# ' D VENKATA REDDY v. R SULTAN & OTHERS - **Citation:** [1976] 3 S.C.R. 445 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1976-02-24 - **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1170 of 1973 - **Bench:** P. K. GOSWAMI ANDS. MURTAzA FAzAL ALI - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/d-venkata-reddy-v-r-sultan-others-6755 - **Pages:** 48 ## Headnote 445 Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951 ), ss. 81 and 86(5)-App/ication for a1ne11dment of petition for giring material part;culars-To what extent 1nay be allowed~A mendrnent allowed in \·iolation of s. 86(5) without objection-If could be challenged in appeal to Supre1ne Court. Election petition-Approach of court to evidence regci.~ding corrupt practices--T ainted · and interested evidencc-J\/tcessi1y for corroborationAttitude of court to poll verdict-Material particulars and evidence, scdpe. The n~spondent, who wa~ a Muslim, was the Congress candidate for election to the State Legit1lative Assembly. He challenged the appellant's elect;on, and the High Court allowed the election petition on three grounds (l) that the appellant committed a corrupt practice under s. 123 ( 1), Representation of the Pl!ople Act, 19•51 in that he offered a bribe to the Jespondent to indu1.,,'e him not to contest the election; (2) that the appellant committed corrupt prac .. tice under s. 123(3A) in that he issued and personally distributed a pamphlet containing communal allegations. with a view to create ill-feeling among the voters; and (3) that the appellant'si agents distributed that pamphlet with the appellant's contest. Allowing the appeal to this_ Court, HELD : ( 1) (a) While it ii; necessary to protect the purity of elections by ensuring that the candidares do not secure the valuable votes of the people by undue influence, fraud, communal propaganda. bribery or other corrupt practices, the valuable verdict of the people at the polls must be given due A B c D res_p~ct and should not be disregarded or ~et at naught on vague, frivolous or E fanciful ailegations, or on evidence which is of a shaky or pre-varicating character. [450F-G, HJ (b) The onus lies heavily on the election-petitioner to make out a strong case for setting aside the election. He must, in onler to succeed, plead \>II material particulars and prove them by clear and cogent evidence. [450G; 451K] ( c) The al1egations of corru'1t practice being in the nature of a quasicriminal charge, mu9t be proved beyond reasonable doubt. When the electionpetitioner seeks to prove the charge by purely partisan evidence of his workers, agents. supporters and friends, the court would have to approach the evidence with great care and caution, and would, as a matter of prudence, th-Ough not as a rule of law, require corroboration of such evidence from independent quarters, unless the court is fully sati9fied that the evidence is so creditworthy and true, that no corroboration to lend further assurance is necessary. [451A-C] (d) The attempt of the agents or supporters of the defeated candidate is always to get the election set aside by fair mean9 or foul and the evidence of such witnesses, must, therefore, be regarded as highly interested and tainted evidence. [451C-D] (e) When, the evidence led by the election-petitione-r, even thoug:h consis· tent. is fraught with inherent iinprobabilities and replete with unnatural tendencies, the .court may refuse to accept such evidence, because consistency alone is not the conclusive test of truth. It is, however, difficult to lay down any rule of universal application and each case will have to be decided on its own facts. f451D-El Bhanu Kumar Shastri" v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia & Ors., [1971] I S.C.C. 370; Rahim Khan v. Khurshid AhmPd & Ors .. r1974l 2 S.C.C. 660; Abdul Hussain Mir v. Shomsul Hurln nnd rn"'thPr. p9751 4 ~.C.C. 533 and Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh & Ors. (1968] · 3 S.C.R. 102, followed. 14-L522SCI/76 F G H A B c 0 E F G 446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1976] 3 S.C.R. (2) In the present case, the High Coun correctly adumbrated the legal propositions but had not correctly applied them to the facts and evidence. It also applied different standards in appreciating the evidence. It readily accepted the evidence of two witnesses on one issue while rejecting as partisan and in .. terested on another issue. [453A-D] (3) The cumulative effect of' thei inher ## Text _Characters 0–39,881 of 160,466. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39881 for what follows._ I ' D VENKATA REDDY v. R SULTAN & OTHERS February 24, 1976 (P. K. GOSWAMI ANDS. MURTAzA FAzAL ALI, JJ.) 445 Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951 ), ss. 81 and 86(5)-App/ication for a1ne11dment of petition for giring material part;culars-To what extent 1nay be allowed~A mendrnent allowed in \·iolation of s. 86(5) without objection-If could be challenged in appeal to Supre1ne Court. Election petition-Approach of court to evidence regci.