# COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, WEST BENGAL v. CHAMPA KUMARI SINGHI & ORS

- **Citation:** [1972] 3 S.C.R. 118
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1972
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 1090 of 1971
- **Bench:** K. S. Hegde, A. N. Grover, A. N. Ray
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/commissioner-of-wealth-tax-west-bengal-v-champa-kumari-singhi-ors-5590
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Wealth Tax Act, 1957, Section 3-Jain undivided family, whether Hindu
Vndivided Fa111ily.
The High Court held that the assessee, a Jain undivided family was
not a Hindu undivided family within the meaning of section 3 of Wealth
B
Tax Act, 1957. According to· the High Court, in order to form a Hindu
C
undivided family its members must be Hindus; the assessee family being
Jains were not Hindus and so its members could not form a Hindu undivided family although it was "capable of forming a unit of very much
of the same type and g_overned by the law applying to a Hindu undivided
family". On the question whether the word 'Hindu' preceding the words
undivided family signifies that the undivided family should be of th05e (i)
who profess Hindu religion; or (ii) to whom Hindu Law applies; or,
(iii) who though not professing Hindu religion have come to be regarded
D
as Hindu undivided family by judicial and legislative prac'ice,
HELD : The expression Hindu undivided family includes 'Jain undivided family'.
For a Jong time Courts seem to have taken the view that Jains
are
Hindu dissenters. [.123 EJ
·
Blzagwandas Tejmal v. Rajmal, (1873) 10 Bbm. HCR. 241, Lala Mohabeer Pershad v. Musammut Kundar Koover, 8 Cal. W.Rep. 116 Civ. Rul
and Sheokuarbai v. Jeoraj, [1921) P.C. 77, referred to.
The above view has been challenged by Jain historians and writers and
it has been maintained that Jains are quite distinct f:rom Hindus and have
a separate code of law which unfortunately was not brought to the notice
of the courts. [124 EJ
Bobba/adi GatePP• v. Bobbaladi Eramma & Others, Al.R. 1927 Mad. ·
228 and C.R. Jain, Jain Law, (1926) pp, 3-23, 21~258, referred to.
E
F
But, the sugges'tion that Jain law which is found in the av&ilable books
should still be applied and the error which bas crept in the matter of jains
being governed by Hindu Law should be rectified cannot possibly be follow.
ed partic;ularly in view of statutory enactment,s
which in express tenns
G
lia\·e been made applicable to Jains. [125 BJ
Panna Lal & Others v. Siiabai, I.L.R. 1954 Nagpur 30, Sheokuarbai v.
Jeoraj, p92!) P.C. 77, referred to.
Before the amendment and codification of major branches of Hindu
law by the four statutes, i.e. the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the Hindu
Succession Act, !956, the Hindu Minority and Guardianship -~ct, i956,
lithe Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, the undisputed position
was that the Jains were governed by Hindu law modified
by custom
•Qd a Jain joint family was a Hindu joint family ·.with all the incidents
COMMR. WEALTH-TAX v. CHAMPA (Grover,/.)
! 19
A
attached to such a family under the Hindu Law.
The legislative practice
also was to generally treat Jains as included in the term 'Hindu' in various
statutory enactments. Wherever Jains were mentioned in addition it was
ex abundant/ cautela. The. new statutes did not change the situation. The·
fallacy underlying the reasonini of the High Court is that the artificial
field of application of the law m those statutes shows that Jainism is not
treated even as a form or a development of Hinduism.
Even if the reliB gions are different, what is common is that all those who are to be governed by the provisions of these enactments are included In the term 'Hindu'.
They ai:e to be governed by the same rules relating to marriage, succession,
minority, guardianship, adoption and maintenance as HindUs. The statutes
thus accord legislative recognition to the fact that even though Jains may
not be Hindus by religion they are to be governed by the same laws as the
Hindus. The expression 'Jain undivided family' is not known to law. The
Jains are governed by all the incidents relating to the Hindu joint family.
