# CHAWLA AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF HARYANA

- **Citation:** [1974] 3 S.C.R. 340
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1974-02-12
- **Case number:** Criniinal Appeal No. 109 of 1973
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/chawla-and-another-v-state-of-haryana-6058
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

340
CHAWLA AND ANOTHER
v.
STATE OF HARYANA
February 12, 1974
[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.l
Criminal law-Practice and Procedure-Seritence of /;fe imprisonment for
murder. when may be 1ranted.
·
Six. accUsed were charged with the murder of three persons. Two of the
ac.:used-tbe appellants-were convicted of murder of two of -the deceased,
n:spectively and were sentenced to death by the High Court in appeal.
The
other four accused were sentenced to life imprisonment.
In appeal to this Court, regarding the sentence of death passed on the two
appellants,
HELD : The death sentence should be commuted to imprisonment for life. for
the following reasons :-
(a) It was probable that the tragedy was provoked or precipitated by the
blame-worthy and intransigent conduct of the deceased in regard to the retaining
or taking possession of the land that had been finally allotted to the accused by
the Consolidation autbprities. and over which land, there were disputes between
the accused and the deceased.
fb) The first appellant was rcs,:ionsible for causing only one out of the
3
fatal injuries received by the
deceased for_ whose murder be was
convicted.
Probably, that was the only blOw given by him to tho deceased, while the
remaining 6 punctured wounds were all caused by the other accused who were
awarded the lesser sentence.
A
B
c
D
( c) The appellants are immature youths who appear to have acted· at the
E
instigation of their elder.
(d) The appellants must have suffered prolonged mental torture on account
of their beinS: constantlI haunted by the spectre of death for one year and 10
, months ever since they were sentenced to death by the trail court.
Moreover the Court has now a discretion to award either of the two penalties
prescribed under s. 302, Penal Code, and death sentence is now exacted only
where the murder was perpetrated with marked brutality. [346 E-347 CJ
Y;v;an Rodrick v. Tiie State of West Be11gal, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1584; Gurd;p
Singh v, State of PunitJb, A.l.R.
1971 S.C. 2240, State of Maharashlra
v.
Mang/ye Dhavu Kongll, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1797, State of B/har v. Pa.rhupatl Singh
and another, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. Ga/anand and ors. v. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1954
S.C. 695, and Ediga A.namma v. State of A.ndhra Pradesh, Cr. A. 67/73 decided
on 11·2·74, followed.
F
Brij Bhukhan and ors. v. State of U.P. A.I.R.~ 1957 S.C. 474, Mil:Jlll and anr.
<tc. v. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1959, S.C. 572 and Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P.
G
Cr. L.J. 370 (S.C.), referred to.

## Text

340
CHAWLA AND ANOTHER
v.
STATE OF HARYANA
February 12, 1974
[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.l
Criminal law-Practice and Procedure-Seritence of /;fe imprisonment for
murder. when may be 1ranted.
·
Six. accUsed were charged with the murder of three persons. Two of the
ac.:used-tbe appellants-were convicted of murder of two of -the deceased,
n:spectively and were sentenced to death by the High Court in appeal.
The
other four accused were sentenced to life imprisonment.
In appeal to this Court, regarding the sentence of death passed on the two
appellants,
HELD : The death sentence should be commuted to imprisonment for life. for
the following reasons :-
(a) It was probable that the tragedy was provoked or precipitated by the
blame-worthy and intransigent conduct of the deceased in regard to the retaining
or taking possession of the land that had been finally allotted to the accused by
the Consolidation autbprities. and over which land, there were disputes between
the accused and the deceased.
fb) The first appellant was rcs,:ionsible for causing only one out of the
3
fatal injuries received by the
deceased for_ whose murder be was
convicted.
Probably, that was the only blOw given by him to tho deceased, while the
remaining 6 punctured wounds were all caused by the other accused who were
awarded the lesser sentence.
A
B
c
D
( c) The appellants are immature youths who appear to have acted· at the
E
instigation of their elder.
(d) The appellants must have suffered prolonged mental torture on account
of their beinS: constantlI haunted by the spectre of death for one year and 10
, months ever since they were sentenced to death by the trail court.
