# CHANDRASEKHAR SINGH & ORS v. SIYA RAM SINGH & ORS

- **Citation:** [1979] 1 S.C.R. 947
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1978-09-26
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 14S of 1977
- **Bench:** Jaswant Singh, P. S. Kailasam, A. 0. Koshal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/chandrasekhar-singh-ors-v-siya-ram-singh-ors-7550
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Code of Criniinal Procedure, 1898-Section
146-The
fin<;ing
of
the
Civil Court under this Section as to possession is final.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, Sections 435 & 439-Revisional powers
of the High Court-High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact of the
Ci11il Court in a proceeding under s. 146 Criminal P.C.-Con~·tiuaion of India,
1950 Art. 2~7-Power of superintendence cf the High Court is limited.
In the 145 proceedings converted from the 144 proceedings on a. police
eport dated 29-2-1968, both the appellants-second parties and the respondents
first parties claimed title as well as possession of the disputed land with them
nd filed in support documents and several affidavits.
The magistrate referred
he rnatte1. to the Civil Court for a fiilding on the issue. On a consideration of
he materials placed before him, the munsif by an order dated 22-12-1975 found
that the appellants-scccnd parties were in possession.
The magistri.lti! passed
an order dated 7-4-1976 in accordance with the findings on the issue as to
possession by the munsif holding that the appellants-second parties were in
possession.
The High Court in revision under sections 435 and 439 of. the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, was of the view that the finding as to possession
on th~ basis of documents alone without mpplying the mind to the affidavits
cannot be sustained and set aside the orders passed by the magistrate.
AJiowing the appeal by special leave, the Court.
IlELD: (1) The finding of the Civil Court given under s. 146(18) of the
1898 Code regarding possession is final and cannot be challenged by way of
ai)peal. review or revision, though the Civil Court acting under section J 46
(IA) and (IB) of the Criminal Procedure Code has not ceased to be ~ Civil
A
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Court.
Neither an appeal nor a revision lies agairut the finding of the Civil
F
Court in the reference because of the express provision in section 146(10) and
not because the proceeding before the Civil Court is not a civil proceeding
[95IC-D, EJ
Sra!e of U.P. v. Ra1nachandra Aggarwal [1966J Supp. SCR 393 followed.
(2) An order passed by the magistrate in conformity with the decision of
the Civil Court ca~not be challenged under sections 435 and 439 of the code.
Sub-section (lB) requires the magistrate on receipt of the findings by the Civil
Court to proceed and dispose of the proceedings under s. 145 in conformity
with the decision of the Civil Court. If the order of the magistrate is in conformity with the decision of the Civil Court, the magistrate will be complying
with the requirements of section 146 (lB) and the order thus passed ca-nnotDC
challenged. It win of course be open to the High Court to interfere if the order
of the magistrate is not in conformity with the· finding of the Civil Court. When
the order of the magistrate is in conformity with the finding of the Civil Court,
the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere under sections 435 and 439 of
G
II
948
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 1 s.c.R.
A
the Criminal Procedure Code.
When there is an express provision namely, subsection (lD) in the Code against the challenge of the finding of the C1vil Court,.
other provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be relied on for doing.
what is expressly prohibite<I.
[952A-D]
B
c
(3) The powers conferred on the High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution =t in any way be curtailed by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.
Therefore the powers of the High Court under Art. 227 of the
Consti~uti0'.11 can be invoked iri spite of the restrictions placed under s. 146 {TD>
of the Criminal Procedure Code. [952D-E]
But the scope of interfere\lce by the High Court under Art 227 is restricted
to seeing that the tribunal functions within its limits of authority.
The· power
of superintendence cannot be invoked to correct the error of fact which only a
superior Court can do in exercise of its statutory power as the Court of appeal
and that the High Court cannot in exercise of i

## Text

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947
CHANDRASEKHAR SINGH & ORS.
v.
SIYA RAM SINGH & ORS.
September 26, 1978
[JASWANT SINGH, P. S. KAILASAM AND A. 0. KOSHAL, JJ.]
