# COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE v. MR. MUKESH GOYAL & ORS

- **Citation:** [2020] 7 S.C.R. 904
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2020-03-17
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1819 of 2020
- **Bench:** Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, Ajay Rastogi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/council-of-architecture-v-mr-mukesh-goyal-ors-34121
- **Pages:** 37

## Headnote

Architects Act, 1972 - s. 37 - Prohibition against use of title
- The High Court held that s.37 of the Architects Act does not create
a bar on individuals not registered with the Council of Architecture
from carrying out the duties and functions of an Architect - On
appeal, held: A plain reading of s.37 clearly supports the proposition
that the Architects Act prohibits individuals not registered with the
Council of Architecture from using the title and style of 'Architect'
and does not prohibit unregistered individuals from practicing the
activities undertaken by Architects such as the design, supervision
and construction of buildings - The legislature stated in the
'Statement of objects and reasons' that with the passing of the
legislation, it shall be unlawful for an unregistered individual to
'designate himself' as an Architect - Further, it is expressly stated
that the legislation protects the 'title' of Architect but does not grant
registered Architects an exclusive right to undertake the design,
supervision and construction of buildings - Thus, it is evident that
legislature did not intend to create a prohibition on the practice of
architecture and associated activities by unregistered individuals -
However, by virtue of the Architects Act, anybody engaging the
services of an individual calling themselves an 'Architect' is assured
that such an individual possesses statutorily recognised educational
qualifications and is competent to complete the task at hand - It is
in this manner that the legislature protects the common person from
untrained individuals - Thus, the decision of the High Court holding
that s.37 of the Architects Act does not prohibit individuals not
registered under the Architects Act from undertaking the practice
of architecture is affirmed.
Architects Act, 1972 - Whether a Government Post titled or
styled using the term 'Architect' can be held by individuals not
[2020] 7 S.C.R. 904
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registered with the Council of Architecture - The High Court held
that the 'mere nomenclature' of a particular post will not violate the
prohibition on the use of 'title and style' of architect u/s. 37 - On
appeal, held: s.37 prohibits unregistered individuals from designating
themselves or referring to themselves as 'Architects' - If a Government
Post is titled 'Architect' or 'Associate Architect', such a person
certainly uses the title and style of 'Architect' and consequently there
is a reasonable assumption that such a person is registered under
the Architects Act and holds a degree in architecture recognised by
the Act - To promote an individual who does not possess a degree
in architecture recognised by the Act to a post titled 'Architect',
'Associate Architect' or of a similar style using the title or style of
'Architect' would effectively violate the prohibition on the use of
title contained in s. 37 of the Architects Act - The text of s.37 makes
no distinction between government employees and private
individuals - Thus, authorities cannot promote or recruit individuals
who do not hold a degree in architecture recognised by the Architects
Act to a post that uses the title or style of 'Architect' - The view of
the High Court is disapproved.
Interpretation of Statutes - The first and best method of
determining the intention of the legislature is the very words chosen
by the legislature to have the force of law - In other words, the
intention of the legislature is best evidenced by the text of the statute
itself - However, where a plain reading of the text of the statute
leads to an absurd or unreasonable meaning, the text of the statute
must be construed in light of the object and purpose with which the
legislature enacted the statute as a whole.
Delegated Legislation - Primary Legislation - It is well
established that delegated legislation is susceptible to invalidity on
the grounds of being ultra vires its parent legislation but also ultra
vires other primary legislation - Where the provisions

## Text

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COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE
v.
MR. MUKESH GOYAL & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 1819 of 2020)
MARCH 17, 2020
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD AND
AJAY RASTOGI, JJ.]
Architects Act, 1972 - s. 37 - Prohibition against use of title
- The High Court held that s.37 of the Architects Act does not create
a bar on individuals not registered with the Council of Architecture
from carrying out the duties and functions of an Architect - On
appeal, held: A plain reading of s.37 clearly supports the proposition
that the Architects Act prohibits individuals not registered with the
Council of Architecture from using the title and style of 'Architect'
and does not prohibit unregistered individuals from practicing the
activities undertaken by Architects such as the design, supervision
and construction of buildings - The legislature stated in the
'Statement of objects and reasons' that with the passing of the
legislation, it shall be unlawful for an unregistered individual to
'designate himself' as an Architect - Further, it is expressly stated
that the legislation protects the 'title' of Architect but does not grant
registered Architects an exclusive right to undertake the design,
supervision and construction of buildings - Thus, it is evident that
legislature did not intend to create a prohibition on the practice of
architecture and associated activities by unregistered individuals -
However, by virtue of the Architects Act, anybody engaging the
services of an individual calling themselves an 'Architect' is assured
that such an individual possesses statutorily recognised educational
qualifications and is competent to complete the task at hand - It is
in this manner that the legislature protects the common person from
untrained individuals - Thus, the decision of the High Court holding
that s.37 of the Architects Act does not prohibit individuals not
registered under the Architects Act from undertaking the practice
of architecture is affirmed.
