# Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v. M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr

- **Citation:** 2025 INSC 73
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2025-01-15
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal Nos. 372-373 of 2025
- **Bench:** J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/cuddalore-powergen-corporation-ltd-v-m-s-chemplast-cuddalore-vinyls-limited-and-38861
- **Pages:** 64

## Headnote

Whether the principles enumerated u/Ord. II r. 2 CPC would bar
the institution of a second suit and warrant rejection of the plaint
filed by the respondent no. 1-buyer.
Headnotes†
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Ord. II r.2 - Suit to include
the whole claim - Relief of permanent injunction sought
in a previous suit, thereafter, institution of suit for specific
performance - Applicability of Ord. II r.2 - On facts, agreement
to sell certain property between respondent no. 1-buyer
and respondent no. 2-seller - Multiple failed attempts by
the respondent no. 1 to get the sale deed registered - Also
respondent no. 1 came to know about the Government Order
banning registration of sale deeds in the said village other
than the appellant - Appellant along with respondent no. 2
interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of
the suit property of the respondent no. 1 - Suit for permanent
injunction by the respondent no. 1 - Meanwhile the GO quashed
by the High Court - Respondent no. 1's case that during the
first suit only he came to know about the execution of the
registered sale deed by respondent no. 2 in favour of the
appellant in respect of the said property - Respondent no. 1
then filed the second suit, the suit for specific performance
of the agreement for sale, cancellation of the sale deed and
permanent injunction - Application by the appellant that the
second suit hit by the bar u/Ord. II r.2 - Application allowed and
plaint rejected in the second suit - First Appeal thereagainst
dismissed - However, the High Court allowed the second
* Author
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appeal and restored the plaint in the second suit, holding that
the second suit not hit by the bar u/Ord. II r.2 - Correctness:
Held: Bar under the provisions of Ord II r.2 would not stand in
the way of the institution of the second suit by the respondent
no. 1 - True import of the bar u/Ord. II r.2 must be that it
operates to preclude a plaintiff from instituting a second suit, on
the same cause of action, for a claim, any portion of a claim,
or reliefs, which the plaintiff was entitled to avail at the time of
filing of the first suit - Ord. II r.2 do not operate as a bar when
the subsequent suit is based on a cause of action different
from that on which the first suit was based and that the identity
of the causes of action in both the suits must be the material
consideration before the court which decide the applicability
of this provision to a second suit filed by the plaintiff - There
may arise a situation where the plaintiff may be entitled to a
relief but such a relief was not available at a certain point in
time - Such relief becomes available to him on the happening
of a subsequent event, post the institution of the first suit, then
the bar u/Ord. II r.2 would not stand in the way of the plaintiff
who has instituted a subsequent suit for claiming those reliefs -
Occurrence of that subsequent event gives rise to a fresh cause
of action to the concerned plaintiff for claiming certain reliefs
which he was otherwise prevented from claiming - On facts,
mandatory bar was created by a G.O. issued by the State
Government which disabled the respondent no. 1 from seeking
the remedy which he was otherwise entitled to - When the order
quashing the G.O. was passed, the rights of the respondent
no.1 crystallized and a relief which was impossible to obtain
earlier due to the existence of a State Government imposed ban
was now made available to the respondent no.1 - Thus, a new
cause of action for obtaining the relief of specific performance
directing the respondent no. 2 to execute the sale deed in
favour of the respondent no. 1 and for seeking the cancellation
of the sale deed entered into between the respondent no. 2
and the appellant had arisen - In the interests of justice, the
decisions of the High Court relating to the GO must be held
to have given rise to a new cause of action to the respondent
no. 1 for the agitating the reliefs

## Text

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[2025] 2 S.C.R. 123 : 2025 INSC 73
Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd
v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.
(Civil Appeal No(s). 372-373 of 2025)
15 January 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the principles enumerated u/Ord. II r. 2 CPC would bar
the institution of a second suit and warrant rejection of the plaint
filed by the respondent no. 1-buyer.
