# COLONEL HIS HIGHNESS SAWAI TEJ SINGHJI, MAHARAJA OF ALWAR v. THE UNION OF INDIA & ANR

- **Citation:** [1979] 2 S.C.R. 62
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1978-10-06
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 12 of 1969
- **Bench:** Y. V. Chandrachud, R. S. Sarkaria, N. L. lh!TWALIA, A. D. KosnAL, A. P. Sen
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/colonel-his-highness-sawai-tej-singhji-maharaja-of-alwar-v-the-union-of-india-7619
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

Constitution of India 1950-Art. 363-Covcnants agreeing to merger of
princely states-Provision in Covenants that any dispute relating to any jtemC
of property of Ruler or state property to be referred for decision to a nominee
of Government of India and such decision shall be final and binding on all
concerned-C@nzrnunication of the Govern1nent of India t~ the effect that the
settlen1ent of the inventory of properties lVas an integral part of an overall
agreement in respect of all outstanding 1natters of dispute-fVhet!ier such
•decision• an agreement and could be enforced by the Ruler-Bar to ;urisdic·
lion of Civil Courts under Art. 363.
D
The appellant who was the Ruler of a princely state entered into a covenant agreeing to merge his state into a union called the United States of
Matsya.
The Matsya Covenant, by Art. XI Cl. (2) provided that the ruler
of each state shall furnish to the Raj Pramukh an inventory of all the immovable properties, securities and cash balances held by him
as
private
property and cl. (3) provided that if any dispute arose as to whether
E
any item of property was the private property of the ruler or the state
property it shall be referred to such person as the' Government of India
may nominate and the decision of that person shall be final and binding
on all parties.
The appellant furnished an
inventory
of
all
propertfes
claimed to be his private property.
Sometime later the rulers of the
const.ituent States of Matsya entered into a Covenant with the Rajpramukh
of the United State of Rajasthan for nlerger of· their ,States into the
F
State of Rajasthan in abrogation of the 1'1atsya Covenant.
The Rajasthan
Covenant by Art. XII, CL (2) provided for the
s~ttle1ne11t
of
'.lny
dispute as to \vhether t.he property was private property or state property
by reference to such person as the Government of India may nominate
in
con3t1ltation \Vith the Rajpratnukh and tha.t the decision of such per<>on shall
be final and binding on the parties.
G
The ~finistry of States, Government of Indin wrote on 14th
September.
1949 to the appellant that the settlement of the inventory was an integral par1
of an overall agreement in respect of all ou!.standing matters of dispute and
did not stand by
it~elf.
After correspondence with the Government of India
the appellant received a \Vritten communication intimating the decision of the
Go·•ernnicnt of India in respect of 25 items of the ~roperty_
ff
The rippellant claimed that four buildings wh~ch wer~ in occupation of the
State Government had been declared as his private properties in the inventory
appended to the letter of the Government of India and that the State Govern-
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TBJ SINGHJI V. UNION
63
ment should pay rent to him in respect of those buildings. This claim of the
BoPpellant hnving been rejected, he filed a suit in the district
court
for
a
declaration that the properties were his private properties and that the respondents should be ordered to pay rent to him.
A.
The suit \Vas transferred by the High Court to itself. The High
Court
dismissed the suit on the ground that adjudication of the dispute was barred
by Art. 363 of the Constitution.
B
·•
In appeal to, this Court it was contended that the letter of 14th September,
1949 wns the result of a decision arrived at in pursuance of cl. (3) of Art. XI
of Matsya Covenant and cl. (2) of Art. XII of the Rajasthan Covenant and
n1ust be construed as a decision of the Government \)f Jndia.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : 1. The decision sought to be enforced is
an
agreement
hit
by
Art. 363 of the Constitution and the High Court was right in dismissing the
suit. [74H]
2. The so-called decision was nothing but
::.·n
agree1nent
bet\veen
the
Gove1 nrnent of Jndin and the appellant.
The Letter
dearly stated th<tt
the
inventory furnished by the plaintiff was discussed with him at New De1h1
and that a copy of the final inventory of the appellant's
private
properties.
which had the approval of the Government of India in the M

## Text

A
B
62
COLONEL HIS HIGHNESS SAWAI TEJ SINGHJI,
MAHARAJA OF ALWAR
v.
