# CHETKAR JHA v. VISWANATH PRASAD VERMA & ORS

- **Citation:** [1971] 1 S.C.R. 586
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1970-05-07
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 2221 of 1966
- **Bench:** J. M. Shelat, G. K. Mitter
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/chetkar-jha-v-viswanath-prasad-verma-ors-5100
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

Cunstiturior. of India,
1950, Art. 226-High Court's powersCertiorari.
Patna University Act ~ of 1962-Appoilllment of Profes.-or-Master's
clt•gree a necessar)J' qualification-Whether degree must be in sanie subject
in respect of which appointment made-Vice-Chancellor advertising post
after obtaining approval of Chancellor-Whether
must again
obtain
approral if revised advertiseinent to be issued-Public Service Commis ..
sion 11:hen. niay be asked to reconsider its ,:ecommendation,
Minutes of
Syndicate nzeeting-Efject of correction-Correction of 1ni11utes
relating
1.0 earlier resollltion does not result in fresh resolution.
The Vice-Chancellor of Patna University after obtaining the apprnval
of the Chancellor for filling up the vacancy for the post of Professor of
Political Science by direct recruitment, got the post advertised through the
Bihar PubJic Service Commission. The Public Service Commission issued
Jn advertisement in which the required qualification was "first or second
class ~raster's degree in the subject." Since the relevint University statute
had no such requirement the Vice-Chancellor got published through the
Commission another, advertisement in which the qualification mentioned
\Vas .. first or second class Master's degree in Political Science or in
an
allied subject."' The Commission
recommended the name of respondent
No. 1 for appointment a'fter consulting two experts, only one of whom was
present atathe interview. the other having sent his opinion by post.
The
Svndicate of the University at its meeting of May 7. !963 considered the
Commission's recommendation.
The minutes of the meeting as originaJly
recorded stated the resolution said to have been passed by a majority of
9 to 8 in the following terms : "Not to proceed with the quest'on of making
t}ijs appointment".
Consiruing- the Syndicate's decision to mean that the
said candidate had not been approved for appointment the Vice-Chacellor
requested the Public Service Commision to rcConsider its recommendation.
This the Commission refused to do.
At the next meeting of the Syndicate on July 3. 1963. 16 out of the 17 members who .had attended the previous meeting \\'ere present.
They authorised the correction of the minu~
tes of the last meeting to read "not to accept the recommendation of the
Commission·· in place of the v,.rords "not to proceed' With the question of
making- his appointment". Thereafter bv resolution it appointed respondent
No. 1 to the post in auestion.
Tl:Je aooellant me.de a reoresentation to the
Chancellor of the Universitv challeneing the appointment. The Chancellor
purpo•tino to act under s.:l(4) of the Patna Universitv Act 3 of 1962
Jnnulled the Svndicate's resolution making the appointnient on the following
~roun''"': (i) !hat the revised advertisement was unauthorised inasmuch as
it \\'JS anainst fhe statute and Sought to amend it. as also because it was
issueJ without the orior aoorov::i.1 of the Chancellor: (ii) that since only
one of the exoerts associated 1.vith thf': selection wa<.: oresent at the interviews
~.'.!6(~) of the Act w::i.<.: violated: (iii) th'.:lt the Vice-Chancellor's action in
refcrrinq, th~ matter for reconsideration by the Commission \vas without
1he authority of the syndicate and was not warranted under s 26(4): (iv)
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587
that under a prior resolution of the ,syndi<;ate a decision taken Jt its meeting
could no~ be f,evised for a period of six months therefrom; therefore' its.
resolution of May 7, 1963 not accepting the recommendation <egarding the
respon_dent. cq.\}lfi not .be substituFed by its resolution date~ July 3, 1963
by which he was appointed. Respondent No. I challenged the Chancellor's
order in High Court 'which held ii to b.e invalid.
In appeal by certi··
ficate,
'
HELD~ '(i) In a· writ petition for certiorari a sup~riot court would not
interfere on the mere ground of an erfdr of fact or even Of law, but if.~
the error of law is apparent on the rec

## Text

586
CHETKAR JHA
V.
VISWANATH PRASAD VERMA & ORS.
May 7, 1970
(J. M. SHELAT AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.J
Cunstiturior. of India,
1950, Art. 226-High Court's powersCertiorari.