Architects Act, 1972 - Whether a Government Post titled or
styled using the term 'Architect' can be held by individuals not
[2020] 7 S.C.R. 904
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registered with the Council of Architecture - The High Court held
that the 'mere nomenclature' of a particular post will not violate the
prohibition on the use of 'title and style' of architect u/s. 37 - On
appeal, held: s.37 prohibits unregistered individuals from designating
themselves or referring to themselves as 'Architects' - If a Government
Post is titled 'Architect' or 'Associate Architect', such a person
certainly uses the title and style of 'Architect' and consequently there
is a reasonable assumption that such a person is registered under
the Architects Act and holds a degree in architecture recognised by
the Act - To promote an individual who does not possess a degree
in architecture recognised by the Act to a post titled 'Architect',
'Associate Architect' or of a similar style using the title or style of
'Architect' would effectively violate the prohibition on the use of
title contained in s. 37 of the Architects Act - The text of s.37 makes
no distinction between government employees and private
individuals - Thus, authorities cannot promote or recruit individuals
who do not hold a degree in architecture recognised by the Architects
Act to a post that uses the title or style of 'Architect' - The view of
the High Court is disapproved.
Interpretation of Statutes - The first and best method of
determining the intention of the legislature is the very words chosen
by the legislature to have the force of law - In other words, the
intention of the legislature is best evidenced by the text of the statute
itself - However, where a plain reading of the text of the statute
leads to an absurd or unreasonable meaning, the text of the statute
must be construed in light of the object and purpose with which the
legislature enacted the statute as a whole.
Delegated Legislation - Primary Legislation - It is well
established that delegated legislation is susceptible to invalidity on
the grounds of being ultra vires its parent legislation but also ultra
vires other primary legislation - Where the provisions of a primary
legislation (The Architect Act, 1972) are contradictory to the
provisions of a delegated legislation (The Promotion Policy 2005),
the provisions of the primary legislation must prevail.
Partly allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. Does Section 37 of the Architects Act prohibit
individuals not registered as architects under the Architects Act
COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE v. MR. MUKESH GOYAL
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from practicing the activities undertaken by architects, including
the design, supervision and construction of buildings.
1.1 The text of Section 37 uses the phrase "no person shall
... use the title and style of architect". Therefore, on a plain
reading of the section, the legal prohibition created is on the use
of the "title and style of architect". Title and style are distinct
from practice. While a prohibition on the use of a title merely
restricts an individual from attaching the said title to their name
in referring to or representing themselves to others, a prohibition
on practice creates a bar on the actual undertaking of specific
actions. The most compelling evidence that the two concepts
are materially distinct is the varied usage of the two phrases by
the legislature. [Para 26][912-F-H]
1.2 In making a distinction between individuals registered
under the statute and those not registered, the Advocates Act
clearly stipulates that unregistered individuals cannot "practice"
the profession of law. This stands in stark contrast to the text of
the Architects Act which merely states that unregistered
individuals cannot "use the title and style of architect". Therefore,
a plain reading of Section 37 clearly supports the proposition that
the Architects Act prohibits individuals not registered with the
Council of Architecture from using the title and style of
"Architect" and does not prohibit unregistered individuals from
practicing the activities undertaken by architects such as the
design, supervision and construction of buildings. [Para 26][933D-F]
1.3 It is well settled that the first and best method of
determining the intention of the legislature is the very words
chosen by the legislature to have the force of law. In other words,
the intention of the legislature is best evidenced by the text of
the statute itself. However, where a plain reading of the text of
the statute leads to an absurd or unreasonable meaning, the text
of the statute must be construed in light of the object and purpose
with which the legislature enacted the statute as a whole. Where
it is contended that a particular interpretation would lead to
defeating the very object of a legislation, such an interpretative
outcome would clearly be absurd or unreasonable. [Para 28][934B-D]
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1.4 The legislature created two classes of individuals: the
first class consisted of registered architects satisfying these
minimum qualifications and a second class of unregistered
individuals who did not satisfy these minimum qualifications. This
is the effect of Sections 2(a), 17, 23 and 35 of the Architects Act.