C Hindu undivided family is a legal expression which has been employed in
taxation· Jaws.
It has a definite connotation and embodies the meaning
ascribed to the expression 'Hindu Joint Family'. [127 E·128A)
D
E
F
G
H
Kamawali v. Digbijai, A.l.R. 1922 P.C. 14, Bachebi v. Makhan Lal &
Another, I.LR. 3 A

## Text

118
COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, WEST BENGAL
A
v.
CHAMPA KUMARI SINGHI & ORS.
Ja~uary 19, 1972
[K. S. HEGDE, A. N. GROVER AND A. N. RAY, JJ.]
Wealth Tax Act, 1957, Section 3-Jain undivided family, whether Hindu
Vndivided Fa111ily.
The High Court held that the assessee, a Jain undivided family was
not a Hindu undivided family within the meaning of section 3 of Wealth
B
Tax Act, 1957. According to· the High Court, in order to form a Hindu
C
undivided family its members must be Hindus; the assessee family being
Jains were not Hindus and so its members could not form a Hindu undivided family although it was "capable of forming a unit of very much
of the same type and g_overned by the law applying to a Hindu undivided
family". On the question whether the word 'Hindu' preceding the words
undivided family signifies that the undivided family should be of th05e (i)
who profess Hindu religion; or (ii) to whom Hindu Law applies; or,
(iii) who though not professing Hindu religion have come to be regarded
D
as Hindu undivided family by judicial and legislative prac'ice,
HELD : The expression Hindu undivided family includes 'Jain undivided family'.
For a Jong time Courts seem to have taken the view that Jains
are
Hindu dissenters. [.123 EJ
·
Blzagwandas Tejmal v. Rajmal, (1873) 10 Bbm. HCR. 241, Lala Mohabeer Pershad v. Musammut Kundar Koover, 8 Cal. W.Rep. 116 Civ. Rul
and Sheokuarbai v. Jeoraj, [1921) P.C. 77, referred to.
The above view has been challenged by Jain historians and writers and
it has been maintained that Jains are quite distinct f:rom Hindus and have
a separate code of law which unfortunately was not brought to the notice
of the courts. [124 EJ
Bobba/adi GatePP• v. Bobbaladi Eramma & Others, Al.R. 1927 Mad. ·
228 and C.R. Jain, Jain Law, (1926) pp, 3-23, 21~258, referred to.
E
F
But, the sugges'tion that Jain law which is found in the av&ilable books
should still be applied and the error which bas crept in the matter of jains
being governed by Hindu Law should be rectified cannot possibly be follow.
ed partic;ularly in view of statutory enactment,s
which in express tenns
G
lia\·e been made applicable to Jains. [125 BJ
Panna Lal & Others v. Siiabai, I.L.R. 1954 Nagpur 30, Sheokuarbai v.
Jeoraj, p92!) P.C. 77, referred to.
Before the amendment and codification of major branches of Hindu
law by the four statutes, i.e. the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the Hindu
Succession Act, !956, the Hindu Minority and Guardianship -~ct, i956,
lithe Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, the undisputed position
was that the Jains were governed by Hindu law modified
by custom
•Qd a Jain joint family was a Hindu joint family ·.with all the incidents
COMMR. WEALTH-TAX v. CHAMPA (Grover,/.)
! 19
A
attached to such a family under the Hindu Law.
The legislative practice
also was to generally treat Jains as included in the term 'Hindu' in various
statutory enactments. Wherever Jains were mentioned in addition it was
ex abundant/ cautela. The. new statutes did not change the situation. The·
fallacy underlying the reasonini of the High Court is that the artificial
field of application of the law m those statutes shows that Jainism is not
treated even as a form or a development of Hinduism.
Even if the reliB gions are different, what is common is that all those who are to be governed by the provisions of these enactments are included In the term 'Hindu'.
