# / D. H. MANIAR & ORS v. WAMAN LAXMAN KUDA V

- **Citation:** [1977] 1 S.C.R. 403
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1976-08-24
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 212 of 1976
- **Bench:** P. N. Bhagwati, N. L. Untwalia, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/d-h-maniar-ors-v-waman-laxman-kuda-v-6928
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Bombay Rents Hotel and J.,odgin~ House Rates Control Act 1947-Sec .. 15A--
Sec. 5(4A)-lndian Easements Act 1882-Sec. 52-62(c)-Revocation of licence
bv efflux of time-Ptesidency Small Causes Courts Act 1882-Scc. 47-Ef]ect
oj filing of application for eviction-Meaning of licence under a subsisting agreement-Interpretation of Statutes-Practice.
A
B
The appellants granted a licence in respect of certain shop pre.mises i~ Bombay to the respondent under a Leave and Licence Agreement which expired on
31st March 1966.
Thereafter the appellants served a notice upon the responC
dent calling upon him to remove himself from the premises .. The respondent
refused to do so.
In July 1967 the a•ppellants filed on application for eviction
under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Court Act. The contention
of the respondent that he was a tenant was negatived by the Small Causes Court,
Bombay. The respondent approached the High Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution. The High Court refused to interfere with the finding of the Small
Causes Court that the respondent was a licensee and not a tena·nt.
The Bombay Rent Act was amended by Maharashtra Act 17 of 1973.
By
D.
the amending Act, section 5(4A) and Section 15A were introduced in the
parent Act to confer on the licensee, who had a subsisting agreement on rebruary 1, 1973, the status and protection of a tenant under the Bombay Rent
'Act.
.
The respondent by an amendment took the plea of protection under the
Maharashtra Amendment Act 17 of 1973 on the ground that he was in occupa·
ti'on of the premises on 1st February 1973 under a subsisting agreement for
E
licence.
The Small Causes Court, Bombay, negatived the plea on the ground
that there was no subsisting &greement for licence on the 1st of Febniary, 1973
as there was ·nothing on record to show that after 31st March 1966 the leave and
licence agreement between the parties was rene\.ved or any fresh agreen1ent was
entered into.
The respondent llled a revision petition under section 115 of C.P.C. in the
High Court. The High Court allowed the revision on the ground that the
licence was not put an end to by the appellants and that in any event by filing
the application for eviction the appellant licensor had granted an implied licence
to the respondent licensee to continue in possession till a decree of eviction was
passed in his favour.
Allowing the appeal,
F
HELD : (a) In order to get the advantage of section 1 SA of the Bombay
Rent Act, the occupant must be in occupation of the' premises as a licensee as
defined in section 5(4A) on the !st of February 1973. If he be such a licensee,
the non-obstante clause of section 15A(l) gives him the status and protection
G
of a tenant in spite of there being anything to the contrary in any ot)l.er law or in
any contract. But if he is not a licensee under a subsisting agreement on the 1st
of February 1973, · then he does not get !he advanta·ge of the amended provision
of the Bombay Rent Act. [407 H, 408 A]
(b) A person continuing in possession of the premises after termination withdrawal or revocation of the licence continues to occupy it is a trespasser ~r as a
person who has no semblance of any right to continue in occupation of the
premises. Such a person cannot be called a licensee at .all. [ 408 BJ
H
(~) A l'.ers~n c_ontinuing in occupation of such premises after revocation of
the. licence 1s still hable to pay compensation. or damages for their use and occupation. [408 E]
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H·
404
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 1 S.C.R.
(d) Filing ~
applic~tion. under section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes
Comt Act !Il~Y m certa!n. ctrcumsta.nces have. the effect of puting an end to
t~e licence if it was subs1s.tii;ig on the date of its filing.
But, that cannot possibly ha".e. the effect o.f rev1ymg the licence as opined by the learned Judge. Such
a proposition of law is both novel and inc01pprehensible. ( 408H, 409 GJ
( e) It is right that the Court should act in consonance with the spirit of

## Text

/
D. H. MANIAR & ORS.
v.
