# D. X N abhirajiah v. The State of Mysore "1Jd Others

- **Citation:** [1952] 1 S.C.R. 756
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1949-03-28
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 132 of 1951
- **Bench:** SAtYID FAZL ALI, PATANJ ALI SAsTR1, Mu1rnEi.JEA, Das, CHANDRASEKHARA AtYAi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/d-x-n-abhirajiah-v-the-state-of-mysore-1jd-others-64
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Preventive Detention Act (IV of 1950), SJ. 3, 12-Detention
order-Non-specification of period of detention-Ground supplied
vague and same as in earlier order-Particulars supplied after
'1months-Legality of deteiJtion-Duty to supply particulars
~lls
soon as may he'-Form of detention order-Order signed by Home
Secretary-Validity.
Non-specification of any
d~finitc period in a detcntioa order
made under s. 3 of the PrcventiVc Detention Act, IV of 1950,
is not a material omission rendering the order invalid in view of
the provisions contained in clauses (4) (a) and (7) (a) of Ar~ 22
of the Constitution and •· 12 of the Act.
An
order of
detention
which
expressly
states
that
the
Go•ernor of the State concerned was satisfied of the neCCMity of
'_,.
. .
••
-~.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
757
making such an order and that it was made by the order of the
1951
Governor i' not defective merely because it is signed by the
Home Secretary.
Ui11gar Si,,g1'
Communication of the grounds of the
made directly by the authority making the
made through recognized channels prescribed
tive rules of business.
order need not be
order but may be
by the administraThe past conduct or antecedent history of a person can be
taken into account in making a detention order, and as a. matter
of fact, it is largely from prior events showing tendencies or inclination of a man that im inference could be drawn whether he
is likely even in the future to act in a manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order. If the authority making
an
order
is satisfied that the ground on which the deten ue was detained
on a former occasion is still available and that there was need for
detention on its basis no ma/a fides can be attributed to the
authority from the fact that the ground alleged for the second
detention is the same as that of the first detention.
Whether grounds have been communicated "as soon as may
be" must depend on the facts of each case.
No
arbitrary
time
limit can be laid down.
The recent rulings of the Supreme Court establish (a) that
mere 11agueneu of grounds standing by itself and without leading
to an inference of mala fides or lack of good faith is not a
jNsticiable issue in a court of law for the necessity of making the
order, inasmuch as the ground or grounds on which the order of
detention was made is a matter for ·the subjective satisfaction
of
the Government or of the detaining authority ; ( b) that there i•
nothing in the Act to prevent particulars of the grounds being
furnished to the detenu within a reasonable time so that he may
have the earliest opportunity of making a
representation
against
the detention order-what is
reasonable time being
dependen~
on the facts of each case; (c) that failure to furnish
grounds
with the speedy addition of such particulars as would enable the
detenu to
make a representation at the earliest
opportunity
against the detention order can be considered by a court of law
as an invasion of a fundamental right or
safeguard
guaranteed
by the Constitution, viz., being given the earliest opportunity to
make a representation; and (d) that no new grounds could be
supplied to s~engthen or fortify the original order of detention.
Where the petitioners against whom detention orders were
made were given only vague grounds and there was inexcusable
delay of nearly 4 months in acquainting them of the particulars,
field that their detention was illegal and they should be released.
ORIGINAL
JuirsorcrroN :-Petitions
Nos
167 of 1950.
149
and
v.
Tlte State of
P11,,i11b.
1951
Ujagar Singh
v.
The State of
Puniab.
Chandrasekhara
Aiyar ].
758
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1952]
Application under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a
writ in the nature of habeas corpus.
Bawa Shiv Charan Singh for the petitioner m
Petition No. 149.
N. S. Bindra for the petitioner in Petition No. 167.
B. K. Khanna, Advocate-General of the Punjab, for
the respondent in both the petitions.
M. C. &talvad, Attorney-General for India, for the
Union of India (Intervener

## Text

1952
D. X..
N abhirajiah
v.
The State of
Mysore
"1Jd Others.
Chondr•·
sek_horo
Aiyor /.