Code of Criniinal Procedure, 1898-Section
146-The
fin<;ing
of
the
Civil Court under this Section as to possession is final.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, Sections 435 & 439-Revisional powers
of the High Court-High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact of the
Ci11il Court in a proceeding under s. 146 Criminal P.C.-Con~·tiuaion of India,
1950 Art. 2~7-Power of superintendence cf the High Court is limited.
In the 145 proceedings converted from the 144 proceedings on a. police
eport dated 29-2-1968, both the appellants-second parties and the respondents
first parties claimed title as well as possession of the disputed land with them
nd filed in support documents and several affidavits.
The magistrate referred
he rnatte1. to the Civil Court for a fiilding on the issue. On a consideration of
he materials placed before him, the munsif by an order dated 22-12-1975 found
that the appellants-scccnd parties were in possession.
The magistri.lti! passed
an order dated 7-4-1976 in accordance with the findings on the issue as to
possession by the munsif holding that the appellants-second parties were in
possession.
The High Court in revision under sections 435 and 439 of. the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, was of the view that the finding as to possession
on th~ basis of documents alone without mpplying the mind to the affidavits
cannot be sustained and set aside the orders passed by the magistrate.
AJiowing the appeal by special leave, the Court.
IlELD: (1) The finding of the Civil Court given under s. 146(18) of the
1898 Code regarding possession is final and cannot be challenged by way of
ai)peal. review or revision, though the Civil Court acting under section J 46
(IA) and (IB) of the Criminal Procedure Code has not ceased to be ~ Civil
A
B
c
D
E
Court.
Neither an appeal nor a revision lies agairut the finding of the Civil
F
Court in the reference because of the express provision in section 146(10) and
not because the proceeding before the Civil Court is not a civil proceeding
[95IC-D, EJ
Sra!e of U.P. v. Ra1nachandra Aggarwal [1966J Supp. SCR 393 followed.
(2) An order passed by the magistrate in conformity with the decision of
the Civil Court ca~not be challenged under sections 435 and 439 of the code.
Sub-section (lB) requires the magistrate on receipt of the findings by the Civil
Court to proceed and dispose of the proceedings under s. 145 in conformity
with the decision of the Civil Court. If the order of the magistrate is in conformity with the decision of the Civil Court, the magistrate will be complying
with the requirements of section 146 (lB) and the order thus passed ca-nnotDC
challenged. It win of course be open to the High Court to interfere if the order
of the magistrate is not in conformity with the· finding of the Civil Court. When
the order of the magistrate is in conformity with the finding of the Civil Court,
the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere under sections 435 and 439 of
G
II
948
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 1 s.c.R.
A
the Criminal Procedure Code.
When there is an express provision namely, subsection (lD) in the Code against the challenge of the finding of the C1vil Court,.
other provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be relied on for doing.
what is expressly prohibite<I.
[952A-D]
B
c
(3) The powers conferred on the High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution =t in any way be curtailed by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.
Therefore the powers of the High Court under Art. 227 of the
Consti~uti0'.11 can be invoked iri spite of the restrictions placed under s. 146 {TD>
of the Criminal Procedure Code. [952D-E]
But the scope of interfere\lce by the High Court under Art 227 is restricted
to seeing that the tribunal functions within its limits of authority.
The· power
of superintendence cannot be invoked to correct the error of fact which only a
superior Court can do in exercise of its statutory power as the Court of appeal
and that the High Court cannot in exercise of its J\Jrisdiction under Art. 227
convert itself into a Court of appeal.
[952F, G, 953A]
Wtlryarn Singh v. An1ar Nath [1954] SCR 56; 1\'agendra Nath Bora & Anr.
v. Commissioner of Hills Division, and Appeals, Assam & Ors.,
[1958]
SCR
1240; Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarts, AIR 1975
SC
1297
reiterated.
D
Raja Singh v. Mahendra Singh, AIR 1963 Patna 243; Dewani Choudhary &
Ors. v. Chaturi Manjhi & Ors. 1971 B,L.J.R. 116; Farzand Aii v. Shaukat AU
& Ors., AIR 1971 All. 12; discussed.
In the instant case, the Civil c·ourt has taken into account the affidavits filed
on behalf of the parties and rejected them on finding that no weight could be
given to the affidavits having been sworn by persons who were interested and
E
belonged to one party or the other.
[953D-E]
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OBSERV AT/ON :
[In view of the coming into force of the Cr. P.C. 1973 (Act II of 1974)
and the amendment of Art. 227 of the Constitution by the 42nd Amendment, the question as dealt with in the Judgment will not any longer
arise.]