Patna University Act ~ of 1962-Appoilllment of Profes.-or-Master's
clt•gree a necessar)J' qualification-Whether degree must be in sanie subject
in respect of which appointment made-Vice-Chancellor advertising post
after obtaining approval of Chancellor-Whether
must again
obtain
approral if revised advertiseinent to be issued-Public Service Commis ..
sion 11:hen. niay be asked to reconsider its ,:ecommendation,
Minutes of
Syndicate nzeeting-Efject of correction-Correction of 1ni11utes
relating
1.0 earlier resollltion does not result in fresh resolution.
The Vice-Chancellor of Patna University after obtaining the apprnval
of the Chancellor for filling up the vacancy for the post of Professor of
Political Science by direct recruitment, got the post advertised through the
Bihar PubJic Service Commission. The Public Service Commission issued
Jn advertisement in which the required qualification was "first or second
class ~raster's degree in the subject." Since the relevint University statute
had no such requirement the Vice-Chancellor got published through the
Commission another, advertisement in which the qualification mentioned
\Vas .. first or second class Master's degree in Political Science or in
an
allied subject."' The Commission
recommended the name of respondent
No. 1 for appointment a'fter consulting two experts, only one of whom was
present atathe interview. the other having sent his opinion by post.
The
Svndicate of the University at its meeting of May 7. !963 considered the
Commission's recommendation.
The minutes of the meeting as originaJly
recorded stated the resolution said to have been passed by a majority of
9 to 8 in the following terms : "Not to proceed with the quest'on of making
t}ijs appointment".
Consiruing- the Syndicate's decision to mean that the
said candidate had not been approved for appointment the Vice-Chacellor
requested the Public Service Commision to rcConsider its recommendation.
This the Commission refused to do.
At the next meeting of the Syndicate on July 3. 1963. 16 out of the 17 members who .had attended the previous meeting \\'ere present.
They authorised the correction of the minu~
tes of the last meeting to read "not to accept the recommendation of the
Commission·· in place of the v,.rords "not to proceed' With the question of
making- his appointment". Thereafter bv resolution it appointed respondent
No. 1 to the post in auestion.
Tl:Je aooellant me.de a reoresentation to the
Chancellor of the Universitv challeneing the appointment. The Chancellor
purpo•tino to act under s.:l(4) of the Patna Universitv Act 3 of 1962
Jnnulled the Svndicate's resolution making the appointnient on the following
~roun''"': (i) !hat the revised advertisement was unauthorised inasmuch as
it \\'JS anainst fhe statute and Sought to amend it. as also because it was
issueJ without the orior aoorov::i.1 of the Chancellor: (ii) that since only
one of the exoerts associated 1.vith thf': selection wa<.: oresent at the interviews
~.'.!6(~) of the Act w::i.<.: violated: (iii) th'.:lt the Vice-Chancellor's action in
refcrrinq, th~ matter for reconsideration by the Commission \vas without
1he authority of the syndicate and was not warranted under s 26(4): (iv)
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that under a prior resolution of the ,syndi<;ate a decision taken Jt its meeting
could no~ be f,evised for a period of six months therefrom; therefore' its.
resolution of May 7, 1963 not accepting the recommendation <egarding the
respon_dent. cq.\}lfi not .be substituFed by its resolution date~ July 3, 1963
by which he was appointed. Respondent No. I challenged the Chancellor's
order in High Court 'which held ii to b.e invalid.
In appeal by certi··
ficate,
'
HELD~ '(i) In a· writ petition for certiorari a sup~riot court would not
interfere on the mere ground of an erfdr of fact or even Of law, but if.~
the error of law is apparent on the record or consists of a misconstruction
of a'jaw 'on which''a~sumption of jurisdiction is made which otherwise'd°oes
not •fist, a certior(ll'I can issue. In the instant case the :chancellor on ·tha:
four .gro~mds bh which he annulled the Syndicate's resolution approprtated
to himself the jurisdiction· to interfere which he did not have unaer s. 9(4)
of the Act.
The High,Court rightly held that the Chancellor's •ssump··
tion of jurisd,iction was based on a wrong interpretation of the statute and
thut there was 'an apparent error of law on the record. [592 D·E]
~
,(ii) Vndyr s. ey,5 of tlte-P!llna University Act, 1962 until s.tatutes, Ordin·
ailces,' RegulB.tioiis ahd RuleS w-ere made under the Act, Regulations-- made·
urider the Biha'ri State University Act 14 1960: were to 'Continue to be in
force. That statute did not say that the Master's degree- which a candidate
for the post of Professor was required tio possess baQ. to be 'in the subject'
for which the candidate would be appointed.