THE UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
October 6, 1978
[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., R. S. SARKARIA, N. L. lh!TWALIA,
A. D. KosnAL AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]
Constitution of India 1950-Art. 363-Covcnants agreeing to merger of
princely states-Provision in Covenants that any dispute relating to any jtemC
of property of Ruler or state property to be referred for decision to a nominee
of Government of India and such decision shall be final and binding on all
concerned-C@nzrnunication of the Govern1nent of India t~ the effect that the
settlen1ent of the inventory of properties lVas an integral part of an overall
agreement in respect of all outstanding 1natters of dispute-fVhet!ier such
•decision• an agreement and could be enforced by the Ruler-Bar to ;urisdic·
lion of Civil Courts under Art. 363.
D
The appellant who was the Ruler of a princely state entered into a covenant agreeing to merge his state into a union called the United States of
Matsya.
The Matsya Covenant, by Art. XI Cl. (2) provided that the ruler
of each state shall furnish to the Raj Pramukh an inventory of all the immovable properties, securities and cash balances held by him
as
private
property and cl. (3) provided that if any dispute arose as to whether
E
any item of property was the private property of the ruler or the state
property it shall be referred to such person as the' Government of India
may nominate and the decision of that person shall be final and binding
on all parties.
The appellant furnished an
inventory
of
all
propertfes
claimed to be his private property.
Sometime later the rulers of the
const.ituent States of Matsya entered into a Covenant with the Rajpramukh
of the United State of Rajasthan for nlerger of· their ,States into the
F
State of Rajasthan in abrogation of the 1'1atsya Covenant.
The Rajasthan
Covenant by Art. XII, CL (2) provided for the
s~ttle1ne11t
of
'.lny
dispute as to \vhether t.he property was private property or state property
by reference to such person as the Government of India may nominate
in
con3t1ltation \Vith the Rajpratnukh and tha.t the decision of such per<>on shall
be final and binding on the parties.
G
The ~finistry of States, Government of Indin wrote on 14th
September.
1949 to the appellant that the settlement of the inventory was an integral par1
of an overall agreement in respect of all ou!.standing matters of dispute and
did not stand by
it~elf.
After correspondence with the Government of India
the appellant received a \Vritten communication intimating the decision of the
Go·•ernnicnt of India in respect of 25 items of the ~roperty_
ff
The rippellant claimed that four buildings wh~ch wer~ in occupation of the
State Government had been declared as his private properties in the inventory
appended to the letter of the Government of India and that the State Govern-
. .
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TBJ SINGHJI V. UNION
63
ment should pay rent to him in respect of those buildings. This claim of the
BoPpellant hnving been rejected, he filed a suit in the district
court
for
a
declaration that the properties were his private properties and that the respondents should be ordered to pay rent to him.
A.
The suit \Vas transferred by the High Court to itself. The High
Court
dismissed the suit on the ground that adjudication of the dispute was barred
by Art. 363 of the Constitution.
B
·•
In appeal to, this Court it was contended that the letter of 14th September,
1949 wns the result of a decision arrived at in pursuance of cl. (3) of Art. XI
of Matsya Covenant and cl. (2) of Art. XII of the Rajasthan Covenant and
n1ust be construed as a decision of the Government \)f Jndia.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : 1. The decision sought to be enforced is
an
agreement
hit
by
Art. 363 of the Constitution and the High Court was right in dismissing the
suit. [74H]
2. The so-called decision was nothing but
::.·n
agree1nent
bet\veen
the
Gove1 nrnent of Jndin and the appellant.
The Letter
dearly stated th<tt
the
inventory furnished by the plaintiff was discussed with him at New De1h1
and that a copy of the final inventory of the appellant's
private
properties.
which had the approval of the Government of India in the Ministry of States,
was forwarded to him.
Under clause (3) Art. XI of the Mat~ya Cvvenant
as also clause (2) of Art. XII of the Rajasthan Covenh11t, no approval of the
Ministry of States was ca11ed for.
