# D/uirantiadhara Chemical Works Ltd v. Stall ~·J Saurashtr~ BhagwaJi]. .November 29

- **Citation:** [1957] 1 S.C.R. 167
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1956-11-29
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 176 of 1956
- **Bench:** S. R. DAS c. J
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/d-uirantiadhara-chemical-works-ltd-v-stall-j-saurashtr-bhagwaji-november-29-1330
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

BHAGWATI,
VENKATARAMA
AYYAR,
B. P. SINHA and S. K. DAs JJ.)
Legal
Practitioner-Report-Procedure-Not open to District
fudge to send back report to the Subordinate Civil fudge-Report
once made proceedings can terminate by-Final Order of the High
Court only-Member of the Bar-Officer of the Court-Duty to client
and Court-Dignity and decorum of the Court must be upheld-Conduct-Not a mattt:t: between individual member of Bar and a member
of
fudicial
Service-Disciplinary
action-Punishment-Mitigating
arcumstances-lnterference by Supreme Court-Legal Practitioners
Act (XVIII of 1879), s. 14.
.
11it appellant pleader who already had strained relation with
the
Munsif made certain objectionable remarks in open Court,
suggesting partiality and unfairness on the part of the Munsif.
The Munsif drew up a proceeding under ss. 13, 14 of the Legal
Practitioners Act, 1879, against the pleader and submitted a ~port
to the
High Court through the District Judge.
An appliption to the Additional District Judge was filed by
the pleader, for time to movt" the
High Court to ge~ an order to
have the matter heard by some
Judicial
Officer other than the
4-76 S.C. India/69
1956
D/uirantiadhara
Chemical Works
Ltd.
v.
Stall ~·J Saurashtr~
BhagwaJi].
.November 29
1956
Lalit Mohan Das
v.
Advocate--GtnMal,
Orissa.
168
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
Munsif who had made the report. One month's time was accordingly granted, and for some reason Ythich is not very apparent, the
Additional District Judge sent the record back to the Munsif. The
Additional District Judge made an effort to settle the trouble. It
was arranged that the
pleader should
apologise and a resolution
should be passed by the members of the local
Bar
Association.
Accordingly, the pleader appeared in the Court of the Munsif and
filed a written apology and expressed _his regret, and the
Munsif
dropped the proceeding.
Ir· was later found that the resolution was
not passed in the terms suggested by the Additional District JuGg:e,
and the terms of settlement suggested by the latter were not i'ull y
carried out.
Accordingly, the proceeding \Va~ re-opened and the
report was re-submitted to the District Judge who with his opinion
forwarded the same to the High Court. The High Court suspended
the pleader for 5 years.
It \Vas contended on behalf of the appellant that there was no
valid reason for reviving the proceeding, after it had once been
dropped on the submission of an apology and expression of regret.
Held, th?t the report under s. 14 of the
Legal Practitioners
Act is a report which is sub1nitted to the High Court.
When a
report is made to the
High Court by any Civil Judge subordinate
to the District Judge, the report shall be made through the District
Judge and the report must be accompanied by the opinion of such
Judge.
Once the report has been made, it is not open to the Gist·
rict Judge to send back the record to the Subordinate Civil Judge,
and no order passed by the Subordinate Civil
Judge can have the
effect of terminating or bringing to an end the proceeding.
The
High Court alone is competent to pass final orders on the report.
A member of the Bar is an officer of the Court, and though he
owes a duty to his client and must place before the Court all that
l..'.an fairly and reasonably be sub,nitted on behalf of his client, he
also owes a duty to the Court and must
uphold the dignity
and decorum of the
Court in which he is appearing.
Making
imputations of partiality and unfairness against the subordinate
Civil Judge in open Court is scandalising the Court in such a way
as to pollute the very fount of justice; such conduct is not a
matter between an individual member of the
Bar and a member of
the Judicial Service.
With regard to disciplinary action against a member of the
bar, the Supreme Court would be reluctant to interfere with the
order of the
High Court unless there are clear
mitigating
circumstances.