Therefore in issuing the re-·
vised advertiserr\ent'the Vice-Chadcellor did not purport .. to modify of alter
the statute relatii:ig to the qualifications but on the contrary clarifiec\ the
correct position.
The Chancellor £OU1d not on a wrong interpretation' of
the statute hold that the revised advertisement was a modification of thestatute. [592 G-H; 593 G-H]
'
The Vice-Chancellor had obtain~·
d the approval of the Chancellor for
filling up the vacancy by direct recr tment and also for the advertisement
in terms of the statute. Once such an pproval had been obtained no further
approval was necessary for the various consequential steps which would'
have to be taken.,6 bring about the appointment and fill up the vacancy ip;
eluding_ .revisioi;i of the advertisement for bt;inging it into conforrriitv with·
the st;itute.
The Chancellor was therefore wrong in holding that ·the·
rfViseJ tidf'ertisemerlt reQui1ed'his. approval. [594 D-G]
(iii) Section 26(2.) (iii) of the Act does not s~y that the expert~ re--
quired to be 'associated' with the selection had ,to be present at the interviews.
;-.;lo S\1-Ch• inference could be ,drawn from the prOvision that they
would not have the ri~ht to vote. The Chancellor was therefore in error
\\ he-i he h'eld that the recornmendatioo. of the Commission was invalid he:.
cause_ orle., Of' the experts consulted was not present at
the
interviews.
1595 A-Fl
(iv) It is only ythen the Syndicate declines to accept the recommenda··
tion of th Commission that the question of sendin:;' back the nlatter for
ri!consideratiOn c\rises und"Cr S. 26( 4) ." There can be no
q~cstion of
sending h'aC!2 'the matter \Vhen the Syndicate either accepts the reconlmcndatiori1 or deCid~~ inot to proceed with making the appointn1ent There
\\'a" an1'ple nJat~riJ.l on record to ~show ihat o.n May 7. 196} the Syndicate
in fa(!
decidcU~)lot to accept the comr,1ission's recommendation.
At its
sur.$~quent me~ting- the
Svndicate corrected the
minutes to this effect.
Th: \"ice-ChanceU~r hail rh.?htlv understood the Syndi~ate's decision and'
fo- rcrnnsidcration'! [595 H-596 El
588
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1971) l S.C.R
When a decision is taken at a meeting and is minuted a·,1J such minut~~
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arc signed by the Chairman they become prin1a facie evidence of ,,·h:it
took place at the meeting.
After such signature the n1inut::'i cannot b.;
altered.
But before the minutes are signed they can be altered if foun<l
to be inaccurate or not in accord with what \i..:as actually Jccided.
1t
that were not so it \vould result in great hardship and lnconvenience for
ho\\·ever inaccurate they arc, they cannot be altered to bring them ;n cor.·
forn1ity with the actual decision.
This \Vas precisely \\hat \v;ls done at the
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meetin.£ of July 3, 1963 l597 A-DJ
The viev.· of the Chancellor that the alteration o·f the minutes on Julv 3.
'1963 constituted a revision or recission of the earlier de;ision or that s·uch
:revision or recission could not be made be~ore the expiry of six months
as provided by the rule passed hy the Syndicate. was unsustainable. [597
G·HT
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2221 of
1966.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated March 8, 1965
·of the P~tna High Court in Misc. Judicial Case No. 1554 of 1964.
H. P. Jha, for the appellant.
Bishan Narain, S. S. Jauhar, K. K. Sinha and Mamsh Kumar
Sinha, for respondent No. 1.
Sarjoo Prasad, R. N. Sinha and U. P. Singh, for respondents
~OS. 3 to 5.
The Judgment' of the Court was delivered by
Shelat, J,
This appeal,
by
certificate,
is directed agaimt
the judgment of the High Court of Patna dated March 8, 1965,
whereby it set aside the order of the Chancellor of the Unil"ersity
of Patna dated September 26, 1964 passed under s. 9( 4) of the
Patna University Act, TI! oi 1962 (hereinafter referred to a; the
Act),
On the retirement o.f one Dr. Muhar as the Umversitl" Professor of Political Science a permanent vacancy occurred fn that
post.