WAMAN LAXMAN KUDA V
August 24, 1976
403
[ P. N. BHAGWATI, N. L. UNTWALIA AND S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JJ.]
Bombay Rents Hotel and J.,odgin~ House Rates Control Act 1947-Sec .. 15A--
Sec. 5(4A)-lndian Easements Act 1882-Sec. 52-62(c)-Revocation of licence
bv efflux of time-Ptesidency Small Causes Courts Act 1882-Scc. 47-Ef]ect
oj filing of application for eviction-Meaning of licence under a subsisting agreement-Interpretation of Statutes-Practice.
A
B
The appellants granted a licence in respect of certain shop pre.mises i~ Bombay to the respondent under a Leave and Licence Agreement which expired on
31st March 1966.
Thereafter the appellants served a notice upon the responC
dent calling upon him to remove himself from the premises .. The respondent
refused to do so.
In July 1967 the a•ppellants filed on application for eviction
under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Court Act. The contention
of the respondent that he was a tenant was negatived by the Small Causes Court,
Bombay. The respondent approached the High Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution. The High Court refused to interfere with the finding of the Small
Causes Court that the respondent was a licensee and not a tena·nt.
The Bombay Rent Act was amended by Maharashtra Act 17 of 1973.
By
D.
the amending Act, section 5(4A) and Section 15A were introduced in the
parent Act to confer on the licensee, who had a subsisting agreement on rebruary 1, 1973, the status and protection of a tenant under the Bombay Rent
'Act.
.
The respondent by an amendment took the plea of protection under the
Maharashtra Amendment Act 17 of 1973 on the ground that he was in occupa·
ti'on of the premises on 1st February 1973 under a subsisting agreement for
E
licence.
The Small Causes Court, Bombay, negatived the plea on the ground
that there was no subsisting &greement for licence on the 1st of Febniary, 1973
as there was ·nothing on record to show that after 31st March 1966 the leave and
licence agreement between the parties was rene\.ved or any fresh agreen1ent was
entered into.
The respondent llled a revision petition under section 115 of C.P.C. in the
High Court. The High Court allowed the revision on the ground that the
licence was not put an end to by the appellants and that in any event by filing
the application for eviction the appellant licensor had granted an implied licence
to the respondent licensee to continue in possession till a decree of eviction was
passed in his favour.
Allowing the appeal,
F
HELD : (a) In order to get the advantage of section 1 SA of the Bombay
Rent Act, the occupant must be in occupation of the' premises as a licensee as
defined in section 5(4A) on the !st of February 1973. If he be such a licensee,
the non-obstante clause of section 15A(l) gives him the status and protection
G
of a tenant in spite of there being anything to the contrary in any ot)l.er law or in
any contract. But if he is not a licensee under a subsisting agreement on the 1st
of February 1973, · then he does not get !he advanta·ge of the amended provision
of the Bombay Rent Act. [407 H, 408 A]
(b) A person continuing in possession of the premises after termination withdrawal or revocation of the licence continues to occupy it is a trespasser ~r as a
person who has no semblance of any right to continue in occupation of the
premises. Such a person cannot be called a licensee at .all. [ 408 BJ
H
(~) A l'.ers~n c_ontinuing in occupation of such premises after revocation of
the. licence 1s still hable to pay compensation. or damages for their use and occupation. [408 E]
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H·
404
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 1 S.C.R.
(d) Filing ~
applic~tion. under section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes
Comt Act !Il~Y m certa!n. ctrcumsta.nces have. the effect of puting an end to
t~e licence if it was subs1s.tii;ig on the date of its filing.
But, that cannot possibly ha".e. the effect o.f rev1ymg the licence as opined by the learned Judge. Such
a proposition of law is both novel and inc01pprehensible. ( 408H, 409 GJ
( e) It is right that the Court should act in consonance with the spirit of the
Mahara~htra Amending Act 17 of 1973.
But the Court cannot and should not
cast the law to the winds or twist or stretch it to a br;:aking point amounting to
almost an absurdity. [410 CJ
(f) The finding of the High Court that the respondent was in occupation
of the premises under a subsisting licence was wholly wrong and suffered from
serious infirmities of law and fact and deserved to be set aside. [410 G]
[The Supreme Court is loathe to pass any harsh or unpalatable remarks concerning the judgment of the High Court and ought to act with restraint.
