# CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY, KERALA v. V. VENUGOPALA VARMA RAJAH A~gust 24, 1976

- **Citation:** [1977] 1 S.C.R. 346
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1977
- **Bench:** A. N. Ray, M. H. Beg, R. s. SARKARIA, P. N. SlllNGHAl, Jaswant Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/controller-of-estate-duty-kerala-v-v-venugopala-varma-rajah-a-gust-24-1976-6916
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

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Estate Duly Act \34 of 1953 ), s. 5-Land corered with ll'i/d and 1wt11ral
forest xrowths-lf agricultural land.
\
Under s.5 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, all property, including agricultural
land situate in the States specified in the First Schedule to the Act. which passes
on th6 death: of the owner is subject to estate duty. The State of Madras was
added in the First Schedule with effect from 6th June, 1955.
The assessee claimed that large tracts of land, covered with wild and natural
f'orest growth9 situate in the Malabar District of the Madras Sta•e, were agri"
cultural lands and that they were not liable to estate duty because the former
owners died before 6th: June, 1955.
The High Court heLd that the property
wa1i agricultural ]and ahd not liable to estate duty, because, ( l) th.e words
'agricultural land' should. be interpreted in their widest significJn-:e, so that. in
the absence of exceptional circumstances4 such a9 the land b-eing entirely rocky
or barren for other reasons, all forest lands in the State of Kerala in which
the District of Malabar was since included, are agricultural lands in the sense
tliat they can be prude11tly and profitably exploited for agricultural purposes;
and (2) although the burden rested upon an assessee to establish an exemption
from liability to estate duty in respect of any part of his estate, yet, if he
claimed immunity on the ground that the subject matter does not fall within
the ambit of the taxing power of the legislature imposing the duty, the Revenue
had to establish that the subject matter involved is taxable.
Allowing the appeal to this Court,
HELD : (I) The expression 'agricultural land' has to be given a restricted
meaning and not the wide meaning given by the High· Court.
The question
whether land is agricultural land has to be decided on evidence of actual or
A..
intehded user for an agricultural purpose for which the land may have been
prepared or set apart. [352 FJ
Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Andhra Pradesh v. Officer-in-Charge (Court of
Wards) Paigah, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 146 followed.
(a) The land in the present case was covered by spontaneous or natural
growth of forests. It was not shown that the assessee or his predecessor in
interest did anything to develop the forest in the sense that any particular .trees
were planted deliberately.
The exploitation of the forest lands was simply to!
give contracts for cutting trees. It must, therefore, be trnated prima facie as
non-agricultural land. [353 EJ
(b) The decision in State of Kera/a v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturiong
(Wvg.) Co. Ltd. [1974] 1 SCR 671 depended upon the special facts of that
case and the provisions of\the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assessmmt)
Act, 1971, interpreted. thereiri. This Court, in that case. explained, ":'hY for
certain special reasons and m an unusual context, certam land descnbed as
'forest land' was to be treated as 'agricultural'.
Forest land ordinarilv means
non arable, that is, non agricultural land. [351 C & El
Rajalz Anand Brahma Shah v.
State of U. P. & Ors. [1967] 1 SCR
373.
followed.
I ,
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CONTROLL.ER OF ESTATE DUPTY V. V. V. VARMA RAJAH (Beg, J.)347
( c) A'suming that the forest land subsequent to th·" levy of estate duly
A
had been acquired by the State to1 be converted and used for agricuitural purposes, there heing no evidence or find<ng of such a character before the events
which attracted the estate duty, it is an irrelevant circumstance of which the
Court cannot take notice.
[351 G]
(2) (a; The burden of establishing the exemption lay upon the assessel. The
High Court was not correct in placing the burden upon the Revenue when it
was admitted that the land was forest land.
The reason given by the High
Court, that a, question of immunity of the subject matter from taxation by
Parliament arose here, and that, therefore, the onus lay on the
Departrrr~nt:
mixes up the questions of legislative competence and OJ° taxability.
Even if
there could be such an onus, it

## Text

346
A
CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY, KERALA
v.