~ding corrupt practices--T ainted · and interested evidencc-J\/tcessi1y for corroborationAttitude of court to poll verdict-Material particulars and evidence, scdpe. The n~spondent, who wa~ a Muslim, was the Congress candidate for election to the State Legit1lative Assembly. He challenged the appellant's elect;on, and the High Court allowed the election petition on three grounds (l) that the appellant committed a corrupt practice under s. 123 ( 1), Representation of the Pl!ople Act, 19•51 in that he offered a bribe to the Jespondent to indu1.,,'e him not to contest the election; (2) that the appellant committed corrupt prac .. tice under s. 123(3A) in that he issued and personally distributed a pamphlet containing communal allegations. with a view to create ill-feeling among the voters; and (3) that the appellant'si agents distributed that pamphlet with the appellant's contest. Allowing the appeal to this_ Court, HELD : ( 1) (a) While it ii; necessary to protect the purity of elections by ensuring that the candidares do not secure the valuable votes of the people by undue influence, fraud, communal propaganda. bribery or other corrupt practices, the valuable verdict of the people at the polls must be given due A B c D res_p~ct and should not be disregarded or ~et at naught on vague, frivolous or E fanciful ailegations, or on evidence which is of a shaky or pre-varicating character. [450F-G, HJ (b) The onus lies heavily on the election-petitioner to make out a strong case for setting aside the election. He must, in onler to succeed, plead \>II material particulars and prove them by clear and cogent evidence. [450G; 451K] ( c) The al1egations of corru'1t practice being in the nature of a quasicriminal charge, mu9t be proved beyond reasonable doubt. When the electionpetitioner seeks to prove the charge by purely partisan evidence of his workers, agents. supporters and friends, the court would have to approach the evidence with great care and caution, and would, as a matter of prudence, th-Ough not as a rule of law, require corroboration of such evidence from independent quarters, unless the court is fully sati9fied that the evidence is so creditworthy and true, that no corroboration to lend further assurance is necessary. [451A-C] (d) The attempt of the agents or supporters of the defeated candidate is always to get the election set aside by fair mean9 or foul and the evidence of such witnesses, must, therefore, be regarded as highly interested and tainted evidence. [451C-D] (e) When, the evidence led by the election-petitione-r, even thoug:h consis· tent. is fraught with inherent iinprobabilities and replete with unnatural tendencies, the .court may refuse to accept such evidence, because consistency alone is not the conclusive test of truth. It is, however, difficult to lay down any rule of universal application and each case will have to be decided on its own facts. f451D-El Bhanu Kumar Shastri" v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia & Ors., [1971] I S.C.C. 370; Rahim Khan v. Khurshid AhmPd & Ors .. r1974l 2 S.C.C. 660; Abdul Hussain Mir v. Shomsul Hurln nnd rn"'thPr. p9751 4 ~.C.C. 533 and Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh & Ors. (1968] · 3 S.C.R. 102, followed. 14-L522SCI/76 F G H A B c 0 E F G 446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1976] 3 S.C.R. (2) In the present case, the High Coun correctly adumbrated the legal propositions but had not correctly applied them to the facts and evidence. It also applied different standards in appreciating the evidence. It readily accepted the evidence of two witnesses on one issue while rejecting as partisan and in .. terested on another issue. [453A-D] (3) The cumulative effect of' thei inherent improbabilities and the intrinsic infirmities of the evidence for the respondent, and the n.nnatural conduct of th"C: respondent and his witnesses, lead to the conclusion that the respondent had failed to prove the allegation of the offer of bribe. [465B-C] (a) The respondent bore a serious animus against the appellant and yet it If was alleged that the appellant offered him a bribe even though they were not well-acquainted with each other. [458G; 460D] (b) The offer was alleg\;:d to have been made in the presence of two witnesses, in a crowded place, and pressed upon the respondc11t even though he spurned it. The High Court is not right in its view that an offer could have been made as alleged, and 1hat only for actual payment a secluded place could be chosen. [ 458F-H; 459B-C] (c) The High Court is also not right in its view that because the appellant ....J.. was at the Taluk Office when the respondent went there the appellant would have offered the bribe. On the contrary, the respondent, for that very reason, might have concocted the story of the offer of bribe, [457E-FJ (d) The High Court failed to consider, (i) that while it is easy to make an allegation of offer of bribe, it is v~ry difficult for the person against whom it is made to rebut it; [457G-H] (ii) that the allegation was sought to be proved by the respondent, by the partisan and highly interested testimony of two witnesses and \Vas sought to be corroborated by the equally interested testimony of two others to whom the incident was alleged to hav~ been narrated shortly thereafter; and that the respondent had not examined any independent witness, even though such witnesses were available; [457H-458AJ (iii) that the appellant would not have attempted to bribe the respondent, because, the respondent had the support of the Congress. and eve"n if he withdrew, the Congress would have put up another candidate. [461B-CJ (iv) that the respondent had not complained about the hribe either to the local Congress committee or to the police; and [461F-G; 464D-E] (v) that there was no reference either to