But
sometimes constraint outweighs restraint and compels this Court in discharge of
its duty to ma.ke strong observations when it finds the judgment of the High
Court running galore with the gross and palpable mistakes of law almost amount·
ing to judicial imbalance in the approach to the case].
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 212 of 1976.
(From the Judgment and Order dated 18-2-1975 of the Bombay
High Court in Civil Revision Appln. No. 741/74).
Soli J. Sorabji, P. H. Parekh, Miss Manju Jetly and Mjs Dharia
& D. D. Kapadia' for the appellant.
B. K. Desai, S. S. Khanduja and Vijay Gandotra for the respon-.
dent.
P. H. Parekh for the Intervener.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
UNTWALIA, J.
The appellants in this appeal by special
leave
had filed an application under section 41 of The Presidency Small
Cause Courts Act, 1882-hereinafter referred to as the S.C.C. Act,
against the respoudent to compel him to quit and deliver
up
the
possession o( the premises in question.
The Small Cause Court made
an order in favour of the appellants under section 43 of the S.C.C.
Act.
On the filing of an application in revision by the respondent
in the Bombay High Court, a learned single Judge of that Court has
set aside the order of the Small Cause Court and
dismissed
the
appellants' application for eviction of the
respondent.
Hence this
appeal.
This Court does, as it ought to, act with restraint and is loathe
to pass any harsh or unpalatable remark concerning the
judgment
of a High Court.
But sometimes constraint outweighs restraint and
compels this Court in discharge of its duty to make some
strong
observations when it finds the judgment of the High Court running
galore with gross and palpable mistakes of law almost amounting to
judicial imbalance in the approach to the case.
We regret to say
that this is one such case.
The appellants had allowed the respondent to occupy the shop
premises in· question which are situated outside Swadeshi
Market,
/
'
..
D. H. MANIAR v. WAMAN LAX.MAN KUDAV (Untwalia, J.)
405·
Kalbadevi Road in Bombay under certain agreements of leave and
A
licence which were renewed from time to time. . The Ias.t agreement
was dated April 30, 1965. purationJ of .the penod of hcence .mentioned in this agreement was m the followmg terms
"(1) This agreement shall be deemed
to
have
commenced from 1st May 1965 and shall remain in force
for 11 months and will automatically come to an end on
31st March, 1966 on which day the Party of the Second
Part shall remove himself from the premises of his
own
accord with all his articles and belongings and in event of
the Party of the Second Part not clearing out of the premises
on the said day viz., 31st March, 1966 the parties of the
First Part shall be at liberty to remove the goods and articles
of the party of the Second Part by themselves, by employment of labour at the cost and on account of the party of
the Second Part and shall be entitled to stop and prevent
thr. Party of the Second Part from entering the premises and
making use of the same by himself or his agent."
The respondent di~ not vacate and remove himself from the premises
as per the aforesaid term of the agreement.
He purported to claim
to be a tenant of the premises and with that end in view his Advocate
wrote a letter to appellant No. 1 on May 23, 1966 stating therein
that the respondent was a tenant of the shop premises and
had
remitted the rent for the months of March and April,
1976.
A
reply to the letter aforesaid of the respondent's advocate was given
on behalf of the appellants on June 14, 1966 refuting therein the res-·
pondent's claim of being a tenant of the shop premises and asserting
that he was a mere licensee. It was also said that the said licence had -.
automatically come to an end on March 31, 1966 and thereafter he
was "no better
than . a
trespasser".
Subsequent
correspondence
followed between the parties in which the appellants showed
their
readiness and willingness to accept money from the respondent
by
way of compensation for the use and occupation of the shop premises
without prejudice to their rights and threatening to take legal action
for getting the possession of the premises."
B
c
D
E
F
On the 10th July, 1967 the appellants filed an application under
section 41 of the S.C.C. Act.
The respondent contested that application, inter-a/ia, on the ground that he was a tenant of the shop
premises and was, therefore, protected against the
eviction
ur:der
G
The Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act,
1947 (for brevity, the Bombay Rent Act). As per the requirement
of section 42A of the S.C.C. Act, the question whether the respondent was a tenant of the appellants was tried as a preliminary issue
by the Small Cause Court, Bombay.
