# Commissioner of one set of costs. Inconie~Tax, Madras. February 3 Appeals dismissed. MOTI RAM v. SURAJ BHAN & OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1960] 2 S.C.R. 896
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1959-08-07
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. SuBBA RAo, K. c. DAS GUPTA
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/commissioner-of-one-set-of-costs-inconie-tax-madras-february-3-appeals-1797
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Rent Control-Ejectment--Statute permitting ejcctment for
reconstruction of building~Subscquent atnendment making of provision more stingent--Whcther retrospective-Statute making appellate
order final-Before making of order statute amended by providing
revision to High Court-If amendment applies to pending appealEast Punjah Urban
Rent Restriction Act, r949 (E.P. 3 of r949,
ss. r3(3)(a)(iii) and r4(4)-East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
(Amendment) Act, r956. (Punj. 29 of r956). ss. 2 and 3.
On August 28, 1956 the respondent l applied to the Rent
Controller for the eviction of the appellant from a shop under s. 13
of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, inter alia
on the ground that he wanted to reconstruct the shop.
On
the date, s. 13(3) (a)(iii) of the Act provided that a landlord may
apply for the eviction of his tenant if he required the building
for reconstruction or for its replacement· by another building or
for the erection of other ,building.
Section 15 provided for an
appeal from the order of the Rent Controller and sub-s. (4) of
s. 15 provided that the decision of the appellate authority, and
subject only to such decision, the order of the Controller shall be
final.
By Amending Act 29 of r956, which came into force on
September 24, 1956, ss. l3(3)(a)(iii) and r5
were amended;
amended
s. l3(3)(a)(iii) permitted ejectment if the landlord
required it to carry out any building \Vork at the instance of the
Government or Local Authority or any Improvement Trust under
some improvement or development scheme or if it had become
unsafe or unfit for human habitation; and new s. 15(5) introduced
by the amending Act, gave to the High Court power to call for
and examine the records relating to any order passed under the
Act for satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such
order. The application for eviction was dismissed by the Rent
Contrpller and an appeal to the appellate .authority also failed.
Respondent l went to the High Court in revision and the High
Court decreed eviction holding that the shop was required for
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
897
reconstruction within the meaning of the unamended s. l3(3)(a)
rg6o
(iii).
The appellant contended that the amended provisions of
s. 15 which permitted a revision to be filed before the High Court
Moti Ram
were inapplicable as the case was governed by the law as it stood
v.
on the date when the application for ejectment was made and
Suraj Bhan
that Respondent l was not
entitled to the decree as the
case did not fall within the provisions of. amended s. l3(3)(a)(iii) G . d-dk
]
h. h
t'
d
l' bl t
h
a;en raga ar •
w rc were retrospec ive an were app rca e o t e case.
Held, that the revision application before the High Court
was competent and the High Court had jurisdiction to interfere.
Finality could ·be attached to the decision of the appellate
authority only after the decision was made and not before. But
at the time when the appellate authority decided the matter in
the present case the amending\ section had come into force and
the appellate order could not claim finality under the earlier
provision.
Indira Sohanlal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi.
[1955] 2 S.C.R. n17, followed.
Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Commissioner, (1924) L.L.R. 9 Lah. 284; Colonial Sugar Refining Co.
Ltd. v. Irving, (1905) A.C. 369, and Garikapatti Veeraya v.
N. Subbiah Choudhury, [1957] S.C.R. 488, referred to.
Held,
further that the provisions of amended s. l3(3)(a)(iii)
were not retrospective and did not apply to the present case,
The amendment was in regard to a matter of substantive law as
it affected the substantive. rights of the landlord.
An amendment which affected vested rights operated prospectively unless
it was made retrospective expressly or by n_ecessary implication.
Ram Parshad Hatwai, Ludhiana v. Mukhtiar Chand, l.L.R.
1958 Pun. l553;approved.
·
Oivil Appellate Jurisdiction: Civil Appeal No. 524
of 1959.
