# CHARLES SOBRAJ v. THE SUPTD .• CENTRAL JAIL. TIHAR. NEW DELHI

- **Citation:** [1979] 1 S.C.R. 512
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1978-08-31
- **Case number:** Writ Petition No. 4305 of 1978
- **Bench:** V. R. Krishna Iyer, D. A. Desai, Chinnappa Reddy
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/charles-sobraj-v-the-suptd-central-jail-tihar-new-delhi-7588
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Pol11ers of the Supre1ne Court to interfere tO right the ll'rong and restore
the rule of law-Constitution of India 1950, Art. 136.
Funda11ze11tal Rights-Whether the prisoners can invoke their constitutional
rights under Part III of the Constitution-Prison justice and Art. 21 of the Constitution--Prison justice is a sort of solemn covenant running with the power of
the Court to sentence the accused-Judicial discretion vis-a-vis priso11 acllninis·
tration and p1 l~oners' rights, explained-Correctional confinen1e1tt and Court's.
jurisdiction.
The petitioner a convict having to serve two sentences of long imprisonment, plus record of one escape and one attempt of suicide and interpol
reports of many crimes abroad in addition to several cases pending in India
against him, through this writ petition contended that barbarity and inhuman·
trcatn1ent have been hurled at him and that intentional discrimination
has·
been his lot throughout and, therefore, sought the assistance of this Court for
directing the jail authorities to give him finer foreigners as companions, and
to re111ove him from a high security ward like Ward-I to a more relaxed \vard ..
by invoking the provisions of Artit:les 14, 19 and 21 of the Ccnstitntion.
Disn1issing the Writ Petition the Court,
HELD : ( 1) Imprisonment does not spell farewell to fundamental rights.
although, by a realistic re-appraisal, Courts will refuse to recognise the fulf
panoply of Part III of the Constitntion enjoyed by a free citizen. Whenever
fundamental rights are flouted or legislative protection ignored to any prisoner's
prejudice, this Court's writ will run breaking through stone \Valls and iron bars,
to right the wrong and restore the rule of law.
Then the parrot-cry of discipline \ViU not deter, of security will not scare, of discretion will not dissuade,
th~ judicial process. For if courts 'cave in' when great rights are gouged
\Vithin the sound-prOOf, sight-proof precincts of prison houses. where often dissenters and minorities are caged, Bastilles will be re-enacted.
\Vhen ]a\\' ends.
tyranny begins; and history whispers, iron has never been thtJ1 ans\\·er to the·
rights of men. [514 H, 515 A-BJ
(2) Art. 21 of the Constitution read with Art. i9(i)(d) an<l (5) is capable of wider application than the imperial mischief which ga.ve its birth and
must dral\' its meaning from the evolving standards of decency and dignity that
mark the progress of a mature society. Fair procedure is the soul of Art. 21f
reai;onableness of the' restriction is the· essence of Art. 19(5) and sweeping discretion degenerating into arbitrary discrimination is anathema for Art.
14.
Constitutional Karuna is thus injected into incarceratory strategy to
produce
prison justice. [515 C-Dl
Sunil Batra v. Delhi Adn1n. & Ors. and Charles Gur1anukl1 Sobraj v. State
of Delhi [1979] 1 SCR 392 referred to.
•
qIARlES SOBRAJ v. SUPDT. CENTRAL JAIL (Krishna Iyer, J.)
513
Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., [1964] 1 SCR 357; applied.
A
(3) P1ison justice implies Court's continuing duty and authority to ensure
that the judicial warrant which deprives a person of his life or Jiberty
i~ not
exceeded~ subverted or stultified. It is a sort ·of solemn covenant running with
the power to sentence. Where a prison practice or internal instruction pla~es
harsh restrictions on jail life, breaching guaranteed rights, the Court directly
comes in. Every prison stntence is a conditioned deprivation of life and liberty,
with civiliz.ed· norms built in and unlimited trauma interdicted. Jn this sense
judicial· policy of prison practices is
implied in the
sentenci~g power.