What each of these clauses provided \Vas
that if any dispute arose as to \Vhether any item of property was the
private
property of the ruler concerned or of his erstwhile state, it was to be referred
to such a person as the Government of India might
nominate,
and
the
decision of that person was to be final and binding on all parties concerned.
Neither the (Jovernment of India nominated a person to whom the dispUl<::
was to be referred; nor did any such person give a decision on
the
point.
The contents of the letter, are not at all relateable to those of either ot the
two clauses.
On the other hand, they clearly indicate
that the
so-called
"decisions'' of the States Ministry contained in the inventory appended to the
letter forrr.ed really the record of the ~a·greement arrived
at
between
the
Ministry of Stntcs and the plaintiff as a result of nesntiation<.<. [7 lD-Hl
3. Parag:;aph three of the letter talks of the "settlement of the inventory•·
wbich \vas to be an integral part of an "ovcnill agreen1cn_t in re'.'.;pcct of 3'11
outstanding matters of dispute" and was not to stand by itself.
\Vhr.t tbG
letter said v.'as that all the disputes regarding ·the property of the Ruler \Vere
to be settled by an overall agreement that the contents
of
the
inventory
appended to the letter merely recorded the settlement between the
appeilant
and the Ministry and that even those contents were not to be regarded as fin:tl
settlement of the n1atters dealt with therein unless they formed part of an
agreen1ent embracing all items of property. [72B-Cl
4. In the instant case instead of having the disputes referred for decision
to a person nominated by the parties they decided to adopt the
method of
n1utual agreement to settle those disputes.
Such mutual agreement could not
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A : be regarded as a decision by ta· person nominated by the Government of India
either under clause (3) of Art. XI of Matsya Covenant or clause (2)
of
Art. XII of Rajasthan Covenant. It must be deemed to be nothing more nor
' Jess than a·n agreement simpliciter eren though it was labelled as a decision
of the States Ministry. [72H-73B]
B
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5. Article 363 of the Constitution bars the jurisdiction of all courts in any
dispute arising out of any agreement which was entered into
or executed
before the commencement of the Constitution by any Ruler of an
Indian
State to \.vhich the Government of India was a party. The operation of the
Article is not limited to any "parent" Covenant and every agreement
whether
it \V<ls primary or one entered into in pursuance of the provisions of a preceding agree-ment would fall within the ambit of the Article. The fact that the
agreement contained in the Jetter dated the 14th September, 1949 had reiiiulted
from action take11 under the provisions of the Rajasthan Covenant, is no an;wer
to the pJea raised on behalf of the respondents that Art. 363 of the Constitution
is a bar tc the maintainability of the two suits, nlthough that agreement did
not flo\~ di!'ectly from the Rajasthan Covenant but was entered into by ignoring
and departing from the provisions of clause (2) of Art. XII thereof. [73D~EJ
D
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 12 of 1969.
From the JudgmeTit and Decree dated 29-4-1965 of the Rajasthan
High Court in D. B. Civil Misc. Case No. 67 of 1965.
B. D. Sharma for the Appellant.
E
S. N. Kacker, Sol. Genl., U. R. Lalit and Girish Chandra for
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Respondent No. I.
S. M. Jain for Respondent No. 2
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KosHAL, J. Th·e facts forming the background to this appeal by
certificate granted by the High Court of Rajasthan against itll judgment
dated the 29th April 1968, in so far as they arc undisputed, may be
stated in some detail.
On the 28th February 1948, the Rulers of the
erstwhile States of A!war, Bharatpur, Dholpur and Karauli entered
into a Covenant (hereinafter refurred to as the Matsya Covenant)
agreeing to merge their States into one State known as the United
State of Matsya which was to come into bebg on the 1st of April
1948 with the Ruler of Dholpur as its Raj Pramukh. Article VI of
the Covenant provided that the Ruler of each Covenanting State shall,
as soon as may be practicable and in any event not later than the 15th
March, 1948, make over the administration of his State to the Raj
Pramukh and that thereupon all rights, authority
a:ad
jurisdiction
belonging to such Ruler which appertained or were incidental to the
Government of his State, shall vest in the United State of Matsya.
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TEJ SINGHJI v. UNION (Koshal, I.)