Crucially, the legislature chose to define an "architect" as an
individual registered under the Architects Act and not as an
individual practicing architecture or any cognate activities. Thus,
the legislature limited the regulatory regime created by the
Architects Act to the first class of individuals. In protecting the
public from the risk of the second class, untrained individuals,
the legislature had two options: first it could bar this second class
of individuals from engaging in the profession altogether (as it
had done with physicians and advocates); or alternatively it could
prevent this second class of individuals from calling themselves
"Architects". The Statement of Objects and Reasons makes it
clear that the legislature chose the second option and in fact went
to great lengths to clarify that choice. The legislature stated that
with the passing of the legislation, it shall be unlawful for an
unregistered individual to "designate himself" as an architect.
Further, it is expressly stated that the legislation protects the
"title" of architect but does not grant registered architects an
exclusive right to undertake the design, supervision and
construction of buildings. Other cognate professions or
unregistered individuals may continue to carry out these activities
provided that they do not refer to themselves as "Architects".
[Para 29][935-E-H][936-A]
1.5 It is evident that the legislature did not intend to create
a prohibition on the practice of architecture and associated
activities by unregistered individuals. As opposed to the case of
physicians or surgeons under the Indian Medical Council Act or
advocates under the Advocates Act, the legislature consciously
chose to employ a less stringent measure in the case of architects,
merely prohibiting unregistered individuals from using the "title
and style" of architect. It is not for this Court to delve into why
the legislature made this choice. [Para 30][936-B-C]
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1.6 Architecture undoubtedly constitutes a highly
specialised profession requiring the possession of minimum
educational qualifications. However, architects are by and large
engaged by means of a contract for services. In other words,
architects provide a set of specialised services towards the larger
goal of construction. Architects are not embarking on construction
independently of other actors. By virtue of the Architects Act,
anybody engaging the services of an individual calling themselves
an "Architect" is assured that such an individual possesses
statutorily recognised educational qualifications and is competent
to complete the task at hand. It is in this manner that the
legislature protects the common person from untrained
individuals. [Para 32][937-C-E]
2. Whether a post titled "Architect", "Associate architect"
or any other similar title using the term or style of "Architect"
can be held by a person not registered as an architect under the
Architects Act.
2.1. If an individual is appointed to a post titled "Associate
Architect", "Architect" or "Senior Architect", they undoubtedly
refer to themselves and are referred to by others as "Architects".
Holding a post using the term "Architect" has the real-world
consequence of being referred to as an architect. This is not a
matter of mere nomenclature. As architecture is a specialised
field of study. Crucially, the scheme of the Architects Act provides
a direct nexus between the minimum educational qualifications
required to be obtained, registration as an architect under the
Act and the prohibition against the use of the title of "Architect"
by those not registered under the Act. If a government post is
titled "Architect" or "Associate Architect", such a person
certainly uses the title and style of "architect" and consequently
there is a reasonable assumption that such a person is registered
under the Architects Act and holds a degree in architecture
recognised by the Act. This assumption finds statutory backing
in Section 35 of the Architects Act which provides that any
reference to an architect in any other law shall be deemed to
mean an architect registered under the Architects Act. To
promote an individual who does not possess a degree in
architecture recognised by the Act to a post titled "Architect",
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"Associate Architect" or of a similar style using the title or style
of "architect" would effectively violate the prohibition on the use
of title contained in Section 37 of the Architects Act. [Para 36][938D-H]
2.2. In the present case, this Court recognises the power
of NOIDA to provide and modify the minimum eligibility criteria
for promotion of candidates to the posts of Associate Town Planner
and Associate Architect. This Court further recognises that the
authority has significant discretion in how it chooses to title the
various posts under its supervision. However, to permit NOIDA
to continue to title a post that includes individuals who are not
registered architects under the Architects Act as "Associate
Architect" would result in a violation of Section 37 of the
Architects Act. In the case of Tulya Gogoi the High Court of
Gauhati expressly held that the prohibition on the use of title and
style of architect contained in Section 37 of the Architects Act
applies to both private individuals and government employees.