Moreover the Court has now a discretion to award either of the two penalties
prescribed under s. 302, Penal Code, and death sentence is now exacted only
where the murder was perpetrated with marked brutality. [346 E-347 CJ
Y;v;an Rodrick v. Tiie State of West Be11gal, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1584; Gurd;p
Singh v, State of PunitJb, A.l.R.
1971 S.C. 2240, State of Maharashlra
v.
Mang/ye Dhavu Kongll, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1797, State of B/har v. Pa.rhupatl Singh
and another, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. Ga/anand and ors. v. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1954
S.C. 695, and Ediga A.namma v. State of A.ndhra Pradesh, Cr. A. 67/73 decided
on 11·2·74, followed.
F
Brij Bhukhan and ors. v. State of U.P. A.I.R.~ 1957 S.C. 474, Mil:Jlll and anr.
<tc. v. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1959, S.C. 572 and Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P.
G
Cr. L.J. 370 (S.C.), referred to.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criniinal Appeal No. 109 of
1973.
Appeal by Special leave from the judgment and order dated the 13th
November, 1972 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh
in Criminal Appeal No. 493 of n and Murder Reference No. 21 of
H
1972.
N. S. Das Bahl, for the appellants.
A
B
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F
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G
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CHAWLA v. HARYANA (Sarkaria, I.)
341
V. C. Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
·
SARKARIA J.
The facts giving rise to this appeal by special leave
are as under :
Jagga had thret sons; Bishna, Ram Lal and Har Lal.
Ram Dia, Dal Singh and Ran Singh deceased were the sons
of Bishna. Ram Lai and his sons, Chawla and Dhanna Har
Lal, his son, Puran, and Har Lal's grandson, Mukhtiara are
the accused in this case.
'
During consolidation operations in their village, Deora, dispute
arose between Ram Lal and Har Lal on one side and Bishna on the
other, over the allotment of a plot, measuring 4' acres. This plot was
allotted by the Consolidation Officer to Bishna· but in revision the
Additional Director,
Consolidation on May 4: 1968, set asid~ the
Order ct the Consolidation Officer and allotted it to Ram Lal and
Har Lal, accused. Bishna died and the deceased succeeded him. Aggrieved, the deceased persons moved the High Court under Art. 226 of
the Constitution for bringiqg up and quashing the order of the Director.
The High Court dismissed this petition on July 14, 1971 and
upheld the order of the Director. On October 4, 1971, the Assistant
Collector made an order that, in implementation of the order of the
Director of Consolidation, the land be demarcated at the spot and
possession delivered to the allottees. It was further directed that the
land be mutated in favour of the allottees.
On October 5, 1971,
the Kanungo, in compliance :with the Assistant Collector's ·order,
demarcated the land at the spot and delivered symbolical possession
.
129
129
1:9 1211
d
H
of Klla Nos.
-7-. ffi'J' 14 . 16
as those· fields were un er crop.
e
delivered actual possession of the other fields, comprised in the allotment, which were not ~nder crops, including I<hasra No. W,
to
the accused, Ram Lal and Har Lal. The deceased persons, however, did not submit to this symbolical and actual delivery of possession. They instituted a suit in the Civil Court at Kaithal and obtained an ex parte interim injunction restraining the accused from taking
possession of the land. This injunction was served on Ram Lal accused on November 5, 1971.
On November 11, 1971, Ram Dia, Dal Singh and Ran Singh deceased, went to the fields with their ploughs. Dal Singh started reaping
chari crop, Ran Singh started ploughing the field, while Ram Dia went
on a round of the field. At about 11 a.m., all the six accused, in a
body reaChed the field.
Puran and Ram La1 were armed with Suas
(iron-spiked sticks) , Dhanna with a Gandasa, and Har Lal, Mukhtiara
and Chawla with Jathis. On reaching the spot, Har Lal exhorted his
companions to kill the deceased. Thereupon, Chawla, Puran and Ram
Lal gave blows with their respective weapons to Ram Dia, Ran Singh
came to the rescue of his brother. Thereupon, Dhanna and Mukhtiara
assaulted him with their respective weapons. Dal Singh interceded but
all the six accused belaboured him. The occurrence was witnessed by
Smt. Mali Nasib Singh and Shadi who had run to a safe distance and
stood ther~. After the assault, the accused ran away taking their weapons with them. Ram· Dia died at the spot. Dal Singh succumbed to
342
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1974 J 3 S.C.R.
his injuries after his admission in the Civil Hospital Kaithal, while Ran
Singh expired in Medical College/Hospital, Rohtak on November 13,
1971.