65
Article XI bl tl1e Covenant provided for the private properties of the
A
Ruler and ran thus :
"!. The Ruler of each Convc::ianting State shall he entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private
properties (as distinct from State properties) belonging to
him on the date of his making over the administration of that
:State to the Raj Pramukh.
"2. He shall furnish to the Raj Pramukh before the 1st
May, 1948, an inventory of all the immovable properties,
&ocurities and cash balances held by him as such private pro-
,perty.
"3. If any dispute arises as to whether any item of property is the private property of the Ruler or State property
it shall be referred to such person as the G-Overnment of India
may nominato and the decision of that person shall be final
and binding on all parties concerned."
Tho United State of Matsya came into being as stipulated in the
Matsya Covenant on the 1st of April 1948 and during the same month
the Ruler of Alwar, who is th: appellant before us, furnil;hed to the
Raj Pramukh an i'.:lventory of all the immovable properties, securities
and cash balances held and c:aimed by him as his private properties.
On the 11th of April 1948, tho Rulers of ten States, namely, Banswara, Bundi, Dungarpur, Jhalawar, Kish:ngarh, Kotah, Mewar, Partabgarh, Shahpura and Tonk entered into a Covenant agreerag to merge
them into one State named the Uni~:d State of Rajasthau. That Covenant was superseded by another dated the 10th of March 1949 (hereinafter called the Rajasthan Cowna·:it) through which the United State
of Rajasthan was to consist of the said ten States as also of four others,
namely, Bikaner, Jaipur, Jaisalmer and Jodhpur, with the Ruler of
Jaipur as the Raj Pramukh. Clause (c) of Article I of the Rajasthan
Covenant defined the expression "new Covenantbg State" to mean any
of the said four States.
Article II of the Covenant last mentioned
provided that the United State of Rajasthan would include any other
:State, the Ruler of which '!ntered into a;i agreement with the Raj
Pramukh, with the approval of the Government of India, to the integ-
:ration of that State with the United State of Rajasthan. ·
Article XII of the Rajasthan Covenant provided :
" ( 1) The Ruler of each Covenanting State shall be entitled to the full ownership, use a;:id enjoyment of al! private
properties (as distinct from State properties), belonging to
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 2 S.C.R~
him on the date of his making over the administration of that
State to the Raj Pramukh of the former Rajasthan State or
as the case may be, to the Raj Pramukh of the United State
under this Covenant.
"(2) If any dispute arises as to whether any item
of
property is the private property of the Ruler of a Covenant ..
ing State other than a new Covenanting Stare or is State pro- ·
perty, it shall be referred to such person as the Government
of India may nominate in consultation with the Raj Pramukh,
a::id the ckcision of that person shall be final and binding on
all parties concerned:
"Provided that no such dispute shall be so referable after
the first day of May, 1949.
"(3) The private properties of the Ruler of each new
Covenanting State shall be as agreed to between the Government of India in the Stat·~s Ministry and the Ruler concerned,
a::id the settlement of properties thus made shali be final."
On the !st of May 1949, the Rulers of the States of Alwar, Bharatpur, Dholpur and Karauli which were the constituent States of the
United State of Matsya, entered into an agreement (hereinafter called
the Amending Agreement) with the Raj Pramukh of the United State
of Rajasthan merging with four States into it with effect from the 15th
of May 1949 in abrogation of the Matsya Covenant. While subscribing to the Amending Agreement the Ruler of Dholpur acted not only
in his capacity as such but also as the Raj Pramukh of the United
State of Matsya.
Article IV of that Agreement •effected amendments
in the Rajasthan Covenant so as to make it applicable to the said four
States with effect from th·c date last mentioned. No cha::lge, however,
was made in the provisions of clause (c) ,)f Artide I of Article XII
of the Rajasthan Covenant.
On the 14th of September 1949, Mr. V. P. Menon of the Ministry
of States, Government of India. wrote the following letter to the Ruler
of Alwar:
"My dear Maharaja Sahib,
"Your Highness will reca:l that the inventory of immovable properties, securities and caoh balances furnished by
Your Highness in accordance with Artic1e XI of the Covenant
for the formation of the United State of Matsya was discussed
with Your Highn~ss at New Delhi on the 9th and 10th April,
1949.