The reasoning of the High Court on this issue commends itself
for our acceptance. The text of Section 37 makes no distinction
between government employees and private individuals.
[Para 37][939-A-C]
3. The U.P. Industrial Area Development Act provides
NOIDA with the power to make rules for the management of its
internal affairs. In exercise of this power, NOIDA formulated the
Service Regulations of 1981. Rule 16 of the Service Regulations
sets out the 'Sources of Recruitment' for posts under NOIDA's
authority. By clause (iv) of Rule 16 NOIDA has the power to
modify the sources of recruitment for posts under its supervision.
It is in exercise of this power that NOIDA formulated the
Promotion Policy of 2005 which sets out the sources and
qualifications for recruitment in its various departments. It is well
established that delegated legislation is susceptible to invalidity
on the grounds of being ultra vires its parent legislation but also
ultra vires other primary legislation. Where the provisions of a
primary legislation (the Architects Act) are contradictory to the
provisions of a delegated legislation (the Promotion Policy 2005),
the provisions of the primary legislation must prevail. This
principle is well established and has received articulation by this
Court on several occasions. [Para 38][939-C-F]
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Tulya Gogoi v. Association of Architects (1999) 3 Gau
LR 179 - approved.
Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India (1985) 1
SCC 641 : [1985] 2 SCR 287 - relied on.
Mukesh Kumar Manhar v. Sri Ram Singh Ahirwar 2006
(1) MPLJ 238; Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram
Kumar Bhardwaj (1980) 18 DLT 283; Om Prakash
Mittal v. Council of Architecture AIR 1983 Del 223;
Premendra Raj Mehta v. National Building Construction
Corporation Limited (W.P. (C) 2106 / 2012 in the High
Court of Delhi); Sudhir Vohra v. Registrar of Companies
(W.P. (C) 934/2012 and C.M. No. 18315/2014 in the
High Court of Delhi); Council of Architecture v.
Manohar Krishnaji Ranade (2020) 16 SCC 476;
Council of Architecture v. Indian Institute of Architects
(2020) 16 SCC 475 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
(1999) 3 Gau LR 179
approved
Para 15
(2020) 16 SCC 476
referred to
Para 19
(2020) 16 SCC 475
referred to
Para 19
[1985] 2 SCR 287
relied on
Para 38
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1819
of 2020.
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.02.2014 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ Petition A No. 22155 of 2011.
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 1820-1822 of 2020.
K.K. Venugopal, AG, R. Balasubramanian, Pramod Swarup,
Sr. Advs., V. N. Raghupathy, Ramnish Khanna, Manendra Pal Gupta,
Vijay Kumar, Thomas Oommen, Aniruddha P. Mayee, Mrs. Chinmayee
Chandra, Raj Bahadur Yadav, G.S. Makker, Ms. Alka Sinha, Ms. Pareena
Swarup, Anuvrat Sharma, Ravindra Kumar, Advs. for the appearing
parties.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.
1. The question before this Court is whether Section 37 of the
Architects Act 19721 merely prohibits the use of the title "Architect" by
individuals not registered with the Council of Architecture2 under Chapter
3 of the enactment or alternatively whether Section 37 actually prohibits
unregistered individuals from carrying out the practice of architecture
and its cognate activities. In other words, does Section 37 permit
individuals not registered with the Council to continue practicing the
profession of architecture in India? As a corollary to this question, this
Court is also called upon to determine whether a government post titled
or styled using the term"Architect" can be held by individuals not
registered with the Council of Architecture.
2. The present appeals arise out of three writ petitions filed by the
first respondent before the High Court of Allahabad. The first respondent
has been working as an Architectural cum Planning Assistant in the
service of the third respondent,the New Okhla Industrial Development
Authority3since January 1988 and claims to possess a degree in
architecture from the Indian Institute of Architects. NOIDA is an authority
created under Section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area Development
Act 19764 to supervise and manage the development of various
geographical zones of the state of Uttar Pradesh.
3. Exercising its powers under Section 19 of the U.P. Industrial
Area Development Act and with the approval of the state government,
NOIDA framed the Service Regulations of 1981 for the recruitment
and promotion of employees in its various departments. One of the
departments under NOIDA's purview is the Department of Planning
and Architecture where the first respondent is employed. Regulation 16
of the Service Regulations 1981 sets out the 'Sources of Recruitment'.