The Sessions Judge convicted and sentenced Chawla, Puran and
Mukhtiara accused to death under s.302/34, Penal Code. He further
convicted them under s.302/149 on three counts and sentenced them
each to imprisonment for life. A conviction under s.148, Penal Code
with a sentence of one year's imprisonment each was also recorded.
The remaining accused were also convicted under ss. 302/149 and 34
and 148, Penal Code and on the capital charge sentenced to imprisonment for life, each.
On appeai, the High Court commuted the death sentence of Puran
to one of imprisonment for life on the ground that it was not known
as to which of the three fatal injuries to Ram Dia had been caused by
Puran. It confirmed the death sentences of Chawla and Mukhtiara, for
committing the murders of Ram Dia, and Ran Singh, respectively. The
conviction of Ram Lal, Har Lal and Dhanna under ss.302/149 was
a1so maintained.
Special Leave in this case was granted only with regard to the
capital sentence inflicted on Chawla and Mukhtiara, appellants.
Mr. Behal, learned arnicus curiae has urged that the death senten·
ces were not justified because of these alleviating circumstances :-
(a) The cause of the tragedy can be traced to the unreasonable, stubborn, and blame-worthy conduct of
the deceased in retaking or retaining possession of
the land that after a protracted litigation, had been
finally allotted and made over to the accused party by
the Director of Consolidation. The violence seems to
have erupted because of the wrongful act of the deceased in ploughing Kila No. 612 etc., actual possession of which had been duly delivered by the Consolidation Authorities, earlier to the accused party. Ram
Dia armed with a stick was on guard duty while the
other deceased were 'ploughing or sowing in the dis·
puted land. Ram Dia provoked the assault by dealing blows with a stick to Har Lal accused.
(b)
(c)
Jn the case of Chawla appellant, it was
not clear
whether any fat'al injury to Ram Dia was caused by
him. Jn any case, it was unreasonable to mark him
out for capital punishment for inflicting only one
of the three fatal injuries with a Iathi, when the coaccused to whom the punctured, fatal wounds were
attributed, have been awarded the lesser penalty.
That Chawla and Mukhtiara appellants
are
raw
youths, aged 25 and 24 ye.ars •. respectiv7Iy, who probably acted under the inst1gat10n of their father; and
that the death sentence has been hovering over their
heads for an agonisingly long period of about 1 year
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
F
G
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CHAWLA v. HARYA~A (Sarkaria, J.)
343
and I 0 months.
The above circumstances, according to Mr. Behal,
taken separately as well as collectively, furnish sufficient ground for mitigation of
the capital sentence.
Reference has been made to the decisions of
this Court in Vivialn Rodrick v. The State of West Bengal;(') Gurdip
Singh v. State of Punjab;(')
State of Maharashtra v. Naglya Dhavu
Kongil;(I') State iii Bihar v. Pashupati Singh and
another(')
and
Gajanand and ors. v. State of U.P.( 5 )
On the other hand, Mr. Vikram Mahajan.
learned Counsel for
the State vehemently contends that none of the circumstances pointed
cut bv Mr. Behal .is a good extenuating factor.
It is emphasisetl that
ti;c accused \vent armed \Vith a determination
to kill the deceased
p~rsons and they succeeded in their nefarious design. This \VJS a cas~
or cold-11loooed triple murder and no leniency in the matter of sent,nce was called for.
It is argued that the mere fact that the murders
were committed at the exhortation of the eldest accused Har Lal, was
no _ground in law for not inflicting the capital sentence on the appellants.
He has further pointed out· that the mere fact that a period of
obout 1 year and 10 months has elapse'd since the award of the capital
sentence, which is mainly due to the protracted proceedings, is
no
:;round for reducing the capital sentence.