CML
APPELLATE
JuRISDICTION :
Civil
Appeal
No. 176 of 1956 and Petition No. 165 of 1955.
Appea

## Text

S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
167
the manner it is used to do in the ~ase of other industries where the conditions of employment and the work
to be done by the employees is of a different character.
These considerations would necessarily
have
to
be
borne in mind while the
Industrial Tribunal is adjudicating upon the disputes which have been referred to it
for adjudication.
They . do
not,
however, militate
against the . conclusion which we
have come to above
that the decision of the Industrial Tribunal to the effect
that the agarias are workmen within the definition
of
the term contained in s. 2(s) of the
Act was justified
on the materials on the record.
We accordingly see no ground for interfering with
that decision and dismiss this appeal with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
LALIT MOHAN DAS
fl.
ADVOCATE-GENERAL, ORISSA
(S. R.
DAS c. J.,
BHAGWATI,
VENKATARAMA
AYYAR,
B. P. SINHA and S. K. DAs JJ.)
Legal
Practitioner-Report-Procedure-Not open to District
fudge to send back report to the Subordinate Civil fudge-Report
once made proceedings can terminate by-Final Order of the High
Court only-Member of the Bar-Officer of the Court-Duty to client
and Court-Dignity and decorum of the Court must be upheld-Conduct-Not a mattt:t: between individual member of Bar and a member
of
fudicial
Service-Disciplinary
action-Punishment-Mitigating
arcumstances-lnterference by Supreme Court-Legal Practitioners
Act (XVIII of 1879), s. 14.
.
11it appellant pleader who already had strained relation with
the
Munsif made certain objectionable remarks in open Court,
suggesting partiality and unfairness on the part of the Munsif.
The Munsif drew up a proceeding under ss. 13, 14 of the Legal
Practitioners Act, 1879, against the pleader and submitted a ~port
to the
High Court through the District Judge.
An appliption to the Additional District Judge was filed by
the pleader, for time to movt" the
High Court to ge~ an order to
have the matter heard by some
Judicial
Officer other than the
4-76 S.C. India/69
1956
D/uirantiadhara
Chemical Works
Ltd.
v.
Stall ~·J Saurashtr~
BhagwaJi].
.November 29
1956
Lalit Mohan Das
v.
Advocate--GtnMal,
Orissa.
168
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
Munsif who had made the report. One month's time was accordingly granted, and for some reason Ythich is not very apparent, the
Additional District Judge sent the record back to the Munsif. The
Additional District Judge made an effort to settle the trouble. It
was arranged that the
pleader should
apologise and a resolution
should be passed by the members of the local
Bar
Association.
Accordingly, the pleader appeared in the Court of the Munsif and
filed a written apology and expressed _his regret, and the
Munsif
dropped the proceeding.
Ir· was later found that the resolution was
not passed in the terms suggested by the Additional District JuGg:e,
and the terms of settlement suggested by the latter were not i'ull y
carried out.
Accordingly, the proceeding \Va~ re-opened and the
report was re-submitted to the District Judge who with his opinion
forwarded the same to the High Court. The High Court suspended
the pleader for 5 years.
It \Vas contended on behalf of the appellant that there was no
valid reason for reviving the proceeding, after it had once been
dropped on the submission of an apology and expression of regret.
Held, th?t the report under s. 14 of the
Legal Practitioners
Act is a report which is sub1nitted to the High Court.
When a
report is made to the
High Court by any Civil Judge subordinate
to the District Judge, the report shall be made through the District
Judge and the report must be accompanied by the opinion of such
Judge.
Once the report has been made, it is not open to the Gist·
rict Judge to send back the record to the Subordinate Civil Judge,
and no order passed by the Subordinate Civil
Judge can have the
effect of terminating or bringing to an end the proceeding.
The
High Court alone is competent to pass final orders on the report.
A member of the Bar is an officer of the Court, and though he
owes a duty to his client and must place before the Court all that
l..'.an fairly and reasonably be sub,nitted on behalf of his client, he
also owes a duty to the Court and must
uphold the dignity
and decorum of the
Court in which he is appearing.
