# D.S. REDDY v. CHANCELLOR, OSMANIA UNIVERSITY & ORS

- **Citation:** [1967] 2 S.C.R. 214
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1966-12-09
- **Bench:** K. Subba Rao, J.C. Shah, S. M. Sjkri, V. Ramaswami, C.A. Vaidjalingam
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/d-s-reddy-v-chancellor-osmania-university-ors-3994
- **Pages:** 19

## Headnote

Constitution of India,
Article 14-Appellant appoimed Vice·Chance//or under s. 12(1) of Osmania
University
Act, 1959 for 5 yearsA-nding Act II of 1966 by new s.
13(1) reducing term of office of
Vice.ChancellorS to 3 years and by new s. 12(2) providing procedure for
their removaJ--Second
Amending
Act XI of 1966
introducing new
s. 13A providing for appointment of new Vice-Chancellor within 90 days
in place ·of appellant-Thus benefit of s. 12(2) ands. 13(1) denied to
appellant-Whether classification of existing Vic!!-Chancellor and future
appointees justified or discrimbuuory.
As a result of the Osmania University (Amendment) Act Il of 1966,
s. 12(1) of the Osmania University Act, 1959, was amended to provide
for the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor by the Chancellor alone; in
s. 12 ( 2) a provision was introduced whereby he could only be removed
from office by an order of the Chancellor passed on the ground of misbehaviour or incapacity after enquiry by a person who was or had been
a Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court and after the Vic<>-
Chancellor had been given an opportumty of making his representation
against such removal Section 13 ( 1) of the 1959 Act was also amended so
as to reduce the term of office of the Vice-Chancellor from 5 to 3 years.
The 1959 Act was again amended later in 1966 by the Osmania
University (Second Amendment) Act XI of 1966.
Section 5 of thi5
amending Act in1roduced a new s. 13A into the 1959 Act whereby it wa.<
provided that tho person then holding the office of Vice-Chancellor could
only hold that office until a new Vice-Chancellor was appointed; and that
sucn new appointment must be made within 90 days of the commence·
ment of the Act whereupon the old Vice-Chancellor would cease to hold
office.
1be appellant filed a writ petition claiming, Inter alia, that s. 5 of the
_.,.,d amending Act introducing the new s. 13A was discriminatory u
against him and tmorefore violative of Art. 14. The High Court dismissed
the petition.
In the appeal to the Supreme c.ourt,
it was contended on behalf of
the respondents that as the tenm of office had beeo reduced to 3 yeaB
by the first amending Ad., the legislature in order to give elf«t to this
provision and to enable fresh appointments to be made under the Act~
bad enacted s. !3A which bad, necessarily, to apply to a pel'SOll like the
appellant who was in aftice at the time when
the provi51ons came into
force.
Such provisions could not, in the nature of things. apply to ViceCbancellors who were to be appointed in future;
the appellant was appointed from a panel submitted by a committee
constituted under the
unamended s. 12(2) whereas future Vice-Chancellors were to be appointed by the Chancellor alone; furthermore,
the appellant had been the
V~ancellor for 7 years.
Having regard to these circumstances tho
legislature had chosen to treat the appellant as a class by himodf and had
differentiated him from persons lo be appointed Vi....Cbancellors in the
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D. s. REDDY v. CHANCELLOR (Vaidialingam, J.)' '215
future; that such classification was reasonable and had a rational relation
to the object sought to be achieved by the sec;ood amending Act I.e.
bringing about uniformity in the tenure of 3 years of office for all VicoCbanceJlors; that the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of s. 12(2)
and the legislature was competent to enact s. 13A so as to give effect to
the amended provisions as early as possible.
HELD : Section 5 of the second amending Act (XI of 1966) introducing s. 13A into the 1959 Act was discriminatory and therefore violative
of Art. 14. [232 E]
There was no intelligible differentia on the basis of which a classification of Vice-Chancellors into two categories i.e. the appellant as the
then existing Vice-Chancellor and the future Vice-Chancellors to be appointed under the Act,. could be justified. The term of office of three
years for the Vice-Chancellor had already been fixed by the first amending Act. There

## Text

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D.S. REDDY
v.
CHANCELLOR, OSMANIA UNIVERSITY & ORS.
December 9,
1966
[K. SUBBA RAO, C. J., J.C. SHAH, S. M. SJKRI, V. RAMASWAMI
AND C.A. VAIDJALINGAM, JJ.]
Constitution of India,
Article 14-Appellant appoimed Vice·Chance//or under s. 12(1) of Osmania
University
Act, 1959 for 5 yearsA-nding Act II of 1966 by new s.
