# CHATIISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. CENTRAL ELECTRICITY REGULATORY COMMISSION AND ORS

- **Citation:** [2010] 4 S.C.R. 680
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2010-04-15
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 3378 of 2010
- **Bench:** G.S. Singhvi, Asok Kumar Ganguly
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/chatiisgarh-state-electricity-board-v-central-electricity-regulatory-commission-26693
- **Pages:** 35

## Headnote

Electricity Act, 2003:
s. 125, proviso - Appeal to Supreme Court - Period of
limitation - Application u/s 5 of Limitation Act for condonation
of delay of 160 days - HELD: Not maintainable - Electricity
Act is a special legislation within the meaning of s. 29(2) of
D Limitation Act - s. 5 of Limitation Act cannot be invoked for
entertaining an appeal filed against decision of Tribunal
beyond the period of 120 days as specified in s. 125 of
Electricity Act and its proviso -
There is no provision in
Electricity Act under which Supreme Court can entertain an
E appeal against an order of Tribunal after more than 120 days
- Limitation Act, 1963 - ss. 5 and 29(2).
Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (Procedure, form, fee
and record of proceedings) Rules, 2007:
F
rr. 94(2) and 98(2) rlw s. 125 of Electricity Act - Notice of
pronouncement of order of Tribunal and 'communication'
thereof- HELD: In view of r. 94(2), the date of pronouncement
as notified in the cause list shall be a valid notice of
pronouncement of the order - Once order is pronounced after
G being shown in cause list with title of the case and name of
the counsel, the same will be deemed to have been
communicated to the parties - Rule 98(2) read in conjunction
with s. 125, makes it clear that once the factum of
pronouncement of the order of the Tribunal is made known
H
680
CHATIISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C.E.R.C. 681
& ORS.
to the parties and they are given opportunity to obtain a copy A
thereof, the order will.be deemed to have been communicated
to the parties and the period of 60 days specified in the main
part of s. 125 will commence from that date - Electricity Act,
2003 - s.125 -
Interpretation of Statutes -
Contextual
interpretation.
B
Words and Phrases:
'Communication' as occurring in r. 98(2) of Appellate
Tribunal for Electricity (Procedure, Form, Fee and Record of
Proceedings) Rules, 2007 - Connotation of
C
The appellant-Chattisgarh State Electricity Board filed
the instant appeal on 24.12.2007 challenging the order of
the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity passed on 17.5.2007.
Along with the appeal, the appellant filed an application o
for condonation of 160 days' delay. It was stated in the
application that the appellant came to know about the
order in July, 2007; that the letter dated 7.6.2007 signed
by the Deputy Registrar of the Tribunal on 11.6.2007
informing the appellant that the matter was disposed of E
on 14.5.2007 could not be treated as communication in
accordance with the provisions contained in Chapter XVI
F
of the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (Procedure, Form,
Fee and Record of Proceedings) Rules, 2007.
Respondent No. 3, the Madhya Pradesh State Electricity
Board resisted the application contending that even
according to appellant's assertion that it came to know
about the order in July 2007, in the absence of any
explanation by the appellant for remaining silent from
July 2007 to December, 2007, the appeal could not be
G
entertained.
The questions for consideration before the Court
·were: (i) "Whether s.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be
invoked by the Supreme Court for allowing the aggrieved
person to file an appeal uls 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003
H
682
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 4 S.C.R.
A after more than 120 days from the date of communication
of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal for
Electricity?" and (ii) "What is the date of communication
of the decision or order of the Tribunal for the purpose
B
of s.125 of the Electricity Act?"
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The Electricity Act, 2003 is a selfcontained comprehensive legislation, which not only
regulates generation, transmission and distribution of
C electricity but also ensures creation of special
adjudicatory mechanism for expeditious adjudication of
disputes emanating from operation and implementation
of the provisions of the Act. The Act excludes the
jurisdiction of civil courts qua an order made by the
D adjudicating officer. Section 111

## Text

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A
B
c
[2010] 4 S.C.R. 680
CHATIISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD
V.
CENTRAL ELECTRICITY REGULATORY COMMISSION
AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 3378 of 2010)
APRIL 15, 2010
[G.S. SINGHVI AND ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, JJ.]
Electricity Act, 2003:
s. 125, proviso - Appeal to Supreme Court - Period of
limitation - Application u/s 5 of Limitation Act for condonation
of delay of 160 days - HELD: Not maintainable - Electricity
Act is a special legislation within the meaning of s. 29(2) of
D Limitation Act - s. 5 of Limitation Act cannot be invoked for
entertaining an appeal filed against decision of Tribunal
beyond the period of 120 days as specified in s. 125 of
Electricity Act and its proviso -
There is no provision in
Electricity Act under which Supreme Court can entertain an
E appeal against an order of Tribunal after more than 120 days
- Limitation Act, 1963 - ss. 5 and 29(2).
Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (Procedure, form, fee
and record of proceedings) Rules, 2007:
F
rr. 94(2) and 98(2) rlw s. 125 of Electricity Act - Notice of
pronouncement of order of Tribunal and 'communication'
thereof- HELD: In view of r. 94(2), the date of pronouncement
as notified in the cause list shall be a valid notice of
pronouncement of the order - Once order is pronounced after
G being shown in cause list with title of the case and name of
the counsel, the same will be deemed to have been
communicated to the parties - Rule 98(2) read in conjunction
with s. 125, makes it clear that once the factum of
pronouncement of the order of the Tribunal is made known
H
680
CHATIISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C.E.R.C. 681
& ORS.
to the parties and they are given opportunity to obtain a copy A
thereof, the order will.be deemed to have been communicated
to the parties and the period of 60 days specified in the main
part of s. 125 will commence from that date - Electricity Act,
2003 - s.125 -
Interpretation of Statutes -
Contextual
interpretation.
B
Words and Phrases:
'Communication' as occurring in r. 98(2) of Appellate
Tribunal for Electricity (Procedure, Form, Fee and Record of
Proceedings) Rules, 2007 - Connotation of
C
The appellant-Chattisgarh State Electricity Board filed
the instant appeal on 24.12.2007 challenging the order of
the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity passed on 17.5.2007.
Along with the appeal, the appellant filed an application o
for condonation of 160 days' delay. It was stated in the
application that the appellant came to know about the
order in July, 2007; that the letter dated 7.6.2007 signed
by the Deputy Registrar of the Tribunal on 11.6.2007
informing the appellant that the matter was disposed of E
on 14.5.2007 could not be treated as communication in
accordance with the provisions contained in Chapter XVI
F
of the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (Procedure, Form,
Fee and Record of Proceedings) Rules, 2007.
Respondent No. 3, the Madhya Pradesh State Electricity
Board resisted the application contending that even
according to appellant's assertion that it came to know
about the order in July 2007, in the absence of any
explanation by the appellant for remaining silent from
July 2007 to December, 2007, the appeal could not be
G
entertained.
The questions for consideration before the Court
·were: (i) "Whether s.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be
invoked by the Supreme Court for allowing the aggrieved
person to file an appeal uls 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003
H
682
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 4 S.C.R.
A after more than 120 days from the date of communication
of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal for
Electricity?" and (ii) "What is the date of communication
of the decision or order of the Tribunal for the purpose
B
of s.125 of the Electricity Act?"
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The Electricity Act, 2003 is a selfcontained comprehensive legislation, which not only
regulates generation, transmission and distribution of
C electricity but also ensures creation of special
adjudicatory mechanism for expeditious adjudication of
disputes emanating from operation and implementation
of the provisions of the Act. The Act excludes the
jurisdiction of civil courts qua an order made by the
D adjudicating officer. Section 111 provides for an appeal
against the order of the adjudicating officer or
appropriate commission to the Appellate Tribunal within
the period prescribed therein. Section 125 lays down that
any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the
E Tribunal can file an appeal to this Court within 60 days
from the date of communication of the decision or order
of the Tribunal. Proviso to s.125 empowers this Court to
entertain an appeal filed within a further period of 60 days
if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing
F appeal within the initial period of 60 days. This shows that
the period of limitation prescribed for filing appeals u/ss
111 (2) and 125 is substantially different from the period
prescribed under the Limitation Act for filing suits etc.
The use of the expression 'within a further period of not
G exceeding 60 days' in the proviso to s.125 makes it clear
that the outer limit for filing an appeal is 120 days. There
is no provision in the Act under which this Court can
entertain an appeal filed against the decision or order of
the Tribunal after more than 120 days. [Para 11) [696-H;
H 697-A-D]
CHATIISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C.E.R.C. & 683
ORS.
1.2. It is evident that the Electricity Act is a special
A
legislation within the meaning of s. 29(2) of the Limitation
Act. Therefore, s. 5 pf the Limitation Act cannot be
invoked by this Court for entertaining an appeal filed
against the decision or order of the Tribunal beyond the
period of 120 days specified in s.125 of the Electricity Act
B
and its proviso. Any interpretation of s. 125 of the
Electricity Act which may attract applicability of s.5 of the
Limitation Act read with s.29(2) thereof will defeat the
object of the legislation, namely, to provide special
limitation for filing an appeal against the decision or order c
of the Tribunal and proviso to s.125 will become
nugatory. [Para 11 and 16] [697-F; 703-C-E]
Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. L.N. Mishra (1974) 2 SCC
133; Union of India v. Popular Construction Company 2001
(3) Suppl. SCR 619 = (2001) 8 SCC 470; Mangu Ram v.