the corroborating witneses or to the narration of the incident of the offe·r of the bribe' to those witnesses, in the petition. If it were true it isunlik~ly that the respondent would have omitted a reference to it. [464A-B} ( e) Further. the f11.ct of repetition of the story of the offer of bribe to the two coJToborating witnesses was a material particular or an additional fact pertaining to the averments in the petition and not a mere matter of evidence. Since it was not mentioned in the petition it has to be excluded from consideration. [ 464 B-C] (f) As the alleged offer is an electoral offence of a quasi-criminal nature, the onus- of proving it was initially on the respondent, but he failed to dis-. ~ charge the onus. [ 4640-H] (g) If such a serious allegation is allowed to be proved again"t a ~uccessful candidate by partisan, inrerested and improbable evidence, without any inde· pendent corroboration, it would give an easy handle to the defeated candidates "'- H to destroy the sanctity of the electoral process. [464A-465B] ( 4) The respondent has. not addu~d any satisfactory evidence that the offendin!? pamphlet was printed by the appellant or distributed by him personally, whereas, the appellant has, through his evidence, though of a I D, V. REDDY V, R. SULTAN t47 negative ch?racter, shown that the probabilities are that the appellant did not A have it pnnted and that he did not distribute it. [491E-F1 (a) Distribution of an objectionable pan1phlet is a corrupt practice. under s. 123(4) and the pamphlet in the present case, containing communal propaganda comes under s. 123(3A) as w,11. [471G-H; 474Jc-r] (b) The allegation of publishing such an objectionable pamphlet is easy to make and difficult to rebut. The court must subject the tainted and interested evictencoe regarding its publication to the strictest scrutiny because it can be B printed by the defeated candidate in any press with secrecy, circulated among his supporters and he can make them say that it was printed, published and circulated by the successful candidate. l471H-472B] Baburao Bagaji Karemoga and ors. v. Govind & Ors., [1974J 3 S,C.R. 719, followed. (c) The appellant had denied the printing: or publication of the pamphlet and the respondent failed tn discharge his ini1ial onus of proving that the apC pellant printed and distributed it. [4720-E] ( d) Since there were a considerable number of Muslim voters in the consti- )- tuencv. thf! appellant would not have taken the risk of offending them by circulating such a pamphlet. The respondent, on the other hand, had a strong motive to reverse the apnellant's election by any possible means, and he had his own press. [472H; 474F-G, HJ (e) The High Court was wrong in its approach that since the pamphlet contained anti-Muslim propaganda it would not have been printed by the respondent. An unsuccessful candidate, motivated by the desire to unseat a successful candidate, would stood to any device to show that the successful candidate was guilt of a corrupt practice. [472G] (f) Merely btecause the respondent disclosed the name of the press where he got some other pamphlets printed, it could not be contended by him that he would hnve disclosed the nnme of the piess which printed the offending pamphlet if he got it printed. The content5 of the namphlet were so offensive that the printer would not have taken the risk of disclosing the name of the press and expose it to legal action. [491B-C] (g) Most of the witnesses for the respondent who stated that the pamphlet was given to them before or during the election were of the turn coat type, that is. persons who claimed to have worked for the -appellant but .gave eviden~ for the respondent; and the others were in some wav or the other totally interested in the respondent or connected with him. I479F] D E Rnhint Khan v. Khurshid Ahnied and others_. [-1974] 2 SCC 660. followed. F (h) One witness gave evidence that he received the pamphlet from his wife during the election. but since shf': was riot examined, the evidence was rightly rejected by the High Court. [490H-491A] (i) The Hi2h Court held that the pamphlet was in existence before or during the election, applying the test that the pamphlet was produced by the witness who stated that it was given to him by the appellant. But that cannot be a safe criterion because, the respondent could have handed it over to G the witness hefore he gave evidence. Further, the probabilities are that it was not then in existence. [471C~E] (i) Respectable witness of the appellant gave evidence that no such pamphlet was circulated, for then they would have known about it. Also. c-onsidoering its provocative language, it i-; unlikely that the Government officials nosted to prevent anv communal propaganda by the candidates would have failed to notice it. [473B; 4740-H] (ii) Further. the respondent \vould not have failed to give in the petition or in the material particulars furnished by him later, the names of the persons from whom he came to know about the pamphlet. The respandent collected material.a for filing the election petition suon after the appellant was declared H ·B 'C D F G . SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1976] 3 S.C.R • elected and more than a month before filing it. In spite of such a full and comiJ1eLe opporlun1ty b.;;fore n11ng the peltuon, and later when the appellant app1i\':d for funher particulars n:garding the dis.ribu.ion of