# CHURCH OF NORTH OF INDIA v. LAV AJIBHAI RAT ANJIBHAI AND ORS

- **Citation:** [2005] 3 S.C.R. 1037
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2005-05-03
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 9419 of2003
- **Bench:** B.P. Singh, S.B. Sinha
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/church-of-north-of-india-v-lav-ajibhai-rat-anjibhai-and-ors-20544
- **Pages:** 40

## Headnote

B
Public Trusts :
Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950-Sections80, 2(13), 17, 19, 21, 22, 26,
36, 41, 51 & 79-Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court under S.80--Extent of- C
'Brethren Church' registered as society under the Societies Registration Act
as also as public trust under the Bombay Public Trusts Act-Consequent
merger of churches in name of Appellant-Civil suit filed a) for declaration
that the 'Brethren Church' had ceased to exist and Appellant was its legal
successor with rights over its property and b) for injunction against obstruction D
in functioning of Appellant-Maintainability of-Held, not maintainableAverments made in the plaint indicate that the dispute was in relation to
management of the churches as a religious trust and not as a society-Control
and management of the religious trusts vests in the Charity Commissioner
·appointed under the BPT Act-BPT Act is a complete code in itself-Civil
Court will have no jurisdiction in relation to a matter where the statutory E
authorities have the requisite jurisdiction-Societies Registration Act, 1860--
Section 13-Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Section 9.
The 'Brethren Church' was established for the propagation of the
protestant faith of Christian religion. It was registered as a religious society F
under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 in 1944 and also as a public
trust under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 (BPT Act) after the same
came into force. The 'Brethren Church' was allegedly dissolved and a
unified Church by the name of "The Church of Northern India" (CNI)
i.e. Appellant was formed. However the dissolution of the 'Brethern
Church' was disputed and the functioning of the Appellant obstructed. G
Consequently, a civil suit was filed praying a) that it be declared that the
'Brethren Church' had ceased to exist; b) that it be declared that Appellant
is the legal continuation and successor of the said 'Brethren Church'
together with the right, title, claim, interest in or over its properties and
1037
H
1038
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2005] 3 S.C.R.
A the constitution, decisions and resolutions of the Appellant, its Synod and
Gujarat Diocesan Council are binding on all the Pastorates on Gujarat
which were functioning as local Churches or congregations under the
'Brethren Church' and c) that the defendants and their associates be
restrained by a perpetual injunction from acting in any manner contrary
B to the constitution, decisions and resolutions of the Appellant, its Synod
and Gujarat Diocesan.Council and from obstructing in any manner the
plaintiffs and other members/ office bearers of these pastorates under the
Appellant in acting in accordance with the said constitution, decisions and
res~lutions and in their use, enjoyment and possession of the Churches
and their properties.
c
D
The question which arose for consideration in the present appeal is
whether the suit involved questions within the exclusive domain of the
Charity Commissioner appointed under the BPT Act and the jurisdiction
of the Civil Court was barred in terms of Section 80 of the BPT Act.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD : 1. The question as regard ouster of a jurisdiction of a Civil
Court must be construed having regard to the Scheme of the Act as also
the object and purport it seeks to achieve. Further, a plea of bar to
jurisdiction of a Civil Court must be considered having regard to the
E
conte~t,ions raised in the .,1aint. For the said purpose, averments disclosing
cause'·of action and the reliefs sought for therein must be considered in
their entirety. The Court may not be justified in determining the question,
one way or the other, only having regard to the reliefs claimed de'hors
the factual averments made in the plaint. When the plaint read as a whole
· d~ not disclose material facts giving rise to a cause of action which can
F be entertained hv a civil court, it may be rejected in terms of Order 7,
....
Rule 11 of the CPC. The same, however, would not mean that in a given
J
case if the c

## Text

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---
CHURCH OF NORTH OF INDIA
A
v.
LAV AJIBHAI RAT ANJIBHAI AND ORS.
MAY 3, 2005
[B.P. SINGH AND S.B. SINHA, JJ.]
B
Public Trusts :
Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950-Sections80, 2(13), 17, 19, 21, 22, 26,
36, 41, 51 & 79-Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court under S.80--Extent of- C
'Brethren Church' registered as society under the Societies Registration Act
as also as public trust under the Bombay Public Trusts Act-Consequent
merger of churches in name of Appellant-Civil suit filed a) for declaration
that the 'Brethren Church' had ceased to exist and Appellant was its legal
successor with rights over its property and b) for injunction against obstruction D
in functioning of Appellant-Maintainability of-Held, not maintainableAverments made in the plaint indicate that the dispute was in relation to
management of the churches as a religious trust and not as a society-Control
and management of the religious trusts vests in the Charity Commissioner
·appointed under the BPT Act-BPT Act is a complete code in itself-Civil
Court will have no jurisdiction in relation to a matter where the statutory E
authorities have the requisite jurisdiction-Societies Registration Act, 1860--
Section 13-Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Section 9.