V. VENUGOPALA VARMA RAJAH
A~gust 24, 1976
B
[A. N. RAY, C.J., M. H. BEG, R. s. SARKARIA, P. N. SlllNGHAl AND
JASWANT SINGH, JJ.)
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G
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Estate Duly Act \34 of 1953 ), s. 5-Land corered with ll'i/d and 1wt11ral
forest xrowths-lf agricultural land.
\
Under s.5 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, all property, including agricultural
land situate in the States specified in the First Schedule to the Act. which passes
on th6 death: of the owner is subject to estate duty. The State of Madras was
added in the First Schedule with effect from 6th June, 1955.
The assessee claimed that large tracts of land, covered with wild and natural
f'orest growth9 situate in the Malabar District of the Madras Sta•e, were agri"
cultural lands and that they were not liable to estate duty because the former
owners died before 6th: June, 1955.
The High Court heLd that the property
wa1i agricultural ]and ahd not liable to estate duty, because, ( l) th.e words
'agricultural land' should. be interpreted in their widest significJn-:e, so that. in
the absence of exceptional circumstances4 such a9 the land b-eing entirely rocky
or barren for other reasons, all forest lands in the State of Kerala in which
the District of Malabar was since included, are agricultural lands in the sense
tliat they can be prude11tly and profitably exploited for agricultural purposes;
and (2) although the burden rested upon an assessee to establish an exemption
from liability to estate duty in respect of any part of his estate, yet, if he
claimed immunity on the ground that the subject matter does not fall within
the ambit of the taxing power of the legislature imposing the duty, the Revenue
had to establish that the subject matter involved is taxable.
Allowing the appeal to this Court,
HELD : (I) The expression 'agricultural land' has to be given a restricted
meaning and not the wide meaning given by the High· Court.
The question
whether land is agricultural land has to be decided on evidence of actual or
A..
intehded user for an agricultural purpose for which the land may have been
prepared or set apart. [352 FJ
Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Andhra Pradesh v. Officer-in-Charge (Court of
Wards) Paigah, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 146 followed.
(a) The land in the present case was covered by spontaneous or natural
growth of forests. It was not shown that the assessee or his predecessor in
interest did anything to develop the forest in the sense that any particular .trees
were planted deliberately.
The exploitation of the forest lands was simply to!
give contracts for cutting trees. It must, therefore, be trnated prima facie as
non-agricultural land. [353 EJ
(b) The decision in State of Kera/a v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturiong
(Wvg.) Co. Ltd. [1974] 1 SCR 671 depended upon the special facts of that
case and the provisions of\the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assessmmt)
Act, 1971, interpreted. thereiri. This Court, in that case. explained, ":'hY for
certain special reasons and m an unusual context, certam land descnbed as
'forest land' was to be treated as 'agricultural'.
Forest land ordinarilv means
non arable, that is, non agricultural land. [351 C & El
Rajalz Anand Brahma Shah v.
State of U. P. & Ors. [1967] 1 SCR
373.
followed.
I ,
--{
CONTROLL.ER OF ESTATE DUPTY V. V. V. VARMA RAJAH (Beg, J.)347
( c) A'suming that the forest land subsequent to th·" levy of estate duly
A
had been acquired by the State to1 be converted and used for agricuitural purposes, there heing no evidence or find<ng of such a character before the events
which attracted the estate duty, it is an irrelevant circumstance of which the
Court cannot take notice.
[351 G]
(2) (a; The burden of establishing the exemption lay upon the assessel. The
High Court was not correct in placing the burden upon the Revenue when it
was admitted that the land was forest land.
The reason given by the High
Court, that a, question of immunity of the subject matter from taxation by
Parliament arose here, and that, therefore, the onus lay on the
Departrrr~nt:
mixes up the questions of legislative competence and OJ° taxability.
Even if
there could be such an onus, it was, snfficiently discharged in the present case
by the adm:.ssion of the assessee that the land was forest land covered with
natural_ or wild growths. [352 A-Cl
(b) The assessce, was given due opportunity to lead evidence to show,
B
that what was prima facie non-agricultural l~nd, was really agricultural land
C
but he led 110 evidence to prove his intention to put the land to agricultnral
use or purpose. On the other hand, he contended that the mere possibility of
using such land for agricultural purposes in future wa~ enough.
