# CHANDRASINGH MANIBHAI AND OTHERS v. SURJIT LAL LADHAMAL CHHABDA AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1951] 1 S.C.R. 221
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1948-02-13
- **Case number:** CIVIL APPELLATE JuR1sD1cnoN: Appeal <Civil Appeal No. 57 of 1950
- **Bench:** PATANJALI SAsTRI, Mehr Chand Mahajan, MuKHERJEA
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/chandrasingh-manibhai-and-others-v-surjit-lal-ladhamal-chhabda-and-others-76
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control AN
(LV/l of 1947), ss. 12, Sri-Application of Act to appealr pending
when Act came into force-Retrospec/ive operation of Act, ertent
of-Construction of ss, 12 and 50.
The Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control
Act, LVII of 1947, which came into force on the 13th February,
1948, has no application to appeals which were pending at the
time
when the Act came into force.
Its retrospective effect is
limited to cases mentioned in s. 50 of the Act, that is to say to
suits and proceedings
which were transferred under the provi·
sions of the said section to the courts having purisdiction under
the Act.
Section 12 of the said Act is in terms prospective and not
retrospective in effect.
Sub-section (2) relates to suits which may
be instituted after the Act comes into force and sub-s. (3)
also
only applies to such suits.
Nilkanth v. Rasiklal (A.I.R. 1949 Born. 210) approved.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JuR1sD1cnoN:
Appeal
<Civil
Appeal No. 57 of 1950) from a judgment and decree
of the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay dated 1st
April, 1948, in Appeal No. 365 of 1947
reversing a
judgment of the Joint
Civil fudge
at
Ahmedabad,
dated 14th October, 1947, in Suit No. 174 of 1945.
B.
Somaya
(lindra Lal,
with
him) for
the
appellants.
C. K. Daphtary (Sri Narain Andley, with him) for
the respondents.
1951. February 23.
The judgment of the Court was
delivered by
MAHAJAN J.-The appellants are owners of a- property known as "Bharat Bhuvan Theatre" at Ahmcdabad. The respondents are the lessees of the said theatre.
Th(' term of the lease was to expire on the 2nd
1951
Feb. 230
t95!
C/ifJwdrasingh
Manibhai and
Oth1rs
v.
Surjit Lal
Ladhamal
Chhabda and
Otlrtrt.
Mahajan].
222
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
December, 1945, unless the lessees gave to the landlords three months previous notice in writing of their
intention of exercising their option of renewal of the
lease for a further period of two years.
On the 13th
December, 1945, the appellants filed the suit out of
which this appeal arises for ejectment of the respondent• and for recovery of certain amounts. This suit was
decreed on the 14th October, 1947, on
the
following
findings : (1) that the respondents had not exercised the
option of the renewal of the lease according to the stipulations contained in the lease, (2) that they had committed breaches of the terms of the lease, and (3) that
they were not protected
by the Rent Restriction Act.
An enquiry was directed into the amount of mesne profits.
The respondents filed an appeal in the High
Court against the decree of the Joint Civil Judge on
the 10th November, 1947. The appeal was
heard by
a Bench of the High Court (Weston and Dixit JJ.) on
the 26th February, 1948, and was decided on the
1st
April, 1948.
The judgment and decree
of the Joint
Civil Judge were reversed and the plaintiff's suit was
dismissed. The High Court affirmed the finding of the
trial court on the first point and held in
agreement
with it that the respondents had not proved that they
gave three months previous notice in writing to
the
appellants for renewal of the lease as required
by
clause 4(2) of the lease. It reversed the finding of the
trial Judge on the
point that the
respondents had
committed breaches of the terms contained in clause 2
(20) of the lease. Finally, it reached the conclusion that
although the decree appeakd from was right on the
date it was made, yet in view of the altered circumstances created by reason of coming 'into operation of Act
L V_II of 1947 the appellants were not entitled to recovery of possession of the suit premises.
Being aggrievea by the judgment of the High Court, the appellants obtained a certificate and filed an appeal in this
court on the 7th March, 1949, and it is now before us
for decision.
It was contended before the High Court that the appeal being in the nature of a rehearing, it should be
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
223
decided in accordance· with· the provisions of Act LVII
of 19

## Text

S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
221
CHANDRASINGH MANIBHAI AND OTHERS
v.
SURJIT LAL LADHAMAL CHHABDA
AND OTHERS.