Headnotes†
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Ord. II r.2 - Suit to include
the whole claim - Relief of permanent injunction sought
in a previous suit, thereafter, institution of suit for specific
performance - Applicability of Ord. II r.2 - On facts, agreement
to sell certain property between respondent no. 1-buyer
and respondent no. 2-seller - Multiple failed attempts by
the respondent no. 1 to get the sale deed registered - Also
respondent no. 1 came to know about the Government Order
banning registration of sale deeds in the said village other
than the appellant - Appellant along with respondent no. 2
interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of
the suit property of the respondent no. 1 - Suit for permanent
injunction by the respondent no. 1 - Meanwhile the GO quashed
by the High Court - Respondent no. 1's case that during the
first suit only he came to know about the execution of the
registered sale deed by respondent no. 2 in favour of the
appellant in respect of the said property - Respondent no. 1
then filed the second suit, the suit for specific performance
of the agreement for sale, cancellation of the sale deed and
permanent injunction - Application by the appellant that the
second suit hit by the bar u/Ord. II r.2 - Application allowed and
plaint rejected in the second suit - First Appeal thereagainst
dismissed - However, the High Court allowed the second
* Author
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appeal and restored the plaint in the second suit, holding that
the second suit not hit by the bar u/Ord. II r.2 - Correctness:
Held: Bar under the provisions of Ord II r.2 would not stand in
the way of the institution of the second suit by the respondent
no. 1 - True import of the bar u/Ord. II r.2 must be that it
operates to preclude a plaintiff from instituting a second suit, on
the same cause of action, for a claim, any portion of a claim,
or reliefs, which the plaintiff was entitled to avail at the time of
filing of the first suit - Ord. II r.2 do not operate as a bar when
the subsequent suit is based on a cause of action different
from that on which the first suit was based and that the identity
of the causes of action in both the suits must be the material
consideration before the court which decide the applicability
of this provision to a second suit filed by the plaintiff - There
may arise a situation where the plaintiff may be entitled to a
relief but such a relief was not available at a certain point in
time - Such relief becomes available to him on the happening
of a subsequent event, post the institution of the first suit, then
the bar u/Ord. II r.2 would not stand in the way of the plaintiff
who has instituted a subsequent suit for claiming those reliefs -
Occurrence of that subsequent event gives rise to a fresh cause
of action to the concerned plaintiff for claiming certain reliefs
which he was otherwise prevented from claiming - On facts,
mandatory bar was created by a G.O. issued by the State
Government which disabled the respondent no. 1 from seeking
the remedy which he was otherwise entitled to - When the order
quashing the G.O. was passed, the rights of the respondent
no.1 crystallized and a relief which was impossible to obtain
earlier due to the existence of a State Government imposed ban
was now made available to the respondent no.1 - Thus, a new
cause of action for obtaining the relief of specific performance
directing the respondent no. 2 to execute the sale deed in
favour of the respondent no. 1 and for seeking the cancellation
of the sale deed entered into between the respondent no. 2
and the appellant had arisen - In the interests of justice, the
decisions of the High Court relating to the GO must be held
to have given rise to a new cause of action to the respondent
no. 1 for the agitating the reliefs in the second suit - It cannot
be accepted that the respondent no. 1 was fully aware of the
[2025] 2 S.C.R.
125
Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.
circumstances relating to the ban at the time of entering into
the agreement to sell - It is only when the respondent no. 1
approached the revenue authorities on multiple occasions for the
execution of the sale deed that the reluctance of the registrar
was noticed and writ petition was filed challenging the actions
of the registrar, thus, no reason to doubt the bona fides of the
respondent no. 1 - It cannot be said that such extraneous
matters not set forth in the plaint - Respondent no. 1 indicated
in the first plaint that a writ petition instituted by them before the
High Court challenging the actions of the registrar is pending
and in the second plaint, they averred that the High Court had
quashed the G.O. in a public interest litigation and had disposed
of their writ petition - Rejecting the plaint in the second suit
would result in depriving the respondent no. 1 from claiming
the relief of specific performance of the agreement for sale and
the cancellation of the sale deed - Reliefs in the subsequent
suit founded on a cause of action distinct from that which is the
foundation of the former suit - Facts necessary to be proved
and the evidence to support the claims in the second suit also
different from that of the first suit - Thus, the respondent no. 1
could not have prayed for the reliefs claimed in the subsequent
suit at an earlier stage - High Court rightly held that the bar
u/Ord II r.2 not applicable and the respondent no. 1 would not
be prevented from instituting the second suit, and the plaint in
the second suit was restored - Trial court to decide both the
suits together on their own merits and in accordance with law,
within the stipulated period. [Paras 73, 74, 77-90]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Ord. II r.2 - Suit to include
the whole claim - General Principles underlying Ord. II r.2:
Held: Object of Ord II r.2 is to prevent the multiplicity of suits -
Provision is founded on the principle that a person shall not be
vexed twice for one and the same cause - Mandate of Ord. II r. 2
is the inclusion of the whole claim arising in respect of one and the
same cause of action, in one suit - Phrase "cause of action" mean
that "every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove,
if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the
Court" - While it is acknowledged that the applicability of Ord II r.2
depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case,
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a correct and reliable test is to determine whether the claim in the
new suit is in fact founded upon a cause of action distinct from
that which was the foundation of the former suit - Defendant who
takes shelter under the bar imposed by Ord. II r.2(3) must establish
that the second suit was in respect of the same cause of action
as that on which the previous suit was based; in respect of that
cause of action, the plaintiff was entitled to more than one relief;
and being thus entitled to more than one relief, the plaintiff, without
any leave obtained from the Court, omitted to sue for the relief for
which the second suit had been filed - Defendant must also have
produced the earlier plaint in evidence in order to establish that
there is an identity in the causes of action between both the suits
and that there was a deliberate relinquishment of a larger relief on
the part of the plaintiff - Since the plea is a technical bar, it has
to be established satisfactorily and cannot be presumed merely
on the basis of inferential reasoning. [Para 47].