Appeal by special l

## Text

896.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)]
I960
aSSeSSment appeals and, aS We have dismissed those
-
appeals, these appeals also must be dismissed.
S.N. Namasfoayam
I th
lt !] t]
.
]
d"
.
d
"th
Chettiar
n
e resu
a
ie six a ppea s are 1sm1sse
w1
v.
costs.
As the appeals were consolidated there will be
Commissioner of one set of costs.
Inconie~Tax,
Madras.
February 3
Appeals dismissed.
MOTI RAM
v.
SURAJ BHAN & OTHERS.
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SuBBA RAo AND
K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)
Rent Control-Ejectment--Statute permitting ejcctment for
reconstruction of building~Subscquent atnendment making of provision more stingent--Whcther retrospective-Statute making appellate
order final-Before making of order statute amended by providing
revision to High Court-If amendment applies to pending appealEast Punjah Urban
Rent Restriction Act, r949 (E.P. 3 of r949,
ss. r3(3)(a)(iii) and r4(4)-East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
(Amendment) Act, r956. (Punj. 29 of r956). ss. 2 and 3.
On August 28, 1956 the respondent l applied to the Rent
Controller for the eviction of the appellant from a shop under s. 13
of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, inter alia
on the ground that he wanted to reconstruct the shop.
On
the date, s. 13(3) (a)(iii) of the Act provided that a landlord may
apply for the eviction of his tenant if he required the building
for reconstruction or for its replacement· by another building or
for the erection of other ,building.
Section 15 provided for an
appeal from the order of the Rent Controller and sub-s. (4) of
s. 15 provided that the decision of the appellate authority, and
subject only to such decision, the order of the Controller shall be
final.
By Amending Act 29 of r956, which came into force on
September 24, 1956, ss. l3(3)(a)(iii) and r5
were amended;
amended
s. l3(3)(a)(iii) permitted ejectment if the landlord
required it to carry out any building \Vork at the instance of the
Government or Local Authority or any Improvement Trust under
some improvement or development scheme or if it had become
unsafe or unfit for human habitation; and new s. 15(5) introduced
by the amending Act, gave to the High Court power to call for
and examine the records relating to any order passed under the
Act for satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such
order. The application for eviction was dismissed by the Rent
Contrpller and an appeal to the appellate .authority also failed.
Respondent l went to the High Court in revision and the High
Court decreed eviction holding that the shop was required for
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
897
reconstruction within the meaning of the unamended s. l3(3)(a)
rg6o
(iii).
The appellant contended that the amended provisions of
s. 15 which permitted a revision to be filed before the High Court
Moti Ram
were inapplicable as the case was governed by the law as it stood
v.
on the date when the application for ejectment was made and
Suraj Bhan
that Respondent l was not
entitled to the decree as the
case did not fall within the provisions of. amended s. l3(3)(a)(iii) G . d-dk
]
h. h
t'
d
l' bl t
h
a;en raga ar •
w rc were retrospec ive an were app rca e o t e case.
Held, that the revision application before the High Court
was competent and the High Court had jurisdiction to interfere.
Finality could ·be attached to the decision of the appellate
authority only after the decision was made and not before. But
at the time when the appellate authority decided the matter in
the present case the amending\ section had come into force and
the appellate order could not claim finality under the earlier
provision.
Indira Sohanlal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi.
[1955] 2 S.C.R. n17, followed.
Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Commissioner, (1924) L.L.R. 9 Lah. 284; Colonial Sugar Refining Co.
Ltd. v. Irving, (1905) A.C. 369, and Garikapatti Veeraya v.
N. Subbiah Choudhury, [1957] S.C.R. 488, referred to.
Held,
further that the provisions of amended s. l3(3)(a)(iii)
were not retrospective and did not apply to the present case,
The amendment was in regard to a matter of substantive law as
it affected the substantive. rights of the landlord.
An amendment which affected vested rights operated prospectively unless
it was made retrospective expressly or by n_ecessary implication.
