# CHITAN J. VASWANI & ANR v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR

- **Citation:** [1976] 2 S.C.R. 300
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1975-10-10
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 300 of 1975
- **Bench:** V. R. Krishna Iyer, A: C. Gupta
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/chitan-j-vaswani-anr-v-state-of-west-bengal-anr-6801
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Suppression of lmmoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act (104 of 1956) ss. 3.
7 and 18-Conviction under ss. J and 7-Power of Magistrate to order evictio111
of keeper or occupier.
\
The appellants were keepers of a public place namely, a bar. They werea.
convicted under s. 3(1) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffio
in
Women
and Girls Act, 1956, for keeping or managing a brothel in the bar, and under
s. 7(2){a) for knowingly permitting prostitutes for the purpose of their trade to
Jo,
resort to or remain in the bar. There was also a direction under s. 18 (I) read!
with s. 18(2) of the Act evicting the appellants from the bar.
It was contended that the order of eviction was bad, because. the bar was.
not within 200 yds. of any public institution of the type referred to ins. 18(1).
HELD : The Magistrate has power to order eviction when there is a conviction either under s. 3 ors. 7. [306 El
Under s. 18'(1), when a Magistrate receives information that a brothel is
being run within a distance of 200 yds. from certain specified types of public
institutions, he may order the eviction of the occupier after hearing him. Under
s. 18(2), once a court convicts a person under s. 3 or s. 7, it may pass orders
~-'\
under s. 18 ( 1) without further notice to such person to show cause as required.
in that sub-section. A close reading of s. 18(2), however. indicates that the
orders under sub-section (1) referred to therein do not wholesale import the
substantive paragraph of s. 18(1 ). but only the eviction orders contained therein. [304 B. G: 305 F-Hl
(a) The consequence of a conviction under s. 3 is the invalidation of any
lease of the premises where the brothel is run.
The logical consequence must
be that the occupier must be throym out of such premises. This is achieved:
by the exercise of the power under s. 18(2). [305 BJ
(b) Section 7 (I) punishes prostitution in premises within a distance of
200 yds. of specified places. Section 7 (2) (b) punishes the person who permits
the use of premises in his occupation for prostitution, and it is an ingredient of "
the offence that the premises must be within 200 yards distance of the specified
"- •
places; but s. 7(2)(a) punishes the keeper of any public place who knowingly
t,/
permits prostitutes to resort to such place for their trade. No question of'
distance arises with respect to such a conviction.
But s. 18 (2) empowers the·
court to pass orders under s. 18 ( 1) if there is a conviction under s. 7 regardless
of whether it falls under s. 7(2)(a) or (b). [305 C-E]
Therefore, s. 18(2) operates not merely on places within the oliending distance of 200 yds. but in all places where the activity of prostitution had been'
conducted. [305 Gl
( c) To dispel the ambiguity in s. 18 ( 2) it must be interpreted in such a way
as to advance the remedy and suppress the evil. If the purpose of extirpating
.the commercial vice from a place were to be successful. the occupier must be
expe!led from there. f304 Hl
Sub-Div. Magistrate v. Ram Kali, [1968] 1 S.C.R. 205 and Heyd en's (1584)
3 Co, Rep. 71, case referred to.
.,. \
•,
...
c. J. VASWANI v. WEST BENGAL (Krishna Iyer, !.)
301

## Text

A
B
c
D
E
F
G
300
CHITAN J. VASWANI & ANR.
v.
STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR.
October 10, 1975
[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND A: C. GUPTA, JJ.]
Suppression of lmmoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act (104 of 1956) ss. 3.
7 and 18-Conviction under ss. J and 7-Power of Magistrate to order evictio111
of keeper or occupier.
\
The appellants were keepers of a public place namely, a bar. They werea.
convicted under s. 3(1) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffio
in
Women
and Girls Act, 1956, for keeping or managing a brothel in the bar, and under
s. 7(2){a) for knowingly permitting prostitutes for the purpose of their trade to
Jo,
resort to or remain in the bar. There was also a direction under s. 18 (I) read!
with s. 18(2) of the Act evicting the appellants from the bar.
It was contended that the order of eviction was bad, because. the bar was.
not within 200 yds. of any public institution of the type referred to ins. 18(1).