13(1) reducing term of office of
Vice.ChancellorS to 3 years and by new s. 12(2) providing procedure for
their removaJ--Second
Amending
Act XI of 1966
introducing new
s. 13A providing for appointment of new Vice-Chancellor within 90 days
in place ·of appellant-Thus benefit of s. 12(2) ands. 13(1) denied to
appellant-Whether classification of existing Vic!!-Chancellor and future
appointees justified or discrimbuuory.
As a result of the Osmania University (Amendment) Act Il of 1966,
s. 12(1) of the Osmania University Act, 1959, was amended to provide
for the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor by the Chancellor alone; in
s. 12 ( 2) a provision was introduced whereby he could only be removed
from office by an order of the Chancellor passed on the ground of misbehaviour or incapacity after enquiry by a person who was or had been
a Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court and after the Vic<>-
Chancellor had been given an opportumty of making his representation
against such removal Section 13 ( 1) of the 1959 Act was also amended so
as to reduce the term of office of the Vice-Chancellor from 5 to 3 years.
The 1959 Act was again amended later in 1966 by the Osmania
University (Second Amendment) Act XI of 1966.
Section 5 of thi5
amending Act in1roduced a new s. 13A into the 1959 Act whereby it wa.<
provided that tho person then holding the office of Vice-Chancellor could
only hold that office until a new Vice-Chancellor was appointed; and that
sucn new appointment must be made within 90 days of the commence·
ment of the Act whereupon the old Vice-Chancellor would cease to hold
office.
1be appellant filed a writ petition claiming, Inter alia, that s. 5 of the
_.,.,d amending Act introducing the new s. 13A was discriminatory u
against him and tmorefore violative of Art. 14. The High Court dismissed
the petition.
In the appeal to the Supreme c.ourt,
it was contended on behalf of
the respondents that as the tenm of office had beeo reduced to 3 yeaB
by the first amending Ad., the legislature in order to give elf«t to this
provision and to enable fresh appointments to be made under the Act~
bad enacted s. !3A which bad, necessarily, to apply to a pel'SOll like the
appellant who was in aftice at the time when
the provi51ons came into
force.
Such provisions could not, in the nature of things. apply to ViceCbancellors who were to be appointed in future;
the appellant was appointed from a panel submitted by a committee
constituted under the
unamended s. 12(2) whereas future Vice-Chancellors were to be appointed by the Chancellor alone; furthermore,
the appellant had been the
V~ancellor for 7 years.
Having regard to these circumstances tho
legislature had chosen to treat the appellant as a class by himodf and had
differentiated him from persons lo be appointed Vi....Cbancellors in the
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future; that such classification was reasonable and had a rational relation
to the object sought to be achieved by the sec;ood amending Act I.e.
bringing about uniformity in the tenure of 3 years of office for all VicoCbanceJlors; that the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of s. 12(2)
and the legislature was competent to enact s. 13A so as to give effect to
the amended provisions as early as possible.
HELD : Section 5 of the second amending Act (XI of 1966) introducing s. 13A into the 1959 Act was discriminatory and therefore violative
of Art. 14. [232 E]
There was no intelligible differentia on the basis of which a classification of Vice-Chancellors into two categories i.e. the appellant as the
then existing Vice-Chancellor and the future Vice-Chancellors to be appointed under the Act,. could be justified. The term of office of three
years for the Vice-Chancellor had already been fixed by the first amending Act. Therefore the differential principle adopted for terminating the
appellant's service under s .. 13A introduced by the second amending Act
and directed as against the appellant alone could not be considered to
have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the second
amending Act.
Budhan Chaudhry v. The State of Bihar [1955] I S.C.R.
1045. 1049; Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar [1959]
S.C.R. 279. 296; referred to. [231 B-D]
While a Vice-Chancellor appointed
under s. 12 could be removed
from office only by adopting the procedure under s. 12(2). the services
of tho appellant, who was also a Vice-Chancellor and similarly situated
were sought to be terminated by enacting s. 13A of the Act. There was
no policy underlying the Act justifying this differential treatment. There
was also no justification for the distinction whereby the appellant would
be forced out of office within 90 days whereas all other V1ce-Chancellors
appointed under the Act would continue in office for three years
[231
E-G]
CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2313of1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
October 13, 1966 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition
No. 853 of 1966.
F
M.C. Setalvad. D. Narasaraju, Anwar Ullah Pasha R. V. Pillai
and M. M. Kashatriya, for the appellant.
Niren De,
Addi.
Solicitor-General,
P. Ram Reddy, S.
Ramachr ndra Reddy and T.V.R. Ta•achari, for t he respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
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Vaidialingam, J. This appeal, by special leave, granted by this
H
Court, is directed against the order dated October, 13, 1966, passed
by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, dismissing Writ Petition No.