A single Judge of that Court
by his judgment and order dated June 30, 1972 held
against the
respondent and found that he was not a tenant of the appellants in
H
respect of the shop premises.
An appeal was taken by the respondent
to a Bench of two judges of the Small Cause Court under section
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
406
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977) 1 S.C.R.
42A(2) of the S.C.C. Act.
By a reasoned order dated
December
11, 1972 th~ api::ellate Bench upheld. the finding of the single Judge
and summarily d1;m1ssed the appeal.
The respondent filed a
writ
application in the High Court which after hearing the appellants was
dismissed on July 3, 1973.
The Bombay Rent Act was amended by Maharashtra Act 17 of
1973. By the amending Act, section 5(4A) and Section l5A \vere
introduced in the parent Act to confer on the licensee who had a
subsisting agreement on February 1, 1973 the status a~d protection
of a tenant under the Bombay Rent Act.
The respondent,
thereafter, by an amendment of his written defence filed in
the
Small
Cause Court proceeded to take the additional
plea
of protection
under Maharashtra Act 17 of 1973.
Although the amendment was
not !'t'lly and effectively allowed by the Small Cause Court Judge, the
parties had proceeded on the footing that such a plea became available to the respondent.
A learned single Judge of the Small Cause Court held that there
was no subsisting agreement for licence on the 1st of February, 1973
as there was nothing on record to show that after 31st March, 1966
the leave and licence agreement between the parties was renewed or
any fresh agreement was entered into. In that view of the matter
the Trial Court held that the respondent was not entitled
to
the
protection of the Bombay Rent Act conferred on a
licensee
by
Maharashtra Act 17 of 1973.
The Court allowed
the
appellants'
application and made an order under section 43 of the S.C.C. Act
directing the respondent to vacate and hand over peaceful possession
of the premises to the appellants within one month from the date of
the order i.e. the 11th October, 1974. This order was not appealable.
-Hence respondent filed a revisian before the High Court.
A learned
single Judge of the High Court by his judgment and order dated
February 18, 1975 allowed the revision and, as stated above,
set
aside the order of the Small Cause Court and dismissed the appellants'
application for eviction of the respondent.
Mr. Sorabji, learned counsel for the appellants after drawing our
attention to the relevant facts and the l11w involved in the case placed
the judgment of the High Court to point out the glaring errors committed by it which were writ large on its face.
Mr. Desai appearing
for the respondent made a strenuous effect to persuade us to uphold
the judgment of the High Court.
But in the
circumstances of the
case he could do no better than what has been said in the judgment.
Section 52 of The Indian Easements Act, 1882 defines "licence"
thus :
"Where one person grants to a110ther, or to a definite
number of other persons, a right to do, or continue to do,
in or upon the immovable property of the. granter, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement or an
interest in the property, the right is called a. licence."
I
'
D. H. MANIAR v. WAMAN LAXMAN KUDAV (Untwalia, J.)
4.07
It was no longer open to debate that the respondent was
a
mere
licensee of the shop premises of which the appellants were the licensors.
Section 62(c) of the Easements Act says
"A license is deemed to, be revoked -
(c) where it has been granted for a limited period, or
acquired on condition that it shall become void on the
performance or non-performance of a specified act, and the
period expires, or the condition is fulfilled;"
By effiux of time, therefore, the licence stood revoked on the 1st of
April, 1966.
Yet the licensee under section 63 of the Easements
Act was entitled to a reasonable time to leave the property and to
remove his goods which he had been allowed to place on such property. In spite of being asked by the appellants to do so the respondont did not pay any heed.
Hence the appellants
took recourse
to section 41· of the S.C.C. Act.
The remedy of section -41 is available only after the permission or the licence granted to tho licensee
to go on the property has been withdrawn or revoked.
If the occupant of the property is not able to show any sufficient cause then
order fo~ possession follows under section 43.