They ai:e to be governed by the same rules relating to marriage, succession,
minority, guardianship, adoption and maintenance as HindUs. The statutes
thus accord legislative recognition to the fact that even though Jains may
not be Hindus by religion they are to be governed by the same laws as the
Hindus. The expression 'Jain undivided family' is not known to law. The
Jains are governed by all the incidents relating to the Hindu joint family.
C Hindu undivided family is a legal expression which has been employed in
taxation· Jaws.
It has a definite connotation and embodies the meaning
ascribed to the expression 'Hindu Joint Family'. [127 E·128A)
D
E
F
G
H
Kamawali v. Digbijai, A.l.R. 1922 P.C. 14, Bachebi v. Makhan Lal &
Another, I.LR. 3 All. SS Bhagwan Koer v. J. C. Bose, Ambalal v. Keshav
.Bandhochand Gujar, I.LR, 1941 Bom.
2SO and Ka/~ani Vithal Das v.
Commissioner of Income Tax, L.R. 64 I.A. 28, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1090
of 1971 arid 1686 ol 1968.
Appeals by special leave/certificate from the judgment and
order dated August 25, 1967 of the Calcutta l;ligh Court in Wealth
Tax Reference No. 435 of 1963.
. S. Mittra, B. D. Sharma and R. N. Sachthe,v, for the appellant
(m both the appeals).
S. T. Desai, D. N. Mishra, J.B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and
Ravinder Narain, for the respondents (in both the appeals).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Grover, J. This is an appeal by special leave from
the
judgment of the Calcutta High Court arising out of a reference
under the Wealth Tax Act 1957 in which the question involved
is one of imP!'rtance, namely, whether a Jain undivided family
is included in the expression "Hindu undivided family"
within
s. 3 of the Act.
The facts are few and may be stated. For the assessment
year 1957-58, the valuation date being 31-12-56 the Wealth Tax
Officer assessed the family assets of the assessee iii the status of
a Hindu undivided family.
On appeal to the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner the contentions raised, inter alia, were that (i)
upon the description of the assessee in the notice of demand the
assessment should be deemed to have been made in the status of
an association of persons which was not a unit· on which t!!X
120
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1972] 3 S.C.R.
could be levied under the Act; (ii) even if the assessee was to be
A
treated a1 a Hindu undivided family, the imposition of wealth
tax on such family was ultra vires the Constitution.
These contentions failed before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.
The Appellate Tribunal, to whom the matter wa5
taken in appeal, held that the assessee followed the Jain religion
ll
and since the unit chargeable to wealth tax under s. 3 of the Act
was either individual or Hindu undivided family
or company
none of the units covered the case of the assessee which was a
Jain family.
According to the Tribunal Jains were not Hindus
and, therefore, the expression "Hindu undivided family" in s. 3
dhid not cover the cashe. of a Jain family. The Tribu~I ~et aside
C:
t e assessment on t 1s ground alone.
The Comm1ss1oner of
Wealth tax filed an application under s. 27 ( 1) of the Act praying
that the question of law which arose out of the order of the Tri·
bunal be referred to the High Court.
At the time of the hearing
of that application it was suggested on behalf of the assessee that
further questions arising out of the order of the Tribunal should n.
also be referred.
Finding that questions other than the question
suggested by the Commissioner of Wealth tax arose out of the
order, the Tribunal referred the following question of law for
the opinion of the High Court :-
" l. Whether, the assessee, a Jain undivided family,
was not a Hindu undivided family within the meaning of
E
s. 3 of the Wealth tax Act, 1957, and as such the Tri·
bunal was right in setting aside the assessment made on
the assessee ?
2. Whether levy of Wealth tax on Hindu undivided
family or joint
family
governed
under Mitakshra
school of Hindu law was beyond the legislative compeF
tence of Parliament and ultra virts the Constitution of
India?
