# CUMBUM ROADWAYS (P) LTD v. SOMU TRANSPORT (P) LTD. AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1966] 3 S.C.R. 7
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1965-12-10
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/cumbum-roadways-p-ltd-v-somu-transport-p-ltd-and-others-3747
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

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[P.
CUMBUM ROADWAYS (P) LTD.
v.
SOMU TRANSPORT (P) LTD. AND OTHERS
December 10, 1965
B .
M.
GAJENDRAGADKAR,
C.J., K. N.
WANCHOO,
HIDAYATULLAH,
V.
RAMASWAMI
AND
P.
SATYANARAYANA RAJU, JJ.]
Motor Vehicles Act (4 of 1939),-Appellate Tribunal disposing of
seven a,pea/s against order of State Transport Authority by consolidated
ap,.l/ate order-Only one party challenging order of Tribunal
before
High Court-High Court whether can ask Tribunal to rehear appea/3 of
/lartiea which did not go to the High Court.
The Regional Transport Authority South Arco! granted a stage carriage permit on the route Kumbakonam to Neiveli to the first respondent
out of a large number of applicants. This led to seven appeals against
1hc grant of the permit before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal.
They were heard together and the Tribunal set aside the order of the
Tranaport Authority granting the permit to the first respondent and instead granted the permit to the appellant. Thereupon the first respondent
filed a writ petition in the High Court at Madras challenging the order
of the Appellate Tribunal. A single Judge of the High Court relying on
this Court's decision in B. Rajagopala Naidu ''· State Transport Appel/au
Tribunal and Ors. allowed the writ petitions. In B. Rajagopala Naidu's
case this Court had held that Government Orde< No. 1298 issued by the
Government of Madras under s. 43A as
introduced by the Madras
Amending Act No. 20 of 1948 in Motor Vehicles Act No. 4 of 1939,
could not be issued under that section inasmuch as it purported to give
directions in respect of matters which had been entrusted to Tribunals
constituted under the Act and which had to be dealt with by them in a
quasi-judicial manner. Against the
order of the single Judge letters
patent appeal was filed by the present appellant.
The Division Bench
dismissed the appeal, but remanded the case to the Appellate Tribunal
for reconsidering the matte< in the light of the decision in B. Raiagopala
Naidu's case. In the peculiar circumstances of the case the High Court
further directed that all the seven appeals which had been disposed of
by the Appellate Tribunal by a single order should be reconsidered as
the taint affected the entire appellate order which was one.
The appellant
came to this Court by special leave.
The material questions that came up for consideration were whether
the High Court was right in remanding the case to the Appellate Tribunal
and
not to the Transport Authority, and whether the High Court was ·
right in asking the Appellate Tribunal to revive and re-hear all the appeals
eTell of those parties which had not gone to the High Court .
HELD : (i) The Appeal Court rightly pointed out that there might
be serious public inconvenience specially in the matter of new routes if
the order of the Transport Authority is also set aside with the result that
such new routes would be without any transport facility. It is therefore
always a question to be decided in each case whether the remand should
be to the Appellant Tribunal or the Transport Authority. In most case-•
it would be proper if the remand is made to the Appellate Tribunal.
[11 F, OJ
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1966] 3 S.C.R.
(ii) Even though all the appeals with respect to one route may have
been disposed of by a single appellate order m form, in reality the appellate order consists of as many orders as there are appeals disposed of
thereby.
In the present case if none of the parties concerned in
the
seven appeals had come to the High Court in writ proceedings within
reasonable time, the order of the Appellate Tribunal would have become
final, even though it might have been
influenced by the Government
Order in question.
The High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with
the orders of the Appellate Tribunal either in favour or against
the
parties which had not come to it.
The remand was therefore to be confined only to those parties which came to the High Court. (12 C-OJ
Civ

## Text

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[P.
CUMBUM ROADWAYS (P) LTD.
v.
SOMU TRANSPORT (P) LTD. AND OTHERS
December 10, 1965
B .
M.
GAJENDRAGADKAR,
C.J., K. N.