HELD : The Magistrate has power to order eviction when there is a conviction either under s. 3 ors. 7. [306 El
Under s. 18'(1), when a Magistrate receives information that a brothel is
being run within a distance of 200 yds. from certain specified types of public
institutions, he may order the eviction of the occupier after hearing him. Under
s. 18(2), once a court convicts a person under s. 3 or s. 7, it may pass orders
~-'\
under s. 18 ( 1) without further notice to such person to show cause as required.
in that sub-section. A close reading of s. 18(2), however. indicates that the
orders under sub-section (1) referred to therein do not wholesale import the
substantive paragraph of s. 18(1 ). but only the eviction orders contained therein. [304 B. G: 305 F-Hl
(a) The consequence of a conviction under s. 3 is the invalidation of any
lease of the premises where the brothel is run.
The logical consequence must
be that the occupier must be throym out of such premises. This is achieved:
by the exercise of the power under s. 18(2). [305 BJ
(b) Section 7 (I) punishes prostitution in premises within a distance of
200 yds. of specified places. Section 7 (2) (b) punishes the person who permits
the use of premises in his occupation for prostitution, and it is an ingredient of "
the offence that the premises must be within 200 yards distance of the specified
"- •
places; but s. 7(2)(a) punishes the keeper of any public place who knowingly
t,/
permits prostitutes to resort to such place for their trade. No question of'
distance arises with respect to such a conviction.
But s. 18 (2) empowers the·
court to pass orders under s. 18 ( 1) if there is a conviction under s. 7 regardless
of whether it falls under s. 7(2)(a) or (b). [305 C-E]
Therefore, s. 18(2) operates not merely on places within the oliending distance of 200 yds. but in all places where the activity of prostitution had been'
conducted. [305 Gl
( c) To dispel the ambiguity in s. 18 ( 2) it must be interpreted in such a way
as to advance the remedy and suppress the evil. If the purpose of extirpating
.the commercial vice from a place were to be successful. the occupier must be
expe!led from there. f304 Hl
Sub-Div. Magistrate v. Ram Kali, [1968] 1 S.C.R. 205 and Heyd en's (1584)
3 Co, Rep. 71, case referred to.
.,. \
•,
...
c. J. VASWANI v. WEST BENGAL (Krishna Iyer, !.)
301
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 300 of
1975.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the
17th March, 1975 of the Calcutta High Court in Govt. Appeal No. 9
; of 1974 and Criminal Revision Nos. 438 and 524 of 1974.
D. Mookherjee and D. N. Mukherjee, for the Appellants.
A. K. Sen and D. N. Gupta, for Respondent No. 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
A
B
KRISHNA IYER, J. Not for dramatic effect but to sting social conscience, we set out the tragic story of this case which is typical of the
spreading disease of immoral traffic, to remedy which the Suppression
of Immoral Traffic in Women And Girls Act, 1956 (for short, the
C
Act) was enacted by Parliament in a mood of high morality but with
such drafting inefficiency that it has pathetically failed to produce any
decline in the malady.
The scene is the lsias Bar, 15, Free School Street, Calcutta.
A
hall of enchantment extends nocturnal invitation to have a nice time
with svelte sylphs.
The entrance fee is but a paltry Rs. 15/- per man
and inside is served animating liquor.
Scantily clad female flesh of
sweet seventeen or thereabouts flit about or sit on laps, to the heady
tune of band music.
They solicit carnal custom, and the willing male
victims pay Rs. 30/-, choose whom they fancy, drink together and,
taking leave of decencies, indulge in promiscuous sex exercise legally'
described as operation prostitution.
The stage is busy with
many
men and girls moving into rooms, lavatories and chambers.
The
curtain rises and a raiding party of police and excise officers surprise
this arotic company drowned in drink and damsels.
This lacherous drama need not detain us further.
The Act went
into action, a prosecution was launched against many under s. 7
resulting in conviction and sentence of two persons, the proprietor and
the manager·of the Isias Bar. Often times, a bar or restaurant is a
euphemism for a brothel and the socialites, unsuspectedly and without
smirch, satisfy their sex in these respectably_ labellel houses patronised
by even prestigious dignitaries and opulent businessmen.
