# Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh

- **Citation:** 2025 INSC 577
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2025-04-28
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 2265 of 2025
- **Bench:** B.V. Nagarathna, Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/chunni-bai-v-state-of-chhattisgarh-38361
- **Pages:** 30

## Headnote

Whether the accused at the time of commission of crime was
incapable of making conscious and informed decision or was
suffering from certain mental incapacity or unsoundness of mind;
Whether a benefit of doubt may be extended to the accused as
regards proof of intention and mens rea.
Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 - ss.84, 299, 300, 302, 304 Part II - Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss.161, 313 - Evidence Act, 1872 -
ss.105, 165 - Appellant killed her minor daughters - Appellant
denied her guilt in a statement recorded u/s.313 of CrPC and
claimed that she had no knowledge of what had happened
and how it happened and that she was under the influence
of some invisible power - Trial Court convicted appellant for
offence punishable u/s.302 of IPC - The High Court upheld
the conviction of the appellant u/s.302 of the IPC - Appellant's
plea that the appellant was not in a proper mental condition
at the time of commission of the offence:
Held: No infirmity in the finding given by the Trial Court as well
as the High Court that the appellant had assaulted both of her
daughters, which caused grievous injuries, thereby causing their
death - In the peculiar facts and circumstances as revealed in the
present case, and also keeping in mind that the incident happened
in a rural setting and the appellant not being highly educated, the
possibility of confusing her unstable mental condition or temporary
lapse of judgmental power bordering on temporary insanity cannot
be completely ruled out which the appellant attributed as coming
under the influence of invisible power, for the purpose of giving a
* Author
[2025] 4 S.C.R.
1817
Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh
benefit of doubt about the non-existence of "intention" - Appellant
had a cordial relationship with all the family members including
her children, which clearly indicates absence of any ill feelings
on the part of the appellant to provide any basis for any motive
to commit the crime which will prove the presence of "intention"
to commit the act - The statement of the father-in-law (PW-5)
of the appellant recorded that 15 days prior to the incident, the
appellant was babbling nonsense, saying that she is Mata, Budi
Dai etc. - Further, it was also mentioned that the appellant was
taken to the Psychiatrist at Government Hospital, Durg where
she was given medicine and was advised to follow up - Under
the circumstances, in view of the plea taken by the appellant, a
reasonable doubt can be said to have arisen as regards existence
of intention, thus of mens rea for causing death in the present
case as - (i) During the commission of crime, the appellant was
shouting that she is killing her children; (ii) Post the incident,
the appellant, on being asked the reason behind her act, kept
on crying and repeating that she has killed her children - This
is corroborated by other prosecution witnesses as well; (iii) The
appellant did not try to flee the scene of crime even after being
left alone in the house by PW-1; (iv) Complete absence of motive
behind the commission of crime in background of the fact that the
appellant loved her children very much, as also acknowledged
by the prosecution witness; (v) The nature of relation between
the accused and the deceased i.e., of a mother and child; (vi)
Absence of any strained domestic relationships or any such
motivating factor - However, in the absence of any conclusive
medical evidence with regards to the mental condition of the
appellant, it may not be enough to extend the benefit of exception
as encapsulated in s.84 IPC so as to acquit the appellant in the
present case - Nevertheless, the circumstances are enough to
cast a shadow of doubt about the existence of the intention of the
appellant to commit the crime in the present case - Thus, in the
present case "intention of causing death" cannot be said to have
proved - Therefore, the conviction of the appellant converted to
under Part II of s.304 IPC is from that of s.302 IPC. [Paras 16,
36, 43, 53, 57, 5

## Text

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[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1816 : 2025 INSC 577
Chunni Bai
v.
State of Chhattisgarh
(Criminal Appeal No. 2265 of 2025)
28 April 2025
[B.V. Nagarathna and
Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the accused at the time of commission of crime was
incapable of making conscious and informed decision or was
suffering from certain mental incapacity or unsoundness of mind;
Whether a benefit of doubt may be extended to the accused as
regards proof of intention and mens rea.
Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 - ss.84, 299, 300, 302, 304 Part II - Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss.161, 313 - Evidence Act, 1872 -
ss.105, 165 - Appellant killed her minor daughters - Appellant
denied her guilt in a statement recorded u/s.313 of CrPC and
claimed that she had no knowledge of what had happened
and how it happened and that she was under the influence
of some invisible power - Trial Court convicted appellant for
offence punishable u/s.302 of IPC - The High Court upheld
the conviction of the appellant u/s.302 of the IPC - Appellant's
plea that the appellant was not in a proper mental condition
at the time of commission of the offence:
Held: No infirmity in the finding given by the Trial Court as well
as the High Court that the appellant had assaulted both of her
daughters, which caused grievous injuries, thereby causing their
death - In the peculiar facts and circumstances as revealed in the
present case, and also keeping in mind that the incident happened
in a rural setting and the appellant not being highly educated, the
possibility of confusing her unstable mental condition or temporary
lapse of judgmental power bordering on temporary insanity cannot
be completely ruled out which the appellant attributed as coming
under the influence of invisible power, for the purpose of giving a
* Author
[2025] 4 S.C.R.
1817
Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh
benefit of doubt about the non-existence of "intention" - Appellant
had a cordial relationship with all the family members including
her children, which clearly indicates absence of any ill feelings
on the part of the appellant to provide any basis for any motive
to commit the crime which will prove the presence of "intention"
to commit the act - The statement of the father-in-law (PW-5)
of the appellant recorded that 15 days prior to the incident, the
appellant was babbling nonsense, saying that she is Mata, Budi
Dai etc. - Further, it was also mentioned that the appellant was
taken to the Psychiatrist at Government Hospital, Durg where
she was given medicine and was advised to follow up - Under
the circumstances, in view of the plea taken by the appellant, a
reasonable doubt can be said to have arisen as regards existence
of intention, thus of mens rea for causing death in the present
case as - (i) During the commission of crime, the appellant was
shouting that she is killing her children; (ii) Post the incident,
the appellant, on being asked the reason behind her act, kept
on crying and repeating that she has killed her children - This
is corroborated by other prosecution witnesses as well; (iii) The
appellant did not try to flee the scene of crime even after being
left alone in the house by PW-1; (iv) Complete absence of motive
behind the commission of crime in background of the fact that the
appellant loved her children very much, as also acknowledged
by the prosecution witness; (v) The nature of relation between
the accused and the deceased i.e., of a mother and child; (vi)
Absence of any strained domestic relationships or any such
motivating factor - However, in the absence of any conclusive
medical evidence with regards to the mental condition of the
appellant, it may not be enough to extend the benefit of exception
as encapsulated in s.84 IPC so as to acquit the appellant in the
present case - Nevertheless, the circumstances are enough to
cast a shadow of doubt about the existence of the intention of the
appellant to commit the crime in the present case - Thus, in the
present case "intention of causing death" cannot be said to have
proved - Therefore, the conviction of the appellant converted to
under Part II of s.304 IPC is from that of s.302 IPC. [Paras 16,
36, 43, 53, 57, 58, 60]
Penal Code, 1860 - Murder and Culpable homicide not
amounting to murder - Difference between - Discussed.
[Paras 18-21]
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Supreme Court Reports
Evidence Act, 1872 - s.105 - Burden of Proof to prove existence
of circumstances which would attract any of the pleaded
exceptions is on accused. [Paras 28-31]
Penal Code, 1860 - s.84 - Legal insanity vis-à-vis medical
insanity - Discussed. [Para 33]
Criminal Law - Rustic person - Not aware of various mental
disorders/illness - Discussed. [Para 36]
Evidence - Grave offences - Direct evidence available -
Absence of proof of motive or intention:
Held: In cases where direct evidence is available that links the
accused to the offence, absence of proof of motive or intention
does not preclude conviction of the accused - However, in cases
where the plea taken by the accused is such that it raises a
concern about the mental stability of the accused, the existence
or lack of motive assumes great significance - This is especially
true in cases involving grave offences such as murder, where a
complete absence of any kind of motive which ordinarily impels
a person to commit such a crime may lend credence to the plea
of insanity, as in the present case, where a mother has taken the
life of her own children of tender age apparently in absence of
any motive. [Para 39]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss.161, 162 - Evidence
Act, 1872 - s.165 - Court to put questions to witnesses to
elicit the truth:
Held: Even though the statements recorded u/s.161 of CrPC
cannot be used for any purposes in a trial due to the embargo
placed u/s.162 CrPC, however, the power of the Trial Court
u/s.165 Evidence Act is wide enough to put questions based on
the statement u/s.161 CrPC to any witness or party at any stage
to secure the ends of justice - Trial Court ought to have taken
into consideration the peculiar circumstances of the case and the
statement of PW-5 recorded u/s.161 CrPC to put right questions
to the parties and witnesses to ascertain the motive or intention of
the appellant in committing the crime. [Paras 54, 56, 64]
Case Law Cited
Rampal Singh v. State of U.P. [2012] 7 SCR 160 : (2012) 8 SCC
289; State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya [1977] 1 SCR 601 :
[2025] 4 S.C.R.
