a house right in front
B of the aforementioned half built house and it was at his
instance that the real number plates of the car which had
the traces of methanol were found. Therefore, no reason
is found to discard the evidence of this discovery. It is
obvious that A-8 was engaged in the business of
c manufacture, storing, sale and supply of illicit liquor
along with A-7 which resulted in liquor tragedy. A-8 was
well aware of the nature of the business as he was
thoroughly into it. Therefore, the offence under section
57 A (1) (i) and (ii) as also the other offences unde.r
0
Sections 324, 326 and 328 read with Section 34, IPC have
been rightly held proved against him. It cannot be said
that the discovery w~s unnatural and was farcical since
both the Courts hav~ held the said discovery to have
been proved. Again his frequent calls to his brother
would cut both ways and would also show that he was
E actively involved in the business. It is not necessary that
the accused had to mix or permit to be mixed the noxious
substance himself. He could be booked on the same
basis as A-7 has bee~ booked on the same logic. It
cannot be accepted thi.t A-8 had no idea that methanol
F
is a noxious substance. If a huge business was going on
and methanol was being imported along with ethyl
alcohol in huge quantity and if the car which brought the
methanol was in his possession and further if the
methanol is established to be a noxious substance, it
G would be a travesty to hold that A-8 did not know that
methanol was obnoxious substance. It is also well
established that this accused could be convicted with the
aid of Section 1208, IPC and also independently of the
offence under Section 57 A (1) (ii) as he was not only the
H part of the business but had actively taken part in it. That
CHANDRAN @ MANICHAN @ MANIYAN v. STATE 287
OF KERALA
by itself is sufficient to hold that he had the knowledge A
about the mixing of the ethyl alcohol with the noxious
substance like methanol and in spite of it,continued. His
offence would be covered fully in the phraseology 'or ·
permits to be mixed' and accordingly, his conviction is
confirmed. The Trial Court and the appellate Court did not B
commit any illegality in booking him under section
57A(1)(ii) also. Considering the number of deaths caused
on account of the business in which this accused was
neck deep, no leniency can be shown. The appeal of A8 is accordingly dismissed. [Para 49, 50 and 52] [343-F- c
H; 344-A-F; 345-B-H; 346-A-D]
4.1. A-4 is another brother of A-7 and A-8. The part
played by A-4, is not less than the part played by A-8, if
not more. It is clear that this witness was thoroughly in
the business like his brothers A-7 and A-8. It is, therefore; D
clear that this was nothing but a conspiracy to run a
patently illegal business along with his two brothers and
others. A-5 and A-11 along with A-6 and A-10 are proved
to have physically transported the mixed substance to
various places. However, they are not the persons who 'E
took active part in the business as its proprietors as A-4
did. In fact A-4 was at the helm of the affairs unlike those
accused who merely transported the liquor. The case of
A-4, therefore, is quite different. It was argued that he
himself had not transported the noxious substance F
which was done by A-15. That may not be so, but he was
practically managing the whole show. It has rightly been
held· by the Trial Court and the appellate court that A-5
was a worker of A-4 and took active part in the
transportation of methanol. His involvement in the G
business is so deep that it was clear that he was a
conspirator and it was in pursuance of conspiracy that
the whole liquor business which essentially involved the
mixing of methanol with the ethyl alcohol was being
conducted. [Para 53] [346-E; 348-C-H]
H
288
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 8 S.C.R.
A
4.2. The language of Section 57A(1) of the Abkari Act
is wide enough and A-4 will fit in the broad language.
Reading the language of Section 57 A (1) as it is, it is more
than proved that all these accused persons entered into
a conspiracy to do the illegal liquor business and in order
B to succeed in their business, took recourse to mixing
methanol with ethyl alcohol and brought out a new type
of spurious liquor. In order to increase the potency of the
drink and .in order to probably give taste, they mixed the
methanol. Once ethyl alcohol is proved to be a noxious
c drug, if they are found to be mixing or permitting mixing
methanol with ethyl alcohol then the offence would be
complete whether they had the knowledge regarding the
qualities of methanol or not. That is apart from the fact
that in this case itself to say that the accused did not
0
know about the properties of methanol would be wrong.