The 'Brethren Church' was established for the propagation of the
protestant faith of Christian religion. It was registered as a religious society F
under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 in 1944 and also as a public
trust under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 (BPT Act) after the same
came into force. The 'Brethren Church' was allegedly dissolved and a
unified Church by the name of "The Church of Northern India" (CNI)
i.e. Appellant was formed. However the dissolution of the 'Brethern
Church' was disputed and the functioning of the Appellant obstructed. G
Consequently, a civil suit was filed praying a) that it be declared that the
'Brethren Church' had ceased to exist; b) that it be declared that Appellant
is the legal continuation and successor of the said 'Brethren Church'
together with the right, title, claim, interest in or over its properties and
1037
H
1038
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2005] 3 S.C.R.
A the constitution, decisions and resolutions of the Appellant, its Synod and
Gujarat Diocesan Council are binding on all the Pastorates on Gujarat
which were functioning as local Churches or congregations under the
'Brethren Church' and c) that the defendants and their associates be
restrained by a perpetual injunction from acting in any manner contrary
B to the constitution, decisions and resolutions of the Appellant, its Synod
and Gujarat Diocesan.Council and from obstructing in any manner the
plaintiffs and other members/ office bearers of these pastorates under the
Appellant in acting in accordance with the said constitution, decisions and
res~lutions and in their use, enjoyment and possession of the Churches
and their properties.
c
D
The question which arose for consideration in the present appeal is
whether the suit involved questions within the exclusive domain of the
Charity Commissioner appointed under the BPT Act and the jurisdiction
of the Civil Court was barred in terms of Section 80 of the BPT Act.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD : 1. The question as regard ouster of a jurisdiction of a Civil
Court must be construed having regard to the Scheme of the Act as also
the object and purport it seeks to achieve. Further, a plea of bar to
jurisdiction of a Civil Court must be considered having regard to the
E
conte~t,ions raised in the .,1aint. For the said purpose, averments disclosing
cause'·of action and the reliefs sought for therein must be considered in
their entirety. The Court may not be justified in determining the question,
one way or the other, only having regard to the reliefs claimed de'hors
the factual averments made in the plaint. When the plaint read as a whole
· d~ not disclose material facts giving rise to a cause of action which can
F be entertained hv a civil court, it may be rejected in terms of Order 7,
....
Rule 11 of the CPC. The same, however, would not mean that in a given
J
case if the court has the jurisdiction to determine a part of the relief
I--
claimed, it will not confine itself thereto and reject the plaint in its entirety.
(1059-C, D, E; 1061-A-BI
G
Dhulabhai and Ors. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr., (1968)
3 SCR 662, Rajasthan Siate Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. Krishna
Kant and Ors., [1995) 5 SCC 75, Dwarka Prasad Agarwal v. Ramesh Chand
.-
Agarwal, .(2003) 6 SCC 220, Sahebgouda v. Ogeppa, (2003) 6 SCC 151,
Dhruv Green Field ltd. v. Hukam Singh, (2002) 6 SCC 416; Swamy
Atmananda and Ors. v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam and Ors., (2005) 4
H SCALE 116 and Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and Ors. v. Assistant Charity
CHURCH OF NORTH OF INDIA v. LA VAJIBHAI RA TANJIBHAI
1039
Commissioner and Ors., (20041 3 SCC 137, relied on.
A
2.1. In the present case, in the plaint itself it is accepted that the
Church which was registered as a society under the Societies Registration
Act was a public trust as defined under Section 2(13) of the BPT Act. The
plaint nowhere suggests that the society and the trust had ever been treated
as two different entities. No case has been made in the plaint to the effect B
that the society as registered under the Societies Registration Act plays
any role or discharges any function which is not done by the trustees of
the trust. It also does not appear from a perusal of the plaint that the
society and the trust comprises of different persons or for different
functions to perform. (1065-C, D, E)
C
2.2. In fact the Appellants have categorically admitted that the
Memorandum of Association of the Snciety itself became the deed of trust.
It also stands admitted that only with a view to have one body to
administer and manage the properties, the trust so created by the society
was also registered. It is not a case where the trust was created for the D
benefit of the society. (1068-B, CJ
2.3. It is not alleged that whereas the properties belong to the trust
it was managed by the society. The plaint furthermore does not disclose
that the decision as regard dissolution of the churches and congregation
of Brethren Church had been taken by anybody other than the trustees. E
The committees constituted for the aforementioned purpose, viz.,
Continuation Committee and Negotiating Committee, evidently were
represented by the authorities of the congregations and not of any society.