An appeal to the High Court substantially failed and the appeal
by the State on some counts, partly succeeded. In this Court, leave
was refused regarding the challenge against the guilt and so the findings
sustaining the conviction stand;
but it is necessary to clari£y that
ultimately the High Court modified the conviction to an extent and
we have to proceed on the footing that the accused, have been found
guilty of offenses under s. 7(2) (a), s. 3(1) but
acquitted
under
s. 7 (2 )(b). What is most pertinent to the present appeal is that an
order was made under s. 18(1) read with sec. 18(2) direc_ting
"the occupiers of portion of premises Nos. 15 and 15/A,
Free School Street commonly known as 'Isias Bar' to be
evicted therefrom within a period of seven days from the
D
E
F
G
H
A
302
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
date of this order and restore possession thereof to the owner
landlord or his agent and we further direct that this premises or any portion thereof shall not be leased out, or
otherwise given possession of, to or for the benefit of the
person or persons, who were connected with the improper
user thereof."
\
B
We had granted special leave limited to the attack on this order for
eviction under s. 18(2) read with s. 18(1). The area of discussion
in these arguments is thus confined to the power to throw out the
occupier of the
guilty premises on conviction for offences under
ss. 3(1) and 7(2)(a) on top of the sentence imposed.
~
c
D
E
G
H
An appreciation of the legal tangle can be facilitated by a .brief
but necessary sketch of the indubitable foundational facts and the basic
legal provisions bearing on the orders under s. 18. The court, as
earlier mentioned, passed an order, following on the sentence, that
since a conviction under ss. 3 and 7 had been rendered, there would
be a direction evicting the appellants-occupiers from the theatre of
prostitutional operation, viz., the Isiah Bar.
The Bar is beyond the
offending distance of 200 yards of any 'public place' referred to in
sub-s. ( 1) of s. 7. The said sub-section itemises premises such as
places of public religious worship, educational institutions, bostelsl
hospitals, nursing homes and such other public places as may be
notified by the authority designated.
At the same time it is a proven
. fact that the appellants have been keeping or managing a brothel
within the meaning of s. 3 ( 1), and are keepers of a public place
knowingly permitting prostitutes for the purposes of their trade to
resort to or remain in such public place viz., the Isiah Bar. Section
18, sub-ss. ( l) to ( 4) may be reproduced in extenso before analysing
the submissions made by counsel on either side :
"18(1). A magistrate may, on receipt of information
from the police or otherwise, that any house, room, place
or any portion thereof within a distance of two hundred
yards of any public place referred to in sub-section (1) of
section 7, is being run or used as a brothel by any person,
or is being used by prostitutes for carnying on their trade,
issue notice on the owner, lessor orlandlord of such house,
room, place or portion or the agent of the owner, lessor
or landlord or on the tenant, lessee, occupier of, or any
other person in charge of such house, room, place, or portion, to show cause within seven days of the receipt of the
notice why the same should not be attached for improper
user thereof; and if, after hearing the person concerned, the
magistrate is satisfied that the house, room, place, or portion
is being used as a brothel or for carrying on prostitution,
then the magistrate may pass orders-
( a) directing eviction of the occupier within seven days
of the passin& of the brder from the house, room,
place, or port10n;
..
..
c. J. VASWANI v. WEST BENGAL (Krishna Iyer, J.)
303
(b) directing that before letting it out during the period
of one year
immediately after the passing of the
order, the owner, lessor or landlord or the agent of
the owner, lessor or landlord shall obtain the previous approval of the magistrate :
Provided that, if the magistrate finds that the owner, lessor or landlord as well as the agent of the owner, lessor or
· landlord, was innocent of the improper user of the house,
room, place or portion, he may cause the same to be restored to the owner, lessor or landlord, or the agent of the
owner, lessor or landlord, with a direction that the house,
room, place or portion shall not be leased out, or otherwise
:given possession of, to or for the benefit of the person who
was allowing the improper user therein.
( 2) A court convicting a person of any offence under
section 3 or section 7 may pass orders under sub-section
(1), without further notice to such person or show cause
as required in that sub-section.
( 3) Orders passed by the magistrate or court under
sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall not be subject to
appeal and shall not be stayed or set aside by the order of
any comi, civil or criminal, and the said orders shall cease
to have validit,y after the expiry of one year :
Provided that where a conviction under section 3 or
section 7 is set aside on appeal on the ground that such
house, room, place or any portion thereof is not being run
or used as a brothel or is not being used by prostitutes for
carrying on their trade, any order passed by the trial court
under sub-section ( 1) shall also be set aside.