853 of 1966, filed by the appellant, under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
The appellant filed the said writ petition under the following
circumstances. The appellant was the Vice-Chancellor of the
Osmania University, having been appointed, as such, by order dated
April 30
1964, passed by the Governor of Andhra Pradesh, in
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 196 7J 2 S.C.R.
his capacity as Chancellor of the said University. The appointA
ment of the app~llant, under the said order, as Vice-Chancellor,
there is no controversy, was for a term of five years from
the date of taking charge; and the appointment itself was made
under sub:s. (1) of s. 12 of the Osmania University Act, 1959 (Andhra
Pradesh Act No. IX of 1959). There is, again, no controven;y
that the appellant took charge as Vice-Chancellor, in terms of the
;J
said order, on April 30, 1964 and, as such, he became entitled to
hold office for the full period of five years, which will expire at the
end of April
1969.
The Osmania University was established in 1918 and the administration of the University was then governed by a Charter of
His Exalted Highness, the Nizam of Hyderabad, promulgated. C
in 1947. With effect from November l, 1956, the State of Hyderabad ceased to exist, and the Telengana region of that State became
part of Andhra Pradesh. In 1959, the Andhra Pradesh Legislature passed the Osmania University Act, 1959, earlier referred to.
That Act itself was one to amend and consolidate the law relating
to the Osmania University. It is only necessary to note at this
stage, that under s. 12(1) of the said Act, it was provided that
the Vice-Chancellor shall be appointed by the Chancellor from a
panel of not less than three persons selected by a Committee, as
constituted under sub-s. (2); but, if the Chancellor does not approve
any of the persons so selected, he may call for a fresh panel from
the Committee. Section 13, again, provided for the term of office,
salary and allowances etc., of the Vice-Chancellor. Under sub-s.
(I), the term of office of the Vice-Chancellor was fixed for a term of
five years and there was also a further provision to the effect that
he shall be eligible for reappointment.
By s. 51 of the said Act, the Osmania University
Revised
Charter · of 1947 was repealed; but, nevertheless, it was provided that
the person holding office immediately before the commencement of
the Act as Vice-Chancellor, was to be the Vice-Chancellor on such
commencement of the Act, and was to continue to hold the said
office, in circumstances mentioned therein.
There is, again, no controversy that the appellant, who was
already the Vice-Chancellor of the Osmania University from 1957,
was again appointed in 1959, as Vice-Chancellor for a period of
five years under this Act; and he was similarly appointed for a
further term of five years, on April 30, 1964, as Vice-Chancellor,
as mentioned earlier. During the middle of 1965, certain amendments were sought to be introduced in the Act by providing for
removal of the Vice-Chancellor, by the Chancellor, from office
under certain circumstances. There was also a proposal to reduce
the term of office of the Vice-Chancellor from 5 years to 3 years,
from the date of his appointment, and for provisions being made
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enabling the Government to give directions to the University
relating to matters of policy to be followed by it.
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The amendments sought to be introduced in the Act, appear to
have come in for considerable criticism "rom several quarters, and
these have been elaborately 'dealt with in the order, under attack.
Aecording to the appellant, he was one of those; who very strenuously opposed the proposed amendments on the ground that the
autonomy of the University was sought to be interfered with by the
Government. According to the appellant,
again, the various
criticisms made by him and others, were taken note of by the
Inter-University Board, by the Education Minister of the Union
and others. It is the further case of the appellant that it was felt by
the Government of Andhra Pradesh that he was responsible for
the agitation that was being made, against the proposed amendments. But, ultimately, the Andhra Pradesh Legislature passed the
Osmania Universit}' (Amendment) Act, 1966 (Act II of 1966),
amending the Osmania University Act of 1959 in certain particulars.
The said amendments are to the effect that the Vice-Chancellor
shall not be removed from office, except as provided for in s. 12(2)
of the amended Act. The term of office was also fixed at 3 years
under the amended s. 13. Another provision relating to the power
of Government to give instructions to the University, was also
jntroduced, as s. 7A; but the appellant continued as Vice-Chancellor.
·
The Osmania University Act, was again amended by the
Osmania University (Second Amendment) Act, 1966 (Act XI of 1966).
Under this amendment, s. 13A was enacted. In brief, that section
was to the effect that the person holding the office of the ViceChancellor, immediately before the-commencement of the amending
Act of 1966, was to hold office only until a new Vice-Chancellor was
appointed under sub-s. (!) of s. 12, and it also provided that such
appointment shall be made within 90 days after such commencement. There was a further provision that on the appointment of
such new-Vice-Chancellor, and on his entering upon his office,
\he person holding the office of Vice-Chancellor immediately before
such appointment, shall eease to hold that office. Section 7-A,
which had been introduced by Act II of 1966, was deleted. Section 33-A was enacted, making special provision as to the re-constitution of the Senate, Syndicate, Academic Council and Finance
Committee of the University.