We now proceed to quote the relevant words of section 5 ( "4-A)
of the Bombay Rent Act :
" "Licensee", in respect of any premises or any
part
thereof, means the person who is in occupation
of the
A
B
c
D
premises or such part, as the case may be, under a subsistE
ing agreement for licence given
for
a
licence
fee
or
charge ........ "
The inclusive clauses thereafter in the definition of the 'licemiee' do
not include a licensee in occupation of the premises whose licence
already come to an end and in such a case the occupant would not
be a licensee under a subsisting agreement.
We now proceed
tO
F
read section 15 A :
"(1) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in
this Act or anything contrary in any other law for the time
being in force, or in any contract, where any person is on the
1st day of February 1973 in occupation of any premises, or
any part thereof which is not less than a room, as a licensee,
G
he shall on that date be deemed to have become, for the purpoies of this Act, the tenant of the landlord, in respect of the
premises or part thereof, in his occupation.
(2) ............................ "
!t ii thus clear beyond doubt that in order to get the advantage of
section 15A of the Bombay Rent Act, the occupant must be in occupation of the premises as a licensee as defined in section 5 ( 4A) on the
1st of February, 1973. If he be such a licensee, the non-obstante clause
1o~1104SCI 176
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
408
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 1 .S.C.R.
of section lSA(l) gives him the status and protection of a tenant in
spite of there being anything to the contrary in any other law or in any
contract.
In other words, even as against the express terms of the
subsisting contract of licence the licensee would enjoy the benefits of
section 15A. But if he is not a licensee under a subsisting agreement on
the 1st of February, 1973, then he does not get the advantage of the
amended provision of the Bombay Rent Act. A person continuing in
possession of the premises after termination, withdrawal or revocation
of the licence continues to occupy it as a trespasser or as a person who
has no semblance of any right to continue in occupation of the premises.
Such a person by no stretch of imagination can be called a licensee. If
therefore, the respondent was not a licensee under a subsisting agreement in occupation of the premises on the 1st of February, 1973 he
could not take shelter under section 15A on the Bombay Rent Act. The
Trial Judge found against him. Apart from the position that this was
essentially a question of fact and a, finding on which could not be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its revisional power under
section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court has done
so, as we shall point out, by committing such gross errors of law and
fact that we were constrained in the beginning of our judgment, though
very reluctantly, to make some strong observations against the judgment
of the High Court.
While reciting the facts of the case the learned Judge of the High
Court states a fact in paragraph three of the judgment that the respondent was ordered to depo~it in Court Rs. 29/- per month which he did.
We are happy to note that the learned Judge has rightly not rested his
judgment on this ground of deposit of rent by the respondent. There
was nothing to show in the records of this case that the appellants had
ever accepted any money either in or outside court from the respondent
after 31st of March, 1966 by way of any rent of the licenced premises.
A person continuing in occupation of such premises after revocation of
the licence is still liable to pay compensation or damages for their use
and occupation. If at any time such compensation had been paid or
accepted it could not undo the effect of the revocation of the licence.
In the seventh paragraph of t11e judgment the learned Judge says :
"In my judgment the filing of the proceeding under section
41 without terminating the licence and/or the permission
granted to the petitioner does not automatically put an end
to the licence which the petitioner had to occupy the premises."
There are two infirnlities in the said observation. Firstly, according to
the appellants' case the licence stood revoked and withdrawn and then
they filed the application under section 41 of the S.C.C. Act. Secondly,
the filing of the application itself may in certain circumstances have the
effect of putting an end to the licence if it was subsisting on the date of
its filing. But in any event, one thing is certain, that cannot have the
effect of reviving the licence as opined by the learned Judge in the subsequent part of his judgment.
y
!
'
..
p. H. MANIAR v. WAMAN LAXMAN KUDAV (Untwalia, J.)
409
In the tenth paragraph of his judgment the learned Judge says :
A
"The respondents have not relied on any notice served on
the petitioner to show that they would treat the petitioner as
a trespasser from March 31, 1966. The respondents did not
even describe the petitioner as a trespasser in proceedings. It
must be therefore presumed that the respondents voluntarily or
involuntarily permitted the petitioner to occupy the premises
till thei filed their application under section 41 of the PresiB
dency Small Cause Courts Act."