( 4) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other
law for the time being in force, when a magistrate passes an
order . under sub-section ( 1 ) , or a court passes an order
under sub-section (2), any lease or agreement under which
the house, room, place or portion is occupied at the time
shall become void and inoperative .
..
A
B
c
D
E
F
The project of the statute, to the extent we are concerned, may
G
11.ew be set out.
When a magistrate receives information that any
brothel is being run within a distance of 200 yards of any public place
such as has been mentioned earlier [in sub-s. ( 1) of s. 7] he may issue
notice to the owner, tenant, occupier or other person in charge of or
connected with the brothel to show cause why it should not be attached
for improper user.
After a hearing being conducted, the magistrate,
if satisfied, may order eviction of the occupier and further direct that
H
the owner or landlord shall not let out the premises for a period of
one IYear after the passing of the order, without his previous approval.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
304
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976) 2 S.C.R
In short, the house of ill-fame where Mrs. Warren's Profession is.
carried on is virtually sealed off by attachment by the magistrate.
However, if the owner satisfies the magistrate of his innocence, it
may·be restored to him with a direction that it shall not be leased out
to the person who had been improperly using it for !mmoral purposes ..
Section 18(1) proprio vigore applies only to brothels within the
vicious distance of 200 yards of specified types of public institutions.
No criminal prosecution or conviction is necessary for taking action
under s. 18 ( 1). Strictly speaking, this is not a punitive provision
but a preventive one.
This power vested in the magistrate is calculated to ensure moral hygiene in the locality which is particularly
sensitive. If one may say so, it is a moral scavenging operation, or
a fumigation process whereby the dangerous visitations mll(Y be totally
inhibited by a legally enforced closure.
So far as we are concerned,
the Isiah Bar is not shown to be within the offending distance and
s. 18(1) cannot therefore apply.
Indeed the Magistrate and the
High C-Ourt have proceeded to exercise powers under s. 18(2) and the
entire controversy before us is as to the real import of that provision.
By way of aside, we may say that plausible submissions were urged
by Shri D. Mukherjee,
supported by the language
of s. 18(2).
Had the drafting been more careful, and lucid, the argument would
have been obviated.
This Court has, more than once, pointed out
that lack of legislative simplicity has led to interpretative complexity.
The home truth that legislation is for the people and must, therefore,.
be plain enough has hardly been realised by our law-makers. Judges,
looking at statutes, are forced to play a linguistic game guessing at
the general legislative purpose and straining at semantics.
In the
present case we have had to reach the conclusion against the appellants by broadening the dimensions of Heyden's case( 1), importing
a 'context-purpose' teleological approach. There are many canons of
statutory construction, but the golden rule is that there are no golden
rules-if we may use Shavian language.
We must emphasize once more that legislative draftsmen and
legislators must not confuse each other but start talking to their real
audience-the people, by writing law in unmistakable and simple
language.
Back to s. 18(2). Once a court convicts a person under s. 3 or
s. 7 as in this case, it may pass orders under sub-s. (1) of s. 18 .
without further notice to such person to show cause as required in
that sub-section.
Shri Mukherjee's submission is that this power of
eviction is conditioned by the !imitations of s.
18 ( 1) . Orders under
sub-s. (1) of s. 18 can, admittedly, be passed only if the brothel is
within 200 yards' distance.
Since, in this case, the place is beyond
that distance, Shri Mukherjee argues that sub-s. (2) cannot apply.
The words 'pass orders under sub-s. ( 1)' creates ambiguity which
we have sought to dispel by trying to advance the remedy and suppress
the evil through the interpretative methodology.
(1) [1584] 3 Co. Rep. 71.
c. J. VASWANI v. WEST BENGAL (Krishna Iyer, J.)
305Shri A. K. Sen has explained-and we think right]jy-that _ s. 3:
A
punishes persons who keep brothels. Sub-s. ( 3) of s. 3 lars d_own
that notwithstanding any other law 'any lease . . . under which such
prell)ises . . . are held or occupied at the time of the commission of
the offence, shall become void and inoperative with effect from the
date of the said conviction'. It is plain therefore that the consequence
of a conviction under s. 3 is the invalidation of the lease of the premises where the brothel is run.