The appellant filed Writ Petition No. 853 of 1966, in the High
Court, praying for the issue of a writ or order declaring s. 5 of
the Osmania University (Second Amendment) Act. 1966, which
introduced s. 13A in the original Act, as unconstitutional and void.
In that writ petition, he challenged the validity of the new Section, s. 13A on several grounds. In brief, his plea was that by virtue
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1967] 2 S.C.R.
of his appointment as Vice-Chancellor for 5 years on April 30
1964, he had acquired a vested right to hold that office for the fuli
term and that such a vested right could not be taken away, during
the currency. of the period, by any legislative enactment. The
legislature had no competence to enact the said provision inasmuch
as s. 13A could not be treated as legislation in respect of University
education. The appellant had also pleaded that the provision
virtually amounted to removal of the appellant from his office
without giving him any opportunity to show cause against such
removal. According to the appellant, even assuming the Legislature was competent to enact the provision in question, nevertheless, s. 13A is unconstitutional and void, inasmuch as it offends
Art. 14 of the Constit.ution.
We do not think it necessary to advert, elaborately, to the
various other grounds of attack levelled against the constitutional
validity of the provision in question, which have, no doubt, been
dealt with by the High Court, because, for the purpose of disposing of this appeal, in our opinion, it is enough to refer to the
grounds of attack, taken by the appellant regarding the constitutionality of s. !3A, based upon Art. 14 of the Constitution.
So far as this aspect is concerned, according to the appellant,
s. 9 of Act II, of 1966 amend~d the Act of.1959 by incorporating new
sub-ss. (I) and (2) in s. 12. Under sub-s. (I) of s. 12, the ViceChancellor is to be appointed by the Chancellor.
Under sub-s.
(2), the Vice-Chancellor shall not be removed from his office except
by an order of the Chancellor passed on the ground of mis-behaviour
or incapacity; and it also provided for such an order being passed
only after due enquiry by a person who is or has been a Judge of
a High Court or the Supreme Court, as may be appointed by the
Chancellor, and the Vice-Chancellor being given an opportunity of
making his representation against the removal. Therefore, in
view of these provisions, the Vice-Chancellor could not be removed
by the Chancellor without any cause, without reason, without
enquiry and without an opportunity being given to him to show
cause
against removal.
This provision applied to the appellant, who was in office, on the date of the passing of Act II of 1966,
as well as Act XI of I 966. Nevertheless, s. 5 of Act XI of 1966
incorporated s.13A in the principal Act. Under that section, not
only has power been conferred on the Chancellor, but also a duty
imposed, so to say, on him, to remove the appellant, who was the
Vice-Chancellor, without any reason or justification or even giving
an opportunity to him to show cause against such removal. No
enquiry, before ordering such removal, is contemplated under this
section. Further, while a Vice-Chancellor, who is appointed after
the passing of Act XI of 1966, cannot be removed from office,
except in accordance with the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 12, the
appellant, who was already in office, could be arpitrarily and
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illegally removed under s. BA of the Act. There is no provi.sion,
again, similar to s. 13A, applicable to a Vice-Chancellor, app01nted
after the coming into force of the amending Act. Therefore,
according to the appellant, the provisions contained in s. 13A
are clearly directed only against him, as he was the person holding
office, prior to the amending Act, and therefore it is a clear case
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Further, according to the appellant, persons appointed as
Vice-Chancellors, constitute a group and must be considered as
persons similarly situated and they must be treated alike; whereas,
by virtue of s. 13A, a differentiation is made between the appellant,
who was a Vice-Chancellor on the date of the commencement of
the Amending Act and other persons who are to be appointed as
Vice-Chancellors thereafter.
This differentiation, according to the
appellant, is again without any basis; nor has such a classification,
any reasonable relation to the main object of the legislation.
The appellant also relied on s. 33A, introduced by s. 6 of Act
XI of 1966, relating to the reconstitution of the Senate, Syndicate,
Academic Council and the Finance Committee and pleaded that
whereas those academic bodies or authorities were allowed to
continue without any time-limit and to function until they were
reconstituted, regarding the Vice-Chancellor alone, a period of
90 days had been fixed, under the Amending Act, within which the
Chancellor was bound to appoint another Vice-Chancellor. This,
again, is a clear proof of discrimination against the appellant.
The respondents controverted the stand taken on behalf of
the appellant. Apart from supporting
the competency of the
Legislature to enact the measure, in question, they urge that Art.
14 of the Constitution has no application at all. According to the
respondents, inasmuch as the term of office of the Vice- Chancellor
had been reduced to three years, as per Act II of 1966, it was thought
fit by the Legislature to provide for the termination of the office of the
Vice-Chancellor, who was holding that post, at the commencement of
Act XI of 1966, as also for the appointment of a new Vice-Chancellor.