the pamphlet, the re:.pondent merely gave the names of certain villages and i.h~ dates on which the pamt-'hlet was alleged to ha\ e been d.stributeo; but he did not mention the name of a single person to whom the pamphlet had been dis.ributed by the appellant persona.'ly, even thougn, according to the evidenc~ led by the responuent, he was in possession of such damaging evidence against the appellant. [410Jl-41lli; 475A-B; 490c>Jo] (iii) 'fhe respondent had made several complaints to the police about var.ous n1atters but did not complain about the pan1phlet either to the p-01ice or the local Long,ess committ...e. Jf h.s silence was due to legal advice, as contended, he should have given the ~xplanation in the petition or exam.ned the lawyer who gave such an advice. [487E-F; 490E-F] (5) (a) Section ?1 of the Representation of the Pc0ple Act, 1951, provides that the election petition shall -be filed within 45 days from the date of the election of the retufned candidate. Therefore, any allegullon of corrupt pfactice which is not made in the election petition iiled v.i1hin the time alloesult which \Vas never envisaged by the statute. [466H; 467B-C, E-H] \ San1ant N. Balakrishha etc. v. George Fernandez & or.r, etc., [1969] 3 S.C.R. --+- 6{)3, followed. · (b) In the present case, reading the aVerments in election petition as a whole, however_ broadly or liberally they are construed, the irresistible inference is that the respondent had laid special stress on the fact of distribution of the pamphlet by the appellant alone. Wherever the averment of distribution of the pamphlet is made in the petition, it is s.tated that it was done by the appellant. There is absolutely no averment that the pamphlet was distributed by the agents, workers or supporters or friend<; of the aopellant. Hence, it could not be contended by the respondent that the averments include not merely distiihution by the appellant, but also by his agents and workers. Since there was no pleading at all by the respondent that the pamphlet was distributed by his agenls, etc., particulars supplied by the respondent in his application for amendment of his petition on the point of distribution by agents, etc., must be compl-etely dig. re,garded. The court al-so has no jurisdiction to allow. su~h particulars to bo given with respect to the fact that the pamphlets were dtslnbu!ed by the agents and supporters of the appellant. Therefore, t~e amendment, 10 respect of the third ground on which the judgment of the High Court was based~ should not have been allowed, the particulars mentioned by the respondent on this item must be disregarded, the eviderice given by him should be excluded from consideration, and the finding of the High Court should be set aside. [468H-469D, E-F] (c) The attention of the High. Court was not drawn by the appellant to this aspect, but, as it is a pure question of law and amounts to violation of the statutory mandate in s. 86(5). this Court can decide on the correctness of the order of the High Court, allowing particulars regarding distribution of pamphlet by the agents etc., of the appellant. [ 469D-E] D. v. REDDY v. R. SULTAN. (Fazal A4, !.) i 449 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1170 of 1973. A\ (From the judgment and order dated the 25-4-1973 of the Andhra ' Pradesh High Court in Election Petition No. 4 of 1972) P. Basi Reddy, C. Sadasiva Reddy, G. Narayana Rao and Mrs. Vimala Markendeywu, tor the appellant. ·· • B. Shiv Shankar, A. V. Rangam, Miss A. Subhashini and K. VenB • kata Ramiah, for the respodents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL Au, J .-This is an appeal under s. 116A of the Representation uf the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act') by Venkata Reddy who was Respondent No. 1 in the election petition C filed beiore the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The appeal anses · out of the general elections held to the Andhra Pradesh Leoislative Assembly in March 1972 from Gooty Assembly constituen\Oy. The appellant Vcnkata Reddy, T. Papa Sab and R. Sultan (the election petitioner before the High Court) applied for Congress ticket for the Gooty Assembly Constituency seat. The District Congress Committee, Anantapur recommended the names of R. Sultan, Papa Sab and Ramachandra Goud but did not recommend the name of the appellant. The Andhra Pradesh Provincial Congress Committee, however, recommended the name of R. Sultan the first respondent alone. This recommendation appears to have been accepted by the All India Congress Committee which gave the Congress ticket to the first respondent R. Sultan on February 1, 1972 as a result thereof the other candidates, namely, the appellant Venkata Reddy, T. Papa Sab and Venkata Subbayya decided to contest the election as independent candidates, whereas Venkata Naidu got the Congress (0) ticket. The polling to the aforesaid constituency was held on March 8, 1972 and counting was done on March 12, 1972 on which date the result was also declared. The appellant was declared elected having secured 19,974 votes polled in the constituency. Respondent No. 1 R. Sultan Jost by a narrow margin of 471 votes having polled 19,503 votes. The other respondents were accordingly defeated and we are not at a11 concerned with their cases. Respondent No. 1 R. Sultan filed an .election petitron before the Anc'hra Pradesh High Court on April 20, 1972 which was assigned to Sriramulu, J., who tried the election petition. For the sake of convenience we shall refer to Venkata Reddy as the apoellant anJ R. Sultan who was the election petitioner before the High Court as the contesting respondent. The contesting resJ)Ondent sought to challenge the election of the appellant on various grounds and alleged that the appellant had indulged in a Jame nmnber of corrupt practices as envisaged bv s. 123 nf the Act. namely, bribery, corn~p lion, communal propaganda; impersonation of · voters. exces<•"e expenses, improper rejection and recept~on :nf ballot papers ~tc. The contesting respondent also filed an awhcatton before the 'fna.l Jud.