[PATANJALI SAsTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and
MuKHERJEA JJ.]
Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control AN
(LV/l of 1947), ss. 12, Sri-Application of Act to appealr pending
when Act came into force-Retrospec/ive operation of Act, ertent
of-Construction of ss, 12 and 50.
The Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control
Act, LVII of 1947, which came into force on the 13th February,
1948, has no application to appeals which were pending at the
time
when the Act came into force.
Its retrospective effect is
limited to cases mentioned in s. 50 of the Act, that is to say to
suits and proceedings
which were transferred under the provi·
sions of the said section to the courts having purisdiction under
the Act.
Section 12 of the said Act is in terms prospective and not
retrospective in effect.
Sub-section (2) relates to suits which may
be instituted after the Act comes into force and sub-s. (3)
also
only applies to such suits.
Nilkanth v. Rasiklal (A.I.R. 1949 Born. 210) approved.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JuR1sD1cnoN:
Appeal
<Civil
Appeal No. 57 of 1950) from a judgment and decree
of the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay dated 1st
April, 1948, in Appeal No. 365 of 1947
reversing a
judgment of the Joint
Civil fudge
at
Ahmedabad,
dated 14th October, 1947, in Suit No. 174 of 1945.
B.
Somaya
(lindra Lal,
with
him) for
the
appellants.
C. K. Daphtary (Sri Narain Andley, with him) for
the respondents.
1951. February 23.
The judgment of the Court was
delivered by
MAHAJAN J.-The appellants are owners of a- property known as "Bharat Bhuvan Theatre" at Ahmcdabad. The respondents are the lessees of the said theatre.
Th(' term of the lease was to expire on the 2nd
1951
Feb. 230
t95!
C/ifJwdrasingh
Manibhai and
Oth1rs
v.
Surjit Lal
Ladhamal
Chhabda and
Otlrtrt.
Mahajan].
222
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
December, 1945, unless the lessees gave to the landlords three months previous notice in writing of their
intention of exercising their option of renewal of the
lease for a further period of two years.
On the 13th
December, 1945, the appellants filed the suit out of
which this appeal arises for ejectment of the respondent• and for recovery of certain amounts. This suit was
decreed on the 14th October, 1947, on
the
following
findings : (1) that the respondents had not exercised the
option of the renewal of the lease according to the stipulations contained in the lease, (2) that they had committed breaches of the terms of the lease, and (3) that
they were not protected
by the Rent Restriction Act.
An enquiry was directed into the amount of mesne profits.
The respondents filed an appeal in the High
Court against the decree of the Joint Civil Judge on
the 10th November, 1947. The appeal was
heard by
a Bench of the High Court (Weston and Dixit JJ.) on
the 26th February, 1948, and was decided on the
1st
April, 1948.
The judgment and decree
of the Joint
Civil Judge were reversed and the plaintiff's suit was
dismissed. The High Court affirmed the finding of the
trial court on the first point and held in
agreement
with it that the respondents had not proved that they
gave three months previous notice in writing to
the
appellants for renewal of the lease as required
by
clause 4(2) of the lease. It reversed the finding of the
trial Judge on the
point that the
respondents had
committed breaches of the terms contained in clause 2
(20) of the lease. Finally, it reached the conclusion that
although the decree appeakd from was right on the
date it was made, yet in view of the altered circumstances created by reason of coming 'into operation of Act
L V_II of 1947 the appellants were not entitled to recovery of possession of the suit premises.
Being aggrievea by the judgment of the High Court, the appellants obtained a certificate and filed an appeal in this
court on the 7th March, 1949, and it is now before us
for decision.
It was contended before the High Court that the appeal being in the nature of a rehearing, it should be
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
223
decided in accordance· with· the provisions of Act LVII
of 1947 which came into force on the
13th
February,
1948, and not. in accordance with the provisions of the
Act in force at the time when the decree was passed by
the trial court. In other words, the contention was that
there having been a change in the law after the date
of the decree passed by the trial Judge. and before the
appeal was heard, the rights of the parties should be
determined in accordance with the law as it stood on
the date of the hearing of the appeal. The High Court
gave effect to this contention and set aside the decree
made for ejectment of the respondents.