It was, under those circumstances, that s. 13A was incorporated
in the Act of 1959, by s. 5 of Act XI of 1966. They also referred
to similar provisions, which were incorporated in the two enactments relating to the two other Universities in the State, viz., the
Andhra University and Sri Venkateswara University.
The respondents furthtcr pleaded that Act II of 1966 placed .the
Vice-Chancellor, who was already appointed and who was functioning prior to that Act, in the first category, as a class apart, from the
Vice-Chancellors who were to be subsequently appointed and who
were to function, after the passing of the said Amending Act, in
the second category. both in the matter of the mode of appointment, as well as the term of appointment. The Vice-Chancellor
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SUPRl!MB COURT REPORTS
[1967] 2 S.C.R..
viz., the appellant, who was in office, on the date of the passing of
Act XI of 1966, according to the respondents, therefore fell into a
class all by himself and, as such, came under a third category~ and
the legislature thought fit to take into account the special features
relating to him and, therefore, made separate provisions regarding
the termination of his office. Therefore, a suitable provision was
made. by enacting s. 13A, in respect of the existing Vice-Chancellor,
who was treated as a class, by himself.
The respondents also claimed that the Legislature was entitled
to treat the Vice-Chancellor, who was then in office, as a class by
himself and make suitable provisions with regard to the termination of his office, and therefore a legislation made for that purpose,
and on that basis, was constitutionally valid. The charge of hostility towards the appellant, or any attempt to effect discrimination,
was stoutly denied by the respondents. The respondents, therefore, urged that the classification of the appellant, as a separate
class, was proper and such a classification had a reasonable nexus,
with the object of the amending legislation.
The respondents further pleaded that the curtailment of the
term of office of an existing Vice-Chancellor, by a statute, enacted
by a competent Legislature, does not amount to 'removal' of the
Vice-Chancellor for sufficient and proved cause. The respondents
also urged that academic bodies or authorities like the Senate,
Syndicate and the Academic Council are not similarly situated like
the Vice-Chancellor, either in the matter of appointment or constitution, or in exercising functions under the statute; and therefore,
the appellant, according to them, was not entitled to place any
reliance on s. 33A, introduced by s. 7 of Act XI of 1966. For
all these reasons, they urged that Art. 14 of the Constitution was
not violated by the Legislature in enacting s. 13A ..
Before we refer to the findings recorded by the learned Judges
of the High Court, this will be a convenient stage to refer to the
material provisions of the statutes, concerned. We have already
mentioned that the appellant was functioning as the Vice-Chancel·
!or of the Osmania University, even from 1957, i.e., even before the
Osmania University Act, 1959, was passed. We have also indicated
that the administration of the University was then governed by a
Charter promulgated in 1947. The Osmania University Act, 1959
(Act IX of 19~9), (hereinafter called the Act), was passed in .1959
and published 1n the State Ga7.ette on February 2. 1959.
Secti~n 3
of the Act provided that the University, established by the Revised
Charter promulgated by H.E.H. the NiZam. of Hyderabad, on
December 8, 1947, and functioning :at Hyderabad immediately
before the commencement of the Act, be reconstituted and declared to be a University by the name of 'Osmania University'.
The said section also provided that the University wouh:I be a
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residential, teaching and affiliating University consisting of a Chancellor, a Pro•Chancellor, a Vice-Chancellor, a Senate, a Syndicate
and an Academic Council.
Section 12(1) provided for the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor, by the Chancellor, from a panel of not less than three persons
selected by a comrnittee, as constituted under sub-s. (2) thereof.
But, if the Chancellor did not approve any of the persons so selected, he could call for a fresh panel from the committee. Sub-section
(2) provided for the constitution of the committee.
Section 13 provided for the term of office, salary, allowances
etc., of the Vice-Chancellor. Under sub-s. (1), the Vice-Chancellor
was to hold office for a term of 5 years and he was eligible for reappointment. 'There was a proviso to the effect that the ViceChancellot shall continue to hold office after the expiry of his term
of appointment, for a period not exceeding six months, or until his
successor is appointed and enters upon his office, whichever is
earlier. Sub-s. (6) provided for the filling up of the vacancy, in the
post of the Vice-Chancellor, when it fell permanently vacant; and
a Vice-Chancellor so appointed as per sub-ss. (1) and (2) of s. 12,
was to hold office for a full term of 5 years.
Section 51(1) repealed the Osmania University Revised Charter,
1947; but sub-s. (2) provided that notwithstanding such repeal, the
person holding office immediately before the commencement of the
Act, as Vice-Chancellor, shall, on such commencement, be the
Vice-Chancellor of the University, and he was entitled to hold
·office until a Vice-Chancellor is appointed in accordance with the
Act.