In support of his arguments. learned Counsel has relied on Brij
Bhu.khan and ors. v. State of U1 P.;(') Mizaji and anr. etc. v. State of
U. P.( 7 l; Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P.(').
Tn:e, according to the finding of the courts beiow, the occurrence
!ook place ~ctuallv in Kila No. 611, anti not in Kila No. 6/2, which
v:as in dispute.
The very numbering of these fields by the Settlement
~uthorities shov.·s that
thev are sub divisions
or parts of the same
J;:iJa "" 6
The disputed land was thus intermin.2led with the plot
cf occurrence.
The deceased were feeling aggrieved by the partition
ond all.otmcnt of this land .including Kila
6.
Indeed.
despite the
conclusion of the dJSpute by the consolidation authorities, the deceased
·,;·ere keeping it alive.
The Kanungo's Report (Ex.PJJ). dated Octol::cr 5. 1971. whereby Possession of the disputed land was delivered
!(] the accused Part~. shows that Kila No. 612 in Rectangle No. 129
·"as one. nf those tlisputed plots. the actual possession oi which had
~~ef ciel1vcred to the accused party.
It was the
prosecution case,
~~e~t
1
~~~;j~
0g~~ t~fo~e the assa~lt. Ram Singh was ploughing to sow
the di~Putcd land an'~'ka~ab~uttmg hch~ri from the field adjacent to
'ibly to keeii a watch ag~inst ;~ was avmg a round. of ~he fields. posunder s 14? Cr p C
he_ accus~d. Chawla tn his cxaminatinn-
----·- --
_.....
.
. eave t is version of the incident--
(!) A. 1. R.-197Ts. c. t584·
(21 A. T. R. 1971 S. C. 2240· '
(3) A. T. R. t972 S. C. 1797·
(41 A. T. R. S. C. 2699
'
(51 A.J.R. 1954 S.C. 695.
(61 A. T. R. 1957 S. C. 474
(7\ A. I. R. 1959 S. C SP
(8) Cr. 1. J. 370 (S. C.l. -
.344
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 19741 3 S.C.R,
... , .. Ram Dia asked us to give up the possession of
the land and hand over the same to him. We told him that
he could take back the possession in the same way as the
_possession had been delivered to us
by
the
Tehsil\lar,
Girdawar and Patwari.
At this, Ram
Dia said
that he
would take the p0ssession ·forcibly.
We told him that we
would not hand over the passession by force.
On the day
<>f orcurrcnce. Ram Dia a_nld his brothers started ploughing
the land and uprooting the crops sown by us, with the help
.of two ploughs.
At sun-rise, Har Lal armed with a lathi, I
armed with a two-pronged iailv and Ram Lal armed with
a lathi were i:oing on th.; road from Deora Lo Ujana to go
to our field ..... -... Har Lal icild us that it seemed to him
that the larrJ in dispute-was being ploughed by the deceased.
Har Lal went and stood in front of the bullocks and told
Ram Dia that he should have been satisfied after cultivating
the land since the consolidation and that he should desist
from ploughing the land and destroying the crop.
At this
Ram Dia gave a lathi blow which hit Har Lal on the right
hand.
At this, Har Lal, Ram Lal and myself gave injuries
with our respective weapons. . . . . .
We got Har Lal medically examined . ... "
Though this version of the accused was not sufficient to make out
:a case of private defence:_ yet, coupled with the Kanun~o·s report,
Ex.PH. and the surrounding circumstances, it strongly points to the
.conclusion that the tragedy was 'probably precipitated by the deceaseld's
insistence on cultivation and possession of the disputed land indudling those fields of which actual possession had been dulv delivered
by the consolidation authorities to the accused.
The appellants had the
order of Additional Director of Consolidation in their favour in respect
of the land in dispute. The deceased challenged that order by a writ
petition under Article 226 in the High Court which dismissed the
·same and uoheld the order of the Director.
Ther~after. on October
5. 1971. in imolementatiop· of the Director's order, symbolical pos-
•ession of that part of the land which was under crops, and actual
possession of the fields which were vacant. was· delivered, to the accused. It seems that the deceased urlder the cloak of an cx-parte interim injunction obtained by them on November 4, 1971, were detern1ined to retain or retake possession
even of those fields of which
actual possession had been--de)ivered to the accused party by
the
·consolidation authorities.