Making
imputations of partiality and unfairness against the subordinate
Civil Judge in open Court is scandalising the Court in such a way
as to pollute the very fount of justice; such conduct is not a
matter between an individual member of the
Bar and a member of
the Judicial Service.
With regard to disciplinary action against a member of the
bar, the Supreme Court would be reluctant to interfere with the
order of the
High Court unless there are clear
mitigating
circumstances.
CML
APPELLATE
JuRISDICTION :
Civil
Appeal
No. 176 of 1956 and Petition No. 165 of 1955.
Appeal by
special leave from the judgment and
order dated March 15 /23, 1955 of the Orissa High Court,
in Civil Reference No. 4 of 1954,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
169
N. C. Chatterji, D. N. Mukherjee and R. Patnaik_, for
the appdlantl
Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent
No. 1.
1956. November 29. The
Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
S. K. DAs J.-The appellant is Shri
Lalit Mohan
Das, a pleader of about 25 years' standing, who ordinarily practised in the
Courts at Anandapur in the district of Mayurbhanj in Orissa.
The Munsif of Anandapur, one
Shri L. B. N. S. Deo, drew up a proceeding
iinder ss. 13 and 14. of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879,
against the pleader for grossly improper
conduct in
the discharge of his professional duty and submitted
a report to the
High Court through the District Judge
of Mayurbhanj on
December 12, 1953.
The District
Judge forwarded
the report,
accompanied
by
his
opinion, to the High Court of Orissa on March 9, 1954.
The recommendation of the Munsif was that the pleader
should be suspended from practice for one year. The
reference was heard by the High Court of Orissa, and
by its order
dated
March 15, 1955, the
High Court
came to the conclusion that the pleader was guilty of
grave professional misconduct and suspended him from
practice for a period of five
years with effect
from
March 15, 1955,
Shri Lalit Mohan Das then obtained
special leave
from this Court to appeal
against the
judgment . and
order of the Orissa High Court dated March 15/23,
1955.
He also filed a petition under
Arr. 32 of the
Constitution.
Learned counsel
for the petitioner has
not pressed the petition
under
Art. 32 and
nothing
more need be said about it. We proceed not to deal
with the appeal which has been brought to this
Court
on special leave.
The charges against the appellant were the following:
On July 15, 1953, the appellant was appearing
on
behalf of the defendant in Suit No. 81 of 1952 pending
before the
Munsif of Anandapur. On that date, there
were two other suits pending before the same
Munsif.
There were petitions for timt> in all the
three suits.
1956
Lalit Mo/ran Das
v.
Advocate-Gm.tol,
Orissa.
1956
..:aJit Mohan Das
v.
Advocate-General,
Orissa
S. K. Das J.
170
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957)
The Munsif wanted to take up the oldest suit for hearing, and the oldest suit being
Suit No. 54 of 1952, it
was taken up first and live witnesses for the plaintiff
were examined. Suit No.
81 of
1952 was postponed
to August 18, 1953.
The appellant,
who appeared
for the defendant
in that suit, was informed of
the
postponement.
When so informed, the appellant made
a remark in open Court and within the hearing of the
Munsif to this effect : "If the Peshkar is gained over,
he can do everything." He then left the
Court. The
Mtinsif was surprised at the remark made and asked
the appellant
to explain his conduct,
by means of
a letter sent the same day. As the appellant
sent
no
reply, the Munsif wrote again to the appellant on July
18, 1953. To this letter the appellant sent the following reply:
"Dear Sir,
I am painfully constrained to receive memo
after
memo for some imaginary act of mine not in any
way connected with
my affairs
for
which if any
explanation is at all warranted officially.
For your second
memo
I felt it
desirable as
a gentleman to reply.
Further I may request you to be more polite while
addressing letters to lawyers.
Yours faithfully,
Sd. L. M. Das, Pleader."
It is
obvious
that the
letter of the
appellant was
couched ii;l very
improper
terms
and
considerably
strained the
relation
between the
Munsif
and
the
appellant.
The appellant, it may be stated here, was
at that time the
President of the
Anandapur SubDivisional Bar Association which consisted of about 14
legal practitioners.