There is nothing on record to show that the concerned churches were being
managed by the societies registered under the Societies Registration Act F
It is clear that the properties have vested in the trustees and not in the
governing body of the society. [1065-E, F; 1066-C, BJ
Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College, Delhi v. State
of Delhi (Now Delhi Administration) and Anr., AIR (1962) SC 458, Dharam
Dutt and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., [200411 SCC 712 and 11/achi Devi G
(Dead) By LRs. and Ors. v. Jain Society, Protection of Orphans India and
Ors., (2003) 8 SCC 413, relied on.
"
Athmanathaswami Devasthanam v. K Gopalaswami Ayyangar, AIR
(1965) SC 338, referred to.
H
1040
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2005] 3 S.C.R.
........
A
3. The suit in question also does not conform to the provisions of
Section 13 of the Societies Registration Act. Unless a suit is filed in terms
of Section 13 of the said Act, the Society is not dissolved. Even assuming
that the society stands dissolved in terms of its Memorandum of
Association and Articles of Association, the same would not ipso facto mean
B
that the properties could be adjusted amongst the members of the society
in terms of the provisions of the said Act. Concededly, the properties of
the trust being properties of the religious trust had vested in such trust.
Such a provision also exist in the BPT Act. Thus, only because the society
has been dissolved, ipso facto the properties belonging to the trust cannot
be said to have been adjusted. The Appellants, ~hus have averred in the
c plaint that the suit relates to the property of the trust and their
administration. If the properties of the churches did not belong to the
society, the Appellant cannot claim the same as their successor. The plaint
has to be read meaningfully. So done, it leads to the only conclusion that
the dispute was in relation to the management of the church~s as religious
D
trust and.not as a society. Even if it is contended that the administration
of the property would mean the properties of the Brethren Church both
as a trust and as a society, still then having regard to the legal position,
the property belonging exclusively to the trust, the suit will not be
maintainable. [1066-D, E, F, G, H; 1067-A)
4.L The BPT Act provides for finality and conclusiveness of the order
.--fl
E passed by the Charity Commissioner in Sections 21(2), 22(3), 26, 36, 41(2),
51(4) and 79(2). Such finality clause would lead to a conclusion that the
Civil Court.'s jurisdiction is excluded if there is adequate remedy to do
what the Civil Courts would normally do in a Civil suit. In this case, this
Court is not concerned with a dispute as regard absolute title of the trust
·-
F property. It is alsc. .iOt concerned with the question as regard creation of
any right by the trust in a third party which would be otherwise beyond
the jurisdiction of the Charity Commissioner. It is also not a case where
the plaintiffs made a complaint that the provisions of the BPT Act were
not complied-with or the statutory tribunal had not acted in conformity
G
with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. In fact no order
has been passed on the Appellant's application for changes in the entries
made in the registers maintained under Section 17 of the Act.
[1068-E, F, G, HJ
--
4.2. The BPT Act provides for express exclusion of the jurisdiction
H
of the Civil Court. In fact, the trustee of a public trust is enjoined with a
statutory duty to make an application for registration wherein all
CHURCH OF NORTH OF INDIA v. LA VAJIBHAI RA TANJIBHAI
104 J
necessary descriptions of movable and immovable property belonging to A
the trust including their description and particulars for the purpose of
identification are required to be furnished. Section 19 of the BPT Act
provides for an inquiry for registration with a view to ascertaining inter
alia the mode of succession to the office of the trustee as also whether any
property is the property of such trust. It is only when the statutory
authority satisfies itself as regard the genuineness of the trust and the
properties held by it, an entry is made in the registers and books, etc.
maintained in terms of Section 17 of the BPT Act in consonance with the
provisions of Section 21 thereof. Such an entry is final and conclusive.
Changes can be brought about only in terms of Section 22 thereof.
B
(1068-H; 1069-A, B, C, DI C
4.3. A change notice having been given, it would now be for the
appropriate authority to consider the matter and if a change has occurred,
a finding is required to be arrived which must contain the reasons therefor.
The defendants are disputing that any such change in accordance with
law·was effected. An order passed by Deputy or Assistant Charity D
Commissioner is appealable. Yet again, when an amendment is made in
the entry in the register, the same would be final and conclusive. Even a
power exists for holding a further inquiry. (1069-D, El
4.4. Section 31 of the BPT Act bars a suit to enforce a right on behalf
of a public trust. Appellant got itself registered as a public trust in the E
year 1981. A suit evidently was filed by the plaintiffs in the year 1980
because Appellant was not then entitled to file a suit. It may be true that
the suit was filed under Order 1, Rule 8 of the CPC but therein the
question as to whether the Appellant herein, being a registered trust
became entitled to the properties of Brethren Church could not have been
gone into. What is prohibited is to enforce a right on behalf of a public F
trust. When the plaintiffs intended to enforce a right on behalf of the
Appellant, the suit was evidently not maintainable. (1069-F, GI
4.5. Furthermore, the purported resolutions of the churches affiliated
to the Brethren Church and merger thereof with the Appellant, having
regard to the provisions of the Act was required to be done in consonance G
with the provisions thereof. It is not necessary to consider as to whether
such dissolution of the churches and merger thereof in the Appellant would
amount to alienation of immovable property but even suth alienation is
prohibited in law. The control and management of the religious trusts vests
in the Charity Commissioner. The trustees of the Trust are statutorily H
1042
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2005) 3 S.C.R.