~e that as number of irrerularities were committed in th~ reiectton ~d .acceptance of the ballot pape~s, the Court should allow scrutmy. E F G H l ' A B c D E F G H 450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1976] 3 S.C.R. .and ;ecouming of the votes. The Court, after considering the evitlence of the parties on this point, eventually allowed the application, but ultimately it held that even if there was any irregularity it had not caused any material change in the electron. The petition was resisted by the appellant who emphatically denied all the allegations made by the contesting respondent and submitted that the elections were free and fair and that the appellant had not indulged in any corrupt practice at all. The appellant further pleaded that all the ,allegations made by the contesting respondent were figment of his imagination and were totally untrue. On the question 'ill corrupt practices, particularly the distribution of objectionable pamphlets, as !he contesting respondent had not given full and material particulars in his ckction petition, the appellant filed an application on July 7, 1972 praying that the Court may direct the contesting respondent to file better particulars by way of amendment. The Court directed the contesting respondent to supply fresh particulars and accordingly the contesting respondent filed his application for amendment by incorporating material particulars on Augu~t 29, 1972. On the pleadings of the parties the High Court framed as many as 3 S issu-~s :in the present case. After taking the evidence of the parties the !Court decid-ed all the issues against the contesting respondent except issues Nos. 7, 26 and 27 which were decided in favour of the contesting respondent. In view of the findings given by the learned Judge the election of the appellant was set aside, but the learned Judge refused to grant the relief to the contesting respondent for being declared as duly elected to the seat in question. It is against this decision that the appellant has come up to this Court in appeal. Mr. P. Basi Reddy learned counsel for the appellant has assailed before us the findings of the High Court on issues Nos. 7, 26 and 27 as these were the only issues which affected the appellant. Mr. B. Shiv Sar,kar, learned counsel for the contesting respondent has endeavoured to support the judgment of the High Court by submitting that the findings arrived at by the High Court were based on a correct and proper appreciation of the evidence and the facts and circumstances of the record. In a democracy such as ours, the purity and sanctity of elections, the sacrosanct and sacred nature of the electoral process must be. preserved and maintained. The valuable verdict of the people at the polls must be given due respect and candour and should not he disregarded or set at naught on va~e, indefinite, frivolous or fanciful allegations or on evidence which is of a shakv or prevaricating character. It is well settled that the onus lies heavily on the election petitioner to make out a strong case for setting a'ide an election. In our country election is a fairly costly and expensive venture and the Representation of the People Act has provided sufficient safe"uards to make the elections' fair and free. In these circumstances. th'::refore, election results cannot be lightly brushed aside in election disputes. At the same time it is necess.;y to protect the purity and sobriety of the elections by ensuring that the candidates do not secure the valuable votes of the people bv undue influence, fraud. comm11nal propaganda, bribery or other corrupt practices as laid down in the Act. + • f • • D. v. REDDY v. R. SULTAN (Fazal Ali, J.) 451 Another principle that is equally well settled is that the election A petitioner in order to succeed must plead all material particulars and prove them by clear and cogent evidence. The allegations of corrupt practices being in the nature of a quasi-criminal charge the same must be proved beyond any shadow of doubt. Where the election petitioner seeks to prove the charge by purely partisan evidence consisting of his workers, agents, supporters and friends, the Court would have to approach lhc evidence with great care and caution, B scrutiny and circumspection, and would, as a matter of prudence though not as a rule of law, require corroboration of such evidence from independent quarters, unless the Court is fully satisfied that the evidence is sc credit-worthy and true, spotless and blemishlcss, cogent and consistent, that no corroboration to lend further assurance is necessary. It has to be borne in mind that the attempt of the agents or supporters of the defeated candidate is always to get the C election set aside by means fair or foul and the evidence of such witnesses, therefore, must