1819
Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh
(1976) 4 SCC 382; Raghunandan v. State of U.P. [1974] 3 SCR
92 : (1974) 4 SCC 186; Sidhartha Vashisht v. State (NCT of Delhi)
[2010] 4 SCR 103 : (2010) 6 SCC 1 - relied on.
Satyavir Singh Rathi, Assistant Commissioner of Police v. State
[2011] 6 SCR 138 : AIR 2011 SC 1748; Munshi Ram v. Delhi
Admn. [1968] 2 SCR 455 : AIR 1968 SC 702; State of U.P. v.
Mohd. Musheer Khan, AIR 1977 SC 2226; James Martin v. State
of Kerala [2003] Supp. 6 SCR 910 : (2004) 2 SCC 203; Dahyabhai
Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat [1964] 7 SCR 361 : AIR
1964 SC 1563 - referred to.
List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860; Evidence
Act, 1872.
List of Keywords
Murder; Culpable homicide not amounting to murder; Intention;
Mens rea; Actus reus; Motive; Star witness; Crime committed by
mother; Section 313 CrPC; Influence of some invisible power;
Beyond reasonable doubt; Legal insanity; Medical insanity;
Burden of proof; General exceptions of IPC; Standard of proof;
Preponderance of probability; Reasonable doubt; Rustic persons;
Mental disorders/illness; Direct evidence; Lack of motive.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2265 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.11.2023 of the High Court
of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in CRLA No. 1035 of 2016
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
S. Mahendran.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Avdhesh Singh, A.A.G., Mrs. Prerna Dhall, Piyush Yadav,
Ms. Akansha Singh, Gopinath Mr, Prashant Singh.
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[2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, J.
Leave granted.
2.
The present appeal has been preferred against judgment and order
dated 21.11.2023 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court
of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal No. 1035 of 2016
whereby, the High Court upheld the conviction and sentence imposed
upon the present appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC').
3.
The case of the prosecution in brief is that on 05.06.2015 at about
9 AM in the village of Bharadkala, District Bemetara, State of
Chhattisgarh, the appellant, namely Chunni Bai, assaulted her two
daughters, namely Kumari Yogita Sahu, aged 5 years and Kumari
Nisha Sahu, aged 3 years with an iron crowbar leading to grievous
injuries thereby causing the death of both the daughters. The incident
was witnessed by Sonam Sahu (PW-1), who is the sister-in-law of
the appellant who also lived in the same house.
4.
On the same day of occurrence, a complaint was lodged before the
Saja Police Station by Laxman Prasad Mishra (PW-3), a neighbour
of the appellant, on the basis of which an FIR No. 126/15 was
registered under Section 302 IPC. On completion of the investigation,
the appellant was put on trial.
5.
According to the star witness, Sonam Sahu (PW-1), in the morning
at around 9 am on the fateful date, while she was doing household
chores, she heard the appellant shouting in her room that she was
killing her daughters, on hearing of which she went inside the room
where PW-1 saw both the children on the bed, soaked in blood,
and saw the appellant hitting the younger child Nisha with an iron
crowbar. PW-1 then snatched the crowbar from the appellant and
rushed out to inform her uncle who stayed next door. Thereafter,
she informed her brother and niece of the incident. Other relatives
were also informed.
6.
The testimony of the eyewitness PW-1 was corroborated by other
witnesses, most of whom were relatives and who lived nearby
[2025] 4 S.C.R.
1821
Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh
and came to the house soon after the incident. They also saw the
appellant crying and shouting that she had killed her children. The
injured children were taken to the hospital but were declared dead.
7.
According to the testimony of the doctor present on duty on the day
of the incident, Dr. G.S. Thakur (PW-18), both the girls had died
before reaching the hospital. PW-18 described the injuries found
during the autopsy of the elder daughter, Yogita Sahu, as follows:
"... There was a crushed wound in the right temporal part
of the head, which measured 10 centimeters in length and
was up to the skull bone. A crushed wound is present 0.5
cm below the said wound. Its length was 2.0 centimeters
and its depth was up to the skull bone. The body's right
occipito-parietal bone of the head was broken and had
sunk into the brain, which measured 16.0 cm in length
and 8.0 cm in width. The entire body of the dead body
had turned pale.