A enjoined with a duty to render all cooperation to the Charity
Commissioner. The directions issued by the Charity Commissioner to the
trustees are binding. Dissolution of a trust is a matter which falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Charity Commissioner.
(1069-H; 1070-A, BJ
B
Dhu/abhai and Ors. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr., (19681
3 SCR 662, relied on.
5.1. Prayer (a) in the plaint is for a declaration. Such declaration
cannot be granted by a civil court as regard succession of the District
Church of Brethren as the same was a religious trust registered under the
C BPT Act. (1070-CJ
5.2. Prayer (b) of the plaint also could not have been granted, as the
question as to whether the applicant is the legal continuation and successor
of the First District Church of Brethren is a matter which would fall for
exclusive determination of Charity Commissioner keeping in view the
D provisions of the deed of trust as regard its succession. It would necessarily
follow that whether the First Appellant became a legal successor of the
properties held by the First District Church of Brethren could not also
have been granted. The decision and resolution purported to have been
adopted by the Synod and Gujarat Diocesan Council are binding on all
churches or not would again be a question which could have been gone
E into by the Charity Commissioner as the same had direct bearing not only
with t.he administration and management of the Church registered with
it but also related to the properties held by it. Such a decision of the
Charity Commissioner is again final and conclusive subject to the decision
of the.appellate authority, viz., Bombay Revenue Tribunal.
F
( 1070:-D, E, Fl
5.3. Grant of prayer (c) for perpetual injunction would also give rise
to adjudication on the question as to whether the Appellant had the legal
right to own the properties of the First District Church of Brethren and.
administer or manage the same although at the relevant time it was not
G registered trust and although no amendment had been effected in the
registers and books maintained by the Charity Commissioner in terms of
Sect~on 17 read with Sections 21 and 22 of the BPT Act. "fhe plaintiffs
with a view to obtain an order of injunction furthermore were required
to establish that they could file a suit ,for enforcement of right of the
Appellant as a religious trust and such a legal right vests either in the
H plaintiff or in the Appellant indirectly. Such a prayer, related to the
-
CHURCH OF NORTH OF INDIA v. LA VAJIBHAI RA TANJIBHAI
} 043
possession of the property, comes squarely within the purview of the BPT A
Act. If the question as regard recovery of possession of the property
belonging to a public trust squarely falls within the purview of Section 50
of the Act, had such application been filed before the Charity
Commissioner he was required to go into the question as to whether the
plaintiffs are persons having interest in the trust and whether a consent B
should be given to them to maintain a suit. Only when, inter a/ia, such
consent is granted, a suit could have been filed in terms of Section 51 of
the Act. In the event of refusal to give consent, the persons interested could
have preferred an appeal. Yet again the question as regard existence of a
trust is a matter which squarely falls within the purview of Section 79 of
the Act. There is no doubt that the Charity Commissioner was impleaded C
as a party at a later stage of the suit only with a view to fulfill the
requirements of Sub-section (3) of Section 50 of the BPT Act.
(1070-G-H; 1071-A, B, C, DJ
Virupakshayya Shankarayya v. Neelakanta Shivacharya Pattadadevaru,
(1995) Supp 2 SCC 531, Narmadabai and Anr. v. Trust Shri Panchvati Balaji D
Mandir and Ors., (1995) Supp 3 SCC 676 and Shree Gol/aleshwar Dev and
Ors. v. Gangawwa Korn Shantayya Math and Ors., (1985) 4 SCC 393,
referred to.
6.1. The provisions of the BPT Act and the Scheme thereof leave no
manner of doubt that the BPT Act is a complete code in itself. It provides E
for a complete machinery for a person interested in the trust to put
forward his claim before the Charity Commissioner who is competent to
go into the question and to prefer appeal if he feels aggrieved by any
decision. The bar of jurisdiction created under Section 80 of the Act clearly
....,..
points out that a third party cannot maintain a suit so as to avoid the F
rigours of the provisions of the Act. The matter, however, would be
different if the property is not a trust property in the eye of law. The civil
court's jurisdiction may not be barred as it gives rise to a jurisdictional
question. If a property did not validly vest in a trust or if a trust itself is
not valid in law, the authorities under the Act will have no jurisdiction to
determine the said question. (1072-C, D, E)
G
6.2. With a view to determine the question as regard exclusion of
jurisdiction of Civil Court in terms of the provisions of the Act, the Court
has to consider what, in substance, and not merely in form, is the nature
of the claim made in the suit and the underlying object in seeking the real
relief therein. If for the purpose of grant of an appeal, the Court comes H
1044
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2005] 3 S.C.R.
