# CONCORD OF INDIA INSURANCE CO. L1D v. NIRMALA DEVI AND ORS

- **Citation:** [1979] 3 S.C.R. 694
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1979-04-16
- **Bench:** V. R. Krishna Iyer, R. S. Pathak
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/concord-of-india-insurance-co-l1d-v-nirmala-devi-and-ors-7664
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Negligence of Counsel which misleads a litigant into delayed pursuit of his.-
remedy-Propriety ·and reasonableness of cofnpanies and other persons relying upon legal opinion in the niatter of co1nputation of liniitation--Lirni-·
tation Act, 1963 (Act XXXVl) Section 5.
Need for no fault tortious liability by State-LeKal rights, literacy in the·
case of automobile, accidents and the processual 1nodalities which secure·
redressal of grievances, explained.
, A doctor and his brother riding a motor cycle were hit by a jeep driver·
..,,
and both \\'ere killed in November 1971, but the Motor Accident claims Tri··
bunal delivered judgment on 5·9· 1976 five
years
later
awarding sums
of
Rs. 80,000/- and Rs. 73,500 ;- to the two sets of claimants.
The appeal in this case had to be filed on or before 19-1-77 but was.
actually filed 30 days later ·with an application for condonation under S. 5
of the Limitation Act on the ground of Counsel's mistake in the calculationof the period of limitation.
The High Court dismissed the appeal and
the~
application.
Dismissing the special leave petitions, the Court
HELD : A company relies on its Legal Adviser and
the
Manager's.
expertise is in company management and not in law.
There is no particular
reason why when a company or other person retains a lawyer to advise it
or him on legal affairs reliance should not be placed on such counse1.
Of
course, if there is gross delay too patent even for layman or if there is i.tL
comprehensible indifference the shield of legal opinion may still be .vulnerable.
If legal Adviser's opinions are to be subjected by company managers to.
further legal scrutiny of their own, an impossible situation may arise.
Inde_ed
Government, a large litigant in this
country, may
find itself in
difficulty •.
[697E·F. 698 F-Gl
This does not automatically secure a visa for the petitioner into this
)C
Court under Art. 136.. There musf be manifest injustice or gross misappreciation or perversity in factual findings.
[698H]
,.-·
State of Kerala v. Krishna Kurup Madhava Kurup, A.I.R. 1971 Keralai
211; approved.
State of West Bengal v. Howrah Z..funicipal Corporation, AIR 1972 SC.-
749; referred to.
Obser;ations
1~ The jurispfudence of compensation for· motor accidentS IDus't develop·
in. the· direction, of no-fault liability and the determination of the quantum
!DU$\ be liberal, not niggardly since the law values life and limb in 'a 'freet
•
•
•
CONCORD INSURANCE co. v. NIRMALA DEVI (Krishna Iyer, !.) 695
country in generous scales.
Social justice, the command of the Constitution
A
is being violated by the State itself by neglecting road repairs, ignoring deadly
over-loads and contesting liability after nationalising the bulk of bus transport
and the whole of general insurMtce business. [696C·Dl
2. Medieval roads \\'ith treacherous dangers and total disrepair, explosive
increase of heavy vehicles often terribly overloaded and without cautionary
signals, reckless drivers crazy with speed and tipsy with spirituous potions,
non-enforcement of traffic regulations_ designed for safety but offering opportunities for systematised corruption and little else and, as a cumulative effect,
mounting high\vay accidents, demand a new dimension to the law of torts
through no fault liability and processual celerity and simplicity in compensation claims caseo. [696B-C]
3. If only no-fault liability, automatic reporting by the police who investigate the accident in a statutory pro-forma signed by the claimants and forwarded to the tribunal as in Tamil Nadu and decentralised empowerment of such
tribunals in every district coupled with informal procedures and liberation
from court-fees and the sophisticated rules of evidence and burden of proof
\'\it:re introduced-easy and inexpensive, if the State has the will to help the
poor who mostly die in such accidents-law's. delays in this compassionate
jurisdiction can be banished.