In the next paragraph the learned Judge quotes the words : "position
not better than that of a trespasser" from the appellants' letter written
so the respondent.
The contradiction in the judgment is apparent. It
is difficult to understand the significance of the observation "that the
respondents voluntarily or involuntarily permitted the petitioner to occ
cupy the premises". Voluntary permission may amount to a fresh
licence. The use of the expression 'involuntarily permitted' is a contradiction in terms.
We are distressed to find the learned Judge repeatedly expressing a
view in his judgment that the conduct on the part of the appellants in
allowing the respondent to continue in the occupation of the premises
D
until the filing of the application under section 41 of the s.C.C. Act on
July 10, 1967 amounted to a grant of fresh licence. It is not necessary
to extract all the strange passages from the judgment of the High Court.
But we shall do a few more. In the fifteenth paragraph while referring
tb the expression "deemed to be revoked" occurring in section 62(c)
of the Easements Act it is said that "it does not necessarily mean that
E
it is in fact revoked." The mistake is so obvious in this observation .
tha11 it does not require any elaboration. In the same fifteenth paragraph occurs a passage which we exercised in vain to understand. It
runs thus :
"The fact that the respondents did not take any steps till
they filed the application under section 41 which also would
not automatically make the petitioner's occupation unlawful
means that the respondents impliedly granted a licence to the
petitioner to continue to occupy the premises."
Later on the learned Judge has said in his judgment that by adopting the procedure of filing the application under section 41 of the s.C.C.
Q
Act, the appellants impliedly granted to the respondent "a right to continue to occupy the premises till he was evicted by an order under section 43." Such a novel proposition of law is beyond our comprehension. If the filing of the application under section 41 gives a right to
the occupant of the premises to continue to occupy it, then how can the
Court pass an order of eviction under Section 43 in derogation or destruction of such a right ? The resulting position is too anomalous and
B
illogical to merit any detailed discussion.
_ In the eighteenth paragraph of the judgment the learned Judge persuaded himself to say :
410
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1977) 1 S.C.R.
A
"The fact that the earlier agreement of licence expired on
March 31, 1966, does not necessarily mean that there was
no subsisting agreement on the date on which the application
under section 41 was made or on February 1, 1973."
B
c
D
E
F
G
It is difficult to understand what f'urther act, conduct or writing of the
appellants led to the undoing of the effect of the expiration of the earlier
agreement of licence and bring about any subsisting agreement either
on the date of the application under section 41 or on February 1, 1973.
We admit that if any such agreement could be culled out, in writing or
oral, expressly or impliedly, by the action or the conduct of the appellants the Court would have been happy to cull out such agreement and
give protection to the licensee in c_:onsonance with the spirit of the
Amending Act viz. Maharashtra Act 17 of 1973. But the Court cannot
and should not cast the law to the winds or twist or stretch it to a breaking point amounting to almost an absurdity. Our observation is amply
demonstrated by the following passage in the judgment of the High
Court.
"Relying on the amendment of the Bombay Rent Act the
respondents no doubt had withdrawn their permission under
the agreements but by filing the proceedings under section 41
they permitted the petitioner to continue as the licensee as
stated above; and this itself is a different kind of agreement of
licence as defined under section 52 of the Easement Act."
The learned Judge also seems to be making a difference between the
filing of a suit agains~ a licensee whose licence has been terminated treating him as a trespasser and an application under section 41 of the S.C.C.
Act. For the purpose of the point at issue the distinction is more illusory than real. Two remedies, previously, were available to the licensor. He could avail the one or the other. The scope of the trial, disposal and further remedies in the two proceedings were different. But
it ill wholly wrong to say that if a licensor filed an application under
section 41 of the S.C.C. Act instead of filing a regular civil suit by
implication treated the occupant of the premises against whom the S.C.C.
application was filed as a subsisting _licensee.
In our opinion the judgment of !he High Court is wholly wrong and
su!fers from seriou~ infirmi.ties of law and facts. We accordingly allow
this appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and
restore that of the Small Cause Court. The respondent must pay the
costs to the appellants in this Court ,as also in the High Court.
P.H.P.
Appeal allowed.
--
•· '