The Vice-Chancellor of the' University. after obtaining the
approval of the Chancellor for filling up the vacancy by direct
recruitment, got the post advertised through the Bihar Public
Service Commission.
ln his letter requesting the approval, the
Vice-Chancellor had stated that he did not propose to lay down
any qualifications in addition to those prescribed under the rele·
vant University Statute. The advertisement, as published oy the
cCommissio.n, announced the necessary qualifications as under :
"First or second class Master's degree in the sub·
ject of an Indian University or an equivalent qualification of a foreign university. . . . . "
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A little later, the Vice-Chancellor got published through the Commis,ion another advertisement amending the earlier
advertisement. The revised advertisement stated the required qualification'
"' under :
"First or second ciass Master's degree in Political
Science or in an allied subject like History or Economics
of an Indian University or an equivalent qualification
of a foreign university-."
As required by the Act, the State Public Service Commission
had to recommend name or names of the candidates for the·
cippointment.
For this purpose two experts in the subject, Dr.
J\-1. P. Sharma of the Saugar University and Dr. Bhaskaran of
the Madras University, were to assist the Commission.
At the
interviews of the candidates taken by the Commission on March
~- 1963 Dr. Sharma was present, but the other expert could not
attend.
His views, therefore, had to be communicated to the
Commission by post.
The Commission recommended respondent
1 herein as the candidate suitable for the post.
On May 7,_ 1963. the Syndicate of the University which had
by that time been constituted under the Act, held its meeting to
c0nsider the Commission's recommendation. The minutes of the
meetings. ·as drawn up. stated the resolution said to have been
:':"sed by a majority of 9 to 8 in the foJlowing terms :
"Not to proc~ed with the question of making this
appointment."
As appearing from subsequent events, it would seem that the said
minutes were not correctlv drafted.
The Vice-Chancellor als'.J
:ippears to have understood that the decision taken at the said
meeting was that the
Commission's
recommendation
was not
::cceptable to the Syndicate and not that the Syndicate was not
10 proceed with the question of making the appointment. Accordingly. at his instance. the Registrar of the University. by his letter
dated June 11. 1963. informed the Commission that the Syndicate
had resolved not to accept its recommendation and he had, there-
:·ore. to request the Commission to reconsider its aforesaid recommendation under s. 26( 4) of the Act.
On June 22. 1963. the
[OJ.:mission wrote back to sav that it found no reason to reconsider its earlier recommendation.
At the next meeting of the
Syndicate held on July 3, 1963, amongst those who were present
were 16 out of the 17 members who had attended the previous
meeting of May 7. 1963.
When the minutes of the
previous
meeting were placed for confirmation it was found that the minutes
as drafted. namely. "not to proceed with the question of making
this appointment" did not represent the resolution which
was
590
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1971] l S.C,R.
.actually passed.
Those words were, therefore, scored out and
fostead the words "not to accept the recommendation of the Commission" were substituted so as to bring the minutes in conformity
with the resolution actually passed. Thereafter the meeting considered the Commission's recommendation and appointed
respondent 1 to the post of University Professor for Political Science
by a majority of 10 to 3 with f0;,, abstentions.
That the ViceChancellor to !et him have his comments on the points raised
minutes a§ drafted did not incorporate the resolution actually
passed on May 7, 1963 is indicated by the fact that. in his representation to the Chancellor even the appellant himself stated that
the Syndicate on May 7, 1963 had decided not to accept the Commission's recommendation.
The appellant did, riot state in that
representation that the Syndicate had resolved not to pro~eed'with
the making of the appointment. Another circumstance indicating
that the said minutes were not correctly drafted was that while
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the items of confirmation came up before the Sy,ndicate on July
3, 1963, which, as aforesaid, was attended by 16 out of the 17
members who had participated in the previous meeting, none of
those 16 members appears to have protested against the change
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in the language of the minutes on the ground that the .resolution
then passed was that the Syndicate would not proceed with the
appoinment, or that the resolution actually passed was not one
refusing to accept the Commission's recommendation of re<pondent I.
Against the resolution dated July 3, 1963 appointing respondent 1, the appellant and Dr. L. P. Siriha, the. Bead of the Department of Political Science, made representations to the Chancellor.
Thereupon the Chancellor first called upon the
ViceChancellor to let him have his comments on the points raised
in the said representations.
On July 15, 1963, the Vice-Chan-
..:ellor furnished his comments. Thereafter the Chancellor issued
~how cause notice to the appellant and the Vice-Chancellor and
after receiying their replies as also the report of the Legal Affairs
Committee appointed by the Syndicate passed the impugned order
under s. 9 ( 4) of the Act annulling the Syndicate's resolution of
July 3, 1963 by which the appointment of respondent' I was made.