Therefore,
he had not discharged his onus, and no case is made out for sending the case
back to the Tribunal for any fresh decision. [353 D-F]
Civ1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 2000-2001· of
1969.
D
(Appeals· by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order
17-10-1968 of the Kerala High Court in Income Tax Referred
No. 79167).
dated
Case
B. Sen, S. P. Nayar and!. Ramamurthi for the Appellant (in both
appeals).
G. K. Viswanatha Iyer, K. Jayaram and R. Chandrasekar for the
Respondent (in both appeals) .
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BEG, J.-Civil Appeals Nos. 2000-2001 of 1969 from the judgment
and order of the Kerala High Court are by grant of special leave by this
Court filed on the ground that these appeals raise a question of wide ·
general importance.
This question was thus framed, in a reference
made by the Madras Bench of the Income-tax Appellate
Tribunal
under Section 64(1) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953:
"Whether on· the facts and in the circumstances of the
case, the ·Appellate Tribunal was correct in law in having
included the value of the forest lands in the total value of
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the Estate for the purpose of Estate Duty ?"
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The assessee had claimed that large tracts of forest land, covered
with wild and natural forest growths, situated in the erstwhile Malabar
District, were 'agricultural' lands not liable to estate duty under the
Estate Duty Act of 1953 (hereinafter referred to
as
'the Act').
According to the Revenue, duty had become leviable on the death of
the former owners, Smt. Jayalakshmi Devi, who died on 6-3-1954, and
Shri Madhava Rajah of Kollengode, who died on 9th May, 1955,
each owning 1/13th share in the Tarwad properties on the dates of
their deaths.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 1 S.C.R.
No question as to the effect of any amendment of the law upon
liability of agricultural land to Estate duty was referred by the Tribunal
to the High Court.
Nevertheless, it ·seems to have been considered
by reason of the general nature of tfue question referred involving a
determination of the correctness of the inclusion of the value of "forest
land in the total value of the estate". We may observe here that the
question framed seems to rest on the assumption that the land under
consideration was "forest land". However, the general nature of the
question framed and the questions argued and decided by the Appellate· Tribunal as well as the High Court indicated that the real contest
was about the very nature of the land involved in order to determine
whether it was liable to estate duty.
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The High Court had observed that the Tribunal's findings that
land, to the extent of 36,857.16 acres, was not agricultural land was
"solely based on the absence of evidence or the assessee's failure to
prove that the disputed forest lands are agricultural lands".
The High Court had also mentioned the basis of this finding relatD
ing to two types of land about which it had disagreed with the Appellate Tribunal while agreeing with the Tribunal that 500 acres
of
rocky land was non-agricultural land. This basis was
given by
quoting the following two passages from the judgment of the Appellate Tribunal :
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" ( 1) According to the valuers, the remaining extent of
15,000 and odd acres out of the first category, has been
leased by the assessee frol\1 time to time for cutting
of
timber and fuel wood, and has never been used by
him
either by himself or through lessees to bring it under cultivation for any purpose. There is no material on record
from which it can be said that this area can at all be brought
under cultivation for any purpose.
Even if it is assumed
that, there is a bare possibility of this area being brought
under cultivation, the assessee has not placed any material
before us from which it can be said that a prudent owner
would undertake any process of farming in respect of this
land".
(2) "With regard to the second category of the land of
the extent of 16,000 and odd acres, the report of the valuers does not throw any light upon the nature of this land, and
the only information available is that these lands have been
held by the Kerala Government under a perpetual lease on
an annual rent of Rs. 5,000/-. The assessee has not shown
whether this land was being cultivated by the Kerala Government or whether it was only being exploited · by the
Kerala Government for its timber value.
On the material
on record, it is not possible for these lands to come under
the category of agricultural lands".
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CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUPTY V. V. V. VARMA RAJAH (Beg, J.)349
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The. High Court had set out the provisions of Section 5 of the
Act as they stood before a slight amendment in 1956.