If that had been so they would not have been running
between Hosur and Kerala to bring methanol in the cars
which had fake registration numbers and secrete
chambers. [Para 54) [349-C-G)
E
4.3. There can be no question about the absence of
conspiracy. The whole business itself was a conspiracy.
It may not be the conspiracy to mix the noxious
substance but the fact of the matter is that in order to
succeed in the business which itself was a conspiracy
F they mixed or allowed to be mixed methanol and used it
so freely that ultimately 31 persons lost their lives. The
prosecution has discharged its primary burden. The
accused persons, more particularly, these three brothers
have not offered any evidence so as to discharge the
G burden put against them under section 57 A(1 )(v). In this
case the prosecution has clearly proved that there was
a noxious substance which was likely to endanger the
human life. Secondly, they have proved that substance
was mixed, permitted to be mixed and was being
H regularly mixed with liquor. They have thirdly proved that
CHANDRAN @ MANICHAN @ MANIYAN
V. STATE
289
.OF KERALA
· the persons mixing had the knowledge that methanol
was a dangerous sub~tance that aspect would be clear
from the fact that after the tragedy A-7 went and punished
his servants and remonstrated them for 'not properly'
mixing methanol with ethyl alcohol. Lastly, it is proved
that as a result of mixing of methanol with the liquor and
as a result of consuming such liquor as many as 31
persons lost their lives and number of others suffered
grievous injuries. The appeal filed by A-4 is dismissed.
[Para 55] [350-E-H; 351-A-D]
5. It is well proved by the prosecution that A-25 was
a major link used to purchase liquor from A-4 and he was
A
B
c
the one to distribute the same. A-25 was selling liquor in
retail through A-32, A-35 etc. A-25 and A-10 were the
employees of A-4 who were supplying the liquor •. It is
0
established that A-25 used to ·take the liquor
manufactured by A-7 and the same used to be supplied ·
to him by A-4 and the same was distributed by hirri ·
further. The sale on the part of A-25 and his active
participation in the business run by A..4 and A-7 was
E
, clearly brought out. He was convicted for the offence
under Sections 57A(2)(i) and was heavily fined for
Rs.50,000/-, Rs.25,000/- and Rs.2 lakhs on different
counts including Section. 55(a)(i) as also under Section
58 of the Abkari Act. He was, thus, in a position for
distributors and it has come out in the evidence that the
liquor sold by sub-distributors killed number of persons.
The sub-distributors were none, but A-37, A-35 and A..41.
It was the chain of distribution of liquor mixed with
methyl alcohol. It is obvious that he was in possession
F
of the poisoned liquor and does not seem to have taken
G
care that it was not mixed with methyl alcohol. There is
no doubt that A-25 was acquitted of the offence under
Section 1208, IPC by the Trial Court and there is no
appeal against it. The conviction of this accused is for
offence punishable under Section 57A(2) and on that
H
290
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011) 8 S.C.R.
A account, he has been awarded life imprisonment. There
can be no dispute that this witne~s had no control over
the business run by A-7 and, therefore, he was rightly
acquitted for the offence under Section 1208, IPC i.e.
conspiracy. However, it cannot be said that his conviction
B under Section 57 A(2) is incorrect on that count. From the
evidence of PW-252, it is found that there was a search
in the house of this accused on 23.10.2010 and a bottle
was seized which was mixed with ethyl and methyl. This
was substantiated by Chemical Analysis Report (Exhibit
G .. P-784). He was also in possession of pure methyl alcohol,
which is substantiated by Exhibit P-417, a disclosure
made by him to PW-269 as per Exhibit P-1019. Even this
was found to be methyl alcohol. Once this fact regarding
.the possession of methyl alcohol is proved, A-25 cannot
0 argue that the possession of methyl alcohol was only
incidental. There is no reason for keeping methyl alcohol
with him. After all, he was not going to use it as a
deodorant or perfume. This may suggest that he had a
hand in mixing the alcohol with methyl alcohol, but there
is no evidence for that and he has not been convicted for
E the offence under Section 57 A(1 ). The words "omits to
take reasonable precaution" would cast a duty on him to
see that the liquor that he sells is not mixed with
poisonous substance. Again, under sub-Section (5) of
Section 57 A, he was bound to prove that he had taken
F reasonable precaution, as contemplated in sub-Section
(2). There is no evidence to the contrary nor has the
accused discharged his burden in any manner.