Under sub-clause (iv) of clause (2) of Regulation 16, NOIDA has been
conferred with the power to modify the sources of recruitment or the
percentage of candidates appointed through promotion and direct
recruitment. Thus, under the Service Regulations 1981, NOIDA has the
power to lay down the conditions and qualifications for promotion from
1 "Architects Act"
2 "Council"
3 "NOIDA"
4 "U.P. Industrial Area Development Act"
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the feeder cadre to various posts in the Department of Planning and
Architecture.
4. NOIDA spelt out the qualifications and conditions required for
the promotion to various posts in the Recruitment and Promotion Policy
20055. The Department of Planning and Architecture consists of two
cadre streams, the Planning cadre stream and the Architecture cadre
stream. The Planning cadre stream consists of the following posts (in
ascending order of seniority): (i) Planning Assistant; (ii) Associate Town
Planner; (iii) Town Planner; and (iv) Senior Town Planner. The
Architecture cadre stream consists of the following posts (in ascending
order of seniority): (i) Architecture Assistant; (ii) Associate Architect;
(iii) Architect; and (iv) Senior Architect. In practice, the two cadres
draw on a common pool of candidates, the only distinction being made
when specific work orders are issued.
5. The Promotion Policy 2005 provided that for the post of
Associate Town Planner, 60 per cent of recruitment would take place
by way of promotion, the eligibility criteria being fifteen years'
experienceas a Planning Assistant. Similarly, for the post of Associate
Architect, 60 per cent of the posts were to be filled through promotion,
the eligibility criteria being fifteen years' experience as an Architecture
Assistant. The remaining 40 per cent of posts were to be filled through
direct recruitment, with a degree in Architecture and Town Planning
and a degree in Architecture stipulated as essential qualifications for
appointmentas an Associate Town Planner and Associate Architect
respectively.
6. A meeting was held by NOIDA on 20 March 2006 to decide
whether a degree in Architecture and Town Planning and a degree in
Architecture was necessary for candidates who were to be promoted to
the posts of Associate Town Planner and Associate Architect. An opinion
was soughtfrom the Mukhya Nagar Gram Niyojak, Uttar Pradesh (Town
and Country Planning Department, Uttar Pradesh). In a letter dated 22
December 2008, the Mukhya Nagar Gram Niyojak recommended that
a degree or diploma in the relevant subjects should be an essential
qualification for candidates seeking promotion. NOIDA subsequently
sought the opinion of the state government on the same question. During
this period, promotions to the post of Associate Town Planner and
Associate Architect have continued to remain in abeyance, resulting in a
5 "Promotion Policy 2005"
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situation where employees who have served for as many as twenty-five
years being denied consideration for promotion.
7. Before the High Court of Allahabad, the first respondent filed
three writ petitions.6 In the writ petitions, the first respondent also
impleaded the present appellant, the Council of Architecture which is
the regulatory body for the profession of architecture in India. By the
writ petitions, the first respondent sought two reliefs:
(i)
A writ of mandamus directing NOIDA to enforce the
provisions of the Architects Act by ensuring that only persons
registered with the Council of Architecture are appointed to
the post of Associate Town Planner / Associate Architect;
and
(ii)
The post of Associate Town Planner / Associate Architect
be filled entirely through promotion of the senior most
Architect cum Planning Assistant holding the necessary
qualifications.
By an amendment to Writ Petition 22155 of 2011 made in 2013,
the first respondent challenged the Promotion Policy 2005 in so far as it
permitted the promotion of candidates to the post of Associate Town
Planner/Associate Architect without requiring that such candidates should
hold a degree in Architecture recognised under the Architects Act.
8. The High Court of Allahabad observed that Regulation 16 of
the Service Regulations 1981, conferred NOIDA with the power to lay
down the conditions and qualifications for promotions in the authority's
various departments. NOIDA had laid down these conditions and
qualifications in the Promotion Policy 2005. The High Court noted that
the sole ground for challenging the Promotion Policy 2005 was that it
allegedly fell foul of Sections 14 and 37 of the Architects Act. Relying
extensively on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in
Mukesh Kumar Manhar v Sri Ram Singh Ahirwar ("Mukesh
Kumar Manhar")7 the High Court held that Section 37 of the Architects
Act does not create a bar on individuals not registered with the Council
from carrying out the duties and functions of an Architect. The High
Court held that Section 37 only prohibits unregistered individuals from
6W.P. 57577 of 2008; W.P. 65973 of 2008; W.P. 22155 of 2011.