D
Municipal Corporation of Delhi 1976 (2) SCR 260 = (1976)
1 SCC 392; Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel 1964
SCR 129 = AIR 1964 SC 1099; Patel Naranbhai
Marghabhai v. Dhulabhai Galbabhai 1992 (3) SCR 384 =
(1992) 4 SCC 264; Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of E
Central Excise, Jamshedpur and others (2008) 3 SCC 70;
Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise v. Punjab Fibres
Ltd. 2008 (2 ) SCR 861 = (2008) 3 SCC 73; Commissioner
of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private
Limited and another (2009) 5 sec 791, relied on.
F
Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker
1995 (2) Suppl. SCR 1 = (1995) 5 sec 5, held
inapplicable.
2.1. The word 'communication' has neither been
G
defined in the Electricity Act, 2003 nor in the Appellate
Tribunal for Electricity (Procedure, Form, 'Fee and Record
of Proceedings) Rules, 2_002. Therefore, the same
deserves to be interpreted by applying the rule of
contextual interpretation and keeping in view the
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 4 S.C.R.
A language of the relevant provisions. In terms of Rule 98(2),
the Deputy Registrar is requfred to send the case file to
the Registry for taking steps to prepare copies of the
order and their communication to the parties. If Rule 98(2)
is read in conjunction with s. 125 of the Electricity Act, it
B becomes clear that once the factum of pronouncement
of order by the Tribunal is made known to the parties and
they are given opportunity to obtain a copy thereof, the
order will be deemed to have been communicated to the
parties and the period of 60 days specified in the main
c part of s.125 will commence from that date. Besides, r.
94(2) requires that when the order is reserved, the date
of pronouncement shall be notified in the cause list and
that shall be a valid notice of pronouncement of the order.
Once the order is pronounced after being shown in the
0 cause list with the title of the case and name of the
counsel, the same will be deemed to have been
communicated to the parties and they can obtain copy
through e-mail or by filing an application for certified
copy. [Para 18 and 19] [704-C-G; 705-D-E]
E
Assistant Transport Commissioner, Lucknow v. Nand
Singh 1980 (1) SCR 131 = (1979) 4 SCC 19, relied on.
Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land
Acquisition Officer 1962 SCR 676 = AIR 1961 SC 1500;
F Muthiaha Chettiar v. I. T. Commissioner, Madras AIR 1951
Madras 2004; Secretary of State v. Gopisetti Narayanasami
ILR 34 Madras 151; and Swaminatha v. Lakshmanan AIR
1930 Madras 490, referred to.
Collector of Central Excise, Madras v. Mis. M. M. Rubber
G and Co., Tamil Nadu 1991 (3) SCR 862 = (1992) Supp 1 SCC
471, distinguished.
2.2. In the instant case, even though the name of the
counsel for the appellant was not shown in the cause list
H of 14.5.2007 i.e., the date on which the impugned order
CHATIISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C.E.R.C. 685
& ORS.
was pronounc_ed by the Tribunal, the factum of A
'
I
pronouncement was conveyed by the Registry of the
Tribunal, which communication was received in the
secretariat of the appellant on 21.6.2007. The appellant
had come to know about the impugned order on
17.7.2007 from another source i.e., respondent No.5, s
which had sent communication for payment of FLEE
charges. Thus, on 21.6.2007 or at least on 17.7.2007, the
appellant had come to know of the order of the Tribunal
through proper channel. The preparation of appeal,
which bears the date 7.9.2007, is a clinching evidence of c
the fact that the appellant had not only become aware of
the order of the Tribunal, but had obtained copy thereof.
The appellant has not offered any tangible explanation as
to why the appeal, which was filed only on 24.12.2007,
could not be filed for more than three and half months 0
after its preparation. Thus, the appeal having been filed
after more than 120 days from the date of communication
of the Tribunal's order, cannot be entertained. [Para 24]
[713-B-H; 714-A-B]
Case Law Reference:
(1974) 2 sec 133
relied on
para 12
2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 619 relied on
para 13
1976 (2) SCR 260
relied on
para 13
1964 SCR 129
relied on
para 13
1992 (3) SCR 384
relied on
para 13
(2008) 3 sec 10
relied on
para 14
2008 (2) SCR 861
relied on
para 14
(2009) 5 sec 191
relied on
para 15
1995 (2) Suppl. SCR 1
held inapplicable
para 17
1962 SCR 676
referred to
para 20
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
686
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 4 S.C.R.