Ram Parshad Hatwai, Ludhiana v. Mukhtiar Chand, l.L.R.
1958 Pun. l553;approved.
·
Oivil Appellate Jurisdiction: Civil Appeal No. 524
of 1959.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated August 7, 1959 of the Punjab High Court
in Civil Revision No. 613 of 1958, arising out of the
Judgment and order dated the August 19, 1958 of the
District Judge, Gurgaon, in Civil Appeal No. 14/14 of
1958.
N. S. Bindra and P. 0. Aggarwala, for the appellant.
·
'
Achhru Ram and• K. P. Gupta, for respondent
No. I.
1960 February 3.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
GAJ'1NDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave
arises from ejectment proceedings taken by Suraj
Bhan (respondent 1) against the appellant Moti Ram
iri respect of a · shop sitU.Med in the urban ··area o'f
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)]
r960
Gurgaon which has been in the occupation of the
appellant as a tenant for more than twenty years on
]\1 oti Ra1n
d
v.
a monthly rental of Rs. 20.
Respon ent 1 purchased
suraj Bhan
the shop on June 15, 1956, and soon thereafter he
applied to the Rent Controller for the eviction of the
Gajendragadkar /. appellant under s. 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent
Hestriction Act, 1949 (3 of 1949) (hereinafter called
the Act). This application was based on four grounds.
It was urged that the appellant was a habitual
defaulter and was in arrears of rent, that the return
of the money invested by respondent 1 in the purchase of the shop was not adequate, that respondent 1
apprehended that the godown and the shop of which
he was in possession as a tenant would be sold off and
he may be dispossessed therefrom, that is why he
would require the shop in the present proceedings
for his personal use and that respondent 1 wanted to
reconstruct the shop for which necessary sanction had
been obtained by him from the Municipal Committee
of Gurgaon and the plan prepared in that behalf had
been duly approved. This claim was resisted by the
appellant who disputed the correctness and the validity of all the pleas taken by respondent 1. The Rent
Controller upheld the contentions of the appellant
and rejected all the pleas made by respondent 1.
In
regard to the plea that the respondent wanted to
reconstruct the shop the Rent Controller found that
the evidence adduced by respondent 1 in support of
the s:iid plea "had been created as a camouflage and
that the said plea was a false pretext to obtain the
eviction of the appellant. On these findings the
application made by respondent 1 for evicting the
appellant was dismissed.
Hespondent 1 then appealed to the District Court
against the said decision. His appeal, however, failed
since the appellate eourt confirmed all the findings
made by the Hent Controller. In respect of the last
plea raised by respondent 1 about the rebuilding of
the shop the appellate court observed that rispondent 1 had got the plan approved and had also got
the sanction from the Municipal Committee to reconstruct the building so as to be able to make a
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
899
ground for getting the appellant ejected from the
z96o
shop.
Moti Ram
This appellate decision was challenged by responv.
dent 1 by his revisional application in the High Court
suraj Bhan
of Punjab at Chandigarh. The High Court confirmed
_.
the findings of the courts below on the first three pleas Gajendragadkar J.
raised by respondent 1.
The last plea raised by
respondent 1, however, was upheld by the High Court
with the result that the revisional application preferred
by respondent 1 was allowed and his claim for evicting the appellant was decreed. It is this decree which
is challenged before us by the appellant in the present
appeal.