The
Criminal judiciary have thus a duty to guardian their sentencees and visit prisons
\\-·hen necessary.
The penological goals which may be rega-rded as reasonab1e
justification for restricting the right to move freely within the confines of a
penitentiary are now well settled. And if prisoners have title to Articles 19, 21
and 14 rights, subject to the limitations, there must be s

## Text

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512
CHARLES SOBRAJ
V.
THE SUPTD .• CENTRAL JAIL. TIHAR. NEW DELHI
August 31, 1978
[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, D. A. DESAI AND 0, CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J
Pol11ers of the Supre1ne Court to interfere tO right the ll'rong and restore
the rule of law-Constitution of India 1950, Art. 136.
Funda11ze11tal Rights-Whether the prisoners can invoke their constitutional
rights under Part III of the Constitution-Prison justice and Art. 21 of the Constitution--Prison justice is a sort of solemn covenant running with the power of
the Court to sentence the accused-Judicial discretion vis-a-vis priso11 acllninis·
tration and p1 l~oners' rights, explained-Correctional confinen1e1tt and Court's.
jurisdiction.
The petitioner a convict having to serve two sentences of long imprisonment, plus record of one escape and one attempt of suicide and interpol
reports of many crimes abroad in addition to several cases pending in India
against him, through this writ petition contended that barbarity and inhuman·
trcatn1ent have been hurled at him and that intentional discrimination
has·
been his lot throughout and, therefore, sought the assistance of this Court for
directing the jail authorities to give him finer foreigners as companions, and
to re111ove him from a high security ward like Ward-I to a more relaxed \vard ..
by invoking the provisions of Artit:les 14, 19 and 21 of the Ccnstitntion.
Disn1issing the Writ Petition the Court,
HELD : ( 1) Imprisonment does not spell farewell to fundamental rights.
although, by a realistic re-appraisal, Courts will refuse to recognise the fulf
panoply of Part III of the Constitntion enjoyed by a free citizen. Whenever
fundamental rights are flouted or legislative protection ignored to any prisoner's
prejudice, this Court's writ will run breaking through stone \Valls and iron bars,
to right the wrong and restore the rule of law.
Then the parrot-cry of discipline \ViU not deter, of security will not scare, of discretion will not dissuade,
th~ judicial process. For if courts 'cave in' when great rights are gouged
\Vithin the sound-prOOf, sight-proof precincts of prison houses. where often dissenters and minorities are caged, Bastilles will be re-enacted.
\Vhen ]a\\' ends.
tyranny begins; and history whispers, iron has never been thtJ1 ans\\·er to the·
rights of men. [514 H, 515 A-BJ
(2) Art. 21 of the Constitution read with Art. i9(i)(d) an<l (5) is capable of wider application than the imperial mischief which ga.ve its birth and
must dral\' its meaning from the evolving standards of decency and dignity that
mark the progress of a mature society. Fair procedure is the soul of Art. 21f
reai;onableness of the' restriction is the· essence of Art. 19(5) and sweeping discretion degenerating into arbitrary discrimination is anathema for Art.
14.
Constitutional Karuna is thus injected into incarceratory strategy to
produce
prison justice. [515 C-Dl
Sunil Batra v. Delhi Adn1n. & Ors. and Charles Gur1anukl1 Sobraj v. State
of Delhi [1979] 1 SCR 392 referred to.
•
qIARlES SOBRAJ v. SUPDT. CENTRAL JAIL (Krishna Iyer, J.)
513
Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., [1964] 1 SCR 357; applied.
A
(3) P1ison justice implies Court's continuing duty and authority to ensure
that the judicial warrant which deprives a person of his life or Jiberty
i~ not
exceeded~ subverted or stultified. It is a sort ·of solemn covenant running with
the power to sentence. Where a prison practice or internal instruction pla~es
harsh restrictions on jail life, breaching guaranteed rights, the Court directly
comes in. Every prison stntence is a conditioned deprivation of life and liberty,
with civiliz.ed· norms built in and unlimited trauma interdicted. Jn this sense
judicial· policy of prison practices is
implied in the
sentenci~g power.