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Ord. II r.2 - Suit to include
the whole claim - Applicability of Ord. II r.2 - Status/Stage
of the first suit:
Held: Ord. II r.2 does not impose any restriction on the applicability
of the principles therein based on the stage or status of the first
suit - No clear requirement that the first suit either be pending or
disposed of in order to make a plea of bar u/Ord. II r.2 as regards
the second or subsequent suit - Laudable object behind this
provision is to prevent the multiplicity of suits and the splitting of
claims - Stage at which the first suit is, would not be a material
consideration in deciding the applicability of the bar u/Ord. II r.2 - It
needs to be looked into, whether the cause of action in both suits
is one and the same in substance, and whether the plaintiff is
agitating the second suit for claiming a relief which was very well
available to him at the time of filing the first suit - Thus, the fact
that the first suit is still pending before the concerned court would
have no material impact in deciding whether the subsequent suit
filed is barred by the principles u/Ord. II r.2. [Paras 48, 49, 51]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Ord. II r.2 - Suit to include
the whole claim - Rejection of plaint u/Ord VII r.11(d) -
Determination of the applicability of the bar u/Ord II r.2 -
Approach to be adopted by the court:
[2025] 2 S.C.R.
127
Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.
Held: Before rejecting the plaint u/Ord VII r.11(d), the Courts must
ensure that the plaint is read as a whole and its entire averments
are looked into - Few lines or passages must not be read in
isolation - It is imperative that the pleadings are read as a whole
for ascertaining the true import of the averments therein - It must
be deduced whether the causes of action in both the suits are
identical in substance in order to sustain a successful plea u/
Ord II r.2 - It would be a reductive approach to only cull out the
cause of action paragraphs from the respective plaints and decide
that they disclose the same cause of action on mere comparative
overview. [Para 56]
Words and phrases - 'Cause of action' - Meaning of - Phrase
'Cause of action for the purpose of Ord II r.2' - Elucidated.
[Paras 37, 39, 40, 44, 45, 47]
Case Law Cited
Ramjilal v. Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, AIR 1964 Raj 114;
National Security Assurance Company Ltd. v. S.N. Jaggi,
AIR 1971 All 421 - approved.
Thiyagavalli Panchayathai Serntha Nochikkadu Grama Vivasayigal
Pdthukappu Mattrum Makkal Pothunala Sangam, represented by
its Secretary, Nochikkadu v. The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity
Board (2008) SCC OnLine Mad 188; Vurimi Pullarao v. Vemari
Venkata Radharani [2019] 18 SCR 1125 : (2020) 14 SCC 110;
Rathnavati v. Kavita Ganashamdas [2014] 13 SCR 120 : (2015)
5 SCC 223; Inbasagaran v. S. Natarajan [2014] 10 SCR 1202 :
(2015) 11 SCC 12; Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal [1964] 7 SCR 831 :
AIR 1964 SC 1810; Sucha Singh Sodhi (Dead) through Legal
Representatives v. Baldev Raj Walia and Anr. [2018] 3 SCR 324 :
(2018) 6 SCC 733; Mohammad Khalil Khan and Others v. Mahbub
Ali Mian and Others, AIR 1949 PC 78; S. Nazeer Ahmed v. State
Bank of Mysore and Others [2007] 1 SCR 843 : (2007) 11 SCC
75; Virgo Industries (Eng.) Private Limited v. Venturetech Solutions
Private Limited [2012] 7 SCR 933 : (2013) 1 SCC 625; Saleem
Bhai and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Others [2002] Suppl.
5 SCR 491 : (2003) 1 SCC 557; Ram Prakash Gupta v. Rajiv
Kumar Gupta and Others [2007] 10 SCR 520 : (2007) 10 SCC 59;
128
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Coffee Board v. Ramesh Exports Private Limited [2014] 7 SCR
461 : (2014) 6 SCC 424; Chhotanben and Another v. Kiritbhai
Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar and Others [2018] 3 SCR 422 : (2018) 6
SCC 422 - referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited
Words and Phrases (4th Edn.); Stroud's Judicial Dictionary; Black's
Law Dictionary; Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn.) - referred to.