Social justice in action is the measure of the
State's constitutional sensitivity. [6

## Text

A
B
c
D
E
F
G
694
..
CONCORD OF INDIA INSURANCE CO. L1D.
v.
NIRMALA DEVI AND ORS.
April 16, 1979
[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]
Negligence of Counsel which misleads a litigant into delayed pursuit of his.-
remedy-Propriety ·and reasonableness of cofnpanies and other persons relying upon legal opinion in the niatter of co1nputation of liniitation--Lirni-·
tation Act, 1963 (Act XXXVl) Section 5.
Need for no fault tortious liability by State-LeKal rights, literacy in the·
case of automobile, accidents and the processual 1nodalities which secure·
redressal of grievances, explained.
, A doctor and his brother riding a motor cycle were hit by a jeep driver·
..,,
and both \\'ere killed in November 1971, but the Motor Accident claims Tri··
bunal delivered judgment on 5·9· 1976 five
years
later
awarding sums
of
Rs. 80,000/- and Rs. 73,500 ;- to the two sets of claimants.
The appeal in this case had to be filed on or before 19-1-77 but was.
actually filed 30 days later ·with an application for condonation under S. 5
of the Limitation Act on the ground of Counsel's mistake in the calculationof the period of limitation.
The High Court dismissed the appeal and
the~
application.
Dismissing the special leave petitions, the Court
HELD : A company relies on its Legal Adviser and
the
Manager's.
expertise is in company management and not in law.
There is no particular
reason why when a company or other person retains a lawyer to advise it
or him on legal affairs reliance should not be placed on such counse1.
Of
course, if there is gross delay too patent even for layman or if there is i.tL
comprehensible indifference the shield of legal opinion may still be .vulnerable.
If legal Adviser's opinions are to be subjected by company managers to.
further legal scrutiny of their own, an impossible situation may arise.
Inde_ed
Government, a large litigant in this
country, may
find itself in
difficulty •.
[697E·F. 698 F-Gl
This does not automatically secure a visa for the petitioner into this
)C
Court under Art. 136.. There musf be manifest injustice or gross misappreciation or perversity in factual findings.
[698H]
,.-·
State of Kerala v. Krishna Kurup Madhava Kurup, A.I.R. 1971 Keralai
211; approved.
State of West Bengal v. Howrah Z..funicipal Corporation, AIR 1972 SC.-
749; referred to.
Obser;ations
1~ The jurispfudence of compensation for· motor accidentS IDus't develop·
in. the· direction, of no-fault liability and the determination of the quantum
!DU$\ be liberal, not niggardly since the law values life and limb in 'a 'freet
•
•
•
CONCORD INSURANCE co. v. NIRMALA DEVI (Krishna Iyer, !.) 695
country in generous scales.
Social justice, the command of the Constitution
A
is being violated by the State itself by neglecting road repairs, ignoring deadly
over-loads and contesting liability after nationalising the bulk of bus transport
and the whole of general insurMtce business. [696C·Dl
2. Medieval roads \\'ith treacherous dangers and total disrepair, explosive
increase of heavy vehicles often terribly overloaded and without cautionary
signals, reckless drivers crazy with speed and tipsy with spirituous potions,
non-enforcement of traffic regulations_ designed for safety but offering opportunities for systematised corruption and little else and, as a cumulative effect,
mounting high\vay accidents, demand a new dimension to the law of torts
through no fault liability and processual celerity and simplicity in compensation claims caseo. [696B-C]
3. If only no-fault liability, automatic reporting by the police who investigate the accident in a statutory pro-forma signed by the claimants and forwarded to the tribunal as in Tamil Nadu and decentralised empowerment of such
tribunals in every district coupled with informal procedures and liberation
from court-fees and the sophisticated rules of evidence and burden of proof
\'\it:re introduced-easy and inexpensive, if the State has the will to help the
poor who mostly die in such accidents-law's. delays in this compassionate
jurisdiction can be banished.
