# CIIlTIARANJAN DAS v. THE STATE OF ORISSA September 18, 1973

- **Citation:** [1974] 1 S.C.R. 656
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1973-09-18
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 58 of 1970
- **Bench:** H. R. Kiia!'Ina, A. Alagiriswami
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ciiltiaranjan-das-v-the-state-of-orissa-september-18-1973-6017
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Food Ad11ltcratio11 Act (37 of 1954) s. 20(1)-Person authorised to give
1rritten consent for prosecution for offence under the Act-Whether the authority
should relate to specific offence or could be general.
Section 20(1) of the Food Adulteration Act, 1954, as it stood before its
2mendment by Act 49 of 1964 provided that no prosecution for an offence under the
Act shall be instituted except by or with the written consent of the State Govern·
ment or &. lucal authority or a person authorised in this behalf by the State
Government or a local authority.
On the written consent of the Superintendent
of Police, Vigilance, who was authorised to give written consent for instituting
prosecutions for offences, under the Act, the appellant was prosecuted and convicted for an offence under s. 16(1) (a) of the Act It was contended on his behalf that while it was permissible under the section, after its amendment by Act
49 of 1964, to issue such general notification authorising a person to give written
consent, under the section as it stood before the amendment, the authority
should be in respect of a specified individual offence.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : There is nothing in the language of the section which makes it
imperative to specify a particular oifence in the order authorising a person to give
consent to the institution of prosecution. The legislature had a two fold object in
enacting s. 20(1-)(a) to prevent institution of prosecutions for offences under the
Act except with the written consent of the authorities mentioned in the section,
and (b) to relieve the State Government or local authority of the necessity of
applying its mind and dealing with each individual case of prosecution under the
Act. In case the authority conferred by the State Government or local authority
could not be general but had to relate to an individual offence the very purpose
of the section would be defeated. for then. it would become necessary for the
State Government or local authority first to authorise a person to give written consent in respect of an individual case and thereafter for the person authorised to
give written consent, so that what could be done in one step by the State Government or local authority would have to be done in two steps.
The words 'in this behalf' indicate that the authority conferred by the State
Government or local authority upon a person should relate to the giving ·of
\Vritten consent for the institution of prosecution for offences under the Act
and not that the authority conferred must relate to some specified individual
offence. The amended sectic1also contains those words, and must obviously
carry the same meaning. If .he interpretation sought to be placed upon these
\VOr<ls is accepted no general authority can be conferred even under.s. 20(1)
even as amended, and the words 'by general or special order' in the amended
section would become meaningless and lose all significance.
The amendment
had only made more. clear what was already contemplated by the section.
[659G--661B]
Corporation of Madras v. Arumagham, A.I.R. 1966. Madras 194, Laxma11
Sitaram Pai & Anr. v. The State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1967 Mysore 33 and Public
Prosecutor v. Tilatha Rao & Ors., A.I.R. 1968 A.P. 17, approved.

## Text

656
CIIlTIARANJAN DAS
v.
THE STATE OF ORISSA
September 18, 1973.
[H. R. KIIA!'INA AND A. ALAGIRISWAMI, JJ.]
Food Ad11ltcratio11 Act (37 of 1954) s. 20(1)-Person authorised to give
1rritten consent for prosecution for offence under the Act-Whether the authority
should relate to specific offence or could be general.
Section 20(1) of the Food Adulteration Act, 1954, as it stood before its
2mendment by Act 49 of 1964 provided that no prosecution for an offence under the
Act shall be instituted except by or with the written consent of the State Govern·
ment or &. lucal authority or a person authorised in this behalf by the State
Government or a local authority.