.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 14S
of 1977.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
10-1-77 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Revision No. 765 of
1976.
R. K. Jain, R. L. Singh, R. P. Singh and Rajeev Datta for the
Appellants.
Lal Narayan ·Sinha and M. P. Iha for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KAILASAM, J.
This appeal is by special leave by the second party
in Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code proceedings against the
judgment of the Patna High Court in Criminal Revision No. 765 ot
1976.
!
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CHANDltASEKHAR v. SIYA RAM (Kailasqm, !.)
94 9
On receipt of a Police Report dated 29-2-1968, proceedings under
Section 144 ol the Criminal Procedure Code were started on 18-3-1968.
The appellants in this Court are the Second Party and the respondents
tho Fmt Party. The proceedings were converted into one under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code and the lands in dispute were
attached on 14-5-1968. Both the parties claimed title as well as possession of the disputed land with them.
The First Party, respondents,
filed their documents and nine affidavits in support of their claims
while the appellants, Second Party, filed several documents and 12
affidavits in support of their case.
The Magistrate on a consideration
of the material placed before him found himself unable to decide as to
which of the parties had been in possession of the disputed land, and
referred the matter to the civil court for a finding on the issue. On
·a consideration of the materials placed before him the Munsif by an
order dated 22-12-1975 found that the appellants, Second Party, were
in possession and sent back the records to the Magistrate for disposal
according to law.
The Magistrate passed an order dated 7-4-1976 in
accordance with th$ finding on the issue as to possession by the Munsif,
holding that the appellants, Second Party were in possession.
Aggrieved by the order of the Magistrate, the First Party filed a
Revision Petition to the High Court.
The High Court found that the
Munsif had failed to consider the affidavit of either party but decided
the question of possession only on the documents.
As the Munsif
failed to consider the affidavits, the High Court was of the view that
the finding as to possession on the basis of documents alone without
applying its mind to the affidavits, can_not be sustained.
The appellants, Second Party, being aggrieved. by the order has come up to this
Court by special leave.
The questions that arise for consideration in this appeal are (l)
whether the finding of Civil Court under section 146 (lB) can be
challenged by way of an appeal or by review or revision, (2) whether
an order which is passed by the Magistrate on the receipt of the finding
of the Civil Court, in conformity with the decision of the Civil Court,
can be challenged before the High Court under Sections 435 and 439
of the Criminal Procedure Code, and (3) whether an order passed by
the Magistrate under Section 146 (lB) can be interfered with by the
High Court in exercise of its powers under Article 22 7 of the Constitution of India.
There is confiict of views between various High Courts regarding
the points raised.
We would content ourselves by referring to three
full bench decisions wherein the decisions of all the High Courts are
referred to.
The two full Bench decisions of the Patna High Court
8-699SCT/78
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] l s.c.R.
A
are reported in AI.R. 1963 Patna 243 (Raja Singh v. Mahendra
Singh), Dewani Choudhary and Ors.
v.
Chaturi Manjhi and Ors.
(1971 B.L.J .R. p. 116): The full Bench decision of the Allahabad
High Court is reported in A.LR. 1971 Allahabad p. 12 (Farzana Ali v.
~
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Shaukat Ali & Ors.
In Raja Singh v. Mahendra Singh (supra), the Full Bench of the
Patna High Court by a majority of 2 to 1 held that in exercise of
its revisional powers under Sections 435 and 439 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, the High Court can, in suitable cases, interfere
with the decision of the Civil Court given by it under sub-Section
(1-A) upon a reference made to it under sub-Section (1) of Section
146 of the Code after the referring Magistrate has disposed of the
proceeding under Section 145 under sub-Section (1-B), and that the
bar as to appeal, review and revision imposed by sub-Section ( 1-D)
operates only so long as the Magistrate has not passed his order under
sub-section (1-B) of Section 146.
The majority view on the other
hand, is that the bar of sub-Section (1-D) continues even after the
Magistrate has disposed of the proceeding under sub-Section (lDJ.
All the three learned Judges constituting the Full Bench however,
agreed that nothing in sub-Section (1-D) affects the power of superintendence which the High Court enjoys under Article 227 of the Constitution.
The correctness of this decision was considered by a full
Bench of five Judges in the Dewani Choudhary's case (supra).