Social justice in action is the measure of the
State's constitutional sensitivity. [696F-G]
CIVIL Al'PELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (Civil)
Nos. 5228 and 5286 of 1977.
B
c
D
From the Judgment and Order dated 8-8-1977 of the Pnnjab
E
and Haryana High Court in F.A.O. No. 81 and 82 of 1977.
P. P. Malhotra and R. N. Dikshit for the Petitioner.
S. K. Gambhir for the Respondent.
The Order of the Court was delivered by
p
KRISHNA IYER, J. An explosive escalation of automobile acci·
dents, accounting for more deaths than the most deadly diseases, has
become a lethal phenomenon on Indian Roads everywhere.
The
jural impact of this tragic development on our I~gJslatures, courts
G
and law enforcing agencies is insufficient, with the result that the
poor, who are, by and large, the casualty iu most of these cases,
suffer losses of life or limb and are deprived of expeditious
legal
remedies in the shape of reasonably quantified compensation promptly
paid-and this, even after compulsory motor insurance and nationalisatkm of insurance business.
The facts of this special leave petiFi
ti~ns;. which we dismiss by this order, raise two serious issues which
o:mstrain us to make a speaking order.
The first deals with legal
A
696
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 3 s.c.R.
rights, literacy in the case of automobile accidents and the processual
modalities which secure redressal of grievances.
The second relates
to the consequences of negligence of counsel which misleads a litigant into delayed pursuit of his remedy.
B
Medieval roads with treacherous
dangers and total
disrepair,
explosive increase of heavy vehicles often terribly overloaded
and
without cautionary signals, reckless drivers crazy with
speed
and
tipsy with spirituous potions, non-enforcement of traffic regulations
designed for safety but offering opportunities for systematised corruption and little else and, as a cumulative effect, mounting highway
C
accidents demand a new dimension to the law of torts through no
fault liability and processual celerity and simplicity in compensation
claims cases.
Social justice, the command of the Constitution is
being violated by the State itself by neglecting road repairs, ignoring
deadly overloads and contesting liability after nationalising the bulk
of bus transport and the whole of general insurance business.
The
D
jurisprudence of compensation for motor accidents must develop in
the direction of no-fault liability and the determination of the quantum must be liberal, not niggardly since the law values life and limb
in a free country in generous scales.
In the present case, a doctor
and his brother riding a motor cycle were hit, by a jeep driver and
both were killed. The fatal event occurred in November 1971 but the
E
Motor Accident Claims Tribunal delivered judgment five years later
awarding sums of Rs. 80,000/- and Rs. 73,500/- to the two sets of
claimants.
F
G
H
The delay of five years in such cases is a terrible commentary on
the judicial process.
If only no-fault liability, automatic reporting
by the police who investigate the accident in a statutory pro-forma
signed by the claimants and forward to the tribunal as in Tamil Nadu
and decentralised empowerment of such tribunals in every district
coupled with informal procedures and liberation from court-fees and
the sophisticated rules of evidence and burden of proof were introduced-easy and inexpensive if the State has the will to help the poor
who mostly die in such accidents-law's delays in this compassionate
jurisdiction can be banished. Social justice in action is the measure
of the State's constitutional sensitivity.
Anyway, we have made
these observation hopefully to help focus the attention of the Union
and the States.
The nationalised insurance company appealed to the High Court
against the award.
We have no doubt that the finding on both the
•
•
•
•
'
CONCORD INSURANCE co. v. NIRMALA DEVI (Krishna Iyer, !.) 697
culpability and the quantum as rendered by the trial court are correct.
But the High Court dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay,
dismissing the application of the petitioner for
condonation
under
S. 5 of the Limitation Act.
The Accident Claims Tribunal pronounced its award on Septem·
ber, 15, 1976, after making the necessary computations and deduc·
tions.
The appeal had to be filed on or before January 19, 1977
but was actually filed 30 days later.
Counsel for the petitioner is
stated to have made the mistake in the calculation of the period of
limitation.