I now forward for Your Highness's information a
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TEJ SINGHJI v. UNION (Koshal, !.)
67
copy of the final inventory of Your J-[ighness's private properties. It has the approval of the Government of India in
the Ministry of States.
"2. The following claims of Your Highness
and
the
count~r-claims of the former Matsya Government are still
under consideration and the decision will be communicated
to Your Highness as soon as possib:e.
( 1) cash balance of the Al war State treasury;
(2) claim for Rs. 4,82,520 as arrears of Privy Purse of
Your Highness for 6 years from 1936-37 to 1942-43.
"3. Your Highness will appreciate that the settlement of
the inventory is an integral part of an over-all agreement
in respect of all outstanding matters of dispute and does not
stand by itself.
"With kind regards,
"Yours sincerely,
Sdl-
"(V. P. Menon)"
This letter was accompanied by a copy of the "final" inventory which
listed 32 items. Reproduced below is the item at Serial No. 1 of that
inventory :
"S.
Nv.
Description of property.
J.
City Palace including adjoining
building,
Decision of the State Ministry.
Ancestral. The portion of the building
at present in use by the State for
administrative
purposes or for
Museum
and Imperial Bank will
continue to be so used
till such
time as required. 'rhe requirements
of the State in future will not be
of the same order as today and
every effo1 t will be n1ade to release
the accommodation at present oc
cupied in the Zenana & Mardana
Mahals at the earliest
practicable
date.
The State will bear the
maintenance cost of the portions used
by it. Any addition or alteration in
the portion used by the State
will
require·
the prior consent of His
Highness and should be carried out
at State expense."
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Thereafter, correspondence went on between the Ministry of States
and the Ruler of Alwar and on the 24th September 1952 the later
received from the former a written communication dealing with 26
items of prop~rties. The opening clause of Para 2 of the Jetter stated :
"2. The Government of India have carefully considered
all the outJ;tanding questions in respect of your Highness's
private properties, in consultation with the Rajasthan Government, and their decisions in respoct thereof are as follows :-"
The description of each item covered by the letter was followed by
the decision in respect thereof.
That part of the Jetter which deals
with item 26 is set down below :
"(26) City Palace including adjoining buildings :
The City Palace with the adjoining buildings, comprising of
the Jagir Office, Central Record, Imperial Bank, Treasury,
Gandhi National School etc. will be your Highness's ancestral
property.
Tho secretariat building will however be State
property."
This decision was reiterated in an Office Memorandum issued by
the Government of Rajasthan in the Political Department on the 30th
of Docember 1952. Through a letter dated the 14th of October 1959
proceeding from his Private Secretary and addressed to the Chief Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, the Ruler of
Alwar
claimed rmt for tlu:ee properties known as the Secretariat
building, Daulat Khana building and Indra Viman Station adjoining
the City Palace and the bungalow at Sariska, which were in the occupation of the Rajasthan Government.
The claim was made on the
ground that all the four properties had been declared to be the private
properties of the Ruler in the inventory appended to the letter dated
the 14th September 1949 mentiond above.
The claim was rejected
by the Ministry of Home Affairs which asserted in its letter dated the
24th of December 1959 that the four properties in question had not
been recognimd as the privaie properties of the Ruler. The claim was
reiterated by the Ruler through a Jetter issued by Shri Gopesh Kumar
Ojha, his Legal & Financial Adviser, but the same was again turned
down by the Ministry of Home Affairs through their letter dated the
6th/8th of December 1960 in which the position taken was :
"Tho Statement regarding the extent of your Private Property rights in the City Palaoe area made in our Jetter dated
24-12-59 are based upon the decision reached in March 1952
after discussion with your Highness and We regret that they
cannot now be reopened."
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TEJ SINGHJI v. UNION (Koshal, J.)
69
2. It was in the above background that the Ruler of Alwar filed
two suits, being suits Nos. 4 and 5 of 1963, in the court of the District
Judge, Alwar. In Suit No. 5 the prayer made was that the three properties known as the Secretariat building, Daulat Khana building and
Indra Viman Station be declared to be the private properties of the
plaintiff and that the State of Rajasthan be ejected therefrom, or, in
the alternative, b~ ordered to pay rent at a specified rate. A decree
for Rs. 36,000/- was also claimed for mesne profits. In suit No. 4 of
1963, the claim was_ that the plaintiff was entitled to rent or mesne
profits in respect of a building forming part of the Mardana Palace.