It will be noticed, by the above reference to the material pro~i
sions of the Act, that there was no provision for removal of a ViceChancellor; and that the appointment of a Vice-Chancellor was to
be by the Chancellor, as provided for ins. 12. The term of office
of the Vice-Chancellor was 5 years and he was eligible for reappointment. The appellant, who was already a Vice-Chancellor,
functioning under the Charter of 1947, was entitled to continue, and
did continue, as the Vice-Chancellor, by virtue of s. 51 of the Act.
He was also, as already mentioned, originally appointed as ViceChancellor for a period of 5 years under the Act, in 1959.
The Act was amended in certain particulars by the Osmania
University (Amendment) Act, 1966 (Act II of 1966) (hereinafter
called the First Amendment Act). The First Amendment Act
received th~ assent of the Governor on January 29, 1966. Section
6 of the First Amendment Act, introduced s. 7 A, which we set
out:
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(1967) 2 S.C.R.
"7A. Instructions by the Gol'ernment.-The Government may, after consultation with the University, give to
the University, instructions relating to matters of major
educational policy such as pattern of University education,
medium of instruction and establishment of post-graduate
centres, to be followed by it.
(2) In the exercise of its powers and performance
of its functions under this Act, the University shall comply
with the instructions issued under sub-section (!)."
Similarly, s. 9 incorporated new sub-ss. (I) and (2) in s. 12 of the
Act, as follows :
"12. (I) The Vice-Chancellor shall be appointed by
the Chancellor.
(2) The Vice-Chancellor shall not be ren10ved from his
office except by an order of the Chancellor passed on the
ground of misbehaviour or incapacity and after due inquiry
by such person who is or has been a Judge of a High Court
or the Supreme Court as may be appointed by the Chancellor, in which the Vice-Chancellor shall have an opportunity
of making his representation against such removal."
Section 10, while effecting certain other amendments to s. 13. of
the Act, incorporated a new sub-s. (I), as follows :
"13. (I) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2)
of section I 2, the Vice-Chancellor shall hold office for a
term of three years from the date of his appointment and
shall be eligible for re-appointment to that office for
another term of three years only;
Provided that the Vice-Chancellor shall continue to
hold office after the expiry of his term of appointment
for a period not exceeding six months or until his successor
is appointed and enters upon his office, whichever is earlier."
It was this Amendment Act, when it was in the Bill stage, that
appears to have been severely criticised by various authorities on the
ground that the autonomy of the University was sought to be interfered with by the Government. In that connection, the appellant
also appears to have made several statements criticising the provisions sought to be incorporated in the Act. It is also on record that
counter-statements were made on behalf of the Government meeting these criticisms regarding the pr9posed amendments. They
have been dealt with by the High Court rather elaborately; but, we
do not propose to go into those matters, for the purpose of this
appeal.
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By virtue of the amendments effected and referred to above,
it will be seen that the term of office of the Vice-Chancellor has been
reduced from 5 years to 3 years. The manner of appointment
of the Vice-Chancellor has also been changed and a provision is
contained for removal of the Vice-Chancellor from his office, but
that can be done only in accordance with the provisions contained in
s. 12(2) of the Act. Section 7A gives power to the Government to
give instructions to the University relating to matters of majcr educational poi,;~y; and it is made obligatory on the University to comply with such instructions issued by the Government.
As we have already stated, the appellant was again appointed
as Vice-Chancellor for a period of 5 years on April 30, 1964; and he
was continuing in office when the First Amendment Act was passed.
One of the claims that is made by the appellant, in these proceedings, is that he is entitled to the protection conferred by s. 12(2)
of the Act referred to above. There does not appear to be any
controversy that any appointment of a Vice-Chancellor was made,
after the passing of the First Amendment Act .
The Act was further amended by the Osmania University
(Second Amendment) Act, 1966 (Act XI of 1966) (to be referred
to as the Second Amendment Act). It received the assent of the
Governor on May 16, 1966. Section 2 of the Second Amendment
Act, omitted s. 7 A of the Act. Section 5 of the Second Amendment Act, which introduced new s. 13A in the Act, and which provisicn is the subject of attack in these proceedinzs, is as follows :
"13A. Special provision as to the appointment of a
new Vice-Chance/lor.-Notwithstanding anything in tlri~
Act, the person holding the office of the Vice-Chancelior
immediately before the commencement of the Osmania
University (Second Amendment) Act, 1966, shall continue
to hold that office only until a new Vice-Chancellor is
appointed by the Chancellor under sub-section (I) of
section 12 and enters upon his office; and such appointment
shall be made within ninety days after such commencement.
On the appointment of such new Vice-Chancellor and
on his entering upon his office, the person holding the
office of the Vice-Chancellor immediately before such
appointment shall cease to hold that office."