It read :
"5. Levy of estate duty__:_
( 1) In the case of every person dying after the commencement of this Act, there shall,
save as
hereinafter
expressly provided, be levied and paid upon the principal
value ascertained as hereinafter provided of all property
settled or not settled, including agricultural land situate in the
States specified in the Fjrst Schedule to this Act, which passes
on the death of such person, a duty called 'estate duty' at
the rates fixed in accordance with Section 35.
(2) The Central Government may, by notification
in
the official Gazette, and the names of any other States to the
First Schedule in respect whereof resol\ltions
have been
passed by the Legislatures of those States adopting this Act
under clause ( 1) of Article 252 of the Constitution iri respect of estate duty on agricultural lands situate in those States,
and on the issue of any such notification the States so added
shall be deemed to be States specified in the First Schedule
within the meaning of sub-section ( 1) ".
After pointing out that agricultural land falls under item 48
of
List II or . the State List in the Seventh Schedule of tlhe Constitution,
the High Court held that. estate duty on the land under consideration
would become ·leviable provided it was agricultural land on the passing of resolutioDJS by the legislature of the State of Madras as
provided by Section 5 (2) set out above.
These resolutions having been
passed on 2-4-1955, the State of Madras was added in
the
First
Schedule to the Act with effect from 6th June, 1955. Hence,
the
High Court held that the estate duty was not leviable under the Act
on agric;ultural land before 6th June, 1955, in the Madras State to
which the land under consideration had belonged at the time when it
was said to have become subject to a levy of estate duty.
Thus, the
principal question which arose was : What is the meaning of "agricultural land" as that term is used in the Act ?
The High Court of Kerala, which had to deal with this reference
decided the question on two grounds : firstly, that, according to the
views expressed in Sarojni Devi v. Srikrishna;(') and Megh Raj v.
Allah Rakha;(') and C.I.T. West Bengal,
Calcutta, v.
Raja Benoy
Kumar Sahas Roy,( 3 ) the words "agricultural land" should be "interpreted in their widest significance"; and, secondly, that although the
burden rested upon an assesee to establish an exemption from liabilitY: to es~ate d~ty in respect of any part of his estate, yet,
if
he
clauned 1mmumty on the ground that the subject matter does
not
fall within the ambit of the taxing power of the legislature imposing
----
(!) A.I.R. 1944 Mad. 401.
(2) A.I.R. 1942 PC 27.
(3) [1957] 32 ITR 466.
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350
SU.PREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 1 S.C.R.
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the d'uty, the Revenue had ·to establish
that the
subject matter
involved is taxable. It then gave its opinion in the following terms
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"It is well known that the extensive areas of different
varieties of plantation that we have got in this State were
once forest lands, and it is also equally well-known that
year after year large areas of forest lands in this State are
being cleared and converted into valuable plantations.
In the
absence of exceptional circumstances such as the land being
entirely rocky or barren for. other reasons, all forest lands
in this State are· agricultural lands in the sense that they
can be prudently and profitably exploited for agricultural
purposes. There is no case that the forest lands concerned
in this case or any part thereof ai:e unfit for agricultural
exploitation".
So far as the correct interpretation of the term "agricultural land'"
in a taxing statute, such as the one before us, is concerned,, we have·
already dealt with the question in our judgment in Commissioner or
Wealth-tax, Andhra Pradesh v. Officer-in-Charge (Court of
Wurds).
Paigah,(1) where we have said:
"We think that it is not correct to
give as wide a
meaning as possible to terms used in
a
statute
simply
because the statute does not define an
expression.
The
correct rule is that we have to endeavour to find out the
exact sense in which. the words have been used in a particular context.
We are entitled to look at the statute as a
whole and give an interpretation in consonance
with the·
purposes of the statute and what legally follows from the
terms used.
We are to avoid absurd results. If we were
to give the widest possible connotation to the words 'agricultural land', as the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court seemed inclined to give to the term 'agricultural
land', we would reach the conclusion that practically all
land, even that covered by buildings is
'agricultural land'
is as much as its potential or possible use could be agricultural. The object of the Wealth Tax Act is to tax surplus
wealth.
It is clear that all land is not excluded from
the
definition of assets~ It is only 'agricultural land' which
could be exempted.