be regarded as highly interested and tainted evidence which should be acted upon only if the Court is satisfied that the evidence is true and does not suffer from any infirmity. Where, however, the evidence led by the election petitioner even though consistent is fraught with inherent improbabilities and replete with unnatural tendencies, the Court may refuse to accept snch eviD dence, becanse consistency alone is not the conclusive test of truth. Judicial experience shows that sometimes even a tutored or parrotlike evidence can be consistent and free from discrepancies and yet not worthy of credence. It is, however, difficult to lay down a rule of universal application because each case will have to be decided on its own facts, but in appreciating the evidence the broad features mentioned above must be borne in mind and have been emphasised by E this Court in a large catena of decisions-a few of them may be referred to here. In Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and others,( 1) this Court observed as follows : "Allegation of corrupt practice is a charge of cr;minal F nature. The provisions in the Representation of the People Act are intended to preserve the purity of the election, buc at the same time these provisions should not be subverted for the impure purposes of maligning candidates who happen to be in the Government on the eve of the election, x x x The Court is always vigilant to watch not only the conduct of the candidates and to protect their character from bping defamecl but also to see that the character and conduct of the public is not corroded by corrupt motive or evil pnrposes of candidates. The genuine and bona fide aims and asnirations of candidates have to be protected on the one hand and mala fide abuse and arrogance of power will have to be censured on the other." (I) [1971] 1 s.c.c. 370. G H 452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1976) 3 S.C.R. A Similarly in Rahim Khan v. Khurshid Ahmed & Ors.( 1) Krishna II c D E F G H Iyer, J., speaking for the Court most lucidly and aptly observed as follows : "An election once held is not to be treated in a lighthearted manner and defeated candidates or disgruntled electors should not get away with it by filing election petitions on unsubstantial grounds and irresponsible evidence, thereby introducing a serious clement of uncertainty in the verdict already rendered by the electorate. An election is a politically sacred public act, not of one person or of one official, but of the collective will of the whole constituency. Courts naturally must respect this public expression secretly written and show extreme reluctance to set aside or declare void an election which has already been held unless clear and cogent testimony compelling the court to uphold the corrupt practice alleged against the returned candidate is adduced. Indeed election petitions where corrupt practices are imputed must be regarded as proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature wherein strict proof is necessary. The burden is therefore heavy on him who assails an election which has been concluded." To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Abdul Hu.esain Mir v. Sltamsul Ruda and Another(') where this Court observed as follows: "Even so, certain basic legal guidelines cannot be lost sight of while adjudging an election dispute. The verdict at the polls wears a protective mantle in a democratic polity. The Court will vacate such ballot count return only on proof beyond reasonable doubt of corrupt practices. Charges, such as have been imputed here, are viewed as quasi-criminal, carrying other penalties from losing a seat, and strong testimony is needed to subvert a Returning Officer's declaration. x x x x x When elections are challenged on grounds with a criminal faint, the benefit of doubt in testimonial matters belongs to the returned candidate. Similarly in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh & others(•) while emphasizing the standard of proof in an election case for a corrupt practice of bribery, Hidayatullah, J., as he then was, speaking for the Court observed thus : "In Anjaneya Reddy v. Gangi Reddy and other<-21 E.L.R. 247-it was held that the proof required to estahl'sh a corrupt practice must be almost of the character required to establish a criminal charge. In our opinion the law requires that a corrunt prac- .tice involving bribery must be fully established. The evidence must show clearly that the promise or gift directly or (I) [1974] 2 S.C.C. 660. (2) [15io] 4 ~ C C 533. (3) [1968]3 S.C.R. 102. • ; • D. v. REDDY v. R. SULTAN (Fazal Ali,!.) indirectly was made to an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election." 