List of Acts
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Registration Act.
List of Keywords
Institution of second suit; Rejection of plaint; Suit to include the
whole claim; Relief of permanent injunction; Suit for specific
performance; Agreement to sell; Government Order banning
registration of sale deeds; Cause of action; Subsequent suit;
Subsequent event; New cause of action; Same cause of action;
Cancellation of sale deed; Extraneous matters; General principles
underlying Ord. II r. 2 CPC; Multiplicity of suits; Status/Stage of first
suit; Rejection of plaint u/Ord VII r.11(d) CPC; Prevent multiplicity
of suits; Plaints read as whole; Second suit not maintainable;
Entitlement of relief; Availability of relief.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 372-373 of
2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 01.09.2016 and 30.06.2016 of
the High Court of Judicature at Madras in CMP No. 12498 of 2016
and SA No. 858 of 2014 respectively
Appearances for Parties
V. Prabhakar, Sr. Adv., D. Ravichander, Sivagnanam K, Nanchil J
Deekshith, Sahil Bhalaik, Tushar Giri, Siddharth Anil Khanna, Ritik
Arora, Shivam Mishra, Gulshan Jahan, Advs. for the Appellant.
V. Chitambaresh, Sr. Adv., K. V. Mohan, K.V. Balakrishnan,
Advs. for the Respondents.
[2025] 2 S.C.R.
129
Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
J.B. Pardiwala, J.
For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided in the
following parts:-
INDEX*
A.
FACTUAL MATRIX ...............................................................
3
B.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
(ORIGINAL DEFENDANT NO. 2) ....................................... 14
C.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO. 1
(ORIGINAL PLAINTIFF) .....................................................
20
D.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION ........................................ 26
E.
ANALYSIS ............................................................................ 26
I.
General Principles underlying Order II Rule 2 CPC ...... 27
II.
Status/Stage of the first suit is immaterial for the
applicability of Order II Rule 2 CPC ............................... 41
III. The plaints have to be read as a whole to determine the
applicability of the bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC for the
purpose of rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d)
CPC ................................................................................ 44
IV. Application of the principles in Order II Rule 2 CPC to
the institution of a suit for specific performance when the
relief of permanent injunction was sought in a previous
suit .................................................................................. 47
V.
The "entitlement to" along with the "availability of" the
relief as a requisite in determining the applicability of
Order II Rule 2 .................................................................. 63
F.
CONCLUSION ..................................................................... 78
* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
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1.
Delay condoned in filing SLPs.
2.
Leave granted.
3.
These appeals arise out of the Judgment and Order passed by the
High Court of Madras dated 01.09.2016 in CMP No. 12498 of 2016
in S.A. No. 858 of 2014 and the order dated 30.06.2016 in S.A.
No. 858 of 2014 respectively filed by the respondent no. 1 herein
(original plaintiff) whereby the High Court allowed the second appeal
and restored the plaint in O.S. No. 122 of 2008.
A.
FACTUAL MATRIX
4.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited (hereinafter, the
"respondent no.1/original plaintiff") is said to have entered into
an agreement for sale with Mrs. Senthamizh Selvi (hereinafter,
the "respondent no.2/original defendant no. 1") on 24.01.2007
whereby the respondent no. 2 agreed to sell the suit property
admeasuring 1 acre situated in village Thiyagavalli, Cuddalore
to the respondent no. 1 for a total consideration of Rs. 1,50,000.
Pursuant to the agreement for sale and after receiving the entire
sale consideration, it is the case of the respondent no. 1 that they
were also put in possession of the suit property. In furtherance
of the same, the respondent no. 2 is also said to have executed
an irrevocable Power of Attorney dated 26.03.2007 to enable the
respondent no. 1 to complete the formalities as regards the execution
and registration of the sale deed pertaining to the suit property.
The Power of Attorney was registered with the Office of the Sub
Registrar, Joint I, Chennai Central, on the same day. Consequently,
on 07.09.2007, the respondent no. 1 got the agreement for sale in
respect of the suit property registered with the Joint Sub Registrar
II, Cuddalore.
5.
However, on 02.11.2007, the respondent no. 2 issued a letter inter
alia revoking the Power of Attorney issued in favour of the respondent
no. 1 to which the respondent no. 1 issued a reply on 05.11.2007.
After couple of months i.e., on 06.02.2008, the respondent no.2
again issued a letter to the respondent no. 1 in which she enclosed a
demand draft of the sum of Rs. 1,50,000. According to the respondent
no. 1, the letter inter alia mentioned that the demand draft was being
enclosed in connection with the repayment of money borrowed from
the respondent no. 1 for the purchase of a vehicle and there was
[2025] 2 S.C.R.