72006 (1) MPLJ 238
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[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]
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using the title "architect". As a necessary adjunct of this reasoning, the
High Court held that the Promotion Policy 2005, which allowed for
individuals not holding a degree in architecture being appointed to the
Class II post of Associate Architect, did not contravene Section 37 of
the Architects Act in so far as they would be carrying out the activities
of an architect.
9. In disposing of the writ petitions, the High Court of Allahabad
held that the "mere nomenclature of the particular post will not in any
way be said to violate the provisions of the Architects Act 1971".
Therefore, the High Court permitted NOIDA to continue referring to
the Class II posts as Associate Town Planner and Associate Architect.
The High Court further noted that as a central legislation, the requirements
set out in the Architects Act could not be read into the Promotion Policy
2005 which is a regulation formulated under a state legislation, namely
the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act.
Submissions
10. The Council of Architecture has challenged the decision of
the High Court in holding that Section 37 of the Architects Act does not
prohibit individuals not registered with the Council from practicing
architecture in India. According to the Council, such an interpretation
defeats the object and purpose of the Architects Act. It is submitted
that:
(i)
The object of the Architects Act is to ensure that only
qualified architects are permitted to provide architectural
services for the purposes of construction and building activity
in India;
(ii)
The Architects Act is a comprehensive legislation which
regulates the qualifications, registration and disciplinary
facets of architecture in India and therefore Section 37
cannot be read only as protecting against the use of the title
"Architect" but it must be read to prohibit unqualified
individuals from practicing architecture;
(iii)
Under Section 37 of the Architects Act, only individuals
registered with the appellant Council are permitted to render
architectural services in India;
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(iv)
The High Court has construed Section 37 narrowly and such
an interpretation risks allowing unqualified individuals from
practicing the profession of supervising buildings and
construction; and
(v)
In its decision in Mukesh Kumar Manhar the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh directed the state government to cease
using the nomenclature of "Assistant Architect" or
"Architect" in regard to posts where the eligibility criteria
did not require appointees to hold a degree in architecture.
11. As the present controversy impacts all persons engaging in
the practice of architecture in India, including thousands of individuals
employed in various government departments holding posts titled
"Associate Architect" or "Architect", this Court considered it fit to issue
notice to the Union of India. During the course of the hearing,
Mr KK Venugopal, learned Attorney General of India appeared for the
Union and submitted that:
(i)
According to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
Architects Act, the legislation aims to protectthe title of
architects but does not grant architects an exclusive right
over the activities of designing, supervising and constructing
buildings;
(ii)
Section 37 of the Architects Act is titled "Prohibition against
the use of title" and prohibits individuals from using the "title
and style of architect". The legal bar created is therefore
limited to the use of "title" and does not prohibit the "practice"
of architecture;
(iii)
The Architects Act does not contain a prohibition on the
practice of architecture or the designing, supervising
orconstruction of buildings by individuals not registered with
the Council; and
(iv)
The definition of "architect" provided by the Architects Act
is a person whose name appears on the register of Architects
maintained with the Council and not individuals engaged in
the design, supervision or construction of buildings in India.
Therefore, the Architects Act regulates individuals registered
with the Council and does not controlthe practice of activities
undertaken by individuals falling outside the regulatory regime
applicable to registered Architects.
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[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]
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Scope of the present appeal
12. In the writ petitions before the High Court of Allahabad, the
question before the court was whether the 2005 Promotion Policy adopted
by NOIDA permitting candidates who do not hold a degree in architecture
to hold the post of Associate Architect violated the provisions of the
Architects Act. The answer to that question substantially turned on an
interpretation of the Architects Act. Primarily, the issue is whether the
Architects Act prohibits individuals not registered with the Council from
holding of the title of "architect" or prohibits them from practicing the
activities undertaken by architects. This is the question that we are called
upon to answer. If Section 37 of the Architects Act prohibits individuals
not registered with the Council from practicing the activities commonly
undertaken by an architect, the 2005 Promotion Policy will violate Section
37 as it allows unregistered individuals to undertake the activities of an
architect. However, if Section 37 only prohibits individuals not registered
with the Council from holding the title of "architect", then the Promotion
Policy 2005 is valid insofar as it permits unregistered individuals from
practicing architecture and only the question of the nomenclature of the
post remains to be decided. It is to this controversy that we now turn.