1980 (1) SCR 131
relied on
para 21
AIR 1951 Madras 2004
referred to
para 22
ILR 34 Madras 151
referred to
para 22
AIR 1930 Madras 490
referred to
para 22
1991 (3) SCR 862
distinguished
para 23
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
3378 of 2010.
From the Judgment & Order dated 17 .5.2007 of the
Appellate Tribunal for Electricity at New Delhi in I.A. No. 4 of
2007 in Appeal No. 21 of 2006.
Ravi Shankar Prasad, Suparna Srivastava, Ram Swarup
D Sharma for the Appellant.
E
C.S. Vaidyanathan, Sakesh Kumar, K.V. Bharathi
Upadhyaya for the Responde:'lt.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G.S. SINGHVI, J. 1. Whether Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 (for short, 'the Limitation Act') can be invoked by this
Court for allowing the aggrieved person to file an appeal under
Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 (for short, 'the Electricity
F Act') after more than 120 days from the date of communication
of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity
(for short, 'the Tribunal') is the question which requires
determination in this appeal filed against order dated 17.5.2007
passed by the Tribunal in I.A. No.4 of 2007 in Appeal No.21 of
G 2006.
2. Appellant, Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board was
established under Section 58 of the M.P. Reorganization Act,
2000. In a sense, it is a successor of Madhya Pradesh
Electricity Board insofar as the State of Chhattisgarh is
H concerned. A dispute arose between the appellant and
CHATIISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C.E.R.C. & 687
ORS. [GS. SINGHVI, J.]
respondent No.3 - Madhya Pradesh State Electricity Board in
A
the matter of payment of FLEE charges to the beneficiaries in
the Western Region under the "Frequency Linked Energy
Exchange" scheme, which was introduced with effect from
1.6.1992. The FLEE charges were payable to the beneficiaries
on the basis of monthly advises issued by Western Regional
B
Electricity Board (renamed as Western Regional Board
Committee) (respondent No.5 herein). The matter was
considered by respondent No.1 - Central Electricity Regulatory
Commission, which passed an order dated 8.12 .2005 fixing the
liability of the appellant and respondent No.3 in the matter of c
payment of FLEE charges.
3. The appellant challenged the aforementioned order in
Appeal No.21/2006, which was allowed by the Tribunal vide its
order dated 14.11.2006. Soon thereafter, respondent No.3 filed
IA No.4/2007 for issue of a direction to respondent No.5 to
D
recalculate FLEE charges in accordance with the Tribunal's
·order in relation to post-reorganization period. By order dated
17.5.2007, the Tribunal allowed that application and directed
respondent No.5 to recalculate FLEE charges in accordance
with order dated 14.11.2006.
E
4. Feeling aggrieved by the last mentioned order of the
Tribunal, the appellant filed this appeal on 24.12.2007. Along
with the appeal, the appellant filed an application for
condonation of 160 days' delay. The reasons for not filing
F
appeal within the period of 60 days specified in Section 125
of the Electricity Act, as disclosed in the application are as
under: -
(i) The impugned order had been pronounced by the
Tribunal on 17.5.2007 but the counsel for the appellant did
G
not receive intimation of the said pronouncement and as
such he was not aware of the same.
(ii) That the procedure which was being followed by the
Tribunal at that time was that the Registry of the Tribunal
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
688
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2010] 4 S.C.R.
used to telephonically give advance intimation to the
counsel of the parties regarding pronouncement of the
order.
(iii) The appellant came to know about the order in July,
2007 when respondent No.5 sent intimation for payment
of FLEE charges to the beneficiaries in the Western
Region. Thereupon, the appellant informed its counsel
about the impugned order who then sent letter dated
26.7.2007 to the Registrar of the Tribunal that intimation
regarding pronouncement of the order had not been given
to him (the date has been wrongly typed in paragraph 3
of the application as 26.11.2007).
(iv) Respondent No.3 had filed a review petition against
order dated 14.11.2006, which was not decided by the
Tribunal along with I.A. No.4 of 2007 and the same was
withdrawn on 25.10.2007.
(v) Thereafter, the impugned order was considered and
discussed by the appellant and after obtaining legal
opinion, it was decided to file an appeal.
(vi) In the light of the decision taken by the appellant, the
counsel proceeded to prepare the appeal but some delay
was caused due to extensive pleadings and voluminous
documents.