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Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.
no indication that the amount sought to be returned was towards
the sale consideration which was received by the respondent no. 2
pursuant to the agreement for sale dated 24.01.2007. It is the case
of the respondent no. 1 that, on 08.02.2008, they had returned
the demand draft and issued a reply to the aforementioned letter.
Additionally, it is also stated that on 09.02.2008, the respondent no. 1
furnished a notice to the respondent no. 2 asking her to perform
her part of the agreement for sale by executing the sale deed and
further not to alienate the property in favour of any other person. It
appears that the respondent no. 2 has not furnished any reply to
the said notice till date.
6.
It is the case of the respondent no. 1 that they had visited the
office of the sub-registrar on multiple occasions for the purpose
of registering the sale deed. However, the same was refused. On
14.12.2007, one more attempt was made by the respondent no. 1
to get the sale deed registered, however, the documents were not
accepted by the revenue authorities. Aggrieved by such refusal,
on 21.01.2008, the respondent no. 1 filed Writ Petition No. 1783 of
2008 before the Madras High Court. During the pendency of these
writ proceedings, it was found out that the revenue authorities
had declined to register the sale deed due to the existence of a
Government Order (hereinafter, the "GO") dated 08.08.1986 issued
by the Government of Tamil Nadu by which certain parcels of land
situated at Thiyagavalli (where the suit property is located) and
Kudikkadu villages were reserved exclusively for the purpose of
a thermal power station to be set up by the Tamil Nadu Electricity
Board (hereinafter, the "TNEB"). Furthermore, vide letter dated
23.10.2006, the TNEB had authorized the Cuddalore Powergen
Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter, the "appellant/original defendant
no.2") to develop a power station and for that purpose an extent
of 350 hectares of land is said to have been earmarked. As a
consequence, the general ban against registering the suit property
did not operate against the appellant herein. It is pertinent to mention
that a petition in public interest being Writ Petition No. 11453 of
2007 was filed by an organization representing the agriculturists
namely the Thiyagavalli Panchayathai Serntha Nochikkadu Grama
Vivasayigal Pdthukappu Mattrum Makkal Pothunala Sangam, on
20.03.2007, before the Madras High Court challenging the decision
of the revenue authorities not to register the sale deeds.
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7.
On and from the 2nd week of February 2008, as alleged, the appellant
along with the respondent no. 2 started to interfere with the peaceful
possession and enjoyment of the suit property of the respondent no. 1.
8.
Since the threat of dispossession was imminent and in order to
prevent further attempts of trespassing into the suit property, on
16.02.2008, the respondent no. 1 filed original suit O.S. No. 28 of
2008 (hereinafter, the "first suit") before the Principal District Judge,
Cuddalore for permanent injunction to restrain the appellant and the
respondent no.2 from interfering with the peaceful possession and
enjoyment of the suit property by the respondent no. 1. The same
is still pending before the concerned court.
9.
However, the appellant in its written statement put forward altogether
a different case in the aforementioned first suit. It is the case of the
appellant that it had entered into a bona fide agreement for sale dated
20.02.2007 with the respondent no. 2 in order to purchase the suit
property and a sale deed in that regard was registered on 24.01.2008.
It is their case that, at the time of both the sale agreement and the
sale deed, it was the respondent no.2 alone who was in possession of
the suit property and consequently, the possession was transferred to
the appellant on 24.01.2008. Therefore, the appellant contended that
the respondent no. 1 cannot seek an injunction against the appellant
who was the actual owner in possession of the suit property as on
the date of institution of the first suit.
10. Subsequently, on 05.03.2008, a Division Bench of the Madras High
Court heard the public interest litigation in Thiyagavalli Panchayathai
Serntha Nochikkadu Grama Vivasayigal Pdthukappu Mattrum
Makkal Pothunala Sangam, represented by its Secretary,
Nochikkadu v. The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board
reported in (2008) SCC OnLine Mad 188 (Writ Petition No. 11453 of
2007) and quashed the G.O. dated 08.08.1986 along with the letter
dated 23.10.2006 by which lands including the suit property were
reserved exclusively for the appellant. In the same breath, the High
Court also directed the revenue authorities to receive and register all
the documents pertaining to the Thiyagavalli and Kudikkadu villages
presented to them, if such documents fulfilled all the stipulations
contained in the Registration Act or any other enactment governing
such registration. The relevant excerpts of this judgement are as
follows:
[2025] 2 S.C.R.
133
Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.