On the written consent of the Superintendent
of Police, Vigilance, who was authorised to give written consent for instituting
prosecutions for offences, under the Act, the appellant was prosecuted and convicted for an offence under s. 16(1) (a) of the Act It was contended on his behalf that while it was permissible under the section, after its amendment by Act
49 of 1964, to issue such general notification authorising a person to give written
consent, under the section as it stood before the amendment, the authority
should be in respect of a specified individual offence.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : There is nothing in the language of the section which makes it
imperative to specify a particular oifence in the order authorising a person to give
consent to the institution of prosecution. The legislature had a two fold object in
enacting s. 20(1-)(a) to prevent institution of prosecutions for offences under the
Act except with the written consent of the authorities mentioned in the section,
and (b) to relieve the State Government or local authority of the necessity of
applying its mind and dealing with each individual case of prosecution under the
Act. In case the authority conferred by the State Government or local authority
could not be general but had to relate to an individual offence the very purpose
of the section would be defeated. for then. it would become necessary for the
State Government or local authority first to authorise a person to give written consent in respect of an individual case and thereafter for the person authorised to
give written consent, so that what could be done in one step by the State Government or local authority would have to be done in two steps.
The words 'in this behalf' indicate that the authority conferred by the State
Government or local authority upon a person should relate to the giving ·of
\Vritten consent for the institution of prosecution for offences under the Act
and not that the authority conferred must relate to some specified individual
offence. The amended sectic1also contains those words, and must obviously
carry the same meaning. If .he interpretation sought to be placed upon these
\VOr<ls is accepted no general authority can be conferred even under.s. 20(1)
even as amended, and the words 'by general or special order' in the amended
section would become meaningless and lose all significance.
The amendment
had only made more. clear what was already contemplated by the section.
[659G--661B]
Corporation of Madras v. Arumagham, A.I.R. 1966. Madras 194, Laxma11
Sitaram Pai & Anr. v. The State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1967 Mysore 33 and Public
Prosecutor v. Tilatha Rao & Ors., A.I.R. 1968 A.P. 17, approved.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 58 of
1970.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 3rd
December, 1969 of the Orissa High Court in Criminal Revision No.
325 of 67.
N. C. Sikri, for the appellant.
S. Chatterjee and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.
A
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CHITTRANJAN DAS v. ORISSA (Khanna, !.)
657
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Kl!ANNA,
J.
Chittaranjan Das appellant was
convicted by
Magistrate First Class Cuttack under section 16(1)(a) of the Pre·
vention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (Act 37 of 1954) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and was sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500.
or in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period
of six weeks. Appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge Cuttack. The appellant then went up in revision
to the High Court but his revision petition too was dismissed by the
Orissa High Court. The appellant thereafter filed the present appeal
by special leave.
The case for the prosecution is that on July 17, 1965 Food
Inspector Behera went to the stall of the accused in the Old Secretariat
Compound Cuttack and found potato chops being fried by an
employee of the accused in groundnut oil in a frying pan. The Food
Juspeotor disclosed his identity N> the accused and after giving the
requisite notice, he purchased 375 gms of the groundnut oil in which
the potato chops were being fried. After the oil was cooled, the Food
Jnspector divided it into three equal parts and poured each part of the
oil in a clean bottle. The bottles were then sealed. One of the bottles
was handed over to the accused. Another bottle was sent to a public
analyst. The public analyst found on analysis the groundnut oil ro be
adulterated as it did not conform to the prescribed standard. The
Superintendent of Police, Vigilance thereafter gave written consent
for the prosecution of the acdllsed. The accused was after that sent
up for trial.
It may be stated that the date on which the sample of groundnut
oil was purchased by the Food Inspector from the accused has been
mentioned in the judgments of the trial magistrate as well as thme of
the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court to be March 14.
1964. This datll was wrong because on reference to the reoord of the
trial court, we find that the date on which the sample of the oil was
purchased· by the Food Inspector from the accused was July 17.
1965. This mistake in any event does not affect the merits of the case.
The plea of the accused at the trial was that the sample of the oil
had been taken not from the frying pan bnt from a tin wherein he had
kept burnt oil for the purpose of using it as fuel. The oil, according
to the accused, was· stored neither for sale nor for being used for frying food articles. This plea of the accused was found bv the trial court
as well as by the learned Addition Session Judge to be false. In the
High Court it was not disputed on behalf of the accused that the
groundnut oil purchased bv the Food Inspector had been taken out
of the frying pan and that potato chops were being prepared with that
oil. One of the contentions which was raised on behalf of the accused
before the High Court was that the sanction or consent given bv the
Superintendent of Police, Vigilance for the prosecution of the accused •
was not in conformity with section 20 of the Act as
the authority
658
S1JPREI\1E COURT REPORTS
( 1974 j 1 S.C.P.
contemplated by that section must be in respect of each imlivi<.Iual
case and a' general authority give!) to the Superintendent of Police to
sanction prosecution was not legal. The High Court rejected this contention as also some other contentions which had been raised on beh:ilf of the accused.