On July 21, 1953, Shri B. Raghava
Rao, who was the predecessor in
office of
Shri Deo,
came to
Anandapur.
He was the guest of Shri A. V.
Ranga Rao, the Sub-Divisional Officer. One Shri N. C.
Mohanty, a pleader of Anandapur and who was related
to the appellant, came to invite the two
Munsifs to
a luncheon on the occasion of a house warming ceremony. On hearing about the trouble between Shri Deo
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
l7.1
and
the
appellant,
Shri B. Raghava Rao interceded
and it appears
that
the appellant was persuaded to
come to the house of the Sub-Divisional Officer anJ to
say that he was sorry for what had happened in court
on July 15, 1953, and that he did not mean to insult
Shri Deo ; Shri Deo, it appears,
accepted the apology
and for the time being the trouble between the two
was smoothed ov.er.
A second incident, however,
took place on September 25, 1953. The appellant was appearing for a defendant in another suit befote the Munsif.
It was Suit
No. 101 of 1952.
This suit was fixed
for hearing on
September 21, 1953.
As that date was a holiday,
the
suit was taken up on
September 22, 1953.
Another
suit, Suit No. 861 of 1952, was also fixed for hearing on
that date but Shri N. C. Mohanty, pleader
for the defendants in that suit, took time on the ground of the
illness of one of the defendants,
which ground
was
supported by a medical certificate. In Suit
No. 101 of
1952 also, the
defendants
applied
for time
on ·the
ground of illness of their witnesses; but there being no
medical certificate in support of the allegation
of illness and no witnesses having been
summoned
in that
suit, the learned Munsif refused to grant time, and one
Shri P. N. Patnaik who also represented the defendants
agreed to go on with the suit. The suit was then heard
for two days, i.e., on
September 22 and 23, 1953, and
at the request of the defendants' lawyers the hearing
of arguments
was
postponed to
September 25, 1953.
On that date the appellant came to
Court accompanied
by his junior Shri P. N. Patnaik. for the purpose
of
arguing the case on behal£ .!Jf the aefendants
At the
very outset of his argilments the
appellant made the
following remarks : "The Court is unfair to me, while
the Court was fair to Mr. Misra (meaning Shri Bhagabat Prasad Misra who was appeari.flg for the plaintiffs
in that suit). The
Court is accommodating and granting adjournments to Mr. Misra while it was not accommodating me."
The
Munsif took objection to these
remarks but nothing untoward happened.
The appellant concluded his arguments.
1956
Lalil Malian Das
v.
AdrJ«41#.Ge~eral,
Orissa
S. K. Das J.
1956
Ldil Mohall Das
...
AtWocau-Cennal,
Oriua
S. IC. Das J.
172
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
A third incident brought matters to a climax, and
this incident took place on
September 29, 1953. The
appellant wa~ appearing
for the defendants in
Suit
No. 6 of 1951.
In that suit a preliminary point of
jurisdiction and sufficiency of court fees was raised and
Shri B. Raghava Rao, the predecessor in office of Shri
Deo, had dealt with the point and decided it against
the appellant's client. A Civil Revision taken
to
the
High Court was also rejected. The appellant, however,
again pressed the same
preliminary
point
and
on
September 29, 1953, Shri Deo passed an order dismissing the preliminary objection.
When this order
was
shown to the appellant, he stood up and shouted at the
top of his voice-"! on behalf of the
Bar
Association,
Anandapur, challenge the
order of the
Court.
The
Court has no principle as it is passing one kind of order
in one suit and another kind of order in another suit."
The Munsif, it appears, was disgusted at the conduct
of the appellant and he stood up and left
the Court
room, directing the bench clerk to send a telegram to
the District
Judge.
A telegram was accordingly sent
to the District Judge asking him to come to Anandapur.
The District Judge asked for a detailed report which
was sent on October 1, 1953.
On October 5, 1953, the
Munsif drew up a proceeding against the appellant on
a charge under s. 13 of the
Legal
Practitioners
Act
referring
therein to the three incidents
mentioned
above.