This takes us to the next circumstance stressed by Mr. Behal.
Chawla has been awarded the capftal sentence for the murder
of Ram Dia. The part ascribed to the appellant by the witnesses,
who admittedly had run away to some distance at the commencement . of the assault. was that he had inflicted a fatal blow with a
1athi on the deceased.
Dr. Raj Gupta who conducted the autopsy,
testified that there were eight iil.iuries in all on the dead-bodv
of
Ram Dia, out of which, six were punctured wounds.
Injury No. 6
A
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CHAWLA v. HARYANA (Sarkaria, J.)
345
was an abrasion on the left fore-arm. Injury No. 8 was a depression
of the frontal and parietai bones. All the injuries, colleclI~ely, in
the opinion of the Doctor, w_ere . sufficient t<>. cause death m
the
ordinary course of nature. It is miury 8 which wa~ attnbutcd _by
the witnesses to Chawla,
apl"'~ant. Jn
the exanunatt0n-m-ch1et,
the Doctor did not say that ·this injury
was by itself, fatal.
Jn.
cross-examination in the Committal Court, she said that injuries I, 2
and 4. individually, as well llS collectively, could cause death.
~t
the trial, Dr. Raj Gupta chang~ this version and said that injuries
1, 4 and 8 were individually _suflicie~t. in the ordinary
course of
nature to cau·se death. She excluded rniury. No. 2 from ·the category
of fatal injuries, and, in its pl_ace, substituted injury No. 8. If the.
Doctor's former statement made in the Committal Court was correct,.
then injury 8 was not a fatal injury and the three fatal injuries (J, 2
and 4) were punctured \\'OUnds which could have b<en caused by
Ram Lal and Puran only, who were
armed
with
sharp-pointed:
weapons.
Further, in the . Co'!"rriittal Court, Dr. Gupta had clearly
testified tlrnt none of the 8 injuries found on the body
of. Ram
Dia had been caused with a .blunt
weapon.
On this point, also,
she took up a different position at the trial and sar..l that injury 8
might have been caused with a lathi.
In any case, apart from • a.
minor abrasion on the left fore-arm which could have been the result
of a fall, there was only one injucy on the body of Ram Dia, caused
with a lathi. It could not be said that Chawla played the dominant
role in the assault. His p~rt, if not less, was in no way greater than
that of Har Lal and Ram Lal who had caused the fatal punctured·
wounds.
We have referred to the contradictory
positions taken by
themedical officer. not to show _that Chawla
could not be convicted
.. und'r s 302. Penal Code, but to appreciate his precist role in the
assault on Ram Dia. for the purpose of sentence, only. From Dr.
Guotas evidence it is clear that he had caused only one injury, with
a lathi, to Ram Dia and his part in the assault. if not less, was in no
wa, greater than that of Har Lal and Ram Lal who had caused no·.
jess thnn f-ix injuries, includinl! two fatal, to the deceased.
Furthet circumstance which deserves· consideration is that these
raw vouths. Chawla and Mukhtiara. appear to haw acted under the
instigation of their elder. Har Lal.
~till ano~her factor to be taken into account in prescribing the
pumshment ts that death penalty has been brooding over the heods
of. these youngmen for an agonisingly long period.
Tlt'y were committed for trial two Years in February 1972 and were condemned
to ~eath by th~ tria! court in April f972.
By cold logic, this circumstai,cc. as " rmt:gattng factor.
more often
than aot, being the unwarranted result of Law's delays, is vulnerable. But humane considerations of administering justice tempered with mercy have impelled the
courts to recognise it as an ameliorating circumstance In the last half
a century, the science of criminology has taken greai strides.
There
has been rethinking about crime and punishment.
The process is con-.
346
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ ] 974] 3 S,C,R.
tinuino.
Winds of compassion for the criminal blowing the world over,
are attecting Jaw and logic, the Judge and the Legislator, alike.
Draconicn notions and ·retributive relics of lex elionis are yielding to "Mankind's concern for Charity".
ln every creature, ''born but to die", it is
"blindness to the future, kindly given" that keeps life going.
