# Cornmi_ssioner of. Income-tax Excess Profits Tax, Bombay· City v. 1rf.essrs. Bhogilal Laherchand - **Citation:** [1954] 1 S.C.R. 454 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1954 - **Bench:** Mukherjea, Vivian Bose, Bhagwati - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/cornmi-ssioner-of-income-tax-excess-profits-tax-bombay-city-v-1rf-essrs-305 - **Pages:** 12 ## Headnote Contempt of court-Contempt of Judges of High Court-Power of S1'preme Court to transfer proceedings to another High CourtCriminal Procedure Code, 1898, ss. 1(2), 527-Constitution of India, • art. 215-Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, s. 3. The Supreme Court bas no power under section 527 of the Criminal Procedure Code or under any other provision of law to transfer from a High Court, proceedings which that High Court has initiated for contempt of itself, to another High Court. Section 527 of the Criminal Procedrire Code does not apply to such a oase as the power of a High Court to institute proceedings for contempt of itself and to punish the contemner where necessary, is a special jurisdiction which is inherent in a.11 courts of record and section 1 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code excludes such special jurisdictions from its scope. It is desirable, on general principles of justice, that a Judge who has been personally attacked should not as far as possible hear a. contempt matter which, to that extent, concerns him personally. In re Abdool and JJiahtab (8 W.R. Or. 32), Surendra.nath Banerjea v. Chief Justice and Judges of the High Coi the sole and exclusive judge of what amounts to a contempt of court ......... and unless there exists a difference in the constitution of the Recorder's Court at 8ierre Leone the same power must be conceded to be inherent in that court ............ we are of .opinion that it is a court of record and that the law must be considered the same there as in this country." (11 (1926) l.L.l{. 48 All. 711. •• 458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1954] 1953 The 1884 edition of Belchamber's Practice of the Sukhdw Singh Civil Courts also says at page 241 thatSodhi " Every superior court of record, whether in the Th Ch ~; J . United Kingdom, or in the colonial. possessions or e ie, usticed d . fth C h . and Judif" of the epen encies o e. rowi;i as _inherent power to . Pepsu pumsh contempts, without its precmcts, as well as in f . • ,, Hi9hUourt. Jacie curiae ....................... . Bose J. So also 7 Halsbury's Laws of England (Hailsham · edition) page 2- " The superior courts have an inherent Jurisdiction to punish criminal contempt etc .................. " But reverting to the developments in India. · The High Court of Allahabad was established in 1866 under the High.Courts Act of 1861 and was consti- -tuted a court of record. In 1906 the Privy Council remarked at page 108 of its judgment in In the matter of Sashi Bhushan Sarbadhicary(') that- "There is also no doubt that the publication of this libel constituted a contempt of com·t which might have been dealt with by the High Court in a summary manner by fine or imprisonment or both." After this came the Government of India Act, 1915. Section 106 continued to all High Courts then in existence the same jurisdiction, powers and. authority as they had at the commencement of that Act, and section 113 empowered the establishment of new High Courts by Letters Patent w.ith authority to vest in them the same jurisdiction, powers and authority "as are vested in or may be conferred on any High Court existing at the commencement' of phis Act." The Lahore High Court was established by Letters Patent in 1919 and was <:Wly constituted a court of record. In the year 1925 a Speuial Bench of that court punished a contempt of itself .in Grown v. Sayyad Habib("). After this the question was again agitated in . the Allahabad High Court in 1926 but this time in respect of a contempt of a subordinate court. A Full Bench was convened and the learned Judges reaffirmed their (I) (1907) I.L.R. 29 AJI. 95. (Z) (1925) !.L.R. 6 Lah. 528 (F.B.) -------~ s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS 459 191i3 powers: In re Abdul Hasan Jauhar( 1). Two of the Judges based broadly on the inherent jurisdiction of a court of record. Sulaiman J. said at page 727 Suki.a;vd:.inyh that "it is not the ter~itorial limits of the jurisdiction ~. ' of a Supreme Court" [of Bengal] "but the very nature The Chief Justice of its constitution that is of importance." Boys J. and Judges of the however preferred to ground on the fact that that _Pepsu court "had conferred on it, by the statute and the lhghOourt. Letters