The appellant
was asked to
show cause by
October 26, 19531 On November 3, 1953, the appellant
denied the allegations
made and took up the attitude
that the Munsif was not competent to hold the enquiry
on the ground that the Munsif was in the position of a
complainant.
The appellant gave a different
version
of what happened on the three dates in question. \Vith
regard to the incident of July 15, 1953, the appellant's
plea was that some other client had
come to him in
connection with a criminal case pending
in another
Court and to that client the appellant had said that an
enquiry should be made from the Peshkar as to the
date fixed.
With regard to the incident on September
25, 1953, the plea of the appellant was a total denial,
and with regard to the last incident, the appellant said
-
...
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
173
that the Munsif behaved rudely and wanted to assault
the appellant, for which the appellant appears to have
filed a petition to the Governor of Orissa on September
30, 1953, for according sanction for the prosecution
of
the Munsif.
It may be stated here that on
October 8, 1953, a
resolution was
passed, numbered
Resolution 6, which
purported to be a resolution
on behalf of the
Bar
Association, Anandapur. The resolution was in these
terms:
"Resolved that on September 29, 1953; the Court's
(Munsif) action on the dais in rising from the
chair,
thumping on the table, shouting at the top of his voice,
and using the words 'shut up' against
one honourable
member (President) of this
Bar
Association
is quite
unprecedented, undesirable and
affecting the prestige
of the Bar and may cause apprehension in the mind of
the litigant public to get fair justice."
It may be sta • .:d that some other members of the Bar
dissociated themselves from the aforesaid resolution at
a later date.
The proceeding
against
the
appellant
under the
Legal Practitioners Act started, as we have
said earlier, on October 5, 1953, and the appellant filed
his written
statement on
November
3,
1953. On
November 5, 1953, the Munsif sent the record
to the
District Judge in connection with the plea of the appellant that the enquiry
should be made by some other
judicial officer.
The District Judge, however, took the
view that under the provisions of ss. 13 and 14 of the
Legal Practitioners
Act the enquiry should be made by
the
Munsif himself and the records
were
accordingly
sent back to the
Munsif.
Thereafter, the appellant
non-co-operated and did not
appear
at the
enquiry
though mor~ than one communication was sent to him.
The enquiry was concluded on December 11, 1953, and
the Munsif submitted his report to
the
High Court
through the
District Judge on December 12, 1953. On
December 22, 1953, the appellant
filed an application
to the Additional District Judge for time to move the
High Court to get an order to have the matter heard
by some other judicial officer. One month's time was
1956
lalit Mvhan Das
v.
Advocate-Genersl,
Or'ssa
S. /(..Das J.
Lalil Mohan Das
v.
Advocatt·General,
Orissa
S. 1(. Das J.
174
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
accordingly granted and the Additional District Judge,
for some reason which. is not very apparent, sent· the
record back to the learned
Munsif.
In the meantime,
the
Additional District
Judge, it appears,
made an
effort to settle the trouble. On December 23, 1953, he
met the members
of the
Bar
Association
and the
Munsif at the inspection bungalow at Anandapur on
his way to
Mayurbhanj. At a meeting held there, a
copy of a draft resolution to be passed by the members
of th'e Bar
Association, Anandapur, was made over.
This draft resolution was in these terms :
"This
Association
regrets
very
much that an
incident relating to the bench clerk of the Civil Court
should have led to the subsequent unhappy differences
between the Bench and the members of the
Bar. As
in the interest of the litigant
public
it is felt not
desirable to allow these
strained
feelings to
continue
further,
this Asscciation unanimously resolves to withdraw Resolution No. 6 dated October 8, 1953, passed
against the
Court and communicate copies of the same
to
the
addressees
previously
communicated.
It is
further resolved
to request
the
Court to
see to the
desirability of withdrawing the proceedings
that had
been started against the various
members of the
Bar
and their registered clerks on their. expressing regret to
the Court Individually in connection
with those pr~
ceedings. It is further resolved that the members of
the 'Bar involved ·in the proceedings be
requested to
take immediate steps in this direction. The
Association
hopes that the bench clerk who has
to
some extent
been the cause for this friction between the Bench and
the Bar would be replaced by a person from a different
place at an earlier date."