5. In the reply filed on behalf of respondent No.3, it has
been averred that the impugned order was communicated by
the Deputy Registrar of the Tribunal vide his letter dated
11.6.2007; that the appellant and the respondents before the
G Tribunal were informed by the said letter that the matter was
disposed of on 14.5.2007 and the parties may request for a
copy of the order in PDF format through e-mail at registraraptel@nic.in or apply for a certified copy and further that the
order would also be available in the Tribunal's website
H (www.aptel.gov.in). It has been further averred that letter sent
CHATTISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C.E.R.C. 689
& ORS. [GS. SINGHVI, J.]
by the Deputy Registrar of the Tribunal was received by the
A
appellant on 21.6.2007 which was entered in its receipt register
at serial No. 2082 and subsequently, the same was received
by the office of the Chief Engineer (Commercial) on 29.6.2007.
Respondent No.3 has supported this assertion by placing on
record photostat copies of the inward register maintained in the
B
office of Secretary of the appellant, which were made available
pursuant to an application filed under the Right to Information
Act. Respondent No.3 has then relied upon the appellant's
assertion that it came to know about order dated 17.5.2007 in
July, 2007 and prayed that in the absence of any explanation c
by the appellant for remaining silent from July, 2007 to
December, 2007, the appeal cannot be entertained. As regards
the review application, respondent No.3 has averred that the
same has no bearing on the appellant's grievance against order
dated 17.5.2007 and in the absence of any explanation for the
D
delay after 21.6.2007, the appeal should be dismissed as
barred by time.
6. In the rejoinder affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant,
it has been pleaded that in the absence of communication of
order by the Tribunal in accordance with the provisions
E
contained in Chapter XVI of Appellate Tribunal for Electricity
(Procedure, Form, Fee and Record of Proceedings) Rules,
2007 (for short, 'the Rules'), the appeal cannot be dismissed
as barred by time. It has then been averred that letter dated
7.6.2007 of the Tribunal, which was signed by Deputy Registrar
F
on 11.6.2007 cannot be treated as communication of order
dated 17.5.2007. It has been further averred that letter dated
7.6.2007 was received in the secretariat of the appellant on
25.6.2007 and the same was forwarded to the concerned
department on 28.6.2007. In paragraph 6 of the affidavit, it has
G
been averred that officers of the appellant had no knowledge
of the impugned order till the receipt of intimation from
respondent No.5 in July 2007 regarding payment to the
beneficiaries in the Western Region and, thereafter, steps were
taken for filing appeal.
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2010] 4 S.C.R.
A
7. Shri Ravi Shankar Prasad, learned senior counsel for
the appellant argued that even though the appeal was filed after
more than 120 days counted from the date of the Tribunal's
order and, in terms of proviso to Section 125 of the Electricity
Act, this Court can extend the time for filing an appeal up to a
B maximum of 60 days only, power under Section 5 read with
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act can be exercised for
condonation of delay beyond the period of 120 days. In support
of this argument, Shri Prasad placed reliance on the judgment
of this Court in Mukri Gopa/an v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayi/
c Aboobacker (1995) 5 sec 5. Learned senior counsel laid
considerable emphasis on the fact that by virtue of the impugned
order huge liability has been created against the appellant and
if the appeal is not entertained, it will suffer irreparable injury.
8. Shri C.S. Vaidyanathan, learned senior counsel
D appearing for respondent No.3 argued that in view of the plain
language of the proviso to Section 125 of the Electricity Act,
this Court has no power to extend the period for filing an appeal
beyond 'i 20 days and the provisions of the Limitation Act
cannot be invoked for negating the legislative inten<~ment to
' E prescribe special. limitation for filing an appeal against any
decision or order of the Tribunal. Learned senior counsel further
argued that letter dated 7.6.2007 sent by Deputy Registrar of
the Tribunal informing the parties that the IA was disposed of
on 17.5.2007 and they may request for a copy of the order in
F PDF format through e-mail or apply for a certified copy amounts
to communication of the order within the meaning of Section
125 of the Electricity Act read with Rule 98 of the Rules and
the appeal filed after more than 120 days from the date of
receipt of letter dated 7.6.2007 is liable to be dismissed as
G barred by time. Learned senior counsel submitted that even if
intimation given by the Deputy Registrar of the Tribunal vide
letter dated 7.6.2007 is ignored, the appeal is liable to be
dismissed because the appellant had become aware of the
Tribunal's order on 17.7.2007 i.e., the day on which letter dated
H 6.7.2007 sent by respondent No.5 was received in the office
,_
CHATTISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C.E.R.C. & 691
ORS. [GS. SINGHVI, J.]