Again, s. 6 of the Second Amendment Act, incorporated s. 33A in
the Act, which is as follows :
"33A. Special provision as to the reconstitution of the
Senate, Syndicate, Academic Council amd Financ~ Committee. Notwithstanding anything in this Act, the memb~rs of the Senate, the Syndicate, the Academic Council
and the Finance Committee constituted and functioning
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before the commencement of the Osmania University
A
(Amendment) Act, 1966, shall continue to be such members and function only until a new Senate, Syndicate,
Academic Council or Finance ColilllUttee, as the case
may be, is rec:mstituted under this Act. On the reconstitution of such new Senate, Syndicate, Academic Council or
Finance Committee, the members of the Senate other than
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the life members thereof, the members of the Syndicate,
Academic Council or Finance Committee, as the case may
be, 'lolding office imm~ately before such reconstitution,
shall cease to hold that office."
Even according to the respondents, s. 13A was incorporated
for the purpose of terminating the services of the appellant as
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Vice-Chancellor, so as to enable the Chancellor to make a fresh
appointment of a Vice-Char:cellor. We have referred to s. 33A
of the Act, because the appellant's case was also to the effect that
with regard to the Senate, Syndicate, Academic Council etc., there
is no provision similar to s. l 3A of the Act, though they are also
similarly situated like him.
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The findings of the learned Judges of the High Court may now
be briefly summarised :
I. The Andhra Pradesh Legislature was competent to
enact s. 5 of the Second Amendment Act. The said
section does not contravene art. 19(1 )(f) of the
Constitution.
2. The appellant was holding the office of the ViccCbancellor wh~n the Act came into force and continued
under s. 51 (2) thereof as Vice-Chancellor until the
Chancellor passed an order in 1959 appointing him
once again under the Act.
3. Section 13(1), as introduced by the First Amendment
Act, is not retrosJX""~tive and the right of the appellant
to continue as Vice-Chancellor for the full term of 5
years stood unaffected and the new s. 13(1) does not
apply to him.
4. The news. 12(2), as introduced by the First Amendment
Act, is not applicable to the appellant.
5.
Sections 12(2) and 13A of the Act, do not cover the
. une field.
Section 12(2) provides for removal by way
punishment and its operation is on a different field
I."~1n that of s. 13A where the cessation of office is
due to a curtailment of the term. Section 12(2)
applies only to the future Vice-Chancellors and s. 13A
is solely applicable to the existing Vice-Chancellor,
th~ appellant.
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Regarding the attack on s. 13A, on the basis of Art. 14 of the
Constitution that there is an unreasonable discrimination, the
learned Judges were of the view that the said section did not suffer
from any such infirmity. The learned Judges held that the impugned legislation had resulted in classifying Vice-Chancellors under two
categories, (a) the appellant, as the existing Vice-Chancellor, falling under the first category; and (b) future Vice-Chancellor, to be
appointed under the Act, who falls under the second category.
According to the High Court, the object sought to be achieved by
such classification, as could be seen from the objects and reasons of
the Second Amendment Act, 1966, was to give effect to the reduced
term of 3 years fixed under s. 13(1) of the Act after the First
Amendment. The High Court further held that the classification
adopted by s. 13A, of putting the appellant, as the existing ViceChancellor, in a class by himself, is founded on an intelligible
dilferentia, which distinguishes the appellant from future ViceChancellors, and that 'this differentia has a rational relation to
the object sought to be achieved by the Second Amendment Act.
In this connection, the learned Judges also advert to the similar
provisions enacted, at about the same time, in the Andhra Uruversity Act, 1925, and the Sri Venkateswara Uruversity Act, 1954.
The High Court is also of the view that the Legislature must
have taken into account the fact that the appellant has already
put in more than 6 years of service as Vice-Chancellor, for treating
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him as a class by himself, as distinct from future Vice-Chancellors,
who are to be appo;nted and, as such, have not put in any service
at all. The learned Judges have, no doubt, adverted to the fact
that the appellant has got an eventful. record of efficient service, full
of recognition and appreciation, but the appellant cannot plead
those circumstances when a competent legislature has passed a valid
legislative measure, under which he has to lose his office.
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Ultimately, on these findings, the High Court came to the
conclusion that s. 5 of the Second Amendment Act, introducing
s. 13A in the Act, is not vitiated by any infirmity, as alleged by the
appellant, and, finally, dismissed the appellant's writ petition.