"11. Taking note of the categorical stand of the third
respondent in the impugned proceedings, we are at a loss
to understand as to how and under what provision of law
such a prohibition came to be imposed by the respondents
restraining any individual land owners in the above two
villages from transferring their lands either by way of sale
or by any other mode to any third party other than "M/s.
Cuddalore Power Company Limited" and refuse to register
such documents.
12. Under Article 300-A of the Constitution, a right of a
citizen to own a property and retain the same has been
well protected and such right cannot be deprived of except
by authority of law.
xxx xxx xxx
15. In this context, it is worthwhile to refer to the decision
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (1982) 1 SCC
39 (Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan and others v. State
of Uttar Pradesh and others), wherein, paragraphs 27
and 41 are relevant for our present purpose which read
as under:
"27. The quintessence of our Constitution is the rule of
law. The State or its executive officers cannot interfere
with the rights of others unless they can point to some
specific rule of law which authorizes their acts. In State
of M.P. v. Thakur Bharat Singh, the Court repelled the
contention that by virtue of Article 162, the State or its
officers may, in the exercise of executive authority, without
any legislation in support thereof, infringe the rights of
citizens merely because the legislature of the State has
power to legislate in regard to the subject on which the
executive order is issued. It was observed:
Every act done by the Government or by its officers
must, if it is to operate to the prejudice of any person, be
supported by some legislative authority.
The same principle was reiterated by the Court in Satwant
Singh Sawhney v. Dr. Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport
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Officer Government of India, New Delhi and Smt. Indira
Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain.
41. There still remains the question whether the seizure
of wheat amounts to deprivation of property without the
authority of law. Article 300-A provides that no person shall
be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The
State Government cannot while taking recourse to the
executive power of the State under Article 162, deprive a
person of his property. Such power can be exercised only
by authority of law and not by a mere executive fiat or order.
Article 162, as is clear from the opening words, is subject
to other provisions of the Constitution. It is, therefore,
necessarily subject to Article 300-A. The word "law" in the
context of Article 300-A must mean an Act of Parliament or
of a State Legislature, a rule, or a statutory order, having
the force of law, that is positive or State-made law. The
decisions in Wazir Chand v. State of H.P. and Bishan
Das v. State of Punjab are an authority for the proposition
that an illegal seizure amounts to deprivation of property
without the authority of law."
16. The above proposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court was subsequently followed in the reported
decisions in 2003 (1) SCC 591 (Hindustan Times and
others v. State of U.P. and another) and (2006) 2 SCC
545 (State of Bihar and others v. Project Uchcha Vidya,
Sikshak Sangh and others).
17. Applying the above said principle to the fact of this
case, we have no hesitation to hold that the impugned
proceedings of the respondents are liable to be set
aside as non-est in law. Accordingly, setting aside the
proceedings, the prayer of the petitioner stands allowed
and the respondents are directed to receive and register all
the documents present by them for registration pertaining
to the villages namely, Thiyagavalli and Kudikkadu, if
such documents satisfy the stipulations contained in the
Registration Act or any other enactment governing such
registration."
(emphasis supplied)
[2025] 2 S.C.R.
135
Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.
11. Immediately thereafter, the respondent no. 1 contended that they
had addressed a letter dated 06.03.2008 to the Tahsildar, Cuddalore,
calling upon the authorities not to alter the revenue records in respect
of the suit property in anybody's name. As a consequence of the
decision rendered in the public interest litigation, vide order dated
25.03.2008, the Writ Petition No. 1783 of 2008 which was filed by
the respondent no. 1 was also disposed of by a learned Single Judge
of the Madras High Court on similar terms.
12. It is the case of the respondent no. 1 that they acquired knowledge
of the sale deed dated 24.01.2008 pertaining to the suit property
executed by the respondent no. 2 in favour of the appellant, only
after the institution of the first suit. Therefore, the respondent no. 1
filed another Original Suit being O.S. No. 122 of 2008 (hereinafter,
the "second suit") in the Court of the First Additional Subordinate
Judge, Cuddalore inter alia praying that (a) the respondent no. 2
be directed to specifically perform the terms and conditions of the
agreement for sale dated 24.01.2007 which was registered on
07.09.2007 by executing and registering the sale deed in favour of
the respondent no. 1; (b) the sale deed dated 24.01.2008 executed
by the respondent no. 2 in favour of the appellant be declared as null
and void; and (c) permanent injunction restraining the respondent no.
2 and the appellant from interfering with the peaceful possession and
enjoyment of the suit property by the respondent no. 1 be granted.