3. Whether the Wealth Tax Act in so far as it pur·
ports to levy Wealth tax on Hindu undivided families is
void and inoperative as it offends Article 14 of the
G
Constitution of India ?"
The High Court held that the Jains not being Hindus in the
generally accepted sense ·of the term a Jain undivided family
could not be a Hindu undivided family although the incidence
of a Jain family and a Hindu family "may be the same or largely
the same''.
According to the High Court, in order to form a
H
Hindu undivided family its
members must be Hindus,_ the
assessee family being Jains, were not Hindus and so its members.
COMMR. WEALTH-TAX v. CHAMPA (Grover, /.)
121
A could not form a Hindu undivided family although it was "capable c>f forining a unit c>f very much of the same type and governed by the law applying to a Hindu undivided family". The
answer to the first question, therefore, was returned in the -affirmative and in favour of the assessee.
The other two questions
were not pressed before the High Court, presumably in view of
B the decision in Banarsi Dass v. Wealth Tax Officer, Special Circle,
Meerut( 1).
c
D
E
F
According to s. 2(c) of the Act assessee means a person by
whom Wealth tax or any other sum of money is payable under
the Act and includes :-
( i) every person in respect of whom any proceedings under this Act has been taken for the determination of wealth tax payable by him or b}
any other person or the amount of refund due to
him or such other person;
(ii) every person who is deemed to be an assessee
under this Act;
(iii) * * * * f,f * (•"
Section 3 is in the following terms :-
"Charge of wealth tax-Subject to the other provisions contained in this Act, there shall be charged for
every (assessment year) commencing on and from the
first day of April 1957, a tax (hereinafter referred to
as wealth tax) in respect of the net wealth on the corresponding valuation date of every individual, Hindu
undivided family and company at the rate or rates
specified in the schedule".
The only other provision in the Act in which the expression
"Hindu" undivided family" occurs is s. 20. It deals with assessment after partition of a Hindu undivided family.
Under s.
3
G of the Act it is the Hindu undivided family which is one of the
assessable entitieS. It should be distinguished from
a Hindu
co-parcenary which is a much narrower body than the Joint
family.
A Hindu joint family consists of all persons lineally
descended from a common ancestor, and includes their wives and
unmarried daughters.
A Hindu coparcenary includes only those
H
who acquire by birth an interest in the joint coparcenary property, being the sons, grandsons and great grandsons of the holder
of the joint property. Thus \here can be a joint Hindu family
(I) 56 1.T.R. 224.
9-L%lS"PCl '72
122
SUPREME COURT llBPORTS
(1972) 3 S,C.R.
consisting of a single male member and widows of · deceased
A
coparceners.
It must be remembered that the words "Hindu
undivided family" are used ln th!!! Income tax statutes with refe·
rence not to one school of Hindu law only but to all schools. The
sole previous decision in which an identical question came up for
consideration under the Income tax law is that of the Nagpur
Judicial Commissioner's Court in Nathu Sao v. Commissioner of B
Income tax C.P. & Berar( 1). In that case the assessee was a
member of the Lad Yaish community and was a Jain.
He claim·
ed to be governed by the Hindu law and contended that his
widowed mother and widowed aunt who lived with him ronsti·
tuted a Hindu joint family.
It was held that ordinarily Hindu
Law applied to Jains in the absence of proof of custom or usage
to the contrary and that the expression "Hindu undivided family"
C
did not mean a Hindu coparcenary but was a wider expression
which would take ln the widowed mother aald the widowed aunt
of the assessee in that case.
No contrary view seems to have
been expressed in any other case subsequently and it appears that
it is for the first time that the Calcutta High Court in the judgment under appeal has upheld the contention that a Jain undivid· D
ed family cannot fall within the expression "Hindu undivided
family".
It will not be out of place to mention that indisputably
eVCll" since income tax laws have been inforce no distinction has
ever been made between a Jain undivided family and a Hindu
undivided family and a Jain family has always been assessed as a
Hindu undivided family.