Therefore, it .is imperative
to
give
reasonable limits to the scope of the agricultural land', or,
. in other words, this exemption had to be necessarily given a
more restricted meaning than the very wide ambit given to it
by the Andhra Pradesh Full Bench".
Learned Counsel for the respondents had sought to rely strongly
upon State of Kera/a & Anr. v. The Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing ( Wvg.) Co. Ltd. etc., (2) where the question under considi:ration was whether the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment)
Act 26 of 1971, purporting to acquire forest lands held on Janmam
---- -------
(I) [1977] I S.C.R. 146.
(2) (1974] (I) S.C.R. p. 671, 682 ..
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CO)iTROLLER OF ESTATE DUPTY V. V. V. VARMA RAJAH (Beg, f.)351
right, _without payment of compensation, for implementing a scheme
of agrarian reform by assigning· 1ands or leasing them to poorer secA
tions of rural agricultural population, was
acquiring
"agricultural
land", for purposes stated in the Preamble to the Act before
this
Cour_ for interpretation.
This Court interpreted the Preamble as
having the effect of an earmarking by Legislature of certain forest
lands for conversion into land meant for agriculture.
We do not think that the forest land involved in Gwalior Rayon
s:
Silk Ma11uf1;cturi11g ( Wvg.) Co. Ltds.' case (supra), which bad become linked up with agricultural purposes and earmarked for them,
by reason of a special statute for special purposes, can bear comparison
with
forest
land
with
"spontaneous"
or
natural
and
wild growths of forest, which is involved in the _case now before
us.
The decision in Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Wvg.) Co.'s
case (supra) obviously depended upon the special facts of that case
C
and the character of provisions to be interpreted.
This Court keeping in view the special features of that case, in the context of certain
judicial pronouncements mentibned in the Statement of objects and
reasons for the statute to be interpreted, observed there (at p. 683)
"It is, therefore, manifesi that when the legislature stated
in the Preamble that the private forests are agricultural land,
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they merely wanted to convey that they are lands which by
and large could be prudently and profitably exploited for agricultural purposes''.
It seems clear to us that this Court, by explaining why, f9r certain
special reasons and in an unusual context, certain land described as
"forest land" was to be treated as though it had become "agricultural",
implied that ordinarily this is not so.
In Rajah Anand Brahma Shah
E
v. State of V.P. & Ors.,(') this Court held forest land to be nonarable which meant "non-agricultural".
We think that, without cvi-·
dence to show that such land had been cleared and prepared or earmarked for agricultural purposes, it must be treated as prima facie nonagricultural land.
·
Learned Counsel app.earing for the respondent stated before us
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that the lands under consideration had also been subsi;:quently acquired
by the Govt. and put to agricultural uses.
There is, however no
finding or evidence before us to that effect.
Apparently, the lea~i::d
Counsel meant that forest land subsequent to the levy of estate duty
had been acquired by the State to be converted and used for agricultural purposes.
There being no evidence or finding of such a charac1 ter before the events which attracted the estate duty, we cannot take
G
notice of such a statement by Counsel. It is irrelevant for the purpose of the cases before us.__
So far as the question of burden of proof is concerned, we think
that to. pr~ceed on the assumption that all land is prima facie capable
?f cult1vatton, so .that the .State must prove that it is non-agricultural
H
m order to establish that 1t could be the subject matter of legislation .
- ---
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(I) [1967] l SC.R. 373 at
p_ 379.
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352
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1977] 1 S.C.l!..
which was within Parliament's legislative competence, and, therefore,
covered by the Act, is to mix up the question of legislative competence
and that of taxability of what is, ·on the face of it, taxable as part
of the estate or property of the assessee within the meaning of Section
5 of the Act set out above. · Indeed, the question of legislative competence of Parliament was neither in issue nor part of the question
referred even if such a question could have been referred at all by
a Tribunal functioning under the Act.
We think that the burden of
establishing the exemption lay upon the assessee respondent as was
rightly 'held by the High Court.
We think that the High Court was
not correct in placing the burden upon the Department, after it was
admitted that it was "forest land", on the ground that the further
question of an immunity of the subject matter from taxation by Parliament arose here and that, therefore, the onus lay on· the Department.