453 We have gone through the judgment of the High Court, particularly on issue Nos. 7, 26 and 27 and find that although in his prdude to the discussion on issue No. 7 the learned Judge has referred to the various authorities and has correctly adumbrated the legal propositions he does not appear to have applied the principles enunciated in the decisions correctly to the facts or the evidence covered by this issue. It also appears that the learned Judge has applied two different standards in appreciatiμg the evidence with respect to issues Nos. 7, 26 & 27 and other issues on which he has given findings against the contesting respondent. For instance, while he has refused to accept the evidence of a partisan or an interested witness being staunch supporters of the contesting respondent on other issues, particularly issue No. 8, he has, while dealing with the evidence of the witnesses on issue No. 7 which suffers from the self-same infirmity, readily accepted their evidence without even noticing the deep interest that these witnesses had in supporting or bolstering up the case of the contesting respondent. We shall, however, refer to this aspect of the matter after we have dealt with the evidence led by the parties on these issues. In the light of the principles enunciated by us we shall now proceed to discuss and examine the findings of the High Court on issue No. 7 and the evidence led thereon by the parties. Issue No. 7 was cast by the Trial Judge thus : "Did the 1st respondent (the appellant) commit a corA B c D rupt practice under s. 123(1) of the Representation of the E People Act by making an offer to pay Rs. 25,000/- to the petitioner and trying to induce him not to contest the election ?" To beoin with we would like to refer to the pleadings of the contesting respcrndcnt in order to show the exact material particulars averred in the election petition itself. The allegation which is the subject-matter of issue No. 7 is to be found in paragraph-12 of the election petition appearing at p .. 2:? of the Paper Book (Vol. I). R. Sultan the contesting respondent '·!lad alleged that he had applied for a Congress ticket for Gooty Assembly constituency and was ultimately granted the said ticket by the Central Election Committee, Delhi on February !, 1972. Alt.hnuoh the n C.C. arl-hnc Congress Committee, Anantapur, had recommended the name of the contesting respondent and others, the Pcovmciat Con~rcss Lomm1ttee recommended the name of the contesting respondent alone which was finally accepted by the Central Election Committee at Delhi. After having been given the Congress ticket the contesting respondent returned to Hyderabad on February 2, 1972 and a day later he was contacted on telephone by Mustafa of Guntakal one of his supporters and had a talk with him regarding the filing of his nomination paper. The contesting respondent told Mustafa that he would be reaching Gooty on February 4, 1972, for filing his nomination papers for the Gooty Assembly constituency and that Mustafa also should reach Gooty on the morning of February 4, 1972. We might pause for a little while F G H A B c D E F G H 454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1976] 3 S.C.R here and notice two important averments. In the first place it was the definite case of the contesting respondent that his visit to Gooty on February 4, 1972, was for the purpose of filing his nomination papers, but it appears from the evidence that he did not file his nomination on this date but some time later. Secondly during his talk with Mustafa on the telephone the contesting respondent did not ask him to bring P.W. 29 Nabi Saheb and P.W. 33 Chinna Bhemanna with him to Gooty. Resuming the thread of averments in the election petition, the further facts arc that the contesting respondent reached Gooty on February 4, 1972 at about 10-00 A.M. and proceeded to Bharat Sewak Samaj-hereafter referred to as 'B.S.S.'-Building which is sometimes described as an office and sometimes as a Guest House in the evidence. P.Ws. 29 and 33 and some others were waiting for the contesting respondent at the B.S.S. Building. The contesting respondent then, along with P.Ws. 29 and 33 went to Taluk office for obtaining a' copy of the voters list for the Gooty Assembly constituency and reached the Taluk office at about 11-00 A.M. While he was returning from the Taluk office the appellant met the contesting respondent and wished him and after talking for some time he made an offer of Rs. 25,000/- to be paid to the contesting respondent if he. agreed to withdraw from the election and help the appellant. This offer is said to have been made in the presence of P.Ws. 29 and 33. Even after the contesting respondent refused the offer he was again persuaded by the appellant to consider the same and on his final refusal the appellant threatened that the contesting respondent was bound to face defeat in the elections. It was also alleged that the appellant took the refusal of the offer as a challenge and spent money lavishly to win the election. The last part of the averment which forms the subject-matter of issue No. 8 and certain other issues has not been accepted by the High Court. These are the only particulars mentioned in the petition with respect to the offer of bribe which· is the subject-matter of issue No. 7. In the course of the evidence, however, a new fact was sought to be introduced by the contesting respondent, namely, that P.Ws. 29 & 33 returned to the B.S.S. Building after the contestng respondent refused the offer of the appellant and then the two witnesses P.Ws. 29 & 33 narrated the entire incident to P.W. 34 Mustafa and P.W. 22 Rama- . chandraiah and others. This fact was introduced in order to ]end corroboration to the evidence of the contesting respondent and that of P.Ws. 29 and 32. But as this was undoubtedly a material particular or an additional fact pertaining to the averments in paragraph12 of the election petition and the same not having been mentioned has to be completely excluded from consideretion. We shall. however, dilate on this matter when we deal with the evidence led by the contesting respondent