The
Criminal judiciary have thus a duty to guardian their sentencees and visit prisons
\\-·hen necessary.
The penological goals which may be rega-rded as reasonab1e
justification for restricting the right to move freely within the confines of a
penitentiary are now well settled. And if prisoners have title to Articles 19, 21
and 14 rights, subject to the limitations, there must be some correlation between
depriviation of comfort and legitimate function of a correctional system.
[515 G. 516-E, F-G]
(4) Deterrence, both specific and general rehabilitation, and institutional
secmity are vital considerations. Compassion wherever possible and cruelty
only where inevitable is the art of correctional confinement. When prison policy
advanC¢S such a valid goal, the Court will not intervene officiously.
But when
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an inmate is cruelly restridted in a manner which supports no such relevant
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purpose, the restriction becomes unreasonable and arbitrary, and unconstitutionality is the consequence. Traumatic futility is obnoxious to pragmatic legality.
Sociai defence is the raison d'etre of the penal code and bears upon judicial
control over prison administration. If a whole atmosphere of constant fear
of violence, frequent torture and denial of opportunity to improve oneself i"I
crea:ed or if medical facilities and basic elements of care and comfort necessary to sustain life are refused, then also the humane jurisdiction of the Court
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will become operational based <>n Art. 19. [516 G-H, '17 D-E]
(5) Prisoners retain all rights enjoyed by free citizens except those
Jo~t
necessarily as an incident of confinement. Rights enjoyed by prisoners under
Arts 14, 19 and 21 though limited are not static and will rise to human heights
~·hen chalJengirig situations arise. [518 A-BJ
R .. C. Cooper v. Union of India, [1971] 1 SCR 512; Maneka Gandhi v.
F
Union vf India & Anr., [1978] 1 SCR 248, Mohammad Giasuddin v: State of
Andhra l'rades/i, [1978] 1 SCR 153; reiferred to.
(6) However, a prison system may make rational distinctions in making
assignments to inmates of vocationa1, educational and work opportunities available, but it is constitutionally impermissible to do.so without a functional classification system.
Courts cannot be critical of the administration if it nlakes a
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classification between dangerous prisoners and ordinary prisoners. A distinction
between the under trials and convicts is reasonable. In fact lazy relaxation
on se(:urity is a prof"'8ional risk inside a prison. [517 F, G, 519 B, C]
The petitioner being a foreigner cannot claim rights under Art. 19.
Moreover he is now a convict and is not in solitary confinement. I519 D]
OBSERV A.TlON:
[The Court must not rush in where· the jailor fears
country. may not make the priron boss the sole sadistic
to tread.
\Vhile the
arbiter of incarcerated
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514
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1979] 1 s:c.R.
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hu1na!1s, the community may be in no mood to handover central prisons to
be run by Courts.
Each instrumentaJity must function within its province.]
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ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 4305 of 1978.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution.
N. M. Ghatate and S. V. Deshpande. for the Petitioner
Soli !. Sorabjee, Adell. Sol. General and Girish Chandrn for
the
Respondent.
The Order of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA IYER, J.
A litigation with a social dimension, even
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in a blinkered adversary system, serves a larger cause than the limited
lis before the court. This petition, with non-specific reliefs, is one
such.
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Sobraj, the petitioner, by the frequency of his forensic
.:omplaints against incarceratory torture and Dr. Ghatate, his counsel,
by the piquancy of his hortative advocacy of freedom behind bars,
have sought to convert the judicial process from a constitutional
sentinel of prison justice-which, emphatically, it is-into a meticulous auditor-general of jail cells-which, pejoratively, it is notalthough, on occasions, 'thin partition do their bounds divide'. Often,
as here, the fountain of confusion in penitentiary
jurisprudonce
is
forgetfulness of fundamentals. Once the legal basics are stated, Sobraj,
with his disingenuous, finical grievances, will be out of court.