WANCHOO,
HIDAYATULLAH,
V.
RAMASWAMI
AND
P.
SATYANARAYANA RAJU, JJ.]
Motor Vehicles Act (4 of 1939),-Appellate Tribunal disposing of
seven a,pea/s against order of State Transport Authority by consolidated
ap,.l/ate order-Only one party challenging order of Tribunal
before
High Court-High Court whether can ask Tribunal to rehear appea/3 of
/lartiea which did not go to the High Court.
The Regional Transport Authority South Arco! granted a stage carriage permit on the route Kumbakonam to Neiveli to the first respondent
out of a large number of applicants. This led to seven appeals against
1hc grant of the permit before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal.
They were heard together and the Tribunal set aside the order of the
Tranaport Authority granting the permit to the first respondent and instead granted the permit to the appellant. Thereupon the first respondent
filed a writ petition in the High Court at Madras challenging the order
of the Appellate Tribunal. A single Judge of the High Court relying on
this Court's decision in B. Rajagopala Naidu ''· State Transport Appel/au
Tribunal and Ors. allowed the writ petitions. In B. Rajagopala Naidu's
case this Court had held that Government Orde< No. 1298 issued by the
Government of Madras under s. 43A as
introduced by the Madras
Amending Act No. 20 of 1948 in Motor Vehicles Act No. 4 of 1939,
could not be issued under that section inasmuch as it purported to give
directions in respect of matters which had been entrusted to Tribunals
constituted under the Act and which had to be dealt with by them in a
quasi-judicial manner. Against the
order of the single Judge letters
patent appeal was filed by the present appellant.
The Division Bench
dismissed the appeal, but remanded the case to the Appellate Tribunal
for reconsidering the matte< in the light of the decision in B. Raiagopala
Naidu's case. In the peculiar circumstances of the case the High Court
further directed that all the seven appeals which had been disposed of
by the Appellate Tribunal by a single order should be reconsidered as
the taint affected the entire appellate order which was one.
The appellant
came to this Court by special leave.
The material questions that came up for consideration were whether
the High Court was right in remanding the case to the Appellate Tribunal
and
not to the Transport Authority, and whether the High Court was ·
right in asking the Appellate Tribunal to revive and re-hear all the appeals
eTell of those parties which had not gone to the High Court .
HELD : (i) The Appeal Court rightly pointed out that there might
be serious public inconvenience specially in the matter of new routes if
the order of the Transport Authority is also set aside with the result that
such new routes would be without any transport facility. It is therefore
always a question to be decided in each case whether the remand should
be to the Appellant Tribunal or the Transport Authority. In most case-•
it would be proper if the remand is made to the Appellate Tribunal.
[11 F, OJ
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1966] 3 S.C.R.
(ii) Even though all the appeals with respect to one route may have
been disposed of by a single appellate order m form, in reality the appellate order consists of as many orders as there are appeals disposed of
thereby.
In the present case if none of the parties concerned in
the
seven appeals had come to the High Court in writ proceedings within
reasonable time, the order of the Appellate Tribunal would have become
final, even though it might have been
influenced by the Government
Order in question.
The High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with
the orders of the Appellate Tribunal either in favour or against
the
parties which had not come to it.
The remand was therefore to be confined only to those parties which came to the High Court. (12 C-OJ
Civ1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 907 of
1964 and 150 and 363 of 1965.
A
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Appeals by special leave from the judgment and orders dated c
May I, 1964, October 5, 1964 and April 22, 1964, of the Madras
High Court in Writ Appeals Nos. 215 of 1962, 74 of 1964 and
151 of 1963 respectively.
M. N. Rangachari, M. K. Ramamurthy, R. K. Garg, D. P.
1
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Singh, and S. C. Aganval, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 907 of
1964).
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G. Ramaswamy, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 150 of 1965).
M. C. Setalvad, and G. Rama.nvamy, for the appellant (in
C.A. No. 363 of 1_965).
K. K. Ven11gopal, S. Thiruma/ai and R. Gopalakrishnan, for
E
respondent No. I (in all the appeals).