1951
756
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19521
the Control Order purports to have been made not
only under clause (bb) of sub-rule (2) of rule 81 of the
Defence of India Rules, hut also under the Supplies,
SefV!Ccs
and
Miscellaneous
Provisions
(Temporary
Powers) Act of 1947. We have not got this Act before us and it was not even referred to in the course
of the arguments.
Hence, no decision is called for
on this point.
The petition fails and is dismissed without
any
order as to costs.
Petition ditmiued.
Agent for the petitioner: K. R. Kri1hnaswamy.
Agent for the respondents : P. A. Mehta.
UJAGAR SINGH
II.
THE STATE OF THE PUNJAB
and
JAGJIT SINGH
II.
THE STATE OF THE PUNJAB
[SAtYID FAZL ALI, PATANJ ALI SAsTR1, Mu1rnEi.JEA,
DAS and CHANDRASEKHARA AtYAi., JJ. J
Preventive Detention Act (IV of 1950), SJ. 3, 12-Detention
order-Non-specification of period of detention-Ground supplied
vague and same as in earlier order-Particulars supplied after
'1months-Legality of deteiJtion-Duty to supply particulars
~lls
soon as may he'-Form of detention order-Order signed by Home
Secretary-Validity.
Non-specification of any
d~finitc period in a detcntioa order
made under s. 3 of the PrcventiVc Detention Act, IV of 1950,
is not a material omission rendering the order invalid in view of
the provisions contained in clauses (4) (a) and (7) (a) of Ar~ 22
of the Constitution and •· 12 of the Act.
An
order of
detention
which
expressly
states
that
the
Go•ernor of the State concerned was satisfied of the neCCMity of
'_,.
. .
••
-~.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
757
making such an order and that it was made by the order of the
1951
Governor i' not defective merely because it is signed by the
Home Secretary.
Ui11gar Si,,g1'
Communication of the grounds of the
made directly by the authority making the
made through recognized channels prescribed
tive rules of business.
order need not be
order but may be
by the administraThe past conduct or antecedent history of a person can be
taken into account in making a detention order, and as a. matter
of fact, it is largely from prior events showing tendencies or inclination of a man that im inference could be drawn whether he
is likely even in the future to act in a manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order. If the authority making
an
order
is satisfied that the ground on which the deten ue was detained
on a former occasion is still available and that there was need for
detention on its basis no ma/a fides can be attributed to the
authority from the fact that the ground alleged for the second
detention is the same as that of the first detention.
Whether grounds have been communicated "as soon as may
be" must depend on the facts of each case.
No
arbitrary
time
limit can be laid down.
The recent rulings of the Supreme Court establish (a) that
mere 11agueneu of grounds standing by itself and without leading
to an inference of mala fides or lack of good faith is not a
jNsticiable issue in a court of law for the necessity of making the
order, inasmuch as the ground or grounds on which the order of
detention was made is a matter for ·the subjective satisfaction
of
the Government or of the detaining authority ; ( b) that there i•
nothing in the Act to prevent particulars of the grounds being
furnished to the detenu within a reasonable time so that he may
have the earliest opportunity of making a
representation
against
the detention order-what is
reasonable time being
dependen~
on the facts of each case; (c) that failure to furnish
grounds
with the speedy addition of such particulars as would enable the
detenu to
make a representation at the earliest
opportunity
against the detention order can be considered by a court of law
as an invasion of a fundamental right or
safeguard
guaranteed
by the Constitution, viz., being given the earliest opportunity to
make a representation; and (d) that no new grounds could be
supplied to s~engthen or fortify the original order of detention.
Where the petitioners against whom detention orders were
made were given only vague grounds and there was inexcusable
delay of nearly 4 months in acquainting them of the particulars,
field that their detention was illegal and they should be released.
ORIGINAL
JuirsorcrroN :-Petitions
Nos
167 of 1950.
149
and
v.
Tlte State of
P11,,i11b.
1951
Ujagar Singh
v.
The State of
Puniab.
Chandrasekhara
Aiyar ].
758
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1952]
Application under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a
writ in the nature of habeas corpus.
Bawa Shiv Charan Singh for the petitioner m
Petition No. 149.
N. S. Bindra for the petitioner in Petition No. 167.
B. K. Khanna, Advocate-General of the Punjab, for
the respondent in both the petitions.