of its Secretary. Learned senior counsel submitted that if the
A
period of limitation is counted from 17.7.2007, the appeal could
be filed by 15.9.2007 whereas the same was actually filed on
24.12.2007. Learned senior counsel then invited the Court's
attention to the memo of appeal and application filed for
condonation of delay to show that the same had been prepared
on 7.9.2007 but were filed on 24.12.2007 i.e., after more than
three and half months. In support of his argument that this Court
cannot extend the time beyond 60 days in terms of proviso to
Section 125 of the Electricity Act, Shri Vaidyanathan relied upon
B
the judgments of this Court in Union of India v. Popular C
Construction Company (2001) 8 SCC 470, Singh Enterprises
v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and others
(2008) 3 SCC 70 and Commissioner of Customs and Central
Excise v. Hongo India Private Limited and another (2009) 5
sec 791.
9. For deciding the question framed at the threshold of this
judgment, it will be useful to notice the relevant statutory
provisions.
Electricity Act and the Rules
125. Appeal to Supreme Court.- Any person aggrieved
by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal, may,
file an appeal to the Supreme Court within sixty days from
D
E
the date of communication of the decision or order of the
Appellate Tribunal, to him, on any one or more of the · F
grounds specified in section 100 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 OF 1908):
Provided that the Supreme Court qiay, if it is satisfied that
the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing
G
the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within
a further period not exceeding sixty days.
94. Pronouncement of order.-(1) The Bench shall as far
as possible pronounce the order immediately after the
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 4 S.C.R.
A
hearing is concluded.
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
(2) When the orders are reserved, the date. for
pronouncement of order shall be notified in the cause list
which shall be a valid notice of intimation of
pronouncement".
(3) Reading of the operative portion of the order in the open
court shall be deemed to be pronouncement of the order.
(4) Any order reserved by a Circuit Bench of the Tribunal
may also be pronounced at the principal place of sitting
of the Bench in one of the aforesaid modes as exigencies
of the situation require.
98. Transmission of order by the Court Master.- (1) The
Court Master shall immediately on pronouncement of
order, transmit the order with the case file to the Deputy
Registrar.
(2) On receipt of the order from the Court Master, the
Deputy Registrar shall after due scrutiny, satisfy himself
that the provisions of these rules have been duly compiled
with and in token thereof affix his initials with date on the
outer cover of the order. The Deputy Registrar shall
thereafter cause to transmit the case file and the order to
the Registry for taking steps to prepare copies and their
communication to the parties.
106. Filing through electronic media. - The Tribunal may
allow filing of appeal or petition or application through
electronic media such as online filing and provide for
rectification of defects by e-mail or net and in such filing,
these rules shall be adopted as nearly as possible on and
from a date to be notified separately and the Chairperson
may issue instructions in this behalf from time to time.
CHATIISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C.E.R.C. & 693
ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
Limitation Act
5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.-,Any
appeal or any application, other than an application under
A
any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) , may be admitted after the
8
prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies
the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the
appeal or making the application within such period.
Explanation.-The fact that the appellant or the applicant
was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High
C
Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period
may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.
29. Savings.- (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect section
25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872).
o
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit,
appeal or application a period of limitation different from .
the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of
section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period
prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of
E
determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit,
appeal or application by any special or local law, the
provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall
apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are
not expressly excluded by such special or local law.
F
(3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time
being in force with respect to marriage and divorce,
nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other
proceeding under any such law.
(4) Sections 25 and 26 and the definition of "easement"
in section 2 shall not apply to cases arising in the territories
to which the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (5 of 1882), may
for the time being extend.
G
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 4 S.C.R.
A
10. The Electricity Act was enacted in the backdrop of
dismal performance of various state electricity boards and
alarming decline in the availability of power necessary for
domestic, agricultural and industrial sectors. Before enactment
of the Electricity Act, the electricity supply industry was governed
B by the Indian Electricity Act 1910, The Electricity (Supply) Act,
1948 and the Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act, 1998.
The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 mandated the creation of
electricity board for every state. The state electricity boards had
the responsibility of arranging the supply of electricity in the
c state. Over a period of time, the performance of state electricity
boards deteriorated on account of various factors including their
inability to take decisions on tariffs in a professional and
independent manner. In practice, the state governments started
determining tariff and huge concessions were provided to
0 various segments of the consumers, many of which were not
deserving. Cross-subsidies had reached unsustainable level.