In appeal before us, Mr. Sikri has at the outset submitted that
there was non-compliance with the provisions of section 10(7) of the
Act as the Food Inspector did not call one or more persons to be
present at the time he purchased the sample of groundnut oil from
the accused. In this respeot we find that the judgment of the High
Court shows that no such argument was advanced before the High
Court. This argument involves questions of fact and as the accused
appellant failed to agitate it before the High Court, we have not per
mitted the appellant to agitate it before us in this Court.
The main contention which has been advanced in appeal !x:forc
Liii on behalf of the appellant is that there was no valid consent to the
prosecution of the accused appellant in accordance with sub-section
( 1) of section 20 of the Act and, as such, the prosecution of the
appellant was not in accordance with law. To appreciate this contention it would be relevant to reproduce the material part of sub-section
(1) of section 20 of the Act, as it stood before its amendment by Act
49 of 1964. It was as under:
"No prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be
instituted except by or with the written consent of the State
Government or a local authority or a person authorised in
this behalf by the State Govermncnt or a local authority."
On December 16, 1964 a notification was issued by the Orissa
Government authorising, inter alia, the
Superintendent of Police
Oittaeik Vigilance Division to give written consent for instituting
prosecutions for offences under the Act within the local limits of
Cuttack Municipality. The notificatiqn reads as under :
HEALTH DEPARTMENT
NOTIFICATION
The 16th December, 1964
"No. 25485-H.-II' exercise of the powers conferred by
sub-section (1) of section 20 of the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act, 1954 (37 of 1954), the State Govemment do hereby authorise the following officers of the Politi"
cal and Services (Vigilance) Department to give written
consent for instituting prosecutions for offences under the
said Act, within the local limits specified against each in
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ClllTl.ll<l,J.1:-0 D.IS v. ORISS.\ (Klu11111a, J.)
G;;J
respect of cases delectcd by the Food Inspectors attached
10 the concerned Vigilance Divisions:-
N amc of ofliccr
I I ) Superintendent of Police,
Cuttack Vigilance Division
Local Limits
Cuttack Municipality
*
•
By order of the Govern0r
C. VENKATARAMANI
Joint Secretary to Government."
The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was amended by Act 49
of 1964 with effect from March 1, 1965. One of the amendments made
by the amentling Act was in section 20 of the Act. As a result 0f
amendment, the material part of sub-section (1) of section 20 reads
as under :
"S. 20 (1) :-No prosecution for an offence under this
Act shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent
of the Central ·Government or the State Government or a
local authority or a person autl1oriscd in this behalf,
by
general or special order, by the Central Government
or
the State Government or a local authority;"
fhe contention which has been raised on behalf of the appellant is
that while it is permissible under section 20 of the Act, as it stands
after the amendment made by Act 49 of 1964, to issue a general notification authorising a person to give written consent under the above
provision of law, such a course was not permissible under section 20,
as it stood before the above amendment. It was, according to
the
learned oounsel, essential under section 20, as it stood before· the
amendment, that the authority should be in respect of some specified
individual offence. As nolification dated December 16,
1964 was
issued heforc Act 37 of 1954 was amended by Act 49 of 1964 and
as the said notification gave a general authority to the Superintendent
of Police, Vigilance to give consent for instituting prosecutions for
offences under the Act committed within the local limits of Cultack
Municipality, the said notification, it is urged. was not in accordance
with law.
As against the above, Mr. Chatterjee on behalf of the State
ha<
argued ·that there is no infirmity in the notification d:itcd Decemhcr
16, 1964 and such a notification could have been validly i;sucd under
section 20 of the Act, as it stood before the amendment. In our
opinion, there is force in the submission of Mr. Chatterjee.