3. Both the suits were resisted by the Union of India and the State
of Rajasthan who were joined as the two del\ondants to each of them
and it was claimed inter-alia that the provisions of article 363 of the
Constitution of India were a complete bar to their maintainability.
4. The two suits were transferred by the High Court of Rajasthan
to itself and the question of their maintainability was mooted before
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it with reference to the provisions of article 363 of the Constitution
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which states :
( !) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution
but
subject to the provisions of article 143, neither the
Supreme Court nor any other court shall have jurisdiction in any dispute arising out of any provision
of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad
or other similar instrument which was entered into
or executed before the commencement of this Constitution by any Ruler of Indian State and to which the
Goviernment of the Dominion of India or any of its
predecessor Governments was a party
<md ""hich
has or has been continued in operation after such
commencement, or in any dispute in respect of any
right accruing under or any liability or obligation
arising out of any of the provisions of this Constitution relating to any such treaty, agreement, covenant,
engagement, sanad or other similar instrument.
(2) In this article-
( a) "Indian State" means any territory recognised
before the commencement of this Constitulion
by His Majesty or the Government of the
Dominion of India: as being such a State; and
(b) "Ruler" includes the Prince, Chief or other person recognised before such commencement by
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His Majesty or the Government of the Dominion
of India as the Ruler of any Indian State.
The High Court proceeded to determine whether the dispute in
suit No. 5 of 1963 was one arising out of an agreement such as fell
within the ambit of article 363 (as was contended by the defendants)
or was merely a one-sided decision of the Government of India and,
therefore, outside the purview of the article as was asserted by the
plaintiff. It held that the "decisions" contained in the latter dated the
14th of September 1949 had really resulted from an agreement between the Ministry of States and the plaintiff, that the extent of the
building adjoining the City Palace was not to be found with precision
in the inventory appen\ied to the said Jetter, that consequently there
Was a real dispute between the parties whether the suit property was
included in the expression "adjoining building" and that the adjudication of such a dispute was barred by the provision of article 363 of
the Constitution.
Suit No. 5 of 1963 was, therefore, dismissed, but
with no order as to costs. In regard to suit No. 4 of 1963, however,
the High Court held !hat the property in dispute was clearly a part of
the City Palace itself as it was comprised in the Mardana Mahal,
that the dispute was altogether illusory in view of the fact that right
up to the 8th. of December 19 60, the Government of India had been
taking the stand that the disputed property was the private property
of the plaintiff, that the dispute was consequently not barred by the
provisions of article 363 of the Constitution, and that the suit, therefore, deserved to be decided by the District Judge on merits.
In the
result, suit No. 4 of 1963 was remilted to the trial court for decision
according to law.
5. It is the judgment of the High Court in suit No. 5 of 1963 alone
F
that is challenged in this appeal.
6. Mr. B. D. Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellant-Ruler,
has vehemently contended that the letter dated the 14th December
1949 was not the result of an agreement beween the plaintiff and the
Government of India and that, on the other hand, it was a decision
G
arrived at in pursuance of clause ( 3) of Article XI of the Mat5ya
Covenant In support of this contention it was pointed out that the
letter was issued as a sequel to the inventory furnished by the plaintiff
under clause (2) of that Article and that the operative pm\ of the
im'cntory apryended to the letter is headed "decision of the
States
Ministry" wh;ch, according to learned Counsel, clearly negatives an
II · agreement. It was further urged that even the Rajasthan Covenant
did not envisaged any agreement in so far as the plaintiff was concerned because he was not the Ruler of a "new Covenanting State" with-
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TEJ SINGHJI v. UNION (Koshal, J.)
71
in the meaning of that expression as used in clauses (2) and (3) ·of
Article XII thereof, that it was clause (2) of that Artic]e which
governed him and which again provided for a decision being given on
disputes relating to properties and that the letter dated 14th September
1949 must still be construed as a decision if the Matsya Covenant
was held to be inapplicable. A careful examination of the material
·on the record, however, clearly makes out that the contention is with-
•OUt substance as we shall presently show.