4. All the injuries found on the dead body were caused by
hard and blunt objects and before death. While examining
the skull and spinal cord of the dead body, I found that a
piece of bone was stuck in the occipital part of the brain
and bleeding was present in the occipital part of the brain.
A long hair-line fracture, was present in the skull of the
body. Which was present from the occipital bone to the
fatal bone.
................................"
PW-18 gave his opinion about the cause of death in the following
words:
"In my opinion, the cause of death was bleeding in the
stomach and stoppage of heart and respiratory rhythm due
to injury in the organic part of the brain which is a result
of hitting the head with a hard and blunt object. Nature: In
my opinion the nature of death was homicidal...."
8.
Similarly, with respect to the autopsy of younger daughter, Nisha
Sahu, PW-18 noted the following injuries:
"...There was a visible injury with blood all around the
left eye of the dead body. Whose measurement was 40
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X 30 centimetres. The left occipital portion of the head
contained a crushed injury measuring 3.0 X 30 cm. The
caudal portion of the said injury contained a crushed
injury measuring 30 X 2.0 cm in length with a depth up
to the skull. A congested bruise of blood was present in
the left scapular area. It measured 9.0 X 20 cm in length,
extending from the central part to the outer part. The above
mentioned wounds were inflicted with a hard and blunt
object and were inflicted before death..."
The cause of death of Nisha Sahu was opined to be due to cardiac
and respiratory arrest due to bleeding in the brain and injuries to
organs of the brain and the said injuries were caused by hitting the
head with a hard and blunt object and it was homicidal in nature.
9.
Based on the memorandum statement of the appellant vide Ex.
P/10, the crime weapon i.e., the iron pounder was seized vide Ex.
P/4 and the FSL report vide Ex. P/31 which confirmed the presence
of human blood on the seized weapon.
10. To support the case of the prosecution, as many as 20 witnesses were
examined. The statement of the appellant was recorded under Section
313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to
as 'CrPC'), wherein the appellant denied guilt and claimed that she
had no knowledge of what had happened and how it happened and
that she was under the influence of some invisible power. However,
no defence witness was produced before the court.
11. The Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Bemetara, in Sessions Trial
No. 76/2015, upon appreciation of evidence and after hearing of
parties concluded that based on the postmortem reports proved by
the doctor (PW-18), the deaths of both daughters were due to serious
injuries on their heads. Further, it was held that the author of the
crime was the appellant, supported by the eye-witness Sonam Sahu
(PW-1) which was corroborated by other prosecution witnesses. The
Trial Court, thereafter, vide judgment dated 29.06.2016, convicted the
appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and
sentenced the appellant to undergo imprisonment for life with fine of
Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo additional
rigorous imprisonment for 1 month.
12. In the appeal against the above order, the High Court in Criminal
Appeal No. 1035 of 2016 vide order dated 21.11.2023, upheld
[2025] 4 S.C.R.
1823
Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh
the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC. The
plea taken by the appellant before the High Court was that the
prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and
that the appellant was not in proper mental condition at the time of
commission of the offence.
13. The High Court relied on the medical opinion of Dr. G.S. Thakur (PW18) and the postmortem reports which stated that the cause of death
was cardiorespiratory arrest caused by intracerebral haemorrhage
and injury to vital parts of brain, as a result of the head being hit by
a hard and blunt object, thereby concluding that the nature of death
was homicidal. Further, the High Court took into consideration the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, seizure of the crime weapon
and its FSL report to observe that the appellant had assaulted her
daughters with an iron pounder causing grievous injuries leading to
their death. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.
ANALYSIS BY THIS COURT
14. Since the death of the two girls was not denied and was proved
on the basis of the evidence on record, the first issue that is to be
addressed is whether the death was caused by the appellant. For
this, we have to revisit the testimonies of the prosecution witness,
more importantly, Sonam Sahu (PW-1) who is the sole eyewitness
of the incident. PW-1 has specifically stated in her testimony that
when she rushed towards the room upon hearing the scream of the
appellant, she saw the appellant hitting her younger daughter Nisha
with an iron pounder while the elder daughter, Yogita was lying in
bed unconscious, soaked in blood. It is to be noted that as per
PW-1's testimony, no other person was present in the house at that
time other than appellant and her two daughters. This testimony of
PW-1 finds corroboration from the statements of other prosecution
witnesses such as Sanat Kumar (PW-16), who is the cousin brother
of the appellant's husband. As per PW-16, he was informed about
the incident by Sonam Sahu (PW-1) who came crying to his house,
which is adjacent to the house of the appellant. When PW-16 reached
the place of occurrence, he saw that the appellant was crying and
saying that she had killed Nisha and Babli (Yogita) and repeated this
statement upon being asked the reason behind killing them. Then,
PW-16 went to the room of the appellant and saw both daughters
lying unconscious on bed, soaked in blood.