Learned counsel for the appellants challenged the decision of the High Court before us on tliree grounds :
(1) that assuming that the appeal had to be
decided
by the High Court in accordance with the provisions
of Act L VII of 1947, the provisions of that Act had no
ap.elication
to
pending appeals
which
had
been
excluded from its ambit ; (2) that Act L VII of 1947
had been amended by Bombay Act - III of
1949
and that the
appeal pending
in
this
court should
be
decided
in
accordance with the provisions of
the
amended
Act which excluded pending appeals
from the purview of Act LVII of 1947 ; and
(3)
that the
High
Court wrongly
reversed the
trial
court's finding that the respondents had committed
oreaches of the terms contained
in
clause 2(20) of
the lease.
The learned counsel
for
the respondents
besides controverting the contentions raised on behalf
of the appellants
con~ended that both . the courts had
erred in holding that the respondents had not proved
that they exercised the option of renewal of the lease
ac.cording to the stipulations contained therein.
In our opinion the decision of the a!Jpeal
depends
solely on the construction of sections 12 and 50 of
Act L VII of 1947. The question to decide is whether
the Bombay Rents.
Hotel and Lodging House Rates
Control Act, L VII of 1947, which
was
enacted
on
the 19th January, 1948, and which came
into force
on
the 13th February,
1948, 11as. application
to
1951
-~
Chandrosingh
Manibhai anti
Others
.v.
Sarjit Lot
Ladha111al
Chhabda on4
.othm.
1951
Chandrasingla
Manibhai and
Ot hm
v.
Surjit Loi
Lodh4mal
Chha6da anti
Oth111.
Mahajan].
...
224
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
pending appeals or whether its retrospective
effect
is limited to cases mentioned in
section 50
of
the
Act.
The
point
whether
the
option
of
renewal
was
exercised
according
to
the
covenants
of the
lease is concluded by a concurrent finding of fact
and nothing that Mr. Daphthary said in support of his
contention in ariy way shake that finding.
The case
must therefore be decided on the assumption that the
respondents did not exercise the option given to them
under the lease for its renewal.
We are also not impressed with the argument of the learned counsel for
the appellants that the High Court wrongly
reversed
):he finding of the trial Judge on the point that the respondents committed breaches of the terms of the lease.
We should not however be taken to concur in all the reasons given by the High Court for reversing that finding.
Whether the High Court was right in holding that
the provisions of Act L VII of 1947 have application to
appeals pending at the time when that Act came into
force; the answer to this question depends on the construction to be placed on sections 12 and 50 of Act
L VII of 1947. Section 12 of the Act is in these terms :
"(1) A landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery
of possession of any premises so long
as
the
tenant
pays, or is ready and willing to pay, the amount of
the standard rent and
permitted increases, if any, and
observes and performs the other conditions of the tenancy, in so far as they arc consistent with the provisions of this Act.
(2) No suit for recovery of possession shall be instituted by a landlord against a tenant on the ground of
non-payment of the standard rent or permitted increases due, until the expiration of one month next after
notice in writing of the demand of the standard rent or
permitted increases has been served upon the tenant
in the manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer
of Property Act, 1882.
(3) No decree for eviction shall be
passed
in any
such •suit if, at the hearing of the suit, the tenant pays
or tenders in court the standard rent
or
permitted
increases then due together with the costs of the suit.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
225
Explanation-In any case where there is a dispute as
to the amount of standard rent or permitted increases
recoverable under this Act the tenant shall be deemed
to be ready and willing to pay such amount if, before
the expiry of the period of one month after notice referred to in sub-section (2), he makes an app1ication to
the court under sub-section (3) of section 11 and thereafter pays or tenders the amount or rent or permitted
increases specified in the order made by the court."
This is the substantive section giving protection
to
the tenant against ejectment.
Section 50 which occurs
in Pait IV dealing with miscellaneous matters is the
repeal section.
It repeals the Act of 1939 and the Act
of 1944, and while repealing these statutes it provides
as follows:-
"Provided that all suits
and
proceedings
(other
than execution proceedings
and
appeals)
between a
landlord and a tenant relating to ·the recovery or fixing
of rent or possession of any premises
to
which the
provisions of Part II apply and all suits and proceedings by a manager of a hotel or an owner of a lodging
house against a lodger for the recovery of chacges for,
or . possession of, the accommodation
provided
in
a
hotel or lodging house situate in an area to which Part
III applies, which are pending in any Court, shall he
transferred to and continued hefor.e the courts which
would have jurisdiction to try such suits or proceedings under this Act; and thereupon all the provisions of
this Act and the rules made thereunder shall apply to
all such suits and proceedi~gs.