Shortly stated the grounds on which the impugrted order was
passed were :
( 1 ) (a) that the revised advertisement, which substituted the words "in the
~ubject" qy the words "in
Political Science or in any allied subject like Bistory
and Economics", had the effect of amending the· Univerc·
sity Statute laying down the qualifications for the post,
that such an amendment could only be made by framing
a new statute under ss. 30 and 31 of the Act and not
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unilaterally by the Vice-Chancellor, and that therefore,
the revised advertisement was invalid;
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( b) that the words in the University Statute, namely, that the University Professor "shall possess a first or
second class Master's degree" meant a Master's degree
"in the subject"; consequently: the original advertisement was in conformity with the University Statute relating to the qualifications, and therefore, the revised advertisemeIJ.t by substituting Hie words "in the subject''
by the words "in political Science or in any allied subject" etc. had the effect of amending the Statute and was
unauthorised;
( c) that the revised advertisement was also bad, in
that, the Vice-Chancellor could not alter the origi1ial
advertisement without the previous
approval of
the
Chancellor under s. 57 of the Act;
(2) that s. 26(2) of the Act contemplates that the
Public Service Commission should take the assistance o!
two experts before making its recommendation, that the
section required that the experts should be present at
the time when the Commission took the interviews of
the candida1es, that the interviews, in the absence of one
of the two experts, were not valid, that therefore, a recomendation based on such invalid
interviews
and
following such recommendation the appointment made
by the Syndicate were both invalid;
( 3) that on a recommendation made by the Commission, the Syndicate had three options. (a) to accept
it and proceed to make the appointment, (b) to reject
it and refer the matter to the Commission for reconsideration, and ( c) to give up the idea of making the
appointment at all; that it was only in the case of (b)
that the matter could be referred back to the Commission under s. 26 ( 4). The Vice-Chancellor's action in
referring the matter for reconsideration by the. Commission was without the authority of the Syndicate and
was not warranted under s. 26 ( 4) :
( 4) that under a prior resoiution of the Syndicate
dated November 13, 1952, a decision taken at the meeting could not be revised for a period of six months there
from.
Consequently, the decision taken by the Syndicate at its meeting on May 7, 1963 not to proceed with
the appointment could not be revised by the Syndicate
before the expiry of six months, and that therefore, the
Syndicate's resolution of July 3, 1963 was invalid.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1971] l S.C.R.
#
In the writ petition filed by respondent 1 against the impugned order of the Chancellor the High Court
quashed the
said order and issued a certiorari on the ground that the order
in que;tion was passed on an erroneous interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Act and the University Statute.
Jn challenging the correctness and validity of the High Court''
order, counsel for the appellant contended before us that the
High Court had no jurisdiction to issue the certiorari as the impugned order did not involve any question of either the assumption
of excessiv·e jurisdiction or a refusal to exercise jurisdiction or any
illegality in procedure or any breach of the principles of natural
justice. The High Court, he argued, could not in exercise of its
prerogative jurisdiction under Art. 226 interfere with or set aside
the impugned order on the ground of a mistake even if such a
mistake was one of law, that is to say, in the Chancellor's interpretation either of the University Statute or any of the provisions
of the Act.
It is true that in a writ petition for certiorari a
superior court would not interfere on the mere ground of an error
of fact or even of Jaw, but if the error of Jaw is apparent on the
record. or consists of a misconstruction of a law on which assumption of iurisdiction is made which otherwise does not exist, a
certiorari can issue.
The question, therefore, is : whether in the
instant case that was the position ° The question, in other words.
would be whether the Cha~cellor, on the four grounds on which
he annulled the Syndicate's resolution, appropriated to himself the
jurisdiction to interfere which he did not have under s. 9( 4) of
the Act.
l1nder s. 58 of the Act, until Statutes, Ordinances, Regulations
and Rules were made under the Act. Regulations made under
the Bihar State Universities Act, XIV of 1960, which were in
force immediately before the commencement of the present Act.
were to continue to be in force and were to be deemed to be
Statutes. Ordinances, Regulations and Rules made under· the corresponding provisions of this Act. Ch, XIT of the Statutes made
under the~ earlier Act and which was in force immediate1v before
the commencement of the Act, was. therefore, to continue in
force and was deemed to have been made under the present Act.
Under that Statute. the qualifications for the post of a University
Professor were inter a/ia "a first or a second class Master's degree
of an Indian University or an equivalent qualification of a foreign
universitv".
The Statute. it wi]] be noticed, did not Jay down
that the ·Master's degree had to be "in the subject" for which the
candidate would be appointed. Apparently, the question whether
the concerned candidate was proficient in the subject for which
he had applied for appointment was left for decision by the appointing authoritv.