Even in the
forms
prescribed for E
making returns of Income tax no such differentiation or distinction has ever been made.
The main reasoning which prevailed with the High Court is
that although Hindu law applies to Jains except in so far as such
law is varied by custom, Jains do not become Hindus in the same F
way as Khojas and Cutchi Memons of Bombay and Sunni
Borahs of Gujarat etc. cannot be regarded as Hindus although
Hindu law applies to them in matters of inheritance and succession.
Moreover, Hinduism does not include Hindu converts to
Christianity and Islam and also dissenters from Hinduism who
formed. themselves into distinct communities or sects with peculiar
G
religious usages so divergent from the principles of the Shastras
that they could not be regarded as Hindus.
Reliance was placed
on the decision of the Mysore High Court. in P. F. Pinto v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Mysore(•). In that case the ancestors
of the assessee were originally Hindus.
They later on became
converts to Christianity.
It was found that although for the purposes of succession to property the Hindu law was still applicable
H
to the family of the assessee, he could be assessed only as an
(I) 2~1.T.R. 463.
(I) 65 I.T.R. !23.
A
B
COMM~. WEALTH-TAX v. CHAMPA (Grover, J.)
123
individual for wealth tax purposes and could not be assessed in
the status ?f ~ Hindu undi.v.ided family.
The Mysore High
Court was mctmed,to the view that the expression 'Hindu undivided family' in s. 3 of the Act was limited to Mitakshra families
or. families of persons professing Hindu religion governed by
M1takshra law and thus it could not include a Christian undivided fam!IY alth?ugh governed by Hindu law.
The Calcutta High
Court ID the judgment under appeal, however, did not consider
that the My~ore High Court was right in holding that s. 3 of the
Act was limited only to Mitakshra families.
It may be pointed
out that so far as Income ta11: law IS cvno•rned the expression
'Hindu undivided family' has been held to have rerer•nce to all
•chool• nf Hindu law and not one school only.
[Se.. K .. 1,_,1.
Vithal Das v. Commissioner of Income tax(')].
The real question for detennination is
whether the word
'Hindu' preceding the words 'undivided family' signifies that the
undivided family should be of those (i)
who profess
Hindu
D
religion; or (ii) to whom Hindu Jaw applies; or (iii) who though
not professing Hindu religion have come to be regarded as Hindu
undivided family by judicial decisions and legislative prac'tice.
It may be mentioned that for a Jong time the courts and particularly the Privy Council seem to have taken the view that Jains
are of Hindu origin; they are Hindu dissenters and although geneE
rally adhering to the ordinary Hindu Law they do not recognise
any divine authority of the Vedas nor do they practice a number
of ceremonies observed by the Hindus.
But the modern trend
of authority is against the view that Jains are Hindu dissenters.
As a result of comparative research in Hinduism, Jainism and
'Buddhism, it is being emphatically claimed that the theory that
Jains are Hindu dissenters is based on a misreading of the ancient
F
authorities relating to these religions (See C. R. Jain-'Jain
Law'-pp. 3-23 and 219-258).
One of the early decisions in
which Ji1ins were stated to be of Hindu origin being Hindu dissenters is that of Westropp C.J. in Bhagwandas Tejmal v.
Ra,;..
mal('). The learned Chief Justice based his view on high
authority including the researches of Mr. Mountstuart ElphinG
stone, !.:ate Col. Mackenzie (9th Vol. of the Asiatic Resea~ches.
including the essay of Mr. Cole Brooke on the Sect of Jamas),
the .work of Abbe Dubois on the Manners etc. of the People of
India and tl1e elaborate account of the Jain sect in the First
Volume of Prof. H. H. Wilson's work.
He also referred to certain decisions of the Sudder Divani Adault in Calcutta and the
H
High Court of Calcutta; in particular to the opinion of Peacock
C.J. in Lala Mohabeer Pershad v. Musammut Kundar Koover(').