To address this issue and to provide for independent
determination of tariffs, the Electricity Regulatory Commissions
Act, 1998 was enacted. Under that Act, the Central Government
created the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and
E most of the state governments created the State Electricity
Regulatory Commissions either under the Central Act or under
their respective state legislations with a view to implement the
policy of ericouraging private sector participation in generation,
transmission and distribution of electricity and to harmonize and
F rationalize the provisions of the three Acts, the Electricity Act
was enacted. Part II thereof contains provisions under which the
Central Government is entitled to prepare the National
Electricity Policy and tariff policy, in consultation with the state
governments and the Central Electricity Authority for
G development of the power system based on optimal utilisation
of resources such as coal, natural gas, nuclear substances or
materials, hydro and renewable sources of energy. Under the
same part, the Central Government can prepare and notify
national policies, permitting stand alone systems for rural areas,
H for rural electrification and for bulk purchase of power and
· CHATIISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C.E.R.C. & 695
.
ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
.
I
management of local distribution in rural areas through A
panchayat institutions, users' associations, co-operative
societies, non-governmental organisations or franchisees. Part
111 contains provision relating to generation of electricity. Part IV
regulates grant of licenses for transmission of electricity,
distribution of electricity and trading in electricity. Part V deals
B
with transmission of electricity including inter-st,!ite
transmission. Pait VI deals with distribution of electricity. Part
V+I contains provision relating to tariff. The provisions contained
in Part IX provide for establishment of the Central Electricity
Regulatory Authority and its functions and duties and those c
contained in Part X provide for establishment of the Central and
State E_lectricity Regulatory Commissions and their functions.
The Electricity Act also envisages establishment of Tribunal to
hear appeals against the orders of adjudicating officers or
regulatory commissions (Part XI). In terms of Section 111, any 0
person aggrieved by an order made by an adjudicating officer
except the one made under Section 127 or an order made by
an appropriate Commission under this Act can prefer an
appeal to the Tribunal. The composition of the Tribunal and
qualifications prescribed for appointment of Chairperson and
E
Member shows that the legislature intended to create a
specialized adjudicatory forum for deciding various disputes
emanating from the operation of the Act. Section 125 provides
for an appeal to this Court against any order or decision of the
Tribunal which can be filed within 60 days from the date of
communication of the decision or order of the Tribunal. The
F
limitation placed on the jurisdiction of this Court is that the
appeal can be entertained only on one or more of the grounds
specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Proviso to Section 125 empowers this Court to entertain the
appeal within a further period not exceeding 60 days, if it is G
satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause
from filing the appeal within the said period. In other words, an
appeal under Section 125 can be filed within a maximum
period of 120 days if this Court is satisfied that there was
sufficient cause for not filing the same within 60 days from the
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 4 S.C.R.
A
date of communication of the decision or order appealed
against. Part XII contains provisions relating to investigation
leading to assessment of electricity charges payable by the
consumer and enforcement of the orders of assessment. It also
contains provisions for appeal against the final order passed
B
under Section 126. Part XIV contains provisions to deal with
theft of electricity, electric lines and materials, interference with
meters and work of licensees and also provides for fiscal
penalties and substantive punishments. Section 145 declares
that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or
c proceeding in respect of any matter which an assessing officer
referred to in Section 126 or an appellate authority referred to
in Section 127 or the adjudicating officer appointed under the
Act is empowered by or under the Act to determine and no
injunction shall be granted in such matters.
D
11. The brief analysis of the scheme of the Electricity Act
shows that it is a self-contained comprehensive legislation,
which not only regulates generation, transmission and
distribution of electricity by public bodies and encourages
public sector participation in the process but also ensures
E
creation of special adjudicatory mechanism to deal with the
grievance of any person aggrieved by an order made by an
adjudicating officer under the Act except under Section 127 or
an order made by the appropriate commission. Section 110
provides for establishment of a Tribunal to hear such appeals.
F
Section 111 (1) and (2) lays down that any person aggrieved
by an order made by an adjudicating officer or an appropriate
commission under this Act may prefer an appeal to the Tribunal
within a period of 45 days from the date on which a copy of
the order made by an adjudicating officer or the appropriate
G commission is received by him. Section 111 (5) mandates that
the Tribunal shall deal with the appeal as expeditiously as
possible and endeavour to dispose of the same finally within
180 days from the date of receipt thereof. If the appeal is not
disposed of within 180 days, the Tribunal is required to record
H
reasons in writing for not doing so. Section 125 lays down that
CHATTISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C.E.R.C. & 697
ORS. [GS. SINGHVI, J.]