What arc the governing principles, decisionally set down by this
court in Batra and Sobraj? Has the court jurisdiction to . decide
prisoners' charges of violation of rights ? If it has, can it meddle with
the prison administration and its problems of security and discipline
from an 'innocent' distance 'I Put tersely; both the 'hands off' doctrine and the 'take over' theory have been rebuffed as untenable
extremes and a middle ground has been found of intervening when
constitutional rights or statutory prescriptions are transgressed to the
injury of the prisoner and declining where lesser matters of institutional order and man management, though irksome to some, are alone
involved.
Contemporary profusion of prison torture reports makes it necessary to drive home the obvious, to shake prison top brass from the
callous complacency of unaccountable autonomy within that walledoff world of human held incommunicado.
Whenever fundamental
rights are flouted or legislative protection ignored, to any prisoner's
prejudice, this Court's writ will run, breaking through stone walls
and iron ])ars, t<Y right the wrong and restore the rule of law. Then the
•
CHARLES SOBRAJ v. SUPDT. CENTRAL JAIL (Krish11<1 Iyer, J.) 515
parrot-cry of discipline will not deter, of security will not scare, of
discretion will not dissuade, the judicial process. For if courts 'cave in'
when great rights are gouged within the sound-proof,
sight-proof
precincts of prison houses, where, often, dissenters and minorities are
caged, Bastilles will be re-enacted. When law ends tyranny begins;
and history whispers, iron has never been the answer to the rights of
men. Therefore we affirm that imprisonment does not spell farewell
to fundamental rights although, by a realistic re-appraisal, courts will
refuse to recognise the full panoply of Part III enjoyed by a free
citizen.
This proposition was not contested by the learned
Additional
Solicitor General Sri Soli Sorabjee. Nor does its soundness depend,
for us, upon the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Art.
21, read with Art. 19(1) (d) and (5), is capable of wider application
than the imperial mischief which gave its birth and must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency
and dignity that
mark the progress of a mature society, as Batra and Sobraj have
underscored and the American Judges have highlighted. Fair procedure is the soul of Art. 21, reasonableness of the restriction is the
essence of Art. 19(5) and sweeping discretion
degenerating
into
arbilrary discrimination is anathema for
Art. 14.
Constitutional
karuna is thus injected into incarceratory strategy to produce prison
justice. And as an annotation of Art. 21, this Courli has adopted, in
Kharak Singh's case(') that expanded connotation of 'life' given by
Field, J. which we quote as reminder:
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"Something more than mere animal existence. The
inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs
and faculties by which life is enjoyed. The provision equally
prohibits the mutilation of the body by the amputation of
an arm or leg, or the putting out of an eye, or the destrucF
tion of any other organ of the body through which the soul
communicates with the outer world".
The next axiom of prison justice is the court's continuing duty
and authority to ensure that the judicial warrant which deprives
a
person of his life or liberty is not exceeded, subverted or stultified.
lt is a sort of solemn covenant running with the power to sentence.
The U.S. Courts have intensified their oversight of State penal
facilities reflecting a heightened concern with the extent to- which the
ills that plague so-called correctional institutions violate basic rights,
points out Edward S. Crowin.('). Although, the learned author, and,
-·-~----
{!) [1964J I SCR 357.
1'2) Supplement to Edward S. Corwin's
'The Constitution•
and What it
means Today; I 976 Edn. p. 245.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] J S.C.R.
indeed, the decisions show that reliance is placed
on the Eighth
Amendment, as we have earlier pointed out, the
same
sensitized
attention and protective process emanate from the humane provisions
of Part III of our Constitution.