13. Contending that the second suit is hit by the bar under Order II Rule
2 CPC, the appellant moved an I.A. No. 17 of 2009 in the second
suit under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC, for the
rejection of plaint. On 30.04.2009, the Court of the First Additional
Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore, allowed the I.A and consequentially,
passed a decree rejecting the plaint in the second suit i.e., O.S. No
122 of 2008. The relevant observation is as follows:
"... in the instant case on our hand we have elaborately
discussed the entire plaint in both the suits with regard
to the subject matter of the cause of actions and we
have also recorded the reasons that the causes of action
for the present suit were very well available during the
filing of the earlier suit and moreover these aspects are
actually admitted by the respondent that the respondent
had knowledge about the impugned sale deed even in the
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2nd week of February 2008; Thus, in the light of the above
discussion the point is answered that the suit is clear bar
as it required under order 2 rule 2 r/w order VII rule 11(d)
C.P.C. and in result this petition is allowed with cost."
(emphasis supplied)
14. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid, the respondent no. 1 filed Appeal
Suit No. 10 of 2009 in the Court of the Principal District Judge,
Cuddalore against the order passed in I.A. No. 17 of 2009 in the
second suit. However, on 05.10.2009, the same was dismissed as
not pressed since the respondent no. 1 conceded to the objection
that a regular appeal against an order passed in an I.A. was not
maintainable and the proper course of action to challenge an order
in allowing an application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC would
be to file a regular first appeal against the decree which is passed
in the original suit. The Court, therefore, observed as thus:
"This appeal coming on the day for final hearing before me
in the presence of Thiru P.I.X. Vedamnayagam, Advocate
for the appellant and Thiru. M. Balathandayutham Advocate
for the respondent, the appellant's counsel made an
endorsement appeal may be dismissed as not pressed,
in view of filing of fresh appeal on the same judgment
and decree, this court doth order and decree as follows:
1.
that the appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed
as not pressed.
2.
that there be no order as in costs."
(emphasis supplied)
15. Thereafter, the respondent no. 1 filed a fresh Appeal Suit No. 1 of
2010 in the Court of the Principal District Judge, Cuddalore against
the judgment and decree dated 30.04.2009 by which the plaint in
the second suit was rejected and prayed that the same be set aside.
The First Appellate Court found no reason to interfere with the order
of the Trial Court. Therefore, the First Appeal was dismissed and
the Trial Court's order was confirmed.
16. As against the concurrent findings of both the Courts, the respondent
no. 1 filed a Second Appeal in S.A No. 858 of 2014 under Section
[2025] 2 S.C.R.
137
Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.
100 CPC before the High Court. On 30.06.2016, the High Court
allowed the second appeal ex-parte and restored the plaint in the
second suit. The High Court was of the view that the second suit
was not hit by the bar under Order II Rule 2 and that the plaint could
not have been rejected. The relevant observations made by the High
Court are as follows:
"19. In this case, I do not find any deliberate omission on
the part of the plaintiff to make a claim in the earlier suit.
Further, in a case of this nature wherein the possession of
the suit property is said to have been handed over to the
agreement holder, it is not an unusual situation of sudden
interference by the land owner warranting the agreement
holder to file a suit for bare injunction. Therefore, if any
such situation arises, the agreement holder cannot be
precluded from claiming or seeking an immediate and
emergent relief first in order to prevent further damage
or abuse. Therefore, filing of such suit for bare injunction
also by reserving the right to file a comprehensive suit
later cannot be construed or considered as the one arising
out of same cause of action in order to bring it under the
hammer of Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C.
20. Considering the above stated facts and circumstances
and considering the case laws discussed as above, I am
of the firm view that the rejection of the plaint by the trial
Court which was confirmed by the appellate Court is totally
erroneous and against law.
21. Accordingly, the substantial question of law raised
in the appeal is answered in favour of the appellant. It
is made clear that this Court is not expressing any view
on the merits as claimed by the appellant as it is for the
appellant to establish the same before the trial Court in
both the suits.
22. Consequently, the Second Appeal is allowed and the
plaint in O.S.No.122 of 2008 is restored. The trial Court
is directed to take up the suit in O.S.No.122 of 2008 and
try along with O.S.No.90 of 2010 and decide the matter
on merits and in accordance with law within a period of
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six months. Connected miscellaneous petition is closed.
No costs."