M. K. Ramamurthy, for intervener No. 1.
N. G. Krishna Iyengar and R. Gopalakrishnan. for intervener
!'lo. 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Wanchoo, J. These appeals by special leave raise common
questions and will be dealt with together.
We shall set out the
facts in C.A. 363 to understand the questions raised
in these
appeals.
The Regional Transport Authority South Arcot granted
a stage carriage permit on the route Kumbakonam to Neiveli to
the first respondent out of a large number of applicants.
This
led to seven appeals against the grant of the permit before the
State Transport Appellate Tribunal.
Those seven appeals were
heard together by the Appellate Tribunal and it set aside the order
of the Transport Authority granting the permit to the first respondent and instead granted the permit to the appellant.
This was
on August 7, 1962. Thereupon the first respondent filed a writ
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CUMBUM ROADWAYS v. SOMU TRANSP. (Wanchoo, J.)
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A petition in the High Court at Madras challenging the order of the
Appellate Tribunal.
This writ petition came up for hearing on
March 5, 1964 before a learned Single Judge.
On the same date,
this Court decided in B. Rajagopala Naidu v. State Transport
Appellate Tribunal and others(') that Government Order
B
c
No. 1298 issued by the Government of Madras under s. 43-A as
introduced by the Madras Amending Act No. XX of 1948 in the
Motor Vehicles Act, No. IV of 1939, could not be issued under
that section inasmuch as it purported to give directions in respect
of matters which had been entrusted to tribunals constituted under
the Act and which had to be dealt with by them in quasi-judicial
manner.
In consequence this Court set aside the order of the ·
Appellate Tribunal in that case as it was based on the provisions
of the impugned Government Order. The decision of this Court,
it seems, was brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge,
and following that decision, he allowed the writ petition on March
10, 1964 and quashed the order of the Appellate Tribunal leaving
0
it free to dispose of the appeal afresh if it could do so or remit
the matter in its turn to the Transport Authority for fresh disposal.
This led to a Letters Patent Appeal by the present appellant which was disposed of by a Division Bench of the High Court
on April 22, 1964. The Principal argument before the Appeal
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Court was that every order of the transport authority or the anpellate tribunal need not be quashed in view of the decision of this
Court in Rajagopala Naidu's case('), but only those orders should
be quashed which had proceeded on the basis of the Government
Order referred to above.
It was further contended that the present order of the Appellate Tribunal had not proceeded on the
basis of the Government Order referred to above and therefo•e
F need not be quashed.
The Appeal Court did not accept the contention that the order of the Appellate Tribunal in the present
case was not vitiated by being based on the Government Order
in question. It consequently dismissed the appeal. It then considered the question as to what order should be passed in the
circumstances. and whether the matter should be remanded to the
G Transport Authority or to the Appellate Tribunal for disposal.
It took the view that if in every case the remand was made to
the Transport Authority it would lead to serious public inconvenience, for the consequence of the quashing of ordef5 of the
Transport Authority would be that stage carriages
on
many
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routes would stop plying.
The Appeal Court therefore thou<?ht
that unless there were exceptional reasons it would be sufficient
if the order of the Appellate Tribunal alone was quashed and
(I) [1964] 7 S.C.R. I.
L9ll~p.Cl/66-2
10
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1966) 3 S.C.R.
the matter remitted to it for consideration untrammelled by the
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Government Order in question.
Finally the Appeal Court considered the question as to which parties should be heard again
by the Appellate Tribunal on remand.
It was contended before
the Appeal Court that only the parties which came to the High
Court by way of writ proceedings should be heard by the Appellate Tribunal and not others who might have preferred appeals to
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the Appellate Tribunal but had not proceeded further by way of
writ proceedings to the High Court. The Appeal Court was unable to accept this contention and was of the view that in the
. peculiar situation that had arisen all the appeals that had been
disposed of by a single appellate order should be reconsidered
by the Appellate Tribunal as the taint affected the entire appellate
C
order which must be considered as one. The Appeal Court therefore ordered that the Appellate Tribunal should consider all the
seven appeals that had been filed before it, even though only one
of the appellants before the Appellate Tribunal had come to the
High Court by way of writ proceedings.