He had intimated the parties accordingly with the result
that the petitioner was misled into instituting appeal late.
The High
Court took the view that the lawyer's ignorance about the law was
no ground for condonation of delay.
Reliance was placed on some
decisions of the Punjab High Court and th_ere was reference also to
a ruling of the Supreme Court in AIR 1972 SC 7 49 ('). The con·
clusion was couched in these words :
"The Assistant Divisional Manager of the Company·
appellant
is not an illiterate or so ignorant person who
could not calculate the period of
limitation.
Such like
appeals are filed by such companies daily. The facts of this
case clearly show, as observed earlier, that the mistake is
not bonafide and the appellant has failed to show sufficient
cause to condone the delay."
We are not able to agre.i;. with this reasoning.
A company relies
on its Legal Adviser and the Manager's
expertise is
in company
management and not in law.
There is no particular
reason why
when a company or other person retains a lawyer to advise it or him
on legal affairs reliance should not be placed on such counsel.
Of
course, if there is gross delay too patent even for layman or if there
is incomprehensible indifference the shield of legal opinion may still
be vulnerable.
The correct legal position has been explained
with
reference to the Supreme Court decision in a judgment of one of us
in AIR 1971 Ker. 211 :
"The law is settled that mistake of counsel may in certain circumstances be
taken into account
in condoning
delay although there is no general proposition that mistake
of counsel by itself is always a
sufficient ground. It is
always a question whether the mistake was bonafide or was
merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose such as !aches
(1) State of West Bengal v. Howrah:Municipa/ Corporation.
6-330SCI/79
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
698
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1979] 3 S.C.R.
on the part of the litigant or an attempt to save limitation
in an underhand way.
The High Court unfortunately never
considered the matter from this angle. If it had, it would
have seen quite clearly that there was no attempt to avoid
the Limitation Act but rather to follow it albeit on a wrong
reading of the situation."
"The High Court took the view that Mr. Raizada being
afi Advocate of 34 years' standing could not possibly make
the mistake in view of the clear provisions on the subject of
appeals existing under Section 39 (1) of the Punjab Courts
Act and therefore, his advice to file the appeal before the
District Court would not come to the rescue of the appellant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
The Supreme
Court upset this approach."
"I am of the view that legal advice given by the mem·
bers of the legal profession may sometimes be wrong even
as pronouncement on questions of law by courts are sometimes wrong.
An amount of latitude is expected in such
cases for, to err is human and lay men, as litigants are, may
legitimately
lean on expert counsel in legal as in
other
departments, without probing the professional competence
of the advice.
The court must of course, see whether in
such cases there is any taint of mala fides · or element of
recklessness or ruse.
If neither is present, legal
advice
honestly sought and actually given, must be treated as sufli·
cient cause when an application under
Section 5 of the
Limitation Act
is being considered.
The
State has not
acted improperly in relying on its legal advisers."
•
•
We haV'e clarified the legal position regarding the propriety and
. •
reasonableness of companies and other persons relying upon legal '!-
opinion in the matter of computation of limitation since it is a pro·
blem which may arise frequently.
If Legal Adviser's opinions are
to be subj•ected by company managers to further legal scrutiny of
their own, an impossible situation may arise.
Indeed Government,
a large litigant in this country, may find itself in difficulty.
That is
the reason why. we have chosen to explain at this length the application of S. 5 vis'a-vis counsel's mistake.
This does not automatically secure a visa for the petitioner into
this Court under Article 136.
There must be manifest injustice or
gross misappreciation or perversity in factual
findings.
We
have
)'
;
'(
•
•
'
->
CONCORD INSURANCE co. v. NIRMALA DEVI (Krishna Iyer, l.) 699
examined the merits of the matter to the extent available on the
record and have heard counsel for the petitioner.
He has hardly
convinced us that the merits of the case call for any intervention at
all.
In this view we are constrained to dismiss the Special Leave
Petitions now that we have expressed ourselves or both the points
dealt with above.
s. R.
Petitions dismissed.
A
8_