On January 8, 1954, the appellant appeared in the
Court of the
Munsif and filed a written apology
and
expressed his regret.
His signature was taken on the
order-sheet and the order of that date reads :
"Sri L. M. Das, pleader, appears and expresses his
regret.
So the proceeding No. 2 of 1952 is dropped.
Intimate Additional District Judge."
No resolution, however, was
passed in
the terms
'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
175
suggested
by
the
Additional
District
Judge.
On
January 19, 1954, two resolutions were
passed in the
following terms :
"No. 1.
In view of the fact that past misunderstandings between the Munsif and members of the Bar
caused by an incident relating to
the bench clerk of
the
Civil Court, have been removed by amicable settlement of differences existing between both parties, it is
unanimously
resolved
that
resolution
No. 6
dated
October 8, 1953, stands withdrawn.
No. 2.
It is further resolved that the copies of the
above resolution be sent to
the addressees previously
communicated of resolution No. 6 of October 8, 1953."
The learned
Munsif, it appears, wanted to see the
minute book of the
Bar
Association, presumably to
pnd out in what terms the
proposed
resolution was
passed.
There was again
trouble
between the Munsif
and the appellant over the
production of the minute
book.
Ultimately, the minute
book
was
produced,
and on February 2, 1954, the Munsif expressed the view
that the resolution passed did not fully carry out the
terms of settlement suggested by the Additional District
Judge.
Accordingly, the
proceeding
was
re-opened
and the record was re-submitted to the District
Judge.
The District Judge thereupon sent the report of the
Munsif to the
High Court accompanied by his opinion.
The High Court dealt with the report with the result
which we have already indicated.
The main contention of Mr. N. C. Chatterji, who has
appeared on behalf of the
~ppellant, is this. He has
submitted that there was no valid reason for reviving
the proceeding against the appellant, after the proceeding had been dropped on
January 8,
1954, on the
submission of an apology and expression of regret
by
his client ; because, in substance ,and effect, the terms
of the settlement suggested by the
Additional
District
Judge had
been
complied
with. - According to Mr.
Chatterji, an expression of regret
having
been made
earlier than the passing of the resolutions
on January
19, 1954, by the
Anandapur Bar
Association and the
bench clerk having
already
been
transferred · from
1956
Lalit Mohan Das
Ir.
Advoeall-Gentt"ol,
Orissa
S. K. Das J.
. 1956
Lolit MoMn DM
v.
A.d'lJOcaU-Gtrural,
Orina
S. K. Das J.
176
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
Anandapur, the resolutions could not be in the same
terms as were
suggested by the
Additional
District
Judge ; but the two resolutions passed
on January 19,
1954, coupled with the expression of individual regret
made on January 8, 1954, complied in
substance
with
the essential terms of the draft resolution
which the
Additional
District Judge had made over on
December
23, 1953.
Mr. Chattcrji has contended that
this view
of the matter has not been properly considered by the
High Court.
He has submitted
that in view of the
order passed by the learned Munsif himself on January
8, 1954, the proceeding against
the appellant
should
be treated as having been dropped
and concluded on
that date.
Mr. Chatterji has
also drawn our attention to
ground No. VI in the petition for special leave dated
May 9,
1955, in which the appellant said that he was
"willing and prepared to
submit before this
Court
expressions of unreserved regret and
apology
for his
error of judgment and indiscretion, if any, in the discharge of his professional duties."
We cannot accept the contention of Mr. Chattcrji
that the order passed by the learned Munsif on January
8, 1954, had the effect of terminating and bringing to
an end the
proceeding against the
appellant.
The
learned Judges of the High Court rightly pointed
out
that the report of the Mul!sif dated December 12, 1953,
was a report which was submitted to the
High Court.
Under the provisions of s. 14 of the
Legal Practitioners
Act, such a report had to be forwarded to tl1e
High
Court by the
District
Judge, accompanied
by
his
opinion. It was not open to the Additional
District
Judge to send back the record to tlie
Munsif. The
efforts of the
Additional
District
Judge were, indeed,
well-intentioned; but at that stage, after the Munsif had
made his report to the High Court, the High Court
alone was competent to pass final orders in the matter.