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15. Similarly, the contemporaneous testimonies of Rekha Sahu (PW-2),
Laxman Prasad Mishra (PW-3), Ram Kumar Verma (PW-6), Manuwa
(PW-9), Namdev (PW-10), Harish Kumar Sahu (PW-11) and Kaushilya
Bai (PW-15) also corroborate the testimony of Sonam Sahu (PW-1)
that the daughters were bleeding, lying unconscious and that the
appellant was crying and saying that she had killed her children.
16. Further, as per the testimony of the investigating officer K.M. Mishra
(PW-19), the crime weapon i.e., the iron pounder was seized based on
the memorandum statement of the appellant, although the witnesses
to the recording of such memorandum statement i.e., Ram Kumar
Verma (PW-6) and Bhuniram Sahu (PW-8) denied that any such
statement had been given by the appellant in their presence. The
FSL report confirmed the presence of human blood on the seized
iron pounder. Therefore, considering the above evidence including
the post mortem report discussed above, we are of the opinion that
there is no infirmity in the finding given by the Trial Court as well as
the High Court that the appellant had assaulted both of her daughters,
which caused grievous injuries, thereby causing their death.
17. Once homicide is proved being committed by the appellant, the next
consideration will be whether such homicide was "culpable homicide"
within the meaning of Section 299 IPC. If it is found to be "culpable
homicide", further consideration will be whether it is "culpable homicide
not amounting to murder" which is punishable under Section 304
IPC or "murder" as defined under Section 300 IPC, punishable under
Section 302 IPC, under which the appellant has been convicted and
punished by the Trial Court which was upheld by the High Court.
18. The difference between "murder" and "culpable homicide not
amounting to murder" has been succinctly explained by this Court
in State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya, (1976) 4 SCC 382 in
the following words:
"12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, "culpable homicide"
is genus and "murder" its specie. All "murder" is "culpable
homicide" but not vice-versa. Speaking generally, "culpable
homicide" sans "special characteristics of murder", is
"culpable homicide not amounting to murder". For the
purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity
of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises
three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what
[2025] 4 S.C.R.
1825
Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh
may be called, "culpable homicide of the first degree".
This is the greatest form of culpable homicide, which is
defined in Section 300 as "murder". The second may be
termed as "culpable homicide of the second degree". This
is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then,
there is "culpable homicide of the third degree". This is
the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment
provided for it is, also, the lowest among the punishments
provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this
degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304."
19. The difference was further elucidated in Rampal Singh v. State of
U.P., (2012) 8 SCC 289 in the following words:
"18. This Court in Vineet Kumar Chauhan v. State of
U.P. [(2007) 14 SCC 660 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 915] noticed
that academic distinction between "murder" and "culpable
homicide not amounting to murder" had vividly been
brought out by this Court in State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu
Punnayya [(1976) 4 SCC 382 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 659] where
it was observed as under: (Vineet Kumar case [(2007)
14 SCC 660 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 915], SCC pp. 665-66,
para 16)
"16. ... that the safest way of approach to the interpretation
and application of Sections 299 and 300 IPC is to keep
in focus the key words used in various clauses of the
said sections. Minutely comparing each of the clauses of
Sections 299 and 300 IPC and drawing support from the
decisions of this Court in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR
1958 SC 465 : 1958 Cri LJ 818] and Rajwant Singh v. State
of Kerala [AIR 1966 SC 1874 : 1966 Cri LJ 1509] , speaking
for the Court, R.S. Sarkaria, J. neatly brought out the points
of distinction between the two offences, which have been
time and again reiterated. Having done so, the Court said
that wherever the court is confronted with the question
whether the offence is 'murder' or 'culpable homicide not
amounting to murder', on the facts of a case, it [would] be
convenient for it to approach the problem in three stages.