on this point. In short, therefore, the story regarding the offer of bribery and the occasion for it may be conveniently divided into three stages : Stage No. 1. This stage starts with the decision of the Central Election Committee, Delhi, in giving the Congress ticket to the conte,ting rcs,,cmdent and as consequence thereof his arrival at Hyderabad on Febru· ary 2, 1972. On reaching Hyderabad the contesting respondent ' + • f • D. v. REDDY v. R. SULTAN (Fazal Ali, l.) 455 who is P.W. 16 received a telephone call from Mustafa who was asked to go to Gooty on February 4, 1971. in order to meet the contesting respondent. Accordingly the contesting respondent reach- , ed Gooty on February 4, 1972 and accompanied by P.Ws. 29 and 33 left !or the Taiuk ofiice. This is the enu ot the drama enacted in Stage No. I. The facts are proved by P.W. 16 the contesting respondent himself, by Mustafa P.W. 34 and by P.Ws. 29 and 33. It may be mentioned here that all the witnesses examined to prove the facts covered by this stage are interested witnesses who are staunch supporters of the contesting respondent and there appears to be a serious discrepancy in the evidence led on this point. It appears from the evidence that when the contesting respondent reached B.S.S. Building apart trom P.Ws. 29 and 33, P.Ws. 34 and 22 were also present. P.Ws. 34 and 22 however did not accompany the contesting respondent to the Taluk Office. P.W. 22 Ramachandraiah says that he did not go to the Taluk office because of ill health and P. W. 34 Mustafa says that he did not go as he had some work at the Railway Station. It may also be noticed that in paragraph-12 of the election petition where the material particulars are given by the contesting respondent, while it is clearly mentioned that when the contesting respondent reached Gooty P.Ws. 29 & 33 were there, the name of P .W. 22 is not specifically mentioned as being present at Gooty. It would appear from the evidence of P.W. 22 that he was a great friend and supporter of the contesting respondent and even the learned Judge has commented on the deep interest which P.W. 22 had shown in order to support the case of the contesting respondent. It is, therefore, difficult to believe that if P.W. n would have been present at the B.S.S. Building how could the contesting respondent have omitted to mention the name of his most confident friend and supporter in paragraph-12 of his election petition. This taken together with the fact that P.W. 22 had given a lame excuse for not having accompanied the contesting respondent to the Taluk office clearly throws a considerable amount of suspicion on the presence of P.W. 22 at Gooty on February 4, 1972. Similarly, while P.W. 34 Mustafa gives a specific reason whv he had not accompanied the contesting respondent to the Taluk office. namely, that he had some work at the Railway Station, which is also deposed to by P.W. 16 himself, yet this fact which was within the knowledge of the contesting respondent at that very time is not mentioned in the election petition. Another important circumstance that has to be noticed is that whereas in the election petition it is the, definite case of the contesting respondent that he had to go to Gooty on February 4, 1972 for filing his nomination papers. the evidence shows that he did not file the nomination papers at all on that date but he merely applied for the voters list of the constituency. This is important, because, while it. mav have been relevant for P.Ws. 29 & 33 to accompany the contesting respondent to the Taluk Office if it was the question of his filing nomination papers. their presence at the Taluk office was not at all necessary if the contesting respondent had merely to take a copy of the voters· list which could have been done by him alone. P.W. 16 the contesting resoondent has no doubt proved the facts mentioned above. Similarly P.W. 34 has supported the contesting A D I' G Iii A B - ·C D E F G H 456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1976] 3 S.C.R. respondent regarding his having a talk with the contesting respondent on the telephone anu his bemg askta to go to Gooty on February 4, 1Y7L P.ws. 29 and 33 have aiso said that they were asked by P. W. 34 Mnstafa to accompany him to Gooty in order to meet the contestmg respondent. lhus so tar as the tacts in stage No. I are concerned, whether they are true or not, they do not appear to be very relevant for the purpose of issue No. 7. Stage No. II This brings us to stage No. 2 which is the bulwark and the bedrock or the case of the contesting respondent regarding the offer of br,be said to have been made by the appellant to h!Ill. So far as this stage 1s concerned the only evidence tnat the contesting n"pornknt has given consists of the tesl!mony of P. Ws. L9 and 3.J apart from h,s own evidence. We would first deal with the evidence of P.Ws. 29 and 33 before commg to the evidence of the contesting respondent himself. P.W. 29 Nab1 Saheb appears to be one of the mo't interested witnesses and a great friend and supporter-of the contesting respondent. He admits at p. 498 of the Paper Book (Vol. I][) that both the witness and Mustafa P.W. 34 worked for the contesting respondent during the recent general elections. He then says that Mustafa approached h,m on February 3, 1972 and requested him and PW. 33 Ch.nna Bhemanna to accompany him to Gooty. The w:tness further admits that the contesting res,pondent R.