The logical consequence must beR
that the occupier must be thrown out of the prostitutional premises.
This is achieved by exercise of the power under s. 18(2).
Section 7 (1) punishes prostitution in premises within a distance·
of 200 yards of specified sensitive places set out therein.
Section
7(2) works out a dichotomy: sub-s. (2) (a) punishes the keeper of
any public place who knowingly permits prostitutes to resott to such·
€
place (that is, any public place). No question of distance arises here
but sub-s. 2 (b) specifically mentions, as an ingredient of the offence,
that the premises must be such as are referred to in sub-s. (1) (that
is, within 200 yards distance).
A pernm convicted either under
sub-s. (1) or under sub-s. (2) (a) or (b) s. 7 will be covered by
s. 18(2) because the latter provision empowers the court to pass
orders under s. 18(1) if there is a conviction under s. 7, regardless
I>
of whether it falls under sub-s. (2) (a) or (b) of that section.
Moreover, if we have regard to the wholesome purpose of cleansing
houses of ill-fame, it can be achieved only by a broader construction
of s. 18(2).
This Court in Sub-Div. Magistrate v. Ram Kafi(,1)
held that
s. 18(1) deals with one class and s. 18(2) relates to another class.
E
Section 18 ( 1) is a summary procedure for closing down obnoxious
places of prostitution, without going through the detailed process of
a criminal prosecution. It is a quick-acting defensive mechanism,
calculated to extinguish the brothel and promote immediate moral
sanitation, having regard to the social susceptibility of places like
shrines, schools, hostels, hospitals and the like.
Section 18(2) on
the other hand, operates on]jy where persons have been convicted of
F
offen~es. under s. ~ or s .. 1:
Thl!s the place is found to be put to
prost1tuttonal use, 111 a cnmmal tnal. It stands to reason that if the
purpose of extirpating the commercial vice from that venue were to
be successful, the occupier must be expelled therefrom.
This is
precisely what has been done in the present case.
Section 18(2)
operates not merely on places within the offending distance of 200
yards but in all pJraces where the activity of prostitution has been
G
conducted.
A close reading of s. 18(2) indicates that the orders under sub-s.
(1), referred to therein; do not, wholesale, import the
substantive
paragraph of s. 18 (1), but only the evicting orders
contained
in
~· 18(2), .clauses (a) and (b). What is, by a process of abbreviation,
!mPorte? mt~ s. 18 (2) is the decretal part of s. 18 (1) to the extent
H
1t 1s wntten mto s. 18(1), (a) and (b). There is some clumsiness
(I) [1968) l s. c. R. 205.
.A
D
E
306
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 S.C.R.
about the drafting, as we have already stated. Even so, if the purpose
is carried to the meaning that we assign, the section fulfils the social
cause.
We are in the International Women's Year-a circumstance
meaningful socially, but not relevant legally.
Even so, it is time to
tighten up this statute and we may permit ourselves a few concluding
observations, hopefully.
Maybe, there are other provisions of the
·Act which have contributed to its dismal failure in the field and the
legislature must, in the International Year of Women, protect the
virtue of the weaker sex from the purchasing power of the takers of
virginity who sip every flower and change every hour.
No nation, with all its boasts, and all its hopes, can ever morally
be clean till all its women are really free-free to live without sale
of their young flesh to lascivious wealth or commerciailsing their -
luscious figures.
India, to redeem this 'gender justice' and to prescribe prostitution whereby rich men btty poor women through houses
of vice, has salved its social conscience by enacting the Act.
B.ut
the law is so ill-drafted and lacunose that few who follow "the most
ancient Profession in the World" have been frightened into virtue and
the customers of wine-cum-women are catered to respectably in bars,
hotels and night-clubs in sophisticated and subtle ways, especially
in ou'r cities.
We dismiss the appeal, upholding the power of the magistrate to
order eviction when there is a conviction under s. 3 or s. 7 confident
that public power vested in a public functionary for public benefit
shall be used whenever conditions necessary for ·the exercise are
present, so that a comprehensive social purpose of moral clean-up
of public places is accomplished.
V.P.S.
Appeal dismissed.
...