(I) L.R. 64 I.A. 28.
(1) (!873) IO llom. HCR 241.
(3) 8 Cal. W. Rep. 116 Civ. Ru\.
124
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
. (1972] 3 s.c.R.
The following passage from the judgment of. W estropp CJ. ls
noteworthy :-
"The term Hindu or Gentu, when used in Regulations Act, Statutes, and Charters in which Hindu.s or
Gentus have been declared .entitled to the benefit of
their own Jaw or succession and of contract, has been
largely and liberally construed. See the remarks at
pages 184, 185, 186, S Born. High C. RepOrts (Lopes
v. Lopes), where Sir Edward Hyde East's evidence in
18 30 before the House nf Lords' Committee is mentioned, in which ho stated that Stlchs were treated as a sect
of Hindus or Gentus of which they woro " dissenting
branch.
The authorities, already 9uoted, show thiit
J ainas are regarded as a sect of Hindus."
B
c
Out of the decisions of the Privy Council, we may mention
Sheokuarbai v. · Jeoraj(•1) in which their lordships relied on the
statement in Mayne's Hindu law and Usage that Jains are of
Hindu origin; they are Hindu dissenters and although "generally D
adhering to ordinary Hindu law, that is, the law of the three
superior castes, they recognise no divine authority in the Vedas
and do not practice the Shradha-or ceremonies for the dead".
The above view has been challenged by 1 ain historians and
writers and .it has been maintained that the 1ains are quite disE
tinct f~ Hindus and have a separate code of law which unfortunately was not brought to the notice of then:ourts. Kumaraswami sastri, Officiating Chief 'Justice; delivering the·. judgment
of. the Bench in· Bobbaladi Gateppa v. Bobbaladi · Etmrtrila d:
Others(2) elaborately diseussed the contrary· view . and observed
that if the matter wtiro res integra be wouldi •be inclined tt> hold
that modern research had shoWn _that Jains' were' not Hindu' ellsIi'_
senfers but that Jainism had an origin and ~tm.r long iilltetior
to Smritis and commentaries which were recOiiil'sed authorities
of Hindu law and •ilsage.
·
Mr. C.-R. Jain hi his work "Jain Law"writtcm,ln 1926 has
discusSed the finding& of varioui.Opentalists s~uent ~ thoee
mentioned in the. judf!1Cnt of Westiop}l C.J •. and bas: put fonv.al:ll
G
the thesis that Hindws!ll apd Jainism were parilllel creeds .th'!!Jjb
they shared the same forni of social order lUi4 mode :,'of liVin,.
Jain Law was quite independent of Hindu, law.: . According -~
him the Courts had tried on each dccasion to.asi:ertaBi the,,Taiil
Law but unfortunately for various -reasons .Jains concealed their
Sha~tras and objected : to their production in .Courts. He ... B
emphasised that Jain 4tw which is found in the. available. boob·
should still be applied and the error which has CreJ>t in the matter ·
(I) [1921] P.C. 77.
.
(2) A.I.R. 1927 ·Mad. 228,
_
COMMR. WEALTH-TAX v. CHAMPA (Grover,/.)
125
A of Jains being governed by Hindu Law should be rectifieil. Since
1926 there have been several enactments apart from the codification of certain major Branches of Hindu law which in express
terms have been made applicable to Jains. The course suggested
by C. R. Jain cannot possibly be followed particularly in the presence of statutory enactments.
B
In Panna Lal & Others v. Sitabai(1), Hidayatullah J. (as he
then was) delivering the judgment of the Divis.ion Bench observed
that it was too late in the day to contend that "Jains' are not
included in the term "Hindus" for the purposes of law. He
referred to Mayne's Hindu law as also the leading cases on the
point apart from West and Buhler's Hindu Law (4th E<ln.), Gopal
C Chandra Sarkar's Hindu Law (7th Edn.) and Harl Singh Gour's
Hindu Code (4th Edn.). All these are acknowledged authorities
and the conclusion which was derived not only from the statements contained in their works on Hindu law but also from decided cases was that the Jains were to be re~arded as Hindus for
the purposes of law though they seem to d1Ssent from eome of the
D principles of orthodox Hinduism.