Patent creating it, similar powers to those conferred on the High Court of Calcutta," and at page 733 went on to say that that applied "to every other High Court in this country." In the presence of all this history the Contempt of Uourts Act, 1926, was passed. The heading states that the Act is "to define and limit the powers of certain courts in punishing contempts of courts." The preamble states- "Whereas doubts have arisen as to the powers of a High Court of Judicature to punish contempts of courts and whereas it is expedient to resolve these doubts and to define and limit the p@wers exercisable by High Courts and Chief Courts in punishing contempts of court: It is hereby enacted as follows:". Section 2 says:- "SubjeQt to the provisions of sub-section (3), the High Gour.ts of Judicature established by Letters Patent shall haV'e and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of courts subordinate to them as they have and exercise in respect of contempts of themselves." This recognises an existing jurisdiction in all Letters Patent High Courts to punish for contempts of themselves, and the only limitation placed on those powers is the amount of punishment which they could th-ereafter inflict. It is to be noted that the Act draws no distinction between one Letters Patent High Court and another though it does distinguish between .Letters Paten,t High Courts and Chief Courts; also, as the \1) (1~20) IL.R. 48 All. 711. Bose J. 460 SUPREME COUR'i 1 REPORTS [1954] 1953 Act is intended to remove doubts about the High Court's powers it is evident that it would have conSuk!tdev Singh Sodhi ferred those powers had there been any doubt about v. the High Court's power to com,mit for contempts of The Chief Justice themselves. The only doubt with which the Act deals and Judges of the is the doubt whether a High Court could punish for P•p•u a contempt of a court subordinate to it. That doubt HighGourt. the Act removed. It also limited the amount of Boee J. punishment which a High Court could inflict. Now this recognises an existing power in all Letters Patent High C.:ourtB to punish and as the Letters Patent High Courts other than the Chartered High Courts could not have derived this power from the common law, it is evident that the power must have been inherent in themselves because they were courts of record. In 1927 another Full Bench of the Lahore High Court consisting of five Judges re-examined the position : In the matter of Muslim Outlook, Lahore('). They reaffirmed their earlier decision in The Crown v. Sayyad Habib el and held that this jurisdiction is inherent in every High Court and not merely in the three Chartered High Courts. In 1928 a Full Bench of the Patna High Court examined the matter [In re llfurli Manohar Prasad(')] and then committed for. contempt. In 1936 another Special Bench of the Lahore High Court [Harkishen Lal v. '/.'he Crown(')] followed the earlier Lahore decisions. The Privy Council decided a case of contempt from Trinidad in HJ36 [Ambanl v. Attorney-General for Trinidad & Tobago(')] and held that it was a quasicriminal offonce and in the course of their judgment they referred to an earlier decision of th·e Board from Sierre Leone to which we have already referred [William Rainy v. The Justices of Sierre Leone(')]. In the Trinidad case their Lordships did not accept. the extreme proposition that every court of record is the (1) A.LR. 1927 Lah. 610. (2) (1925) I.L.R. 6 Lah. 528. (3) (1929) I.L.R. 8 Pat. 323' - (4) (1937) I.LR. 18 Lah. 69. (5) [1936] A.C. 322, \6i s Moo. P.C. 47. -·; ''""' \ S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 461 sole and exclusive judge of what amounts to a con1958 tempt because of their decision in Surendranath Sukhdev Singh Banerjea v. The Chief Justice and Judges of the High Sodhi Court of Bengal(1), but they did not doubt the sound· v. ness of the decision otherwise. The Ohief Juslice . • . and Judges of lhe In ·1942 the Lahore High Uourt exammed the pos1- · Pepsu tion in a Full Bench for the third time and reached HighOouri. the same conclusion : In the matter of K.L. Gauba( 2 ). This time they pointed out that the Sind, Rangoon BoseJ. and Nagpur High Courts had alf:;o punished summarily for contempts. They also referred to two American decisions where, though the power was said to have been derived from the common law, it was said that- "The power to fine and imprison for contempt from the earliest history of jurisprudence has been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of a court without which it could no more exist than without a Judge ....... " Finally, in Parashuram Detaram v. Emperor( 3) the Privy Council said that "this