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7. It i~ no doubt true that the plaintiff had furnished the inventory
-0f the properties held by him in accordance with Article XI of the
Matsya Covenant as is stated in the opening paragraph of the letter
dated the 14th of September 1949. It further cannot be gain-said
>that the third column of the inventory to that letter was
headed
"decision of the State Ministry".
These two factors, without more,
might have gone a long way to support the case propounded on behalf
of the plaintiff, but they are sought to be used out df context as is
clear from a perusal of the entire letter from which it can be safely
spelt out that the so-called "decision" was nothing but an agreement
arrived at between the Government of India and the plaintiff. It is
pertinent that the letter mentions that the inventory furnished by the
plaintiff was discussed with him at New Delhi on the 9th and I 0th
·of April 1949 and then states that a copy of the final inventory of
the plaintiff's private. properties, which had the approval of the Government of India in the Ministry of States, was forwarded to him.
Now, under clause (3) of Article XI of the Matsya Covenant as also
dause (2) of Article XII of the Rajasthan Covenant no approval of
the Ministry of States was called for.
In 'fact, what each of those
clauses provided was tlrnt if any dispute arose as to whether any item
-0f property was the private property of the Ruler concerned or of
his erstwhile State, it was to be referred to such person as the Government of India might nominate, and the decision of tluit person was
to be final and binding on all parties concerned. Now, it is not the
case of the plaintiff that the Government of India nominated a person
to whom the dispute was to be referred; nor is it claimed by him
that such a person gave any decision.
The contents of the letter,
therefore, are not at all relateable to those of either of the two clauses
just above-mentioned.
On the oher hand, they clearly indicate that
the so-called "decisions" of the S'ates Ministry contained in the
bventory appended to the letter formed really the record of the agreemwt arrived at between the Ministry of States and the plaintiff as a
result of negotiations held on the 9tji and 10th of April 1949. In this
connection, reference may poin~~dly be made to paragraph 3 of the
' letter which bears r~petition :
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"3. Your Highness will appreciate that the settlcme:it of
the inventory is an integral part of an overall agreement in
respect of all onffitanding matters of dispute and does not
stand by itself."
This paragraph talks of "the settlement of the inventory" which
was to be an i:itegral part of an "over-al! agreement in Pespect of all
outstanding matters of dispute" and was not to stand by itself.
In our
opinion, the paragraph is a clincher against the plaintiff and indicate!>
without any shadow of doubt that what the letter said was that all the
disputes regarding the property of the Ruler were to be settled by an
over-all agreement, that the contents of the inventory appended to the
letter merely recorded the settlement between the plaintiff and the
Ministry of States and that e~en those contents were not to be regarded
as a final settlement of the matters dealt with therein unless they formed part of an agreement embracing all items of property.
8. It may be noted here that the Matsya Covenant had been abrogated with effect from the 15th May 1949 by the Rajasthan Covenant
as modified by the Amending Agreement and there was thns no question of any decision being given after that date under clause 3 of
Article XI of the Matsya Covenant and that the anly surviving provision under which disputes regarding property owned by the plaintiff
could be determined after the 15th of May 1949, was Article XII of
the Rajasthan Covenant. It is true that the expression "new Covenanting State" as defined in clause ( c) of Article I of that Covenant
meant only any of the four States of Bikaner, Jaipur, Jaisalmer and
Jodhpur, that the definition was not amended by any provision of the
Amending AgPoement, so that the State of Alwar could not be regarded
as a "new Covenanting State" for the purpose of clause (3) of Article
XII of the Rajasthan Covenant and that the clause of that Article in
accordance with which disputes relating to property claimed by the
Ruler of Alwar as his private property wore to be determined was
clause (2) which provided for their decision by a P'erson nominated
by the Government of India in that behalf. The fact remains, however, that no such person was ever nominated and ihat th,., letter dated
the 14th September, 1949, cannot be construed (for rea•ons already
stated by us) as laying down a decision of any such person. What
appeam to have happened is that instead of following tho course indicated in clause (2) last mentioned and having the disputes referred
for decision to a person nominated by th~ Government of India, the
parties (the Gowrnment of India and the appellant) decided to adopt
the method of mutual agreement to s•,.,ttlc those disputes-a method
which always remained open to them, notwithstanding the
Matsya
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TEJ SINGHJI v. UNION (Koshal, J.)