The
Full Bench upheld the unanimous view in Raja Singh's case (supra)
that sub-Section (1-D) does not take away the power of judicial interference which the High Court possesses under Article 227 of the Constitution with the decision of the Civil Court given under sub-Section
(IA) of Section 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code in cases involving
flagrant violation of legal principles or principles of natural justice.
The second qu6stion that was considered in Choudhary's case was
whether the High Court was competent to i.nterfere with the findings
of the Civil Court under Section (lA) of Section 146 in the exercise
of its powers of criminal revision; the Full Bench held that there is
no scope for interference with the findings of the Civil Court in exercise
of the criminal revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, not by reason
of the bar enacted in sub-Sec. (lD) of Section 146, but upon ths
express term of Sections 435 and 439 of the Code.
The power of the
High Court is confined against the final order which the Magistrate
is enjoined to pass in conformity with the decision of the Civil Court.
In doing so, the High Court can examine whether the Magistrate passed
the final order in conformity with the decision of the Civil Court o~
not.
But it cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the legality or
•
CHANDRASEKHAR v. SIYA RAM (Kailasam, !.)
951
~-
propriety of the decision of the Civil Cour~ which is the basis of the
A
Magistrate's final order. On this question the full Bench did
not
,
accept the majority view in Raja Singh's case (supra).
•
The Allahabad High Court (AfR 1971 All. 12 FB-Supra)
considering the question whether the bar contemplated under Section
146 (lB) is a bar against the finding being interfered with in revisicm
even against the order of the Magistrate who decides the proceeding
before him in accordance with the finding of the Civil Court, held
that even in revision from the ultimate order which disposes of
Y,
!he proceedings in accordance with the findings of the Civil Court, the
finding of the Civil Court cannot be interfered with.
An examination of the provisions of Section 146 of Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 would show that the finding of the Civil Court on
a reference by the Magistrate regarding possession cannot be appealed
against or challenged by way of review or revision.
Thoiigh the Civil
Court acting under Section 146 (lA) and (lB) of Criminal Procedure Code, has not ceased to be a Civil Court, the finding regarding
possession given by the Civil Court cannot be challenged by an appeal,
revision or review.
In other words, the finding given by the Civil
Court is final.
This Court in State of U.P. & Anr. v. Ramchandra
Aggmwal and Anr. (') held that neither an appeal nor a revision lies
against the finding of the Civil Court in the reference because of. the
express provision in Section 146 ( lD) and not because the proceeding
before the Civil Court is not a civil proceeding.
The wording of
Section 146 (lD) puts the matter beyond any
controversy.
SubSection (ID) reads as follows:-
"No appeal shall lie from any finding of the Civil Court
given on a reference under this Section nor shall any review
or revision of any such finding be allowed".
--\. The sub-Section makes it clear that the finding of the Civil Court cannot
be questioned by way of an appeal. It also prohibits any cblillmge
to the finding by way of review or revision.
The answer therefore to
'
the first question is that the finding of the civil court given under s,...,e_
tion 146 (lB) regarding possession is final and cannot be challenged
•
· by way of appeal, review or revision .
The second question that arises is whether when the Magistrate
passes an order on receipt of a finding, from the civil court that order
can be challenged by way of revision before the High Court. . The
plea that was put forward was the bar to the challenge of the finding·
of the civil court is lifted when the Magistrate passes his order after
(!) [1966] Suppl. S. C. R. 393.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] l s.c.R.
the receipt of the finding of the civil court. Sub-section ( lB) requires
tho Magistrate on receipt of the findings by the civil court to proceed.
and dispose of the proceedings under Section 145 in conformity with,
the decision of the civil court. If the order of the Magistrate is in
conformity with the decision of the civil court, the Magistrate will be
complying with the requirements of Section 146 (lB) and the order
thus passed cannot be challenged. It will of course be open to the
High Court to interfere if the order of the Magistrate is not in conformity with the finding of the civil court.
When the order of the
Magistrate is in conformity with the finding of the civil court, the
,
High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere under Sections 435 and. 'f
439 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
When there is an express provision sub-Section ( lD) in the Code against the challenge of the findfn/~
of the civil court other provisions of the Criminal Procedure Cod·e
cannot be relied on for doing what is expressly prohibited. The
answer therefore to the second question is that an order passed by the·
Magistrate under Section 146 ( lB) in conformity with the decision of
the civil court cannot be challenged under Sections 435 and 439.