(emphasis supplied)
17. The appellant thereafter preferred a Civil Misc. Petition in CMP No.
12498 of 2016 before the High Court against the ex-parte judgement
and order dated 30.06.2016. It is the case of the appellant that the
vakalat nama of their counsel was duly filed with the registry of the High
Court on 02.09.2015, however, the same was returned on 07.09.2015
since the vakalat nama did not contain the enrolment number of the
counsel in compliance with the new procedure implemented by the
registry. It was contended that the counsel of the appellant never
knew about the return of the vakalat nama and that his actions were
neither willful nor wanton but a bona fide mistake. Furthermore, when
the matter was listed for hearing, the name of the counsel with the
endorsement "Vakalat returned" was also not mentioned in the cause
list as per usual practice. It was submitted that this was the sole
reason why the matter was taken up for hearing in the absence of
the counsel for the appellant. Therefore, the appellant prayed that
the second appeal be re-heard as otherwise they would be subject
to serious prejudice. After hearing the counsel for the appellant,
the High Court rejected the miscellaneous petition on 01.09.2016
observing that the objections raised by the counsel for the appellant
had no merit. Hence, the High Court concluded that setting aside
the earlier judgment and order dated 30.06.2016 and reopening the
matter would not serve any useful purpose.
18. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant has filed the
present appeals before this Court.
B.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT (ORIGINAL
DEFENDANT NO. 2)
19. Mr. V. Prabhakar, the learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellant submitted that in order to test whether the second suit
would be hit by Order II Rule 2, the averments of the plaint in the first
suit would have to be taken note of with a view to ascertain whether
the respondent no. 1 had any cause of action for seeking the relief
claimed in the second suit, while filing the first suit itself. The counsel
highlighted the following averments made by the respondent no. 1
in the plaint of the first suit:
[2025] 2 S.C.R.
139
Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.
 "6. Quite unfortunately, the First Defendant for reasons
best known to her, issued a letter on 2nd November 2007
(received by the Plaintiff on 5th November 2007) inter alia
revoking the Power of Attorney issued in favour of the
Plaintiff...
7. While these are the circumstances, the Defendant with
an ulterior design and ill motive issued a letter to the
Plaintiff on 06.02.2008 setting forth frivolous and vexatious
contentions enclosing a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- by way of
demand draft. A copy of the said letter along with a copy
of the demand draft is submitted herewith as document
No. 6..."
According to the learned counsel, these aforesaid averments as
regards the revocation of the Power of Attorney and the alleged
return of the entire sale consideration clearly and explicitly indicate
the refusal on the part of the respondent no. 2 to have the sale deed
executed and registered in favour of the respondent no. 1. Despite
being conscious of the explicit refusal of the respondent no. 2 to
perform the contract, the respondent no. 1 had chosen to sue only
for permanent injunction in the first suit without seeking the relief
of specific performance. This omission amounts to a deliberate
relinquishment and therefore, attracts Order II Rule 2(2) CPC.
20. The counsel also drew the Court's attention to the averments made
as regards the cause of action in the plaint of the second suit:-
"The cause of the action for the suit arose on and from
24th Jan 2008 (sic - 2007) when the first defendant
entered into the Agreement for sale with the plaintiff on
25th March, 2007 when the first defendant executed the
irrevocable power of Attorney in favour of the plaintiff and
when the payments were made under the Agreement for
sale. On 7th September, 2007 when the agreement for
sale was registered, on 24th January 2008 when the sale
deed was executed by the first defendant in favour of the
second defendant, on and from the 2nd week of the Feb,
2008 when the plaintiff came to know of the impugned
sale deeds, on and from 24th Jan, 2008 when the first
defendant registered the sale deed in respect of the suit
property in favour of the second defendant which amounts
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to deemed refusal on her part to perform her part of
the Agreement for sale and on all dates when the first
defendant has failed to perform her part of the contract
and at Thyagavalli village, Cuddalore District within the
jurisdiction of this Honourable court."
(emphasis supplied)
The counsel submitted that the above referred paragraph would
indicate that the respondent no. 1 had a cause of action to seek
the relief of specific performance in the first suit in view of specific
knowledge of the execution of sale deed in favour of the appellant.
21. Furthermore, it was submitted that Order II Rule 2(3) permits the
institution of a second suit in respect of a relief which had been
omitted to be sought only if the leave of the court is obtained therefor.
Although the respondent no. 1 averred that "The Plaintiff reserved
its right to file a separate suit for specific performance against the
Defendant" in the plaint of the first suit, yet admittedly no such leave
was granted by the Court before which the first suit was instituted.
22. As regards the relief for declaration that the sale deed dated
24.01.2008 executed by the respondent no. 2 in favour of the
appellant is null and void, which was sought for in the second suit,
the counsel submitted that the respondent no. 1 was already aware
of the factum of sale and this was sufficiently indicated in the plaint
of the first suit through the following averment:
"9. The 2nd Defendant claims to have purchased the
property from the first defendant while the first defendant
has no right, title or interest in respect of the suit property ..."
According to the counsel, the aforesaid averment contained in the
first suit has been clarified by the respondent no. 1 in the second
suit as follows:
"VIII.