73
Covenant and the Rajasthan Covenant. Such mutual agreement couid,
by no stretch of imagination be regarded as a decision by a person
nominated by the Government of India either under clause (3) of
Article XI of the Matsya Covenant or clause (2) of Article XII of
the Rajasthan Covenant and must be deemed to bo nothing more or
less than an agreement simplicirer even though it was labelled as a
"decision of the States Ministry" in the inventory appended to the
letter dated the 14th September, 1949.
9. Another contention raised by Mr. Sharma was that even if the
letter dabod the 14th September, 1949 was held to evidence an agreement, it was not hit by the provisions of article 363 of the Constitution
inasmuch as it was an agreement resulting from the Rajasthan Covenant which alone, according to him, was the agreement covered by the
article. This contention is also without substance. Article 363 of the
Constitution bars the jurisdiction of all courts in any dispute arising
out of any agreement which was enteP"..-0 into or executed bdore the
commencement of the Constitution by any Ruler of an Indian State to
which the Gowrnment of India was a party.
The operation of tho
article is not limited to any "parent" Covenant and every agreement
whether it is primary or one entered into in pursuance of the provisions of a preceding agreement would fall within the ambit of the article.
Thus the fact that the agreement contained in the letter dated
the 14th September 1949 had resulted from action taken under the
provisions of the Rajasthan Covenant, is no answer to the pica raised
on behalf of the respondents that article 363 of the Constitution is a
bar to the maintainability of the two suits, although we may add, that
that agreement did not flow directly from the Rajasthan Covenant but
was ent•ered into by ignoring and departing from the provisions of
clause ( 2) of Article XII thereof.
10. The only other conterrtion put forward by Mr. Sharma was
based ori the contents of column 3 of Item 1 of the inventory appended to th•:: letter dated the 14th September 1949. He drew our attention to the mention in that column of the portions of the adjoining
building being occupied by the State for administrative purposes or for
Museum and Imperial Bank and also comprising the Zenana and
Mardana Mahals. According to him, thi~ meant that th:: entiPe building ad joining the City Palace was held to be the private property of
the plaintiff, which finally vested in the plaintiff as from the date of
tho let~::r and of which the plaintiff could not be divested by any subsequent decision of the Ministry of States.
In this connection, Mr.
Sharma urged that the Ministry of States had no power of reviewing
a settlement once arrived at and argued that if it was claimed that such
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a power existed, the determination by a court of the limited question
of the power of review would be barred by the provisions of article
363 of the Constitution.
This contention also is of no avail to him.
As held above, the agreement dated the 14th SepN,mber 1949 was
not to stand by itself but was to be a part and parcel of an overall
agreement •embracing all outstanding matters of dispute.
It follows
tha '. the berms of the agreement contained in the letter wer•e liable
to change till a final agreement was reached, and in this vi•ow of the
matbor no finality could be said to attach to those ·~errru; until all the
disputes became the subject-matter of an agreed settlement. The terms
of the inventory attached to the letter were thus merely tentative, the
process of settlement being a continuous one till all the disputes were
finally resolved.
And the ultimate decision of the Ministry of Home
Affairs conveyed in its letter of the 24th of December 1959, not to
treat the Secretariat building, Dau:at Khana building and Indra Viman
Station adjoining the City Palace to be the private property of the
plaintiff, was based upon a mutual a_greement between the parties which
was reached after discussion in March 1952, as part of an over-all
agreement as is evident from the letter of the Ministry of Home Affairs
dated the 6th/8th of December 1960.
11. In view of the conclusions arrived at above, we hold that the
"decision" sought to be enforced by the plaintiff is an agreement hit
by article 363 of the Constitution and that the High Court was right
in dismissing suit No. 5 of 1963 as being not maintainable.
The
.appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed, but with no order as to costs.
N.V.K.
Appeal dismissed.
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