In the Nagpur cilSe the question which was being considered was whether The Hindu
Women's Right to Property Act 1937 was meant to apply to
Jains as weJI or to ·Hindus proper. It was in that CO!lpection
that the extent to which Jains were governed by Hiadu law or
were to be treated as Hindus for purposes of that Jeilv came up
E for discussion. The following passage may be 111*oduced with
advantage :-
F
"The .legislature must be taken to be aware of the
pronouncements of the Privy Council as well as the
leading decisions of the Indian High Courts where a
liberal interpretation was given to the tetlll 'Hilldu'.
We do not think that the Legislature used lhe term
without advertence to these dicta and, in· our judgment,
the Legislature must be deemed to have used the term
"Hindu' in that larger sense which has beeo explailed
by Mayne at page 5 of his treatise in the paS&age quoted
by us elsewhere and which has been the fouodation of
G
decisions on the subject in the courts of I~dia";
It may be mentioned that the statement from Mayne's Hindu
Law referred to above is the same which was relied upon by the
Privy Couneil in Sheokuarbai v. Jeoraj(").
We may next notice certain decisions in · which . the. word
'Hindu' as used in various statiites came to bci intetpreted by the
H Courts.· In Kamawali v. Dlgbijai Singh( 8 )
s. 331 of the Indian
(l) I.LR. 1954
N~BPur 30.
(2) A.I.R. 1921 P.C.14.
(3) [1921] J'.C. 77.
'
126
SUPREME COU!l.T REPORTS
(1972] 3 S.C.R.
Succession Act 1865 had to be interpreted.
According to that A
section the provisions of that Act were not to apply to intestate
or testamentary succession to the property of any Hindu.
It was
held that the person who had .ceased to be a Hindu in religion
and had become a Christian could not elect to be bound by the
Hindu Law in the matter of succession after the passing of the
Indian Succession Act and that a Hindu convert to Christianity
B
was solely governed by that Act.
In other words, according to
the Privy Council a person who had ceased to be a Hindu by
religion was not a Hindu within the meaning of s. 331
of the
aforesaid Act. It was held in Bachebi v. Makhan Lal & Another(') that the term 'Hindu' ins. 331 of the Indian Succession
Act 1865 included a Jain and consequently in matters of sucesC
sion Jains were not governed by that Act. It was pointed out
that the ordinary Hindu law of Inheritence was to be applied to
Jains in the absence of proof of custom or usage varying that
law.
The Privy Council in Bhagwan Koer v. J,
C. Bose &
Others(') expressed the view that a Sikh was a 'Hindu' within the
meaning of that tern1 as used in s. 2 of the Probate and Administration Act 1881. It was pointed out that the Courts had always
D
acted upon the premise that Sikhs were Hindus and that Hindu
Law applied to them in the same way as it applied to Jains in the
absence of custom varying that Law. It was observed :
"It appears to their Lordships to be clear that in
s. 331 the term "Hindu' is used in the same wide sense
as in earlier enactments, and includes Sikhs. If it be not
E
so, then Sikhs were, and are, in matters of inheritence.
governed by the Succession Act, and Act based upon,
and in the main embodying, the English law; and it
could not be seriously suggested that such was the
intention of the legislature".
In Ambalal v. Keshav Bandlwchan& Gujar( 3 )
the question
was whether Jains were governed by Hindu law of Inheritence
(Amendment) Act 1929 which applied to all persons governed
F
by Mitakshara as modified by the Mayukha. It was argued in
that case that the Indiiin Succession (Amendment) Act of 1929
speaks of Jains as-well as Hindus and ss. 4 and 57 of the Indian
G
Succession Act 1925 also did the same.