The Appeal Court havD
ing refused to grant leave, the appellant got special leave from
this Court; and that is how the matter has come up before us.
Three points have been urged
before us on behalf of the
appellant, namely-
(i) The Appeal Court was not right in coming to the
conclusion that the order of the Appellate Tribunal had been influenced by the Government
Order in question;
(ii) The respondent could not be heard to say that
the Government Order in question was bad as it
had relied on the said Government Order before
the Transport Authority; and
(iii) The Appeal Court was not right in holding that
all the appeals which had been disposed of by
one order by the Appellate Tribunal should be
revived and re-heard when only one of the appellants had come to the High Court by way of
writ proceedings, and that when the Appeal
Court sent the matter back to the Appellate
Tribunal it should have directed the Appellate
Tribunal to consider the respective cases of only
two parties before the High Court, i.e. the present appellant and the present respondent.
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CUMBUM ROADWAYS v. SOMU TRANSP. (Wanchoo, J.)
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We are of opinion that there is no force in the first two contentions raised on behalf of the appellant.
We agree with the
Appeal Court that the Appellate Tribunal was plainly influenced
by the Government Order when it dealt with the appeals before
it and this cannot be said to be a case where the decision of
the Appellate Tribunal was not influenced by the Government
B Order in question.
A perusal of ~he order of the Appellate
Tribunal shows that it considered the various aspects which were
mentioned in the Government Order in question.
It had even
referred in some of the appeals to the marks obtained by various
operators. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the
Appellate Tribunal was not influenced by the Government Order
C in question.
We also see no force in the contention that as the
respondent had relied on the Government Order it was not open
to it to urge in the High Court that the Government Order was
bad.
Before the decision· of this Court, referred to above, the -
Government Order had always been relied upon by applicants for
D permits.
That is no reason for holding that the respondent was
barred raising the question that the Government Order was bad
after the decision of this CouJ.'.(.
This brings us to the last question, namely, whether the Appeal
Court was right in remitting the matter to the Appellate Tribunal
and in ordering that all the appeals before it should be re-heard.
E It is true that in Raiagopala Naidu's case(1), this Court had
ordered that the matter be remanded to the Transport Authority
and not to the Appellate Tribunal. That however does not mean
that in every case where there has to be a remand it must be to
the original authority which has the power to grant the permit.
As the Appeal Court has pointed out there may be serious public
1
inconvenience specially in tl!e matter of new routes if the order
of the Transport Authority is also set aside with the result that
such new routes would be without any transport facility. It is
therefore always a question to be decided in each case whether
the remand should be to the Appellate TribunaJ or the Transport
G Authority.
We agree with the Appeal Court that in most cases
it would be proper if the remand is made to the Appellate Tribunal to consider the appeals before it without being influenced by
the Government Order in question .
The appellant then contends that even so the Appellate Tribunal should have been asked to consider the cases of the appelH !ant and the respondent only on remand and the Appeal Court
was not right in ordering the Appellate Tribunal to consider all
(I} [1964] 7 S.C.R. I.
12
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
( 1966] 3 S.CR.
the appeals afresh.
It is true that generally the Appellate TriA
bunal deals with all appeals relating to one route by one order.
It is also true that before the decision of this Court the Appella·c
Tribunals were generally influenced by the Government Order in
q11estion.
There is therefore some force in the observation of the
Appeal Court that where the disposal of appeals has been found
to have departed from known principles of judicial procedure all
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the appeals disposed of by one order should be revived.
But
there is one serious difficulty in accepting this view of the Appeal
Court.
Even though all the appeals with respect to one route
may have been disposed of by a single appellate order in form,
in reality the appellate order oonsists of as many orders as there c
are appeals disposed of thereby.
In this very case there were
seven appeals before the Appellate Tribunal and the order says
that the appeal of the appellant alone was allowed while the other
appeals were dismissed.