Apart, however, from that difficulty, we
are not
satisfied that the terms of settlement suggested by the
Additional District Judge were fully
complied with in
this case. It is true that the appellant did express his
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
177
regret and to that extent the settlement
suggested by
the Additional District
Judge was carried out. It is
also true that by
the resolutions
passed on January
19, 1954, the earlier resolution of
October 8, 1953, was
cancelled, but one essential and important part of the
terms of settlement suggested by the
Additional District
Judge was that the
Association should express regret
at what
had
happened.
Resolution
No. 1 dated
January 19, 1954, was
so worded
as
to
give the
impression that
the
misunderstanding
between
the
Munsif and the appellant was all due to the bench
clerk and that misunderstanding having been removed
Resolution No. 6 dated October 8, 1953, should be withdrawn. There is nothing
in the
resolution to show
that the
appellant was in any way at fault, a
fault
which he had\expiated by an expression of regret. It
may be pointed out that the earlier resolution, Resolution No. 6 dated October 8, 1953, had been communicated to a large number of persons and authorities
and
the later resolution dated
January 19, 1954, passed in
the diluted form in which it was passed, could hardly
wido the damage which had been made by the earlier
resolution.
On merits we agree with the High Court that the
appellant was undoubtedly guilty of grave professional
misconduct.
A member of the
Bar undoubtedly owes
a duty to his client and must place before the Court all
that can fairly and reasonably be submitted on
behalf
of his client.
He may even submit that a
particular
order is not correct and may ask for a review of that
order. At the same time, a member of tl1e
Bar is an
officer of the
Court and owes a duty to the Court in
which he is appearing.
He must uphold the dignity
and decorum of the Court and must not do anything to
bring the Court itself into disrepute.
The
appellant
before us _grossly overstepped the
limits of
propriety
when he made imputations of partiality and unfairness
against the
Munsif in open Court.
In suggesting that
the Munsif followed no principle
in his
orders, the
appellant was adding insult
to injury,
because the
Munsif had merely upheid an order
of his predecessor
on the preliminary point of jurisdiction and Court fees,
\
1956
IAlit Mohan Das
v.
Advorate-General,
Ori.rsa
S. K. Das].
1956
Lalit Mohan DaJ
v.
Ad1JOeale-Gennal,
Orissa
S. K. Das J.
178
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
which order had been upheld by the
High Court in
revision. Scandalising
the Court in such manner is
. really polluting the very fount of justice; such conduct
as the appellant indulged in was not a matter between
an individual member of the Bar and a member of the
judicial service ; it brought into disrepute the
whole
administration of justice.
From that point
of view,
the conduct of the appellant was highly reprehensible.
The appellant gave no
evidence in support
of his
version of the incidents, though he had an opportunity
of doing so, if he so desired.
The only point left for consideration is the question
of punishment. On a matter of this nature, this Court
would be reluctant to interfere with the
order of the
High
Court as respects the disciplinary action
to be
taken against a member of the
Bar who has been
guilty of professional misconduct. There are, however,
two mitigating circumstances.
One is that the learned
Munsif himself recommended suspension of practice
for one year only. · The appellant was suspended from
practice · with effect
from
March 15, 1955. The order
of suspension has now lasted for a little more than a
year
and
eight
months.
The
second
mitigating
circumstance is that the appellant did file a written
apology
and
expressed
regret
to
the
learned
Munsif on January 8, 1954.
It is unfortunate that the
appellant did not take up a more contrite attitude in
the High Court.
In this Court, the appellant tried to
make out that the proceeding against him should not
have been revived ; he however showed his willingness
to offer an apology and expression of regret. Having
regard to all the
circumstances, we think that the
punishment imposed errs on the side of excess. We
would accordingly reduce the period of suspension to
two years only.
In the result, the petition under Art. 32 is dismissed
and the appeal is also dismissed, subject to the reduction of the period of suspension as indicated above. In
the circumstances of this case, there will be no order
for costs.
Appeal dismissed.