Therefore, his conviction for offence punishable under
Section 57 A(2) is justified. However, he should not be
G punished with life imprisonment. This accused is
convicted for offence punishable under Section 55 as
also under Section 58, the maximum punishment for
which Section is 10 years and he has already undergone
more than 10 years of imprisonment. This Court,
H
CHANDRAN @ MANICHAN @ MANIYAN v. STATE 291
OF KERALA
therefore, deems it fit while confirming his conviction for A
the other offences and the sentences therefor to bring
down the sentence from life imprisonment to what is
undergone by him. [Para 56) [353-A-H; 354-A-G]
6. The case of A-30 more or the less is identical with
8
A-25. As per the prosecution version, this accused had
filled the liquor supplied by A-4 through A-5 and A-10 in
covers and on the fateful night (on 20.10.2000), he carried
the same in Car to the residence of A-39 and she, in turn,
sold the same to the customers. The evidence of PW-153
is clear enough, who complained that the liquor was C
found to be stronger and when he asked what the matter
was, it was pressed by A-39 that the liquor was supplied
by A-30. In fact, as per the evidence of PW-153, he had
himself found A-30 bringing the liquor. Similar is the
evidence of PW-154 who felt uneasy after drinking the D
liquor; He was required to be hospitalized. Even he has
deposed that A-39 used to sell the liquor which was
supplied to her by A-30 and A-31. He has also seen the
liquor being supplied. In fact, he also spoke about the
happenings on 20.10.2000. PW-164, the father of A-39 had
E
also consumed the liquor and he also suffered. He also
established the connection of A-30. Thus, there is enough
evidence to establish that on the fateful day, A-30
accompanied by A-31 supplied three bundles of
covers, each having 100 covers. He has made a
F
disclosure statement that alcohol was poured in the
closet of a latrine recently constructed on the eastern side
of the Senior Orthodox Church. The liquid in this closet
which was having smell of liquor was collected and it was
established that it contained methyl alcohol. M.O. 256 is G
the sample while Exhibit P1001 is the chemical analysis
report. There can be no dispute that there is enough
evidence to show that A-30 was involved in the
procurement of liquor from A-4. He then packed it in the
covers and supplied to A-39. The High Court did not find
H
292
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011) 8 S.C.R.
A him guilty under Section 304 or Section 307, IPC. Instead,
the High Court booked him for offence under Section
57A(2)(ii), Section 55(a), (h) and (i) and Section 58 of the
Abkari Act. The contention raised that his conviction
should not be maintained under Section 57A(2)(ii) as he
B did not have knowledge and he was not concerned with
the preparation of the spurious liquor is liable to be
rejected on the same reasoning as given for rejecting the
similar contentions raised on behalf of A-25. The role
played by both is almost the same. The contention raised
c that he could have been booked only under Sections
55(a), (h) and (i) and under Section 58, is also rejected.
The statement made that this accused was also behind
the bars for more than 10 years, was not seriously
disputed on behalf of the Government. Therefore, his life
0 imprisonment is set aside and brought down to that
already undergone by him. The appeal filed by A-30 is
dismissed with the modification in the sentenc·e as
indicated. [Para 58] [355-C-H; 356-A-H; 357-A]
7. This Court is not only perturbed by the
E enormousness of the tragedy but the enormousness of
the liquor trade run by A-7 and that was under the socalled vigilant eyes of those who had duty to stop it. The
avarice is not only on the part of the accused persons,
but also on the part of those who benefit from this horrible
F business. It is hoped and expected that the Kerala
Government takes up this issue and takes definite steps
for overhauling the system. It will be, therefore, for the
administrators and the Government to take positive steps,
firstly, to overhaul the system by weeding out the
G corrupts by punishing those who are responsible for the
whole system looking sideways. This Court is not aware
as to whether such an exercise is taken up, but if it has
not been taken up the government is directed to take
such steps. [Para 59) [357-E-H; 358-A]
H
CHANDRAN @ MANICHAN @ MANIYAN v. STATE 293
OF KERALA
State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George 1965 (1)
A
SCR 123; State of Gujarat v. Acharya D.