The only other question that remains to be considered is wheth,!r·
an order under Section 146 (lB) can be interfered with by the Hi1~h
Court in the exercise of its powers under Article 227 of the Constiiution. It is admitted that the powers conferred on the High Court
under Art. 227 of the Constitution cannot in any way be curtailed
by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.
Therefore, the
powers of the High Court under Art. 22 7 of the Constitution can be
invoked in spite of the restrictiorts placed under Section 146(1D) of
the Criminal Procedure Code.
But the scope of interference by the
High Court under Art. 227 is restricted.
This Court has repeatedly
held that "the power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is t<>
be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order fo __ )"
keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and
not for correcting mere errors vid.e 1954 S.C.R. 565 (Waryam Si,igh
\
v. Amar Nath). In a later decision, (Nagendra Nath Bora and anol'her
,
v.
The Commissioner of Hills Division, and Appeals, Assam
~lili
Others( 1), the view was reiterated and it was held that the power of
judicial interference under
Article 227 of the Constitution are not
•
greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution, and
that under Art. 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is
limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its
~·
authority. In a recent decision,
(Babhutmal Raichand Oswal
v.
Laxmibai R. Tarts( 2 )
this Court reiterated the view stated in tb.e
(I) [1958] S. C. R. 1240.
(2) A. I. R. 1975 S. C.1297,
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CHANDRASEKHAR v; SIYA RAM (Kailasam, J.)
953
<earlier decisions referred to and held that the power of superintendence
under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot be invoked to s;orrect an
error of fact which only a superior court can do in exercise of its
statutory power as the Court of appeal and that the High Court cartnot
in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 227 convert itself into a court
-0f appeal.
The High Court has interfered with the order of the Magistl"ate
which is in conformity with the finding of the civil court regarding
possession on the ground that the civil court has failed to consider
the affidavits filed by the parties.
The High Court ori a reading of a
passage in the judgment of the civil court came to the conclusion that
the Munsif failed to consider the affidavits.
In dealing with thei affidavits, the civil court observed that as persons who had sworn to the
caffidavits, are highly interested persons, undue importance cannot be
attached upon their oath.
After referring to the person on both sides,
who had sworn to the affidavits, the civil court stated that "I do riot
think that these affidavits and counter-affidavits will be of any help to
-either party".
We find that the civil court has taken into account the
affidavits filed on behalf of the parties but as the persons who had
·sworn to the affidavits were interested and belonged to one party or
the other, it found that no weight can be given to the affidavits. We
-do not agree that the rejection of the affidavits under the circumstances
'Can be termed as failure to consider the affidavits.
Apart from finding
that the reason given by the High Court is not convincing, we are of
1lpinion that the High Court has no power under Sections 435 and
439 of the Criminal Procedure Code to interfere with the findings ofl
the civil court regarding possession in a reference under Section 146
Qf the Criminal Procedure Code. In the result we hold that the High
Court was in error in invoking Sections 435 and 439 for interferins
with the finding of the civil court. In fact,
Mr. Lal Narain Sinha,
learned counsel appearing for the respondent, with his usual fairness
conceded that he cannot contend that the High Court can in exercise
of its power under Sections 435 and 439 interfere with the finding of
the civil court regarding possession.
But Mr. Lal Narain Sinha submitted that the order of th~ High
Court could be sustained as the power of the High Court under Art.
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227 cannot be questioned.
While there could be no dispute that the
·power of the High Court under Art. 227 cannot be curtailed under
Section 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code, we do not thirik that
H
the facts of the case would justify the High Court to interfere under
Art. 227.
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[1979] 1 s.c.R.
Before concluding the judgment, we may point out that Section 14(;.
of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, is no longer in force having
been replaced by the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973 (Act 2 of
1974). Under the new Section, 146(1), if the Magistrate is unable
to satisfy himself as to which of the parties was in possession of the
subject of dispute he may attach the subject of dispute until a competent Court has determined the rights of the parties thereto with regard
to the person entitled to the possession thereof.
Art. 227 has also
been since amended by 42nd Amendment further restricting the powets
of the High Court to interfere under Art. 22 7.
The question thus
dealt with by us can no longer arise :ifter the coming into force of
the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act 2 of 197 4) . In the result the
appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court is set aside and
that of the Magistrate is restored.
S.R.
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