· Provided further that-
( a) every order
passed
or
act
done
by
the
Controllers
under Part IV of the Bombay Rents, Hotel
Rates and Lodging
House Rates (Control) Act, 1944,
and every order O! act deemed llo have been passed or
done under that Part shall be deemed to have been
passed or done under this Act; and
(b) all proceedings pending before the
Controllers
under Part IV of that Act shall be transferred to and
continued before the Controllers appointe4 under this
19~1
Ch•ntlrasavli
Manibliai an'
Othirs.
v.
Surjit Lal
Ladhamal
Chha6da and
Others.
Mahajan].
..
1951
Chantlrasingh
Manibhai and
Othlrs
v.
Suriit Lal
Ladhamal
Chhabda ana
Others.
Mahajan].
•
226
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
Act :is if they were proceedings instituted before the
Controllers under this Act".
· The High Court held that section 50 merely provided
for transfer of pending suits and proceedings to courts
given jurisdiction under
the
Act to hear them and
that from its ambit execution proceedings and appeals
were excluded because no question could arise of the,ir
being transferred from one court to another and that
an appeal being a continuation of the suit and in the
nature of a re-hearing, the provisions of section 12
should be applied to pending appeals. The opinion expressed by the Division Bench
on
the
construction
of sections 12 and 50 of the Act was questioned in
Nilkanth v. Rasiklal('), and the matter was referred
to a
full
Bench.
The
Full Bench
overruled
the
decision reached by the Division Bench on the construction of section 50 and observed that it was clear
that in terms the provisions of the new Act and the
rules made thereunder are made to app1y only to such
suits and proceedings which are transferred under the
provisions of this section
and that
its
retrospective
effect is confined to what is expressly stated in section
50 of •the Act. We are in respectful agreement
with
the view expressed by the
Full
Bench.
On a plain
reading cf the language of sections 12 and 50 it seems
clear to us that the Act was given retrospective operation only to a limited extent and execution proceedings
and appeals were exclnded from this effect and were
to be governed by the provisions of the law in force at
the time when the decrees were passed.
The concluding words of section 50 "and thereupon all the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder shall
apply to all such
suits and proceedings" fully bear
out this construction.
Mr. Daphthary contended that
the whole object of section 50 was to make provision
for transfer of pending cases
to
courts which were
given jurisdiction under the Act to· hear them and the
section did not concern itself with the extent of the
retrospective operation of the Act, and that section 12
of the Act which gives protection to tenants should
en A. 1. R. 1949 Dom. 210.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
227
be construed as having retrospective effect.
In our
opinion this contention is not sound.
Section 50
cannot be described as a section providing merely for
transfer of pending cases to courts having jurisdiction
to deal with them. It is on the other hand a "repeal"
section in the new statute.
It repeals the two earlier
statutes, and while repealing them it provides that the
repeal shall not affect
"executions and appeals" and
that the provisions of the Act ·shall apply to all
pending suits which shall be transferred to ·the courts
having
jur~sdiction to hear them under section 28 of
the Act.
We are also inclined to agree with the view
of the Full Bench that section 12 is in terms prospective
and not retrospective.
Sub-section (2) clearly
relates to suits which may be instituted after the Act
comes into force.
It cannot apply
to
suits
which
were already pending when the Act was put on the
statute book.
Sub-section (3) which gives the right to
the tenant to pay or tender the rent at the hearing of
the suit only applies to those suits which may be
instituted after the Act comes into operation because
it in terms states "in such suit" and not "in any suit".
"Such suit" can only be a suit referred
to
in subsections (2) and (3) of section 12.
The result therefore is that, in our opinion, the High
Court erroneously applied the provisions of Act L VII
of 1947 to the appeal in this case and was wrorig
in allowing it on that basis. In this view of the case it
is unnecessary to deal with the alternative argument
of the learned counsel that this appeal should be
decided in accordance · with the provisions of Act III
of 1949. We accordingly set aside the decree of the
High Court dismissing the plaintiff's suit and restore
the decree of the trial Judge decreeing the plaintiff's
suit with costs.
Appeal allowed.
Agent for the appellants: /l[aunit Lal~
Agent or the respondants: Ra;inder Narain.
1951
Chandrasingh
· M anibhai and
Otlurs
v.
Surjit Lal
Latlhamal
Chhabtla and
Others,
Mahajan].