A to t~e conclusion that the question is required to be determined or dealt
with by an authority under the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court must
be held to have been ousted. The questions which ate required to be
determined are within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities
whether simple or complicated. Section 26 of the Act must be read in that
B c.ontext as it specifically refers to those questions wherewith a court of
competent jurisdiction can deal with and if the same is not expressly or
impliedly barred~ Once a decision is arrived at, having regard to the nature
of the claim as also the reliefs sought for, that Civil Court has no
jurisdiction, Section 26 per force will have no application whatsoever.
6.3. Civil Court will have no jurisdiction in relatic;-n to a matter
C whereover the statutory authorities have the requisite jurisdiction. On the
other hand, if a question arises, which is outside the purview of the Act
or in rellltion to a matter, unconnected with the administration or
possession of the trust property, the Civil Court may have jurisdiction.
In this case, having regard to the nature of the lis,.the jurisdiction of the
D Civil Court was clearly barred.
Ramesh Chand Ardawatiwa v. Anil Panjwani, [20031 7 SCC 350,
distinguished.
State of Madras v. Kunnakudi Melamatam and Anr., AIR (1965) SC
E 1570, Sri Vedagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami Temple v. Jnduru Pattabhirami
Reddi, AIR (1967) SC 781, Chiranji/al Shrilal Goenka (Deceased) Through
LRs. v. Jasjit Singh and Ors., (19931 2 SCC 507, Rajasthan State Road
Transport Corporation and Anr .. v. Krishna Kant and Ors., [1995) 5 SCC 75,
Sahebgouda (Dead) ByLRs. and Ors. v. Ogeppa and Ors., (2003) 6 SCC 151,
NDMC v. Satish Chand (Deceased) By LR. Ram Chand, (2003) 10 SCC 38,
. F K.Shamrao and Ors. v. Assistant Charity Commissioner, (2003) 3 SCC 563,
Yeshwantrao Laxmanrao Ghatge and Anr. v. Baburao Bala Yadav (Dead) By
LRs. , (1978) I SCC 669, Suresh Ramniwas Mantri and Anr. v. Mohd.
lftequaroddin s!o Mohd Badroddin, (1999) 2 Mh.L.J. 131, Mahibubi Abdul
Aziz and Ors. v. Sayed Abdul Majid and Ors., (2001) 2 Mh.L.J. 512, Keki
Pestronji Jamadar and Anr. v. Khodadad Merwan Irani and Ors., AIR (1973)
G (Born) 130 and Nagar Wachan Mandir, Pandharpur v. Akbaralli Abdulhusen
and Sons and Ors., (1994) 1 MhW 280, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 9419 of2003.
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.3.2003 of the Gujarat High
H Court in $;A. No. 303 of 1986.
CHURCH OF NORTH OF INDIA v. LAV AJIBHAI RA TANJIBHAI [S.B. SINHA, J.]
} 045
WITH
A
I.A. Nos. 5-10 of 2005.
C.A. Sundaram, Ms. Rohini, Sashank Kumar, Ms. Manjula Gupta with
him for the Appellant.
K. Ramamoorthy, Huzefa Ahmadi, MJ. Marchant, Ejaz Maqbool, Nakul
Dewan, Ms. Saloni Sinha, Abhimit Sinha, Vikash Singh, M.N. Shroff, Naveen •
Chawla, D.M. Nargolkar and Shivaji M. Jadhav with him for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J. INTRODUCTION
The extent of bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court under Section 80 of the
Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'the BPT Act') ,
B
c
is the question involved in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and
order dated 21.03.2003 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad , D
in S.A. No. 303 of 1986.
BACKGROUND FACT:
The basic fact of the matter is not much in dispute.
In or about 1895, some American Missionaries established a religious
institution (Church) at Valsad for propagation of protestant faith ofChri!:itian
religion and to establish and manage the churches for the people professing
that faith. The object of the 'Brethren Church' was to propagate the work of
the church of the brethren in western India in order to reveal Christ by means
E
of evangelistic, educational, medical, literary, industrial school, social and F
charitable activities leading to the establishment of the kingdom of God. A
Continuation Committee is said to have been appointed in the year 1930 by
the representatives of the Brethren Church and other churches in a Round
Table Conference held in New Delhi with a view to consider the modalities
and other details for amalgamation of churches. The Committee is said to G
have worked out a broad basis for the unification of churches which was '
accepted by the participant churches whereupon a new committee came into
being in the year 1951. The First District Church of the Brethren in India
(Brethren Church) was registered as a religious society under the Societies
Registration Act, 1860 bearing Registration No. 1202/44; the object whereof
was to promote the work of the church of the brethren in Western India with H
1046
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
" [2005] 3 S.C.R.