It would appear from what has been stated abow that the short
question which arises for consideration is whether it is permissible for
the State Government or local autl1ority under section 20, as it stood
before the amendment, to give a general authority to a person to give
consent to the institution of prosecutions for offences under the Act
without mentioning a specified individual offence. We have reproduced
660
sup;{EME COURT REPORTS
[ 197·l] 1 s.c.R.
above section 20, as it stood before the amendmen~ and
we find
nothing in its language which makes it imperative to specify a pa.iii·
cular offence in the order authorising a person to give consent to the
institution of prosecution. The words "in this behalf" in the above
provision, to which our attention has been invited, indicate that the
authority conferred by the State Government or local authority upon
a person should relate to the giving of written consent for institution of prosecutions for offences under the Act. It is diffi~ult to spell
out an inference from those words that the authority conferred upon
a person under the above provision cannot be a general authority in
respect of offences under the Act but must relate to some specified
individual oiience. If the interpretation sought to be placed upon the
words "in this behalf" on behalf of the appelfant were to be accepted,
in such an event no general authority can be conferred even under
su~tion ( 1) of section 20, as amended by Act 49
of
1964,
because even the amended section contains those words. The words
"by general or special order" in the amended section in that event
\Vould become meaningless and lose all significance. It is, indeed, not
disputed that under the amended section a general authority can be
conferred upon a person for giving consent to the institution of prosecutions for offences under the Act. The words "in this behalf"
in
sub-section ( 1) of section 20, as it existed before the amendment, as
well as after the amendment must obviously carry the same meaning.
If those words in the amended section do not postulate that the
authority conferred by the State Government
or !peal authority
should have reference to a specified individual offence committed by
a particular accused, we fail to understand as to how those words as
used in the section before the amendment would carry a different
connotation.
Petusal of sub-section ( 1) of section 20 of the Act, as it existed
before the amendment, shows that the legislature had two fold object
in enacting this provision. One object was to prevent institution of
prosecutions for offences under the Act unless written consent to the
institution of such prosecutions was given by the State Govenunent
or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf by the State
Government or local authority. The other object was to relieve the
State Government or local authority of the necessity of applying its
mind and dealing with each individual case of prosecution under the
Act. Provision was accordingly made 1io enable the State Government or local authority to assign the function of giving written con·
sent to some other person. In case the authority conferred by the
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CH!TTARANJAN D.\S v. ORISSA (Khanna, J.)
66 l
State Government or local authmity could not be general but had to
relate to an individual offence, the very purpose of the latter part of
sub-section (1) of section 20 would be defeated, for it would in such
an event become necessary for the State Government or local autho·
rity first to authorise a person to give written consent in respect of an
individual case of prosedution and thereafter for the person autho·
riscd to pass another order for giving the written consent. The result
would be that what could be done in one step by the State Govern·
meat or local authority by straightaway giving its written consent
would have to be done in two steps. It is difficult to accede to the
contention that the above provision instead of simplifying the matter
was intended to make it needlessly more cumbersome.
The change made in section 20 by Act 49 of 1964 has now put
the thing beyond any pale of controversy. Even without the change
made in the section the authority conferred by the State Government
or local authority upon a person for giving the consent contemp·
lated by the section,
in our opinion,
could be of general nature
and it was not essential that the order authorising the person should
have mentioned specified individual · off.mces. The amendment made
ia this section had the effect of making more clear what was already
contemplated by the section.
The Madras High Court in the case of Corporation of Madras v.
Arumugham,( 1) the Mysore High Court in the case of Laxman Sitaram
Pai & Anr. v. The State of Mysore(') and the Andhra Pradesh High
Court in the case of Public Proseoutor v. Thatha Rao &Ors.(') have
all taken the view that a general authorisation to launch prosecutions
under the Act is sufficient. For the reasons stated above,
we agree
with the view taken in the above three cases.
We see no cogent ground to interfere with the sentence. The appeal
fails and is dismissed.
V.P.S.
(I) A. I. R. 1966 Madras 194.
(2) A. I. R. 1967 Mysore JJ.
(3) A. I. R. 1968 A. P. 17.
Appeal dismissed.