Under Ch. XIV of the Statute, whenever an
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appointment had to be made the Vice-Chancellor had the power
with the approval of the Chancellor to decide whether the post
. should be filled up by promotion or by direct recruitment.
There is no dispute that the Vice-Chancellor had obtained
such approval and the post was to be filled up by direct recruitment.
As required by s. 26(1) of the Act, appointments of
teachers and professors of the University could only be made on
the recommend_ations made by the State Public Service Commission. Accordingly, the Vice-Chancellor sent to the Commission a requisition for advertisement for the post. In that requisition he set out, without any words of limitation or additional
qualifications, Ch. XII of the Statut~s which laid down the qualifications. In the advertisement issued by the Commission, however, that body introduced the words "in the subject" announcing
thereby that the candidate must possess a first or second class
Master's degree in Political Science. The insertion of those words
of limitation clearly was not in comformity either with the requisition sent by the Vice-Chancellor or with Ch. XII of the
Statutes and actually debarred candidates with first or second
class Master's degrees in subjects other than Political Science.
Such a restriction was not consistent with the Statute in Ch. XII
laying down the qualifications.
It was obviously to correct this error on the part of the Com
mission that the Vice-Chancellor caused the revised advertisement to be issued by the Commission in which it was clarified that
candidates not only with first or second class M. A. degrees in
Political Science but those with such degrees in allied subjects
such as History and Economics could also apply.
The record
shows that this fact was explained to the Chancellor by the ViceChancellor and the then Chancellor had at that time raised no
objection.
As appears from the Vice-C:1ancellor's reply to the
show cause notice issued by the Chancellor, this very interpretation of the Statute had been given in the past on a number of
occasions and several appointments had been made without any
objection from anybody.
The revised advertisement was thus
made to clarify the position that under the Statute laying down
the qualifications for the post it was not as if an eligible candidate
could be the one who held the M.A. degree in Political Science
only. Since the post was for a professorship in Political Science,
the revised advertisement stated that candidates with
first
or
second class M.A. degree in Political Science as a]so in an allied
subject could apply.
In doing so the Vice-Chancellor did not
purport to modify or alter the Statute refating to qua'lifications as
was the view of the Chancelkr, but on the contrary, clarified the
correct position and gave a correct interpretation to the Statute
in question.
The Chancellor, therefore, could not, on a wroni
13Sup. Cl/70-9.
594
SUPREME COURT REfORTS
(l971] ! S.C.lt
interpretation o.f the Statute, held that the revised advertisement
was a modificatiop of that Statute, that it was, therefore, invalid.
and that therefore, he had the jurisdiction to nullify the Syndicate's
rcsolut!on.of July 3, 1963 under s. 9(4) of the Act.
Sec. 9(4)
a~thonses t~e Chancell?r t~ nullify th.~ Syndicate"s resolution pro·
v1ded only 1f the Syndicates proceedings were not in conformitv
with the Act or the Statute.
•
Under s. 57 of the Act, which ideals with
transitory provisions, the Vice-Chancellor had, for a period of six months from
the date of the commencement of the i Act, the power to discharge
all the function of the University for carrying out the purposes
of the ~<'t and to exercise powers arid perform the duties of any
oflicer or authority of the University. subject, of course, to the
previous approval of the Chancellor I This provision was m~de
to carry on the university and its fu~ctions till the other authorities such as the Senate, the Syndicate and the Academic Council
were duly constituted under the new Act.
The appointment of
a University Professor in place of Dr. Muhar was obviously one
of the functions of the University, ,vhich. subject to the Chan··
cellar's approval, had to be performed by the Vice-Chancellor.
Admittedly, the Vice-Chancellor had obtained such appr0val for
filling up the vacancy by direct recru1tment and also for the advertisement in terms of the Statute laying down the qualifications for
the post.
Once, therefore, such an ·approval had been obtained.
no further approval would be necessary for the various consequential steps which would have to be taken to bring about the
appointment and fill in the vacancy. Furthermore, the revision in
the advertisement became necessary because the
advertisement
given by the Commission was not in ,conformity with the University
Statute and the requisition made by ;'the Vice-Chancellor for which
he had already obtained the Chancellor's
approval.
In other
words, he had the advertisement revised so as to bring it in accord
with his requisition which was san¢tioned by the Chancellor. That
could only be done by removing jhe limitation under which con·
trary to the Statute only candidates with M.A. degrees in Political
Science could apply. The Chancellor, therefore, was in error in
holding that the revised advertisement required his approval and
that in the absence of such approval it was invalid or that the
Commission's recommendation and the appointment by the Syndicate based thereon were bad in law on that account.