A the same object wherefor the church was established. Another Round Table
Conference is said to have been held in the year 1951 at New Delhi resulting
in appointment of a new committee known as 'Negotiating Committee' in
order to continue deliberations for the union of churches; five other associations
were included in the Committee, namely, The Council of the Baptist Churches
in North India, The Church of India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon, The
B Methodist Church (British and Australian Conference), The Methodist Church
in Sou_them Asia and The United Church of Northern India. The. Brethren
Church (First District Church of the Brethren) was registered as a public trust
in Gujarat bearing No. E-643, Bharuch in tenns of the BPT Act. The
Negotiating Committee made its final recommendations which came to be
C known as the '4th Plan of the Union' which was published in a book entitled
'Plan of Church Union in North India and Pakistan'; the principal
recommendation of the Committee being that all the six uniting churches
should be dissolved and united to become one church to be known as "The
Church of Northern India" (hereinafter referred to as "the CNI) which should
be the legal continuation and successor of the united churches and all the
D properties, assets, obligations etc. thereof would vest in or devolve on CNI.
The booklet of the 4th Plan is said to have been circulated to the governing
bodies of the uniting churches with a view to enable them to deliberate
thereover and to take appropriate decision in that behalf.
E
On or about 17.02.1970, a Resolution bearing No. 70/08 is said to have
been passed by the majority of members for effecting the dissolution as a
society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The Negotiating Committee
thereafter on or about 29.11.1970 took a decision to formally inaugurate the
CNI at Nagpur. The Brethren Church allegedly placed the said Resolution
No. 70/08 at the altar wherein it was explicitly affirmed that the CNI shall
F be deemed to be the_ legal continuation and successor of the bre~hren church
and the rights, titles, claims, estates and the interests of the church together
with its privileges and obligations shall vest in the CNI as its legal heir on
or from the date of inauguration. The Church of North India Trust Association
was registered as a company under the Companies Act, 1956, in the year
G 1976. The original defendant Nos. 1 to 4 who were said to be initially part
of the CNI and were parties to the resolution dated 17 .02.1970 raised a
contention that the Brethren Church continued to exist. They started Qbstructing
the functioni'1g of the CNI, and in particular the worship in churches, and
asserted that the First ~rethren Church had not been dissolved and continued
and they represented the same.
H
CHURCH OF NORTH OF INDIA'" LA VAJIBHAI RA TANJIBl IAI [S.B. SINHA, J.] l 04 7
The original plaintiffs, namely, Ambelal Okarial Patel, Shantilal A
Lakshmichand Purani, Bishop T.L. Christachari and Samuel Nagarji Bhagat
(since deceased) said to be the former office bearers of the Brethren Church
filed a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Bharuch, marked
as Civil Suit No. 72 of 1979.
The CNI was imp leaded as defendant No. 5 therein, although no relief B'
thereagainst was claimed contending that it was a necessary and/or a proper
paity. The Brethren Church were not made parties in the said suit. It is stated
at the Bar that the said churches were impleaded at a later stage of the
proceedings but the said applications were later on dismissed. The original
defendant No. 4 in his written statement filed in the said suit took a categorical C.
stand that there had been no dissolution of the Brethren Church and their
separate entity was not lost. According to the said defendant they were
temporarily suspended till it was revived again and, thus, they were entitled
to work for and on behalf of the Brethren Church. In the said proceedings,
certain interim orders were passed wherewith we are not concerned. However,
with a view to complete the narration of facts, we may notice that the CNI D
filed an application for its registration before the Charity Commissioner in
terms of the provisions of the BPT Act, which was granted by an order dated
12.5 .1980 with effect from 19. l l.l 97 l. The CNI thereafter filed a change
report before the Charity Commissioner on or about l 5. l.198 l. Admittedly,
the said application has not yet been disposed of.
While things stood thus, the Charity Commissioner was impleaded as
a party in the suit and in its written statement a plea was raised that the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred in terms of Section 80 of the BPT
Act contending :
F
"4. In view of provisions of Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. The
question whether or not a trust of particular property is the property
of such trust, is to be decided exclusively by the Deputy or Assistant
Charity Commissioner appointed under the Act, the Assistant Charity
of the Brethren "as a public trust at No. E-643 (Bharuch) under the
Bombay Public Trusts ct, 1950. The decision of the Assistant Charity G '
Commissioner, Bharuch unless set aside as provided under the Act,
is final and conclusive. It is further submitted that the jurisdiction of
the Hon'ble Court is also barred under Section 80 of the Act. The
plaintiffs are, therefore, not entitled to the reliefs as prayed for by
them. The suit, deserves to be dismissed."