Now if none of the parties concerned in
!he seven appeals had come to the High Court in writ proceedings
within a reasonable time, the order of the Appellate Tribunal
D
would have become final, even though it might have been influenced by the Government Order in question.
Therefore there
seems to be no reason why when only one party brought the matter
before the High Court by way of writ proceedings against another
party, and the appellants in the other six appeals were content
with the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal, the High Court
F.
should interfere
in favour of those persons also who had not
thought fit to challenge the order of the Appellate Tribunal.
On
principle therefore it does not appear right that the High Court
should set aside orders in appeal passed by the Appellate Tribunal
when the parties to those appeals do not bring up the ma.tier
before the High Court, simply because as a matter of convenience
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the Appellate Tribunal deals with all the appeals relating to one
route by a consolidated order.
Therefore, we are of opinion that
lite remand should only be confined to those parties which came
to the High Court and not extend to others, as the . High Court
would have no jurisdiction to interfere with the orders of the
Appellate Tribunal either in favour of or against the parties which
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have not come to it.
In the circumstances the order of the
Appeal Court will have to be modified and the remand confined
m a reconsideration of the appeal of the present appellant alone
as against the claims of the respondent, and the Appellate Tribunal should decide between these two only who should be granted
the permit for the routes in question.
H
Turning now to appeal No. 907, we find that the permit was
granted by the Transport Authority to respondent No. l out of
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CUMBUM ROADWAYS v. SOMU TRANSP •. (Wanchoo, J.)
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A 32 applicants.
Ten of the applicants appealed before the Appellate Tribunal. Of these, the appeal of the present appellant was
allowed and the order of the Transport Authority granting the
pern1it to the respondent was set aside and the permit was granted
to the appellant instead.
The respondent filed a writ petition
before the High Court against the order of the Appellate Tribunal.
B The learned Single Judge quashed the order of the Appellate
Tribunal and remanded the ma~ter for disposal of the appeal in
question afresh.
This order of the learned Single Judge was taken
in appeal by the present appellant and the appeal was heard by
a Full Bench. It appears that a new ground was urged before
the Appellate Tribunal with respect .to the respondent being a
C
benamidar of Aruppukottai Sri Jaya Vilas (P) Liniited, and that
was taken into consideration by the Appellate Tribunal.
The
Appeal Court set aside the view of the learned Single Judge with
respect to this.
But it remitted the matter to the Appellate Tribunal for fresh disposal in view of the decision of this Court in
D Rajagopala Naidu's case('). It is not clear whether the Appeal
Court intended by its order that all the appeals before the Appellate Tribunal should be revived and re-heard; but this is how
apparently the order has been interpreted.
In view of our decision in C.A. 363 we order that when the matter is re-heard by
the Appellate Tribunal, it shall confine itself to the case of the
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appellant and respondent No. 1 before us and not consider the
cases of other appellants before it who had not gone to the High
Court against the Appellate Tribunal's order.
We however express no opinion on the new ground which was raised before the
Appella!e Tribunal as to the question of benami and that matter
may have to be considered after the fresh decision of the Appellate
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Tribunal.
We now come to appeal No. 150.
It appears that there were
two writ petitions before the High Court. They gave rise to two
appeals.
The appeal before us is only from one of the appeals,
in which the present appellant was the appellant and the present
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respondent No. 1 was respondent No. 1.
The appeals failed
before the Appeal Court in view of the decision of this Court in
Rajagupala Naidu's case(').
The only point raised before us is
whether the order of the High Court reviving other appeals before
the Appellate Tribunal besides the two between the parties which
went to the High Court is correct.
In view of our decision in
H appeal No. 363 the reconsideration before the Appellate Tribunal
(1) [1964] 7 S.C.R. 1.
14
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
(1966] 3 S.C.R.
will only be confined to the parties which went to the High Court
A
in writ proceedings and the respondents therein.
Wo therefore partially allow all the appeals and vary the order
of the Appeal Court in the manner indicated above. In the circumstances we pass no order as to costs in all the appeals.
Appeals allowed in part.
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