The question to be considered at the first stage would be,
whether the accused has done an act by doing which he
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has caused the death of another. Proof of such causal
connection between the act of the accused and the death,
leads to the second stage for considering whether that act
of the accused amounts to 'culpable homicide' as defined
in Section 299. ... If the answer to this question is in the
negative the offence would be 'culpable homicide not
amounting to murder', punishable under the First or the
Second Part of Section 304, depending, respectively, on
whether the second or the third clause of Section 299 is
applicable. If this question is found in the positive, but the
case comes within any of the Exceptions enumerated in
Section 300, the offence would still be 'culpable homicide
not amounting to murder', punishable under the First Part
of Section 304 IPC. It was, however, clarified that these
were only broad guidelines to facilitate the task of the
court and not cast-iron imperative."
20. This Court in the aforesaid case of Rampal Singh (supra) further
explained the difference between these two offences from the
perspective of the punitive provisions of Sections 302 and 304 IPC
by grading the offences in three categories as follows:
"21. Sections 302 and 304 of the Code are primarily
the punitive provisions. They declare what punishment a
person would be liable to be awarded, if he commits either
of the offences. An analysis of these two sections must
be done having regard to what is common to the offences
and what is special to each one of them. The offence of
culpable homicide is thus an offence which may or may
not be murder. If it is murder, then it is culpable homicide
amounting to murder, for which punishment is prescribed
in Section 302 of the Code. Section 304 deals with cases
not covered by Section 302 and it divides the offence into
two distinct classes, that is, (a) those in which the death
is intentionally caused; and (b) those in which the death is
caused unintentionally but knowingly. In the former case the
sentence of imprisonment is compulsory and the maximum
sentence admissible is imprisonment for life. In the latter
case, imprisonment is only optional, and the maximum
sentence only extends to imprisonment for 10 years.
The first clause of Section 304 includes only those cases
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1827
Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh
in which offence is really "murder", but mitigated by the
presence of circumstances recognised in the Exceptions
to Section 300 of the Code, the second clause deals only
with the cases in which the accused has no intention of
injuring anyone in particular. In this regard, we may also
refer to the judgment of this Court in Fatta v. Emperor [AIR
1931 Lah 63] , 1151. C. 476 (Refer: Penal Law of India by
Dr Hari Singh Gour, Vol. 3, 2009.)"
21. From the above extracts, it can be understood that one of the criteria
to determine, in any given case, as to whether the act amounts
to "murder" or "culpable homicide not amounting to murder" is the
presence or absence of intention of the offender. If the "intention"
to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death or the knowledge, which obviously has to be a conscious
one, that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability,
cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death and
commits such act "without any excuse" for incurring the risk of
causing death or such injury, comes out aloud and clear in the
case, it would be most appropriate to categorise it as a case of
"murder" under Section 300 IPC in which event, penal provision
of Section 302 IPC would be attracted. On the other hand, if the
"intention" in causing the death or to causing such bodily injury is
not so clear, the case will fall under the less stringent category of
"culpable homicide not amounting to murder" as punishable under
Section 304 IPC.
22. In the case at hand, it can be said to have been proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the appellant had caused the death of her
two children and thus committed culpable homicide.
The evidence on record clearly shows that the appellant had caused
the death of her children by hitting them with an iron crowbar on
their heads.
The crucial question however is, whether she had the intention
to cause death of her children or had the intention to cause such
bodily injury which was likely to cause death or whether she had the
conscious knowledge that it was imminently dangerous that in all
probability, it would cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to
cause death and committed the act without any excuse for incurring
the risk of causing death or such injury?
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23. When a person performs an act, he is attributed with the intention to
cause the natural consequences that follows from the act performed.
There may be situations when the person makes the intention for
performing an act known clearly by oral declaration or otherwise.
However, it can be illusive when intention is not clearly spelt out or
discernible, and the same has to be gathered from the surrounding
facts and circumstances and the acts of the accused.
24. In the present case, once the factum of homicide being committed
by the appellant is proved beyond reasonable doubt and considering
the nature of the injuries received by the minor victims at the hands
of the appellants with iron crowbar on the basis of the medical and
other evidence brought on record, it can be stated that the intention
to commit homicide can certainly be inferred as had been done by
the Trial Court and the High Court.
However, we have certain reservations about such a conclusion
being drawn by the courts below in respect of proof of "intention"
or the conscious knowledge of what she was doing in the light of
the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in the case. In our
opinion, it cannot be conclusively held in the present case that the
intention of the appellant or conscious knowledge of what she was
doing, a component of mens rea, has been established beyond
reasonable doubt.
25. It is well settled that in any criminal case, the burden of proof is on
the prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt in order
to secure conviction of the accused, that is to say that no reasonable
doubt can be said to have arisen in the judicial mind of the court
after appreciating the evidence presented, and the outcome reached
by the prosecution is the only possible outcome in the given facts
and circumstances of the case.