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2005) 3 S.C.R.
A PROCEEDINGS :
The learned Civil Judge by judgment and decree dated 31.3 .1984 decreed
the suit; findings in support whereof would be noticed a little later.
An appeal was preferred thereagainst on or about 4.5.1984 by the original.
B defendants in the Court of the District Judge, Bharuch, which was marked as
RCA No. 72 of 1984. By judgment and decree dated 11.8.1986, the said
appeal was allowed whereagainst the CNI (Appellant herein) preferred a
Second Appeal before the Gujarat High Court, which was marked as Second
Appeal No. 303 of 1986. On or about 29.3.2002, the Charity Commissioner
C is said to have filed a detailed affidavit in support of the Change Report No.
665/81. By reason of the impugned judgment and order dated 21.3.2003, the
said Second Appeal was dismissed.
Hence the Appellant is before us.
D CONTENTIONS :
Mr. C.A. Sundaram, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
the Appellant would submit that the Court of First Appeal as also the High
Court committed a manifest error in passing the impugned judgments insofar
they failed to take into consideration the scope and purport of the suit.
E According to the learned counsel, the learned Trial Judge had rightly decreed
the suit having taken into consideration the fact that the matter relating to
formation of churches and their merger in the name of the CNI was not a
matter which could be determined by the Charity Commissioner in exercise
of his powers under the BPT Act. The learned counsel would contend that the
society and the trust are two separate entities. The Society being not a juristic
F person although cannot own any property but manage the affairs of the trust
which would be the owner of the property. According to the learned counsel
the Court of First Appeal and the High Court misdirected themselves in
passing the impugned judgments insofar as they proceeded on the premise
that having regard to the fact that properties belonging to the Brethren Church
G were registered in the books maintained by the Charity Commissioner under
Section 17 of the Act, any church affected thereby would fall within his
jurisdiction and consequently the dissolution of the society and managing of
the churches and consequently their merger would also come within the
purview of the provisions of the BPT Act.
H
Mr. Sundaram would submit that a society registered under the Societies
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CHURCH Of NORTH Of INDIA v. LAVAJIBHAI RA TANJIBHAI [S.B. SINHA, J.]
} 049
Registration Act, 1860 and a trust registered under the BPT Act are two A
different entities. Whereas the activities and the dealings of the latter may fall
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities specified under the BPT
Act, the activities of the society would be governed by the Societies
Registration Act, 1860. The Civil Court, therefore, according to Mr. Sundaram,
had the requisite jurisdiction to deal with the question as to whether the
resolution adopted in the year 1970 resulting in dissolution and the merger B
of the churches was valid. Such a dispute, Mr. Sundaram would argue, is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Charity Commissioner. The learned counsel
would urge that once the dissolution of the Brethren Church and consequent
merger in the Appellant is held to be valid, in terms of the Section 26 of the
BPT Act, the Charity Commissioner is enjoined with a duty to make necessary C
changes in the books maintained under Section 17 of the BPT Act. Sections
3 l, 50, 51, 79 and 80 of the BPT Act, according to Mr. Sundaram, do not
clothe the Charity Commissioner or any other authority thereunder to determine
a question as r~gard the validity of a resolution of a society and/or its merger.
Mr. K. Ramamoorthy, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
the Brethren Church supporting the Appellant would contend that
administration of a religious property must be understood in its proper context.
According to the learned counsel, administration of a property belonging to
trust may not have anything to do with the actual possession or dealing with
the administration thereof.
Th~ learned counsel would draw our attention to the judgments in State
n'
E
of Madras v. Kunnakudi Melamatam and Anr., AIR (1965) SC 1570;
Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka (deceased) Through L.Rs. v. Jasjit Singh and
Ors., (1993] 2 SCC 507 and Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation
and Anr. v. Krishna Kant and Ors., [1995] 5 SCC 75 and contended that in F
various situations, the Civil Court and the Probate Court alone have been
held to have exclusive jurisdiction and not the Charity Commissioner.
According to the learned counsel, the Charity Commissioner being a creature
of statute must exercise its jurisdiction within the four-comers thereof and
the matters which do not come within the purview of the_ BPT Act must
necessarily be left to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. According to the G
learned counsel the provisions of Section 50 of the BPT Act do not show that
requirements contained therein must be carried out even in a case where the
Charity Commissioner may not have any jurisdiction.
As regard interpretation of Section 31 of the BPT Act, the learned H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2005] 3 S.C.R.