The second ground on which the Chancellor
nullified the
appointment was, in our view, equally unsustainable.
Under s.
26(2), the Commission had to have the assistance of two expert>
in the subject for which an appointment was to he made.
Cl.
(iii) of that sub-section provides that such experts "shall be assoA
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ciated" with the Commission, whose duty it shall be to give expert
advice to the Commission but who shall have· no right to vote.
The Chancellor, in our opinion, read more in this sub-section than
what it contains or requires.
The sub-section merely
requires
that the two experts shall be "associated" with the Commission
before it made its recommendation. It does not say that such
association can only be by their presence at the time of the interviews. If that were so, it was· easy for the Legislature to provide
that the expert or experts shall remain present at the time of the
interviews. The benefit of expert advice can be had both by the
experts remailling present at the time of the interviews and also
by their advice communicated to the Commission by post or otherwise.
There is nothing in cl. (iii) suggesting that only th~ first
method was the one which was intended.
On the contrary, the
deliberate use of the word "associated" indicates that the Legislature thought that such advice could be made available by both
the methods.
The Legislature appears to have left the method
of obtaining such advice to the Commission for it is possible that
by making their presence at the interviews compulsory, the Commission might in conceiveable cases lose the benefit of really competent experts residing at distant places, not to say -0f those outside the country. The denial of the right to vote to the experts
has nothing to do with their having to be present or not.
What
is sought by the clause is that even if the experts happen to be
present they cannot affect the decision of the Commission which
is the exclusive decision of that body. The Chancellor clearly
misinterpreted cl. (iii) of s .. 26(2) when he thought that the denial
of the right to vote to the experts therein indicated that they were
required to be present at the time of the interviews. Admittedly,
the Commission, as required by cl. (iii), had the benefit of the
advice of both the experts.
The experts were, therefore, "associated" with the Commission and consequently the requirements
of that clause were fulfilled, despite one of them not being present
at the time of the interviews. The Chancellor was, therefore, in
error wh~n he held that the recommendation ot the Commission
was invalid, and therefore, the appointment based o nit was also
invalid.
Grounds 3 and 4 of the Chancellor involve a common question and may conveniently be dealt with together. It is true, as
the Chancellor said, that on the recommendation made by the
Commission the Syndicate could adopt
any one of the
three
courses, viz., to accept it, or to decline to accept it and refer back
the recommendation to the Commission for reconsideratioii,' or
not !o. proce~ with making the appointment. . It is equ~lff trii~
that 1t is only Ill the e&se of the ~econd course that the m'atter'c011-ld
~e sent back for reconsi~eration up~er s. 26(4)t f6!i '~i<nisly
m the case of the syndicate. ae¢eptmg~1be rei;Oifimend.atitm ·0r
596
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1971] l S.C.R.
refusing to proceed to make the appointment, the question
of
M:nding back the matter for reconsideration does not arise at all.
T)1e point for Consideration,_ therefore, is : which particular course
<lid the Syndicate adopt at the meeting of May 7, 1963 ? There
is abundant material on record to show that on May 7, 1963 the
Syndicate in fact decided not to accept the Commission's recommendation. But the minutes, as drafted and placed for confirmation before the meeting of July 3, 1963, were not only not
in
a;:cord with that decision but t1lrough mistake or inadvertence
hJd recorded something quite different. This was found out when
the minutes were placed before the meeting for confirmation. They
were, therefore, corrected by scoring out the incorrect portion and
sul;stituting it by words incorporating the decision that the Syndicate did not accept the Commission's recommendation.
As already stated, this position is borne out by the fact that though
\here were present in that meeting as many as 16 members who
had participated in the previous meeting none of them protested
t0 the alteration in the minutes nor did any one of them 3ay that
the decision taken on Ma_y 7, 1963 was not one of refusal to accept
the Commission's reco~endation. Therefore, if the Syndicate's
decision was not to accept the Commission's recommendation it
had to refer under s. 26( 4) the matt.er back to the Commission,
the words of sub-s. ( 4) of s. 26 in that regard being mandatory.
le seems that the Vice-Chancellor had also understood that the
Syndicate's decision of May 7, 1963 was not to accept the Commission's recommendation and it was because he had so understood that he got the Registrar on Jun.e 11, 1963 to refer the
matter back to the Commission.