any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Tribunal
A
can file an appeal to this Court within 60 days from the date of
communication of the decision or order of the Tribunal. Proviso
to Section 125 empowers this Court to entertain an appeal filed
within a further period of 60 days if it is satisfied that there was
sufficient cause for not filing appeal within the initial period of B
60 days. This shows that the period of limitation prescribed for
filing appeals under Sections 111 (2) and 125 is substantially
different from the period prescribed under the Limitation Act for
filing suits etc. The use of the expression 'within a further period
of not exceeding 60 days' in Proviso to Section 125 makes it c
clear that the outer limit for filing an appeal is 120 days. There
is no provision in the Act under which this Court can entertain
an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal after
more than 120 days. The object underlying establishment of a
special adjudicatory forum Le., the Tribunal to deal with the D
grievance of any person who may be aggrieved by an order of
an adjudicating officer or by an appropriate commission with
a provision for further appeal to this Court and prescription of
special limitation for filing appeals under Sections 111 and 125
is to ensure that disputes emanating from the operation and
E
implementation of different provisions of the Electricity Act are
expeditiously decided by an expert body and no court, except
this Court, may entertain challenge to the decision or order of
the Tribunal. The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil courts
(Section 145) qua an order made by an adjudicating officer is
also a pointer in that direction. It is thus evident that the
F
Electricity Act is a special legislation within the meaning of
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, which lays down that where
any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or
application a period of limitation different from the one
prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall G
apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the
Schedule and provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24
(inclusive) shall apply for the purpose of determining any period
of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application unless
they are not expressly excluded by the special or local law.
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 4 S.C.R.
A
12. In Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. L.N. Mishra (1974) 2
SCC 133, this Court interpreted Section 29(2) of the Limitation
Act in the backdrop of the plea that the provisions of that Act
are not applicable to the proceedings under the Representation
of the People Act, 1951. It was argued that the words "expressly
B
excl-uded" appearing in Section 29(2) would mean that there
must be an express reference made in the special or local law
to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the
operation is to be excluded. While rejecting the argument, the
three-Judge Bench observed:
c
D
E
F
" ........... what we have to see i§ whether the scheme of the
special law, that is in this case the Act, and the nature of
the remedy provided therein are such that the Legislature
intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone
should govern the several matters provided by it. If on an
examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the
provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded,
then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid
to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our view, even
in a case where the special law does not exclude the
provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an
express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the
Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature
of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and
scheme of the special law exclude their operation."
(emphasis supplied)
13. Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996, which is substantially similar to Section 125 of the
Electricity Act came to be interpreted in Union of India v.
G Popular Construction Company (2001) 8 SCC 470. The
precise question considered in that case was whether the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are applicable to
an application challenging an award under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The two-Judge Bench
H referred to earlier decisions in Mangu Ram v. Municipal
CHATIISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C.E.R.C. & 699
ORS. [GS. SINGHVI, J.]
Corporation of Delhi (1976) 1 SCC 392, Vidyacharan Shukla
A
v. Khubchand Baghel AIR 1964 SC 1099, Hukumdev Narain
Yadav v. L.N. Mishra (supra), Patel Naranbhai Marghabhai
v. Dhulabhai Galbabhai (1992) 4 SCC 264 and held:
"12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act
B
is concerned, the crucial words are "but not thereafter"
used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this
phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the
meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would
therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act.
Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the court
C
could entertain an application to set aside the award
beyond the extended period under the proviso, would
render the phrase "but not thereafter" wholly otiose. No
principle of interpretation would justify such a result.
D
16. Furthermore, Section 34(1) itself provides that recourse
to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by
an application for setting aside such award "in accordance
with" sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). Sub-section (2)
relates to grounds for setting aside an award and is not
E
relevant for our purposes. But an application filed beyond
the period mentioned in Section 34, sub-section (3) would
not be an application "in accordance with" that sub-section.
Consequently by virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to the
court against an arbitral award cannot be made beyond
F
the period prescribed. The importance of the period fixed
under Section 34 is emphasised by the provisions of
Section 36 which provide that
"where the time for making an application to set
aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has
G
expired ... the award shall be enforced under the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the same manner
as if it were a decree of the court".
.
This is a significant departure from the provisions of the
H
A
B
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 4 S.C.R.
Arbitration Act, 1940. Under the 1940 Act, after the time
to set aside the award expired, the court was required to
"proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award,
and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall
follow" (Section 17). Now the consequence of the time
expiring under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is that the award
becomes immediately enforceable without any further act
of the court. If there were any residual doubt on the
interpretation of the language used in Section 34, the
scheme of the 1996 Act would resolve the issue in favour
of curtailment of the court's powers by the exclusion of the
operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act."
(emphasis supplied)
14. In Singh Enterprises v.