Viewed differently, supJJO§ing a court sentences a person to simple
imprisonment or assigns him 'B' class treatment and the jail authorities unwittingly or vindictively put him under rigorous
imprisonment or subject him to 'C' class treatment, does it not show contempt
of the court's authority and deprivation of li11erty beyond a degree
validated by the court warrant ? Likewise, where a prisoner is subjected to brutality, exploiting the fact that he is helplessly within the
custody of the Jail Administration, does it not deprive the prisoner
of his life and liberty beyond the prescribed limits set by the court?
Yet again, where conditions within a prison are such that inmates
incarcerated th~rein will inevitably and necessarily become more
sociapathic than they were prior to the sentence, is not the court's
punitive purpose, charged with healing hope, stultified by the prison
authorities?
Of course, where a prison practice or internal instruction places harsh restrictions on jail life, breaching guaranteed rights,
ihe court directly comes in. Every prison sentence is a conditioned
deprivation of life and liberty, with civilised norms built in and unlimited trauma interdicted. In this sense, judicial policing of prison
practices is implied in the sentencing power. The Criminal judiciary
have tlms a duty to guardian their sentences and visit prisons when
necessary. Many of them do not know or exercise this obligation.
Another jurisdictional facet may be touched upon in view of the
widely worded relief sought to treat Sobraj 'in a human and dignified
manner, keeping in view the adverse effect. of his confinement upon
his mental and physical conditions'. The penologica\ goals which may
be regarded as reasonable jusiifieation for restricting the rigl1t to move
freely within the confines of a penitentiary are now well-settlep. And
if prisoners have title to Article 19, 21 and 14 rights, subject to the
limitation we have indicated, there must be some correlation between
deprivation of freedom and the legitimate functions of a correctional
system. It is now well-settled, as a stream of rulings of courts proves,
that deterrence, both specific and general, rehabilitation and instir
tutional security are vital considerations. Compassion wherever possi-·
ble and cmelty only where inevitable is the art of correctional confinement.
When prison policy advances such a valid goal, the court
will not inervene officiously.
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CHARLES SOBRAJ v. SUPDT. CENTRAL JAIL (Krishna Iyer, J.)517
This overall attitude was incorporated as a standard
by the
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American National Advisory Commission on Crimine Justice Standards and Goals :-
,, . . . . . . A rehabilitative purpose is or ought to be
implicit in every sentence of an offender unless
ordered
otherwise by the sentencing court".(')
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The U.S. Supreme Court summed up:
"In a series of decisions this court has held that.
even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end
can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative
abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means
for achieving tl1e same basic purpose."(')
But when an inmate is cruelly restricted in a manner which supports no such relevant purpose, the restriction becomes unreasonable
and arbitrary, and unconstitutionality is the consequence. Traumatic
futility is obnoxious to pragmatic legality.
Social defence
is
the
raison d'etre of the penal code and bears upon judicial control over
prison administration.
If a whole atmosphere of constant fear of
violence. frequent torture and denial
of opportunity
to improve
oneself is created or if medical facilities and basic elements of care
and comfort necessary to sustain life are refused
then
also
the
humane jurisdiction of the court will become operational based on
Art. 19: Other forms of brutal tmreasonableness and anti-rehabilitative
attitude violative of constitutionality may be thought of in a penal
system but we wish to lay down only a broad guideline tliat where
policies, with a 'Zoological touch', which do not serve valid penal
objectives are pursued in penitentiaries so as to inflict conditions so
unreasonable as to frustrate the ability of inmates to engage in rehabilitation, the court is not helpless. Hom;ver, a prison system may
make rational distinctions in making assignments to inmates of vocational, educational and work opportunities available hut it is constitutionally impermissible to do so without a functional
clas!ification
system. The mere fact tl1at a prisoner is poor or rich, high-born or
ill bred, is certainly irrational as a differential in a 'secular socialist
republic'. Since the petitioner charges the jail staff with barbaric and
inhuman treatment in prison we are called upon to delineate the
broad boundaries of _judicial jurisdiction vis-a-vis prison administration
and prisoner's rights.
(1) "To solve the age-old Problem of Crime" Roger Lanphear, J. D. p-19.