The question then is whether the minutes, as
drafted
and
placed before t!le meeting on July 3, 1963, could be altered as
was done on that day. The alteration clearly was not of a minor
or a clerical error but constituted a substantial change. Minutes
of a meeting are recorded to safeguard against future d.isputes as
to what had taken place thereat. They are a record of the fact
t'iat a meeting was held and of the decision taken thereat. Usually
the · are written up after the termination of the meeting,
ofter.
lroin rough notes taken by the person who is to draft them and
then are placed before the next meeting for what is
generally
known as "confirmation", though they are placed for verification
and not for confirmation.
Indeed, theire is no question of any
confir•nation at the next meeting of a decision already taken, for,
a dev ·.'.)n once taken does not require any confirn1ation. Accordingly, when minutes of a meeting are placed before the next meeting the only .thing that can be done is to see whetheir the decision
taken at the earlier meeting has been properly recorded or not.
The accuracy of the minutes and not the validity of the decision
is, therefore, before the meeting: Once a decision is duly t::Jcen it
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can only be changed by a substantive resolution properly adopted
for such a change.
When, therefore, a decision is taken and is
minuted and such minutes are signed by the Chairman they become prima facie evidence of what took place at the meeting. Jn
the case of company meetings,
every meeting of directors or
managers in respect of whose proceedings minutes have been so
lllade is deemed to have been properly held and convtined and all
proceedings had there to have been duly had and all appointments
of directors, managers or liquidators are deemed to be valid unless the contrary is proved.
(cf. Halsbury's Laws of England.
3rd ed., vol. 6, p. 318). This is the position when minutes have
been signed by the Chairman. After such signature they cannot
be altered. But before the minutes are signed they can be altered
if found to be inaccurate or not in accord with what was actually
decided. If that were not to be so, it would result in great hardship and inconvenience, for, however, inaccurate they are, they
cannot be altered to bring them in conformity with the
actual
decision.
[cf. Talbot, W.F., Company Meetngs, ( 1951 ed.).
p. 82).
This was precisely what was done at the meeting of Juty
? , 1963 and no objectiQn to the course adopted then by the Chairm~n and the Syndicate could be validly taktn particularly
cs
nrne present then had raised any protest against the alteration.
The decision rc'ied on by Mr. Jha in In re Botherham Alum and
Ch~mical Company(') is altogether on a different question and
cannot be of any assistance.
Since the Vice-Chancellor was right in his understanding that
what had been decided at the meeting of May 7, 1963 was not to
accept the Commission's recommendation and since such refusal to
accept meant under s. 26( 4) that the matter should be sent back
to the Commission for recommendatic.rl, his action in asking the
Commission to reconsider clearly fell under s. 26(4) and could
not be said to be unwarranted as the Chancellor ruled.
Since
that was actually the decision of the Syndicate, the Vice-Chancellor
was bound to follow it Up by writing to the Commission to reconsider its recommendation.
It is somewhat difficult to appreciate
the Chancellor's observation that that action was unwarranted as
it was without the Syndicate's sanction. Once the Syndicate had
taken the decision of not accepting the recommendation, it was
obligatory under s. 26( 4) to refer back the matter to the Com-
- mission.
The action taken by the Vice-Chancellor was consequential and required no further
sanction of the
Syndicate.
Equally unsustainable was the view of the Ch~ncellor that. ~he
alteration in the minutes on July 3, 1963 constituted a revmon
or a recission of the earlier decision or that such revision or recission could not be made 6efore the expiry of six months as provided by the rule passed by the Syndicate in 1952.
In our view
11\ [1884] 25 Ch. D. p. !OJ.
598
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1971 J I S.C.R.
the revised advertisement,
the remission of the matter to the
Commission, the recommendation of respondent 1 by the Commission and the proceedings of the Syndicate's meeting of. July 3,
1963 including the revjsion of the draft minutes were all in accordaace with the provisions of the Act and the University Statutes
and therefore the Chancellor had no jurisdiction under s. 9 ( 4) of
the Act to annul the decision of the Syndicate or the proceedings
of thi meeting of July 3, 1963.
In the result, the High Court was right in holding the ·annulling
order of the Chancellor to be without jurisdiction as it was passed
on a wrong assumption of jurisdiction.made on a misinterpretation
of !he Act and the University Statute. The High Court accordingly was justified on that ground as also on the ground that there
was an apparent error of law ort .the record to quash the impugned
order of the Chancellor. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. Each party will bear his own costs.
G.C.
Appeal dismissed.
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