Decisions of the High Courts
13. Since the adoption of the Architects Act in 1972, there have
been several pronouncements by High Courts on whether Section 37
should be interpreted as prohibiting individuals not registered with the
Council from undertaking the activities of designing, supervising and
constructing buildings in India. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v
Ram Kumar Bhardwaj8 the respondents challenged the power of the
Delhi Municipal Corporation to stipulate who a "Licensed Architect"
was. It was contended by the respondents that the adoption of the
Architects Act represented a comprehensive regulatory framework and
the Delhi Municipal Corporation could no longer impose restrictions on
who a "Licensed Architect" was in a manner contrary to the provisions
of the enactment. Justice V S Deshpande (as the learned Chief Justice
then was) speaking for a Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi
observed:
"2. ... The Architects Act, 1972 sets out the qualification to be
possessed by the persons to be registered as architects under the
said Act. It also prohibits persons who do not have such registration
8(1980) 18 DLT 283
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from describing themselves as architects and also deals with
disciplinary action for misconduct of architects. It is, therefore, a
complete enactment the effect of which is that a person cannot
call himself an architect unless he is registered under the said
Act. Of course, unlike the Advocates Act, which restricts
the right to practice in courts only to the advocates qualified
thereunder, the Architects Act does not restrict the practise
by architects to persons registered under the said Act.
Therefore, some persons who cannot call themselves
architects may still be free to do the work which is ordinarily
done by architects and they are not dealt with by the
Architects Act.Whether the Corporation can deal with such
persons is not a question which arises before us. Our consideration
is limited to the question whether the Corporation can regulate
the profession and the practice of architects registered under the
Architects Act, 1972 by insisting that the architects practising in
Delhi and submitting plans for construction of buildings for the
approval of the Corporation must possess licences issued by the
Corporation."
(Emphasis supplied)
On the question of whether the Delhi Municipal Corporation could
regulate architects already registered with the Council of Architecture,
the Division Bench held:
"The Architects Act, 1972 is a special law dealing with the
qualifications to be possessed by persons for being registered as
architects and restricting the term "architect" or "registered
architects" to such persons only. Since the possession of a
registration certificate under the Architects Act, 1972 is regarded
by Parliament as sufficient qualification for the practice of
architects and since all related questions have been dealt with in
respect of architects by the said Act, it became unnecessary for
the Corporation to do so thereafter."
The question before the High Court of Delhi was whether the
Delhi Municipal Corporation could require that architects submitting plans
for the construction of new buildings must possess a license issued by it.
While answering this in the negative, the Division Bench specifically
observed that unlike the Advocates Act 19619, the Architects Act did
9 "Advocates Act"
COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE v. MR. MUKESH GOYAL
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]
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not restrict the practice of architecture to persons registered under the
Architects Act. The High Court observed that even after the adoption
of the Architects Act, there continue to exist individuals who cannot call
themselves architects but are free to carry out the work which is ordinarily
done by architects.
14. In Om Prakash Mittal v Council of Architecture10 Sections
35 and 37 of the Architects Act were challenged as ultra vires Articles
14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India before a single judge of the
High Court of Delhi. It was contended that Section 37 restricted the use
of the title of "architect" to a certain category of qualified persons as
distinct from other qualified persons, a distinction not supported by a
rational nexus with the objects of the Architects Act. In dismissing the
constitutional challenge, Justice S B Wad cited the Statement of Objects
and Reasons of the Architects Act.The High Court of Delhi held:
"Article 19(6) empowers State to make law relating to the
professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising
any profession laying down professional qualifications for the
profession of architecture as done by the Act and prohibiting
persons who do not fulfil the said qualifications from posing
themselves as architects is constitutionally permissible. The
restriction, if at all, is a reasonable restriction. There is no merit
in the petitioner's contention that there is no nexus with
the object of the Act. The object of the Act, as stated above,
is to prevent unqualified persons calling themselves as
architects and undertaking the construction of buildings
which are uneconomical or unsafe and who are bringing the
profession of architect into disrepute. The provision is
essentially in the interest of the general public and it is
meant for protecting the public from unqualified persons
working as architects. The restriction imposed by Section 37
does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution."