summary power of punishing for contempt ....... is a power which a court must of necessity possess." We have omitted references to the Bombay and Madras decisions after 1883 because the Judicial · Committee settled the powers of the three Chartered High Courts. What we are at pains to show is that, apart from the Chartered High Courts, practically every other High Court in India has exercised the jurisdiction and where its authority has been challenged each has held that it is a jurisdiction inherent in a court of record from the very nature of the court itself. This is important when we come to construe· the later legislation because by this time it was judicially accepted throughout India that the jurisdiction was a special one inherent in the very nature of the court. The only discordant note that we know of was struck in Emperor v. B. G. Horniman(4) where a Division Bench of the Allahabad (I\ (1883) IO I.A. lJI. (2) (r942) I.L.R. 23 Lah. 4rr. (3) A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 134 at 136. (4) A,I.R. 1945 All. I at f· \ 462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1954] ig53 High Court held that afterthe Act of1926 the offence of contempt was punishable under an Indian penal Sukhdev Singh statute and so the Code of Criminal Procedure applied Sodhi v. because of the words "any other law" in section 5. The Chief Justice In our opinion, this is wrong because the Act of 1926 and Judges of th_e does not confer any jurisdiction and does not create· _Pepsu the offence. It merely limits the amount of the HighOourt. punishment which can be given and removes a certain BoseJ. doubt. Accordingly, the jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings and take seisin of the matter is as before. The Pepsu High Court was established in 1948 and section 33 of the Ordinance which established it recites that it shall be a court of record and that it shall have power to punish for contempt. It will be remembered that the Charter of 1774 which established a Supreme Court for Bengal said the ·same thing of that court and yet the Privy Council did not trace its powers about contempt from the Charter but from <" the common Jaw. In the same way, the law by this time was so well settled in matters of contempt that the words "court of record" and "power to punish for contempt" had acquired a special meaning. Consequently, it is immaterial whether in 1948 the power of the Pepsu High Court was derived from section 33 or was inherent in the nature of the court because whichever it is the jurisdiction is a special one, and· had the legislature desired to take_ it away and confer another kind of jurisdiction it would have been neces- • , sary to use express words in view of the case law which by then had become well established. In 1950 came the Constitution of India and article 215 st.ates that- " Every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the , power to·punish for contempt of itself." Here again, whether this is a fresh conferral of power or a continuation of existing powers hardly m~tters because whichever way it is viewed the jurisdiction is a special one and so is outside the purview of t.ho:i Crimiμal Procedure Coqe, · /'' r' '· S.C.R. -SUPREME COURT REPORTS 463 The Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, was repealed by · Act XXXII of 1952. Section 3 of the new Act is similar to section 2 of the old and. far from conferring a new jurisdiction, assumes, as did the old Act. the existence of· a right to puniSh for contempt in everv High Court and further assumes the existence of :i . special practice and procedure. for it says that every Hil!h Court shall exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authoritv "in accordance with the same procedure and practice." These words are new and would be inappropriate if the Criminal Procedure Co s.o.:R. SUPREME COURT :REPORTS 465 comport themselves with that dispassionate dignity 1953 and decorum which befits their high office and will Sukhdev Singh bear in mind the oft quoted maxim that justice must Sodhi not only be done but must be seen to be done by all v. concerned and most particularly by an accused person The Chief Justice who should always be given, as far as that is humanly and Judges of tltc possible, a feeling of confidence that he will receive a H.P;r;::Urt. fair, just and impartial trial by judges who have no. ig personal interest or concern in his case. Petition dismissed. Agent for the petitioner: Ratnaparkhi Ananl Gov·ind. · Agent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha. MINERVA MILLtl LTD. v. THEUt WORKERS. [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, B. K. MuKHERJEA an