The appellant has again raised, no doubt, most of the contentions that were taken before the High Court. But the main ground
of attack that has been pressed before us, by learned counsel for t'1.e
appellant, is the one based upon Art. 14 of the Constitution. Tue
findings recorded, and the views expressed, by the High Court are
sought to be sustained by the learned Additional Solicitor-General,
appearing for the respondents. But, we do not th;nk it necessary to
go into the larger controversy that has been raised by the appellant,
before the High Court, in the view that we take, that the appellant
must succeed in respect of the attack levelled against the impugned
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[1967] 2 S.C.R
provision, based upon Art. 14 of the Constitution. As to whether
the criticism, made by the appellant, about the proposals to amend
the Act, was or was not responsible for the JJdSsing of the legislation in question, docs not assume much of an importance; because,
the simple quest ion is whether the provision, s. I 3A, as it now stands
in the Act, is violative, in any manner of Art. 14 of the Constitution. If the answer is 'yes·, it is needless to state that the provision will have to be struck down. Therefore, we are confining
our attention only to the provisions of the Act and we will refer to
any other circumstance that is brought to our notice only for the
limited purpose of C<-nsidering the grounds of attack based upon
Art. 14 of the Constitution.
According to Mr. Setalvad, the appellant is entitled to take
advantage of the provisions of s. 12(2) of the Act. On the date
of the passing of the First Amendment Act, the appellant was,
admittedly, a Vice-Chancellor and he had been continuing as such.
He cannot be removed from his office, except in accordance with the
provisions of s. 12(2) of the Act.
But, in view of s. I 3A of the Act,
introduced by the Second Amendment Act, the appellant is forced
out of his office. within 90 days of the passing of the Second Amendment Act. The creation of two classes of Vice-Chancellors, viz.,
of Vice-Chancellors appointed under the Act and the Vice-Chancellor who was in office at the commencement of the Second Amendment Act, is not on any rational basis. Persons appointed as ViceChancellors, constitute a group, and the imp•1gned provision
makes a differentiation between the person who is a Vice-Chancellor
then and other persons who are to be appointed Vice-Chancellors
thereafter, for which differentiation, there is absolutely no basis.
Further, even if it can be stated that there is any basis for the said
classification, nevertheless, there should be a nexus or connection
hetween the basis of the classification and the object of the legislation, which aga;n, is lacking in this case.
Mr. Setalvad further urged that while the services of a ViceChancellor, appointed under the Act, could be terminated only in
:cordance with the prm ;sions conta;ned in s. 12(2) of the Act, the
appellant's services coi.ld be terminated under 5. 13A,
without
adopting the procedure laid down in s. 12(2) of the Act. There
was also no provision in the Act, Mr. Setalvad pointed out, making
s. 13(2) applicable to Vice-Chancellors to be appointed in future.
Though the term of office for a Vice-Chancellor has been fixed
und< · the Act, even after the amendments, as three years, and that
may
, ·ply to all the Vice-Chancellors, so far as the appellant is
conc~~·.1ed, his term has been reduced or restricted to 90 days under
s. 13A of the Act.
Mr. &talvad again urges that even assuming that it is open to
the Legislature, in an appropriate case, to make provisions applicable
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to only one individual or a group of individuals, neverthele~s. it is
well-established, by this Court, that the classification that is effected
by the statute must be a Classification founded on an intelligible
differentia and that differentia must have a rational relation to the•
object sought to be achieved by the statute. Applfng these two
tests, learned counsel urges, that the impugned legislation must b\!
considered to be violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution.
The 'learned Additional Solicitor-General has urged that the
term of office of the Vice-Chancellor has been reduced to three
years by the First Amendment Act. The Legislature, in order to
give effect to this provision and to enable fresh appointments to be
made under the Act, has enacted s. 13A. That section has, necessarily, to apply only to persons like the appellant who are holding
office at the time when these provisions came into force. Such a
provision, in the nature of things, cannot apply to Vice-Chancellors
who are to be appointed in future under the Act.
Therefore it is
wrong to state that all Vice-Chancellors, irrespective of the manner
or mode under which they are appointed, in present or in future,
fall under the same category. Further, the appellant has been a
Vice-Chancellor for nearly 7 years. The legislature, the learned
Solicitor points out, having regard to these circumstances, has
chosen to treat the appellant, the Vice-Chancellor holding office
on the date of the Second Amendment Act, as a class by himself
and ha~ differentiated him from persons to be appointed ViceChancellor for the first time. Such a classification, is reasonable
and it has got a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved
by the Second Amendment Act, viz., bringing about uniformity in
the tenure of three years of office for all Vice-Chancellors. The
learned Solicitor points out further that the appellant is not entitled
to the benefit of s. 12(2) of the Act. The Legislature was competent to enact the measure in question and the object of the Legislature was to give effect to the amendment provisions as early as
possible. He pointed out that similar provisions were also made
in two other enactments at about the same time, viz., in the Andhra
University Act, 1925, and the Sri Venkateswara University Act,
1954. It may be that the Legislature could have adopted another
method for replacing the present Vice-Chancellor, but that is a
matter of policy, which cannot be reviewed by the Courts, so long
as the Legislature had the competence to enact the measure and the
provisions, so enacted, do not suffer from any other legal infirmities.
We have given due consideration to the various contentions
placed before us by Mr.