(Emphasis supplied)
In dismissing the constitutional challenge, the Single Judge of the
High Court of Delhi held that one of the objects of the Architects Act
was to prevent unqualified persons "calling themselves as architects"
which can result in untrained individuals being tasked with the critical
10 AIR 1983 Del 223
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work of construction. This may lead to unsafe buildings. Section 37 was
enacted to protect citizens from being misled by untrained persons and
mistakenly entrusting them with the task of construction. Even though
the Single Judge undoubtedly recognised the need for trained and qualified
architects, Section 37 was interpreted as creating a bar on individuals
representing themselves to be qualified architects and not as creating a
bar on untrained individuals practicing the tasks undertakenby architects.
15. The issue of using the nomenclature "architect" in government
services has also arisen before the High Courts. In Tulya Gogoi v
Association of Architects11 an order of the Government of Assam
was challenged. The said order re-named the post of "Architectural
Draftsman P.W.D." as ''Junior Architect". The individuals whose posts
were to be renamed had at the time obtained a diploma certificate in
Architectural Assistantship which was not recognised by either the
Central Government or the Council of Architects. The order was
challenged by the Association of Architects, Assam as violating Section
37 of the Architects Act as it would effectively allow the concerned
individuals to hold the title of "Architect" without holding a qualification
recognised by the Council. In response, it was contended that Section
37 was intended to prevent private individuals from calling themselves
"Architects" and misleading the general public, but this rationale did not
extend to government employees.Therefore, it was urged thatthe
government was free to designate its posts howsoever it saw fit. In
rejecting this distinction between private architects and employees of
the government, Chief Justice Brijesh Kumar (as the learned judge then
was) speaking on behalf of a Division Bench of the High Court of Gauhati
held:
"12. It is no doubt that the argument as advanced on behalf of the
appellants is attractive, but it hardly appeals us. It is true, looking
into the sudden spurt in the activity of building, constructed for
factories, industries, housing colonies, office complexes, etc., it
was considered that the profession of architecture must be
regulated. Only those who have proper education and training
and are qualified to work as such may alone be permitted to work
as architects. It is a legislation especially dealing with architects.
Meaning of the word 'architect' has been statutorily provided
under clause (a) of Section 2 where it has been provided that it
11 (1999) 3 Gau LR 179
COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE v. MR. MUKESH GOYAL
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]
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means one whose name is entered in the register. ... Conduct of
an architect is effectively controlled by Section 30. As a
Government servant may be punished under the
Government rules, but still he may practice the profession
of architecture. But check is placed by Section 30 under
which the name of an architect is even liable to be removed
from the register disentitling him to practice. Therefore,
the argument that being in Government service an architect
is accountable to his employer according to the rules does
not hold good since mere punishment as a Government
employee may not be enough to debar him from practising
as an architect which is only controlled under Sections 22,
29 and 30 of the Act, 1972.
...
"15. ... Apart from the categories as indicated above, no other
exception to the applicability of Section 37 has been
provided much less on the ground that one is engaged in
private profession or in Government employment...."
(Emphasis supplied)
The High Court rejected the argument that the object of Section
37 to prevent misrepresentation by untrained individuals engaged in
architectural activities only applied to private individuals and not
government employees. The High Court observed that even where the
rules of service stipulated by the government provided for the regulation
of architects, the provisions of the Architects Act allowing for the
registration and de-registration of architects provided an overarching
regulatory framework to protect the integrity of the architectural
profession. The Actensures that individuals who did not possess a
statutorily recognised qualification cannot refer to themselves as
"Architects". Crucially, the High Court observed that Section 37 did not
carve out an exception for government employees, therefore the
prohibition on the use and the "title and style of architect" contained in
Section 37 applied to both private individuals and government employees.
16. Both the appellant and the Union of India have relied on the
decision of the Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in
Mukesh Kumar Manhar and it would be pertinent at this juncture to
discuss the judgement. The facts of that case were substantially similar
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to those before us. The petitioners before the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh were employed as "Draughtsman" and "Head Draughtsman"
and held architectural degrees recognised by the Architects Act. Their
next promotional post was that of "Assistant Architect - Class II". One
of the pre-requisites for appointment as "Assistant Architect - Class II"
was the completion of a degree in architecture. In 1991 the relevant
recruitment rules were modified and the requirement of a degree in
architecture was removed as a pre-requisite for appointment as
"Assistant Architect - Class II".