A counsel would contend that the provision thereof bars hearing and decision
in the suit and not the institution thereof. Although in the year 1979, the·
Appellant herein was not registered but as before hearing of the suit was
taken up, it became registered in the year 1980, the Civil Judge had the
jurisdiction to hear and decide the said suit even it involved dealing with the
B trust property.
Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
contesting Respondents, on the other hand, would submit that for the purpose
of determining the question as to whether the suit before the Civil Court was
maintainable or not, the averments made in the plaint must be read as a
C whole and substratum thereof must be noticed. As adjudication was sought
for in relation to administration and possession of the properties of a trust;
the suit was not maintainable. It was pointed out that the true identity of the
Appellant had not been disclosed, i.e., as to whether it is a trust registered
under the BPT Act, or a company registered under the Indian Companies
Act, 1956.
D
The learned counsel submitted that although a distinction is sought to
be made between the activities of a society which runs the administration of
a trust and a trust which owns the property, no such distinction was made in
the proceedings before the courts below. Drawing our attention to certain
grounds taken in the Special Leave Petition, Mr. Ahmadi would urge, that in
E fact the finding of the High Court to the effect that the society and the trust
are two separate entities had been questioned. Taking us through the plaint,
the learned counsel would contend that plaintiffs as also the learned Trial
Judge proceeded on the basis that the trust had ceased to exist and wherever
the expression "Brethren Church" has been used in the judgment, the learned
F Trial Court referred to it as a trust and not as a society.
Mr. Ahmadi would contend that the learned Trial Court proceeded on
the basis that there existed inconsistencies between the provisions of the
Societies Registration Act which is a Parliamentary Act and the BPT Act.
which is a State Act and relying on or on the basis of clause (2) of Article
G 254 of the Constitution of India, it came to the decision that the former shall
prevail over the latter. It is in that context, issues were decided and not on
the basis that the society and the trust are. two separate entities. We were
taken through the relevant paragraphs of the BPT Act and in particular Sections
2(10), 2(13), 13(b), 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 31, 36, SO, 51, 74, 79 and 80 by
H Mr. Ahmadi to show that the said provisions clearly indicate that the DPT
.J
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....,.._
CHURCH OF NOR TH OF !NOIA v. LAV AJIBHAI RAT ANJIBHAI [S. B. SINHA,J .] lOSL
Act is a self-contained code and deals with all questions governing a trust A
and the properties held by it. It was urged that the provisions of Section 26
thereof must be read in that context. The learned counsel would submit that
the provisions of Section 26 of the BPT Act, in the facts and circumstances
of the case, would have no application where a suit was expressly barred
which regulates management of a trust, as the BPT Act created a specialized B
machinery to determine the issues governing the same.
Drawing our attention to the prayer (b) of the plaint, Mr. Ahmadi
would argue that the same would squarely fall within the purview of Sections ,
50 and 51 of the BPT Act and, thus, would be barred as no permission of the ,
Chief Commissioner was sought for and obtained.
c
The learned counsel would contend that the plea that the suit related to
the affairs of the society is merely a ruse or a camouflage. It was argued that
the society itself is a religious trust and, thus, both stand on the same footing '
and in· that view of the matter, the suit will not be maintainable.
The learned counsel would further submit that a finding of fact had· D
bet:n arrived at by the Court of Appeal that the Brethren Church had not
ceased to exist, this Court should not interfere therewith.
--
Mr. M.N. Shroff, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Charity
Commissioner, adopted the submission of Mr. Ahmadi and would further 'E
contend that the substantial issue before the learned Civil Judge was as to
whether the Brethren Church which was registered as trust had ceased to
exist and/or stood dissolved or not.
SOCIETIES REGISTRATION ACT, 1860
'p
~
The Societies Registration Act was enacted, as it was found expedient
that provisions should be made for improving the legal condition of societies
established for the promotion of literature, science, or the fine arts, or for the
-<
diffusion of useful knowledge, the diffusion of political education and for
charitable purposes.
0
Section 2 of the Societies Registration Act provides for memorandum
--
of association which, inter a/ia, must contain the name of the society and the
objects of the society. A society which is formed for charitable purpose may
also carry on its activities. The words 'charitable purposes' includes religious
purposes. Section 4 provides for annual list of managing body to be filed H
,,
I(
__..
i
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2005] 3 S.C.R.
A stating names, addresses and occupations of the governors, council, directors,
committee, or other governing body then entrusted with the management of
the affairs of the society.
In terms of Section 5, the property of a society both movable and
immovable, if not vested in the trustees, would be deemed to have vested, for
B the time being, in the governing body of such society. A suit by or against
the society is to be filed in the name of the President, Chairman or Principal
Secretary or trustees of such society as may be determined by the rules and
regulations thereof.
C
Section I 3 of Societies Registration Act provides for dissolution of
societies and adjustment of their affairs. It reads as under :
D
E
"13.