This legal position is necessary for both the ingredients of "actus reus"
and "mens rea", though "mens rea" can sometimes be inferred from
the nature of "actus reus", and as far as "mens rea" is concerned,
intention or guilty knowledge is certainly the most important facet.
26. The case of the appellant, as evident from the records, is the claim
of innocence and denial of the charges and the appellant made a
specific plea while being examined under Section 313 CrPC that at
the time of occurrence, she was under the influence of some invisible
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Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh
power. However, the appellant did not produce any witness in support
of her claim and produced only two documents.
27. The appellant by taking the said plea is seeking to bring her case
within the general exceptions as mentioned in IPC.
Some of the general exceptions which are available under the Indian
Penal Code to escape criminal liability are contained in Sections 76
to 106 of IPC as well as five "Exceptions" mentioned in Section 300
IPC, etc.
The plea taken by the appellant of being under the influence of some
invisible power can be understood to invoke Section 84 of the IPC,
which reads as follows:
"84. Act of a person of unsound mind.-Nothing is an
offence which is done by a person who, at the time of
doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable
of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what
is either wrong or contrary to law."
28. Though in a criminal case the burden of proof to establish a case
beyond reasonable doubt is on the prosecution, however, under
Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred
as "Evidence Act"), the burden of proof to prove the existence of
such circumstances which would attract any of the above pleaded
exceptions is on the accused.
Section 105 of the Evidence Act reads as follows:
"105. When a person is accused of any offence, the
burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing
the case within any of the General Exception in the
Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860), or within any special
exception or proviso contained in any other part of the
same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is upon
him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such
circumstances."
29. At this juncture, it may be pertinent to note that the standard of
proof for the accused required by law in such cases, in invoking
any exception clause is preponderance of probability, which is also
adopted in civil cases. [See: Satyavir Singh Rathi, Assistant
Commissioner of Police v. State, AIR 2011 SC 1748; Munshi
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Ram v. Delhi Admn., AIR 1968 SC 702; State of U.P. v. Mohd.
Musheer Khan, AIR 1977 SC 2226].
This would mean that if the accused is able to raise a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court that there exists a possibility of existence
of such circumstances based on preponderance of probability, that
would attract the exception as mentioned under the IPC, and if the
said burden of proof is discharged by the accused, he would be
entitled to such benefit of exception.
30. It is also well settled that in order to discharge this burden of proof on
any of the exceptions pleaded, it is not imperative for the accused to
lead defence evidence. The court can also by taking into consideration
the evidence available on record, which may have been presented
by the prosecution, reach a conclusion that an exception is attracted
in a given case, as observed by this Court in the case of James
Martin v. State of Kerala, (2004) 2 SCC 203:
"13.... Under Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
(in short "the Evidence Act"), the burden of proof is on
the accused, who sets up the plea of self-defence, and,
in the absence of proof, it is not possible for the court to
presume the truth of the plea of self-defence. The court
shall presume the absence of such circumstances. It is for
the accused to place necessary material on record either by
himself adducing positive evidence or by eliciting necessary
facts from the witnesses examined for the prosecution. An
accused taking the plea of the right of private defence is
not necessarily required to call evidence; he can establish
his plea by reference to circumstances transpiring from the
prosecution evidence itself. The question in such a case
would be a question of assessing the true effect of the
prosecution evidence, and not a question of the accused
discharging any burden."
31. To understand what exactly the burden of proof under Section
105 of the Evidence Act is, we may refer to the landmark case of
Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964
SC 1563, wherein it was observed that:
"7. The doctrine of burden of proof in the context of the plea
of insanity may be stated in the following propositions : (1)
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The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that
the accused had committed the offence with the requisite
mens rea, and the burden of proving that always rests on
the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial.
(2) There is a rebuttable presumption that the accused was
not insane, when he committed the crime, in the sense
laid down by Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code : the
accused may rebut it by placing before the court all the
relevant evidence oral, documentary or circumstantial, but
the burden of proof upon him is no higher than that rests
upon a party to civil proceedings. (3) Even if the accused
was not able to establish conclusively that he was insane
at the time he committed the offence, the evidence placed
before the court by the accused or by the prosecution may
raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as regards
one or more of the ingredients of the offence, including
mens rea of the accused and in that case the court would
be entitled to acquit the accused on the ground that the
general burden of proof resting on the prosecution was
not discharged."