Before dealing with the contentions raised by
. Mr. Bindra on behalf of the appellant it is necessary
to mention one material fact. The application for
ejectment was made on August 28, 1956. Before the
written statement was filed by the appellant on
November 14, 1956, the Act was amended by amending Act 29 of 1956 o·n September 24, 1956. In the
present appeal we are concerned with amendments
made in ss. 13 and 15 of the Act. Section 13(1)
provides inter alia that a tenant in possession of a
building shall not be evicted therefrom except in
accordance with~ the provisions of this section, or in
pursuance of an order made under s. 13 of the Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947 as subsequently
amended. Section 13, sub-s. (2) provides for an application to be made by a landlord who seeks to evict his
tenant for a direction in that behalf. It then proceeds
to prescribe conditions on the satisfaction of which
a decree for ejectment can be passed in favour of the
landlord. We are not concerned with these conditions
in the present appeal. Section 13(3)(a)(iii) as it stood
at the date of the application made by respondent 1
provided that a landlord may apply to the Controller
for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord
in possession in the case of any building if he requires
it for the reconstruction of that building or for its
replacement by another building or for the erection
of other buildings. By the amending Act this provision has been substantially modified. Section 13(3){a)
(iii) as amended reads thus: · "In the case of any
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)]
· r96o
building or rented land, if he requires it to carry out
any building work at the instance of the Government
Moti Ram
v.
or Local Authority or any Improvement Trust under
suraj Bhan
some improvement or development scheme or it has
become unsafe or unfit for human habitation." One
Gajendragadkar J. of the questions which we have to consider in this
appeal is whether this amended provision applies to
the present proceedings.
The other relevant section is s. 15, sub-s. (4). Under
s. 15, sub·s. (4) as it stood on the date when the
application was filed provided that the decision of the
appellate authority, and subject only to such decision,
an order of the Controller shall be final and shall not
be liable to be called in question in any court of law
whether in a suit or any other proceeding by way of
appeal or revision. This has been subsequently
amended by deleting the last clause in sub-s. (4) and
substituting in its place the words "except as provided
in sub-s. (5) of this section." Sub-s. (5) which has
been added reads thus :
"The High Court may, at any time, on the
application of any aggrieved party or on its own
motion, call for and examine the records relating
to any order passed or proceedings taken under this
Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the
legality or propriety of such order or proceedings
and may pass such order in relation thereto as it
may deem fit."
On behalf of the appellant it is urged before us that
this amended provision which permits a revisional
application to be filed before the High Court is
inapplicable to the present proceedings.
Let us first deal with the point about the competence of the revisional application. The appellant's
case is that under s. 15, sub-s. (4) as it stood at the
time when the present proceeding commenced, the
decision of the appellate authority was final, and it
could not be questioned in suit or other proceedings
by way of appeal or revision. In other words, a
revisional application against the appellate decision
was expressly excluded. If at the time when the
present proceedings commenced the decision of the
appellate authority was fin'aJin the eyes oflaw the
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
901
subsequent amendment by which a revisional appliz96o
cation has been allowed cannot affect that position.
It was the appellant's right as a party to the proceeMoti Ram
dings to claim the benefit of the finality of the
Sura;·Bhan
appellate order so far as the present proceedings are
concerned. Put in a different form the contention is Gaje",,dragadkar f·
that the provision for a revisional application which
has now been made by the amending Act .cannot
retrospectively affect the proceedings which were
pending at the time when the amending Act was
passed.
Unfortunately for the appellant this point is
concluded by the decision of this Court in the case of
Indira Sohanlal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property,
Delhi (1). In that case the appellant who was a
displaced person from Lahore was the owner of a
house there and had arranged to have it exchanged
with certain lands in a village in the St'ate of Delhi
belonging to an evacuee' M '. On February 23, 1948,
the said owner made an application to the Additional
Custodian of Evacuee Property (Rural) Delhi for the
confirmation of the transaction of exchange under
s. 5-A of the East Punjab Evi!-cuees' (Administration
of Property) Act, 1947 as amended in 1948 and
applied to the State of Delhi. Under s. 5 of the said
Act an order if passed by the Custodian or Additional
Custodian was not subject to appeal or revision and
was to become final and conclusive. However, the
application in question was not disposed of until
March 20, 1952, on which date the Additional
Custodian passed an order confirming the exchange·.
Meanwhile the relevant provisions of the law had
been amended and ultimately Central Act XXXI of
1950 was passed which, among other things, conferred
revisional powers on the Custodian-General by s. 27.
In exercise of these revisional powers the Custodian.