The Court pointed
out thats. 331 of the Indian Succession Act 1865 did not make
any separate mention of Jains and even then it had been held
that the term 'Hindu' included Jains.
The Hindu Wills Act of
1870 which applied to the territories under the Lt. Governor of
Bengal and the cities of Bombay and Madras no doubt mentioned
Jains as well as Hindus being governed by certain sections of the
H
(I) I.L.R. 3 All. 55.
(2) l.L.R. 31 Cal. 11.
(3) !.L.R. i 941 Born. 250.
A
B
COMMR. WEALTli·TAX V, CHAMPA (Grover, I.)
127
Succession Act of 1865 and the Indian S11ecession Act 1925 was
a cc111solid!lting A~t which repealed the previous Act of 1865 .. as
well as H11;1du Wills Act of 1870. It was, therefore, probably
th?ugh.t necessary e~·majore cautela to separately mentiOiD. the
I ams m the consolidating measure.
However in all the other
e.nactmen~ affecting the Hindu Law there was' no separate men·
tion of Jams along with the Hindus.
The Jains were therefore
governed by the Hindu Law of Inheritence (Amen~ent) Act
1929. The mention of Jains separately in Article 25 of die
Constitution was noticed in Panlltlla/ v. Sita Bai(1) and it was
obse~ that the .framers of t~e Constitution felt, having regard
to the differences m the two faiths that an express mention might
c be made of all faiths ex-abundanti cautela and to put the matter
beyond all controversy, and that faith is one thing and law is
another and the Constitution could not be taken to ha.ve undone
the long series of decisions on the subject.
Before the amend·
ment and codification of major branches of Hindu law by the four
statutes, i.e. The Hindu Marriage Act 1955, the Hindu Succes·
0
sion Act 1956, the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956,
the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, the undisputed
position was that the Jains were governed by the Hindu law modified by custom and a Jain joint family was a Hindu joint family
with all the incidents attached to such a family under the_Hindu
law.
The legislative practice also was to generally treat Jains
as included in the tern1 'Hindu' in various statutory enactments.
•
E
Wherever Jains were mentioned in addition it was only by way
of abundant caution.
The new statutes did not change the
situation and it is not possible how the High Court in !'he judgment under appeal pressed them into service in support of its
view.
The fallacy underlying the reasoiling of the High Court is
that the artificial field of application of the law in those statutes
shows that Jainism is not treated even as a forni or a development
of Hinduism.
That is an erroneous approach.
We are not con·
F
cerned with the question whether J ains are a sect of Hindus <!r
Hindu dissenters.
Even if the religions are different, what !s
common is that all those who are to be governed by the prov1·
s10ns of these enactments are included in the terni 'Hindu'. They
are to be governed by the same rules relating to marriage, succes·
G sion, minority, guardianship,
adopti~n :ind
m~~nance as
Hindus. The statutes thus accord legJSlative recogmtton to the
.fact that even though J ains may not be Hindus by religion they
are to be governed by the ~e
l~w~ as the . ?indus. . I~ tbfas
view of the matter the expression Hindu undivided family
will
certainly include the 'Jain undivided f.amily'.
The latter class of
family is not known to law:
Th~ .Jruns ar;e gove!11ed by all. the
incidents relating to the Hindu 1omt family.
Hmdu und1v1ded
H
(!) I.L.R.1954 Nagpur 30·
128
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972] 3 S.C.R.
fam11y is a legal express.ion which has been employed in taxation A
laws. It has a definite connotation and embodies the meaning
ascribed to the expression 'Hindu joint family'.
For the above reasons the appeal is allowed and the question
referred is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the ·
a~. There will be no order as to costs in this Court. The
appeal by Certificate (CA 1686/68) being defective for want of 8
reasons is het"by dismissed.
K.B.N.
Appeal allowed.