But in u
condemned man, the Book of Fate open before him consrantly telling
of the doom prescribed, the life-stream of hopes and aspirations rapi~
Jy starts drying under the excruciating heat of the mental. desert. W1tn
passaoe of time, the prisoner painfully awaiting execution, become:;
no bcttcr than a "life-less" mummy.
It was in this perspective that
tilis
Court in Slate of Bihar v. Pashupati Singh and anr. (supra),
ruled 1hat if there has beep. a long interval between the date of the
offence and the consideration of appeal by the Supreme Court. the
capital sentence few the c001mission of an offence under s. 30'.:,
Penal Code for which the accused has undergone a long period of
mental agonv, the sentence of death may not be exacted.
A simila:·
note was struck bv a Bench of this Court, constimted by both oi
us, in Ediga Anamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh(').
Parliament also has taken note of the current penological thought.
Before Criminal Amendment Act 26 of 1955, for the offence
of
murder, death sentence w.'IS the rule and transportation for life an
exception. anld if the lesser penalty was to be awarded, then subsection (5) of s. 367, Code of Criminal Procedure required reasons
I<> be given.
By Act 26 of 1955, this sub-s. ( 5) was recast and
the requirement of giving reasons
for the lesser punishn1ent, \\'US
done away with.
The former rule is thus no longer oporative. The
Court .has now a discretion
to award either
of the two penalties
prescribed under s. 302, Penal Code. Death sentence is now exacted
onlv where the murder was perpetrated with marked brutality.
Parliament has passed the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, which
is coming into force shortly.
In it, the position is reverse of what
it was before the Amendment of 1955.
After this Bill becomes !aw.
it will be obligatory for the court to give reasons if the death sen-·
tence is to be inflicted.
The Penal Code Bill, 1955, which is on th'
anvil, reserves capital punishment for only a few types of murders.
We have referred to the modern penologicaJ thought and current
legislative trends not with a view to decide this case on the basis of what
is yet. in embryo, but to have a proper perspective for appreciating of
the CIIcumstances which have been urged in this case in mitigation of
the sentence.
To sum up, these are :
A
B
c
E
F
G
(a) There was some probability of the tragedy having
been. provo~ed or precipitated by the blame-worthy
and 1ntrans1gent conduct of the deceased in regard
to the retaining or retaking possession of the land
H
WC A. 67(73;.Jeeided on ll-2-74.
'
A
CHAWLA V, HARYANA (Sarkaria, /.)
that had been finally allotted to the accused by the
consolidation authorities.
(b) Chawla appellant was responsible for causing only
one out of the three fatal injuries received by Ram
Dia, deceased. Probably, that
was the only blow
given by him to the deceased, while the remaining six
347
B
punctured wounds were all caused by the other
accused who have been awarded the lesser sentence.
c
(c) Chawla and Mukhtiara,
appellants are
Immature
youths who appear to have acted at the instigation
of their elder, Har Lal.
(d) Prolonged mental torture suffered by Chawla and
Mukhtiara on account of their being constantly haunted by the spectre of death for the last one year and
10 months.
Perhaps, none of the above circumstances, taken singly and judged
rigidly by the old Draconian standards, would be sufficient to justify
the imposition of the lesser penalty; nor are these circumstances adeD
quate enough to palliate the offence of murder. But in their totality,
they tilt the judicial scales in favour of life rather then putting it out.
E
F
The circumstances considered above have long been recognised
by courts as valid grounds for mitigating the sentence. They are not
innovations. Formerly what was in the penumbra of extenuation,
"dim-described", now, in the twilight of compassion, has become clearly discernible.
Before we part with this judgment, we may in fairness to the learned Counsel for the State, note it here that the rulings cited by him
turn on their own facts. In Mizaji's case and Jagmohan Singh's case
(supra), the accused were awarded
capital sentences as they were
found guilty of having fired the fatal shots with fire-arms. In Brij
Bhukhan's case (supra), the victim had been dragged out of his own
house and mercilessly beaten .. Such is not the case here.
For the foregoing reasons, while maintaining the convictions of the
appellants, we would allow the appeal and commute the death sentences of the appellants to that of imprisonment for life on each count. The
sentences shall run concurrently.
V.P.S.
Appeal c;l/owed.