General after hearing the parties set aside the order
of confirmation and directed that the matter should
be reconsidered by the Custodian. The appellant
urged before this Court that the order of confirmation
originally. passed was not open to revision on· the
ground that at the date when she filed the application in 1948 she got a vested right to have it deter.
(1) ~r9~;;J 2 s.c.:a. u17,
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SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1960 (2)J
mind under s. 5-A with the attribute of finality and
conclusiveness under s. 5-B attaching such determinaMoti Ram
tion. Her argument was that the subsequent repeal
v.
and re-enactment of the said provisions cannot affect
z960
Suraj Bhan
such a :right in view of s. 6 of the General Clauses
Gajendragadkar ]. Act and s. 58(3) of Act XXXI of 1950. This contention was rejected and the revisional order impugned
by the appellant was confirmed. It is true that the
decision of this court was founded on two grounds.
The first of these related to the effect of the provisions of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act read in the
light of s. 58(3) of Act XXXI of 1950. The other
ground, however, was one of general importance and
it is clear that it is on this latter ground that this
Court based its decision.
According to this decision
then the finality prescribed by s. 5-B came into operation after the order in question was made and not
before. "Even if there be in law any such right at
all'', observed Jagannadhadas J., who delivered the
unanimous opinion of the Court, " it can in no sense
be a vested or accrued right. It does not accrue until
the determination is in fact made when alone the
right to finality becomes an existing right as in Delhi
Cloth and General Mills Go. Ltd. v. Income tax Commissioner (1 ).
\Ve are, therefore, of the opinion that the
principle of Colonial Sugar Refining Go. Ltd. v. Irving (2)
cannot be invoked in support of the case of the kind
we are dealing with". Having regard to this decision
it is impossible to accede to Mr. Bindra's argument
that the finality of the appellate decision could be
invoked by the appellant before the said appellate
decision was actually recorded. If no finality could
be claimed at an earlier stage it is clear that at the
time when the appellate authority decided the matter
the amending section had come into force and when
the appellate order was actually passed it could not
claim the finality under the earlier provision. We
may incidentally point out that the said principle laid
down in the case of Indira Sohanlal (') has been cited
by this Court in Garikapatti Veeraya v. N. Subbiah
Choudhury ('), and it has been observed that the
question which was left open by the court on the
earlier occasion fell to be considered in the case of
(1) (1927) I.L.R. 9 Lah 284.
(3) [1955] 2 S.C.R. III7
(2) (1905) A.C. 369
(4) (1957 J S.C.R. 488
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REJ;>ORTS
903
Garikapatti V eeraya (1) and was in fact considered and
r960
decided. Mr. Achru Ram, for the respondent, has
h
f I
;i•
Moti Rain
suggested that the very passage in t e case o
nu,ira
v.
Sohanlal (2) which enunciated the principle appears to
Suraj Bhan
have been cited with approval. However that may
_
be, we are bound by the decision of this Court in the Gajendra •adkar J.
case of Indira Sohanlal (2) and that decision is clearly
b
against the contention of the appellant that the
amended provision in respect of revisional jurisdiction
of the High Court was inapplicable.
That takes us to the other contention that the
amended provision of s. 13(3) (a) (iii) applies. There
is no doubt that if this amended provision applied to
the present case respondent l would not be entitled to
obtain an order of ejectment. It is plain that by
the amendment Legislature has imposed rigorous
limitations on a landlord's right to recover possession
in the . case of any building or rented land. The
question is whether this amendment can be said to be
retrospective in operation. It is clear that the amendment made is not in relation to any procedure and
cannot be characterised as procedural. It is in regard
to a matter of substantive law since it affects the
substantive rights of the landlord. It may be conceded
that the Act is intended to provide relief to the
tenants and in that sense is a beneficial measure and
as such its provision should be liberally construed;
but this principle would not be material or even
relevant in deciding the question as to whether the
new provision is retrospective or not.
It is wellsettled that where an amendment affeets vested rights
the amendment would operate prospectively unless it
is expressly made retrospective or its retrospective
operation follows as a matter of necessary implication.