(2) Ibid p. 21
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] I S.C.R.
The court is reluctant to
intervene in the day-to-day
operation of the State penal system; but undue harshness and avoidable ·
tantrums, under the guise of discipline and security, gain no i111niunity frum court writs.
The reason is, prisoners
retain
all rights
enjoyed by free citizens except those lost necessarily as an incident
of confinement.
Moreover, the rights enjoyed by prisoners
under
Articles 14, 19 and 21, though limited, are not static and will rise
to human heiihts when challenging situations arise.
Cooper(')
an'!
Maneka Gandhi(') have thus compulsive conseguercc benignant to
prisoners.
The petitioner in the present case has contended
that
barbaric
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and inhuman treatment have been hurled at him and that intentional
discrimination has been his lot throughout.
These allegations invited us to examine the limits and purpose of judicial jurisdiction but
we have to apply the principles so laid down to the facts
of the
present case.
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Starry abstractions do not make sense except in the context of
concrete facts.
That is why we agree with the propositions of law
urged by Dr. Ghatate but disagree with the distre» and discrimination his client wails about.. True, confronted with cruel conditions
of confinement, the court has an expanded role.
True, the light to
life is more than mere animal existence, or vegetable subsistence.(')
True, the worth of the human person and dignity and divinity of
every individual inform articles 19 and 21 even in a prison setting.
True, constitutional provisions and municipal laws must be interpretc
ed in the light of the normative Jaws of nations, wherever possible
and a prisoner does not forfeit his Part III rights.
But what
are
the facts here ?
Charles Sobraj is no longer an under-trial, having to s~rve two
sentences of long imprisonment.
He is given all the amenities of
a 'B' class prisoner.
He goes on hunger strike but medical men
take care of him.
Ward I, where he is lodged, gives him the facilities of wards XIII and XIV where he wants to be moved.
He has
a record of one escape and one attempt at suicide
and
Interpol
reports of many crimes abroad.
There are several cases . pending in
India against him.
Even so, the barbarity of bar fetters inflicted
on him by a qualmless jail staff was
abandoned under
orders -of
this Court. Now. he seeks the other extreme of coddling as if a
jail were a country club or good hotel.
Give me finer foreigners as
companions, he demands. Don't keep convict cooks and warders as
(I) [1971]
I SCR 512.
(2) [1978] I SCR 248
(3) Mohammed Giasuddin v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [I 978] 1 SCR l SJ.
•
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CHARLES SOBRAJ V. SUPDT. CENTRAL JAIL (Krishna [yer, J.) 5 !!}
jailmates in my cell he rails. Remove me from a
high security . A
ward like Ward I to a more relaxed ward like Ward 14 or 13, he
solicits. These delicate and genteel requests from a prisoner with
his record and potential were turned down by the Superintendent
and the reasons for such rejection, based ou security, rules
and
allergy of other inmates to be his risky fellow-inmates
have been
stated on oath. We cannot be critical of the Administration if it
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makes
a classification between dangerous prisoners and ordinary
prisoners. In the present case, the Superintendent swears, and it is
undisputed, that the petitioner is not under solitary
confinement.
We further aver that a distinction between under-trials and convicts
is reasonable and the petitioner is now a convict. In fact, lazy relaxation on security is a professional risk inside a prison.
The court must not rush in where the jailor fears to tread. While
the country may not make the prison boss the sole sadistic arbiter
of incarcerated humans, the community may be in no mood to hand
over central prisons to be run by courts. Each instrumentality must
function withiu its proviuce.
We have no hesitation to hold
that
while Sobraj has done litigative service for prison reform, he has
signally failed to substantiate any legal iujury. We, therefore, dismiss the writ petition, making it clear that strictly speaking
the
petitioner being a foreigner cannot claim rights under Art. 19, but
we have discussed at some length the import of Articles 14, 19 and
21 because they are interlaced and in any case apply to
Indian
citizens.
S.R .
Petition dismissed.
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