32. In the light of the above legal position, we may now examine the
facts and circumstances as well as the evidence on record to
consider whether the appellant was in fact suffering from insanity
or was not in a proper state of mind during the commission of crime
for the purpose of understanding whether she had the "intention"
or whether she had knowingly and consciously committed the act
without any excuse.
33. The plea taken by the appellant during her examination by the Trial
Court is that she came under the influence of certain invisible power
when she committed the act. However, this plea does not appear
to be a legally recognised exception as is the case of sudden and
grave provocation, heat of passion, right of self-defence, etc. There
is a difference between medical insanity and legal insanity. What
Section 84 IPC provides is legal insanity as distinguished from
medical insanity. A person is said to be of unsound mind on whom
criminal liability cannot be fastened if at the time of commission of
the act, he is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that
what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. It may also
be noted that the expression "unsoundness of mind" or the word
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"insanity" has not been defined in the Indian Penal Code, though
these have been used interchangeably. In the absence of a precise
definition of these terms, insanity or unsoundness of mind has
been variously understood by courts in varying degrees of mental
disorder and the courts have applied this attribute to give the benefit
of doubt or otherwise, depending on the facts and circumstances
of the cases. However, mere odd behaviour or certain physical or
mental ailments affecting the emotions or capacity to think and act
properly have not been construed to be "unsound mind" within the
scope of Section 84 of the IPC. All kinds of insanity as are understood
are not covered under Section 84 of IPC but only such acts, when
committed by a person who was incapable of knowing the nature
of the act or that he was doing which is either wrong or contrary to
law are concerned. As a consequence, only such mental or medical
condition which affects or disturbs the faculty of the person which
renders him unable to know the nature of act committed or that he
was doing which he did not know that it was wrong or contrary to
law can be given the benefit of insanity under Section 84 IPC, and
thus escape criminal liability.
34. In the present case, it is noticed that apart from the plea taken by the
appellant during her examination under Section 313 CrPC that she
was under the influence of invisible power, no evidence has been
brought on record by the appellant which would prove that she was
of "unsound mind" within the meaning of Section 84 of IPC.
35. Nevertheless, merely because the appellant could not convey
herself in a legally understandable expression or idiom of her
mental condition to indicate the existence of legal insanity or prove
such a condition and provide evidence, in our opinion, such a plea
could not have been completely ignored by the Trial Court or by
the High Court.
36. In the peculiar facts and circumstances as revealed in the present
case, and also keeping in mind that the incident happened in a rural
setting and the appellant not being highly educated, the possibility
of confusing her unstable mental condition or temporary lapse
of judgmental power bordering on temporary insanity cannot be
completely ruled out which the appellant attributed as coming under
the influence of invisible power, for the purpose of giving a benefit
of doubt about the non-existence of "intention".
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It is not common for rustic persons to be aware of various mental
disorders/illnesses such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, that may
temporarily impair the mental condition of an individual. More often
than not, these disorders are unrecognised and remain untreated
as it may be difficult to identify the symptoms and they do not seek
proper and timely medical intervention, resulting in such medical/
mental conditions which can be misinterpreted or confused with spells
or influence of invisible forces based on superstitions.
In the present case, we have also noted that no particulars have
been mentioned about the nature of the "invisible influence" and as
such it can be purely in the realm of speculation that this "invisible
influence" may be a symptom of such mental conditions referred to
above. However, in the light of the strange, bizarre and inexplicable
behaviour of the appellant, there is no other plausible explanation
that could be attached to her conduct in the given circumstances,
other than to infer that she was under certain impaired mental
condition which the appellant described as being under the influence
of invisible power.
37. As per the testimony of Sonam Sahu (PW-1), on hearing the shout
of the appellant, PW-1 went to the room to check, and she found
the elder daughter of the appellant soaked in blood and saw the
appellant hitting the younger daughter with the iron pounder. After the
incident too, the appellant kept on shouting and crying that she had
killed her daughters. This evidence stands substantially corroborated
by the contemporaneous testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
such as Rekha Sahu (PW- 2), Lakshman Prasad Mishra (PW-3),
Ram Kumar Verma (PW-6), Pradeep Sahu (PW-7), Bhuniram Sahu
(PW-8), Manuwa (PW-9), Namdev (PW-10) and Harish Kumar Sahu
(PW-11).
38. Further, when PW-1 left the appellant alone in the house and went
to the adjacent house of her uncle to call for help, the appellant did
not try to flee.