The amending Act obviously does not make the
relevant provision retrospective in terms and we see
no reason to accept the suggestion that the retrospective operation of the relevant provision can be
spelt out as a matter of necessary implication. We
ought to add that Mr. Bindra has not argu~d that the
initial provision in s. 13(1) which is retrospective is
(r) [1957] S.C.R. 448.
(2) (1955] S,C.R. I n7.
II5
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2))
I96o
attracted in interpreting the amended provision in
s. 13(3) (a) (iii).
Such a contention would of course be
Moti Ram
v.
wholly untenable.
Sum} JI hon
There is another consideration to which reference
may be made. If the new provision is held to be
Gojendragadkar J. retrospective in its operation what would be the consequence? Inevitably all pending actions in which
landlords may have applied for possession of their
buildings let out to the tenants under the provisions
of s. 13(3) (a) (iii) as it stood before the amendment
would automatically fail because they would not
satisfy the tests imposed by the amended provision.
If such a drastic consequence was really intended
by the Legislature it would certainly have made
appropriate provisions in express terms in that
behalf.
Where the Legislature intends to make
substantive provisions of law retrospective in operation it generally makes its intention clear by express,
provisions in that behalf. We are, therefore, satisfied
that s. 13(3) (a) (iii) as amended cannot apply to
proceedings which were pending either before the
Controller or before the appellate authority at the
time when the amendment was made. In this
connection we ought to add that when the revisional
application was argued before the High Court it was
admitted by the appellant that it was the old law
which was in force before the date of the amendment
that applied to the case. Even so we have allowed
Mr. Bindra to raise the point before us but we see no
substance in it~ This point has been considered by
the Punjab High Court in Ram Parshad Halwai,
Ludhiana v. Mukhtiar Chand (1 ) and it appears that
the Punjab High Court has taken the same view
about the effect of the amendment
made m
s. 13(3) (a) (iii).
There is one more point which remains to be
considered.
Mr. Uindra has argued that the High
Court was in error in coming to its own conclusion as
to whether the requirement of s. 13(3) (a) (iii) has been
satisfied .. As we have already pointed out the finding
of the Rent Controller and the appellate authority
was that the claim made by respondent 1 that he
\I) I.l,.R. \r958) Punjab r5~3
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905
required the shop for the purpose of reconstuction
r95o
was not bona fide.
The High Court has reversed this
Moti Ram
conclusion and Mr. Bindra challenges the correctness
v.
or the propriety oJ the said conclusion. The revisional
Suraj Bhan
power conferred upon the High Court under s. 15(5)
is wider than that conferred by s. 115 of the Code of Gajendragadkar .T·
Civil Procedure. Under s. 15(5) the High Court has
jurisdiction to examine the legality or propriety of
the order under revision and that would clearly justify
the examination of the propriety or the legality of the
finding made by the authorities in the present case
about the requirement of the landlord
under
s. 13(3)(a) (iii).
The High Court no doubt has accepted the appellant's argument that the requirement in
question must be bona fide but it has observed that
there was no legal evidence on which it could be said
that the landlord's requirement was not bona fide.
Indeed it is obvious that the tests applied both by the
Rent Controller and the appellate authority in dealing
with the question were based on the assumption that
the amended provision of s. 13(3)(a) (iii) applied to the
present proceedings. Otherwise it was irrelevant to
enquire whether the property in question had become
unsafe or unfit for human habitation as they have
done. All the relevant evidence available on the
record on this point clearly sustains the view taken
by the High Court that the case made by the landlord
under s. 13(3) (a) (iii) was bona fide.
Soon after he
purchased the house he decided to reconstruct the
building, moved the Municipality· with his plan and
obtained its sanction. It is difficult to understand
how on these facts it would be permissible to hold
that the landlord is acting mala fide. That is the view
which the High Court took and we see no substance
in the argument that in taking the said view the
High Court has acted either irregularly or improperly.
In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with
costs.
Appeal dismissed.
•