Even if there could be such an onus here, it was, we think, sufficiently discharged by the admission that this was "forest land" covered with natural or wild growths.
After that, at any rate, the assessee
had to prove change of its character.
In Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Andhra· Pradesh v. Officer-incharge (Court of Wards) Paigah, (supra), in which we heard arguments together with arguments in the case now before us, we found
that there was some evidence of the agricultural character of land
in the shape of entries in revenue record.
We do not find what could
similarly constitute evidence 'of agricultural character of the land involved in this case.
On the other hand, the assessee's admission that
the land under consideration was "forest land", covered by wild
and natural growth of forests, constituted evidence to the contrary.
We think that, unless tl1ere was evidence that such lands had been, in
some way, set apart or earmarked for or linked up with an agricultural purpose, by their owners or occupiers, it could not be held that
they are agricultural lands.
We think that the view of the Kerala High Court, that "all forest
lands in this State are agricultural lands in the sense that they can be
prudently and profitably exploited for agricultural purposes", is
too
wide.
It is erroneous for the reasons we have already set out in our
judgment in the case from the Andhra Pradesh High Court.
The
question has to be decided on evidence of actual or intended user for
which land may have been prepared or set apart.
·
In the case before us now, the Tribunal said in its referring
order:
"The Tribunal permitted the accountable person to raise
the contention that the value of the forest lands has to' be excluded as they were agricultural lands.
So far as this contention was concerned, the following facts were not in dispute :
viz., that the forest consisted. of trees of spontaneous growth;
that no operations in the nature of forest development were
being carried on; and, that only operations in the nature of
exploitation of the forest
were
being
conducted.
The
accountable person, however, contended that these
lands
were capable of being brought under cultivation at a future
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CONTROLLER OF 'ESTATE DUPTY V. V. V. VARMA RAJAH (Beg, J.) 353
date and that therefore they must be deemed to be agricultural lands.
Reliance was sought to be placed upon the
decision of the Madras High
Court
in Sarojini Devi v.
Shri Krishna (AIR 1944 Madras p. 401) in which it was
held that the expression 'agricultural lands' must be taken
to include lands which are used or are capable of
being
used for raising any valuable plants or trees or for any other
purpose of husbandry.
The Tribunal was, however, of the
view that in the said decision their Lordships did not intend
to lay down a definition of the expression 'agricultural lands'
for all purposes, and that, on the other hand, they clearly
indicated that the expression admits of different interpretations and that it was only from the context of the particular
enactment in which this expression is used that its meaning
has to be inferred.
The Tribunal observed that the very
wide definition of the expression 'agricultural lands' laid
down in the above cited decision was not applicable to cases
under the Estate Duty Act.
The Tribunal, therefore, negatived the contention of the accountable person that the forest
lands had to be excluded from the value of the assessable
estate of the deceased".
Thus, it is clear that the assessee, after having been given due
opportunity to lead evidence to show that what was prima facie nonagricultural land, in the sense that it was covered by the spontaneous
or natural growth of forests, was really agricultural land, had led no
such evidence.
It was not shown that the assessee or his predecessor in interest did anything to develop the forest in the sense that
any particular trees were planted deliberately. It appears that the
nature of exploitation of the forest lands was simply to give contracts
for cutting of the trees.
The assessee not having led any evidence
of any intention to prepare or appropriate or ear-mark the land for
any agricultural use or purpose, but, on the other hand, having contended that mere possibility of using such land for agricultural purposes in future was enough, could not be said to have discl;iarged his
onus of proof.
After the assessee's admission that it was "forest
land", which presumably prevented cultivation, no evidence was led,
as we have already observed, to indicate any change of character of
this land or its conversion into agricultural
land.
We,
therefore,
think that the Appellate Tribunal was correct in expressing the view
it had taken and the conclusions it had recorded.
And, no case is
made out for sending the case back to the Tribunal for any fresh
decision.
.
·
Consequently, we allow these appeals, set aside the judgment and
orders of the High Court.
The parties will bear their. own costs.
V.P.S. ·
Appeals allowed.
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