M. C. &talvad, Attorney-General for India, for the
Union of India (Intervener in Petition No. 149).
1951.
February 23.
The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J.-The earlier of the two
petitions has been filed by one Ujagar Singh, under
article 32 of the Constitution of India, for a writ of
habeaJ corpus and for an order of release from -detention. The latter petition is a similar one by one
Jagjit Singh. In both the petitions the respondent
is the State of Punjab. The orders of detention were
made under the Preventive Detention Act IV of 1950.
The petitions are not connected with each other,
except that they riise the same grounds.
In petition No. 149 of 1950, Ujagar Singh was
originally
arrested and
detained under the
East
Punjab Public Safety Act on 29th September, l948.
He was released on 28th March, 1949, but on the liflme
' date, there was an internment order against him. On
29th September, 1949, he was re-arrested.
On 2nd
March, 1950, an order of detention under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, was served on him, and on
3rd April, 1950, he was served with the grounds of
detention dated 11th March, 1950. Both in September, 1949, and in March, 1950, the ground alleged was
"You tried to create public disorder amongst tenants
in Una Tehsil by circulating and distributing objectionable
literature
issued
by
underground
communists." Additional
grounds were furnished in July
1950.
In petition No. 167 of 1950, Jagjit Singh was arrested on 24th July, 1948, under the
provis~ons of the
• <
. "
..
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
759
Punjab
Safety
Act, 1947. After the
East
Punjab
Public Safety Act, 1949, came 'into force, a fresh
detention order dated 14th May, 1949, was served on
him and he continued to be kept in jail. Grounds of
detention were given to him on 7th September, 1949.
A fresh order of detention under the Preventive Detention Act (IV of 1950) dated 2nd March, 1950, was served
on 7th March, 1950. Grounds of detention dated 11th
March, 1950, were served on him on 3rd April, 1950.
Both in September 1949 and ApriL 1950, the same
ground was given, i.e., "In pursuance of the policy of
the Communist Party, you were engaged in preparing
the
masses for
violent revolutionary campaign
and
attended secret party meetings to give effect to this
programme."
Additional or
supplementary
grounds
were served on 5th August, 1950.
Several contentions were advanced on behalf of the
petitioners challenging the legality of their detention
and urging, that as the detention was unlawful and the
petitioners' fundamental right of personal liberty had
been infringed, they should be set at liberty.
The
points taken on their behalf can be briefly summarised
as follows. As the ground of detention now mentioned was the same as the ground specified in 1948 or
1949, i.e., months earlier under the Provincial
Acts,
the order of detention was made mechanically and
was really ma/a fide in the sense that there is nothing
to show that were was any fresh satisfaction on the
part of the detaining authority that detention was
necessary in the interests of public order. Secondly, the
grounds were not given "as soon as may be", which is
required under section 7 of the Act; and as an unusually long period of time elapsed between the order of
detention and the giving of the grounds, the detention
must be held to be unlawful after the lapse of a reasonable time. Thirdly, the grounds given originally
were so vague that they could not be said to be grounds
at all such as would enable the detenu to make any
representation against the order.
Fourthly,
supplementary grounds could not be furnished and should
not be taken into account in coruidering whether the
1951
Ujagar Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab.
Chandrasekhara
Aiyar /.
1951
Ujagar Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab.
Chandrasekhara
Aiyar /.
760
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
original order was lawful, or whether the detention
became
unlawful after a particular period of time.
Two other points of a subsidiary nature were also
raised, namely that the order was bad as the period of
detention was not specified therein as appears to be
required by section 12 and that the grounds given did
not purport to state that the authority making the
order was the Governor of the State.
There is no substance in the last two points, Section
12 of the Act does not require that the period of detention should be specified in the order itself where the
detention is with a view to preventing any person
from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The section itself provide•
that he can be detained without obtaining the opinion
of an Advisory Board for a period longer than three
months but not exceeding one year from the date of
detention. Normally, the detention period shall not
exceed
three
months,
unless
an Advisory
Board
reports before the expiration of the said period that
there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention. See article 22, clause ( 4), sub-clause (a) of the
Constitution. Under sub-clause (7) (a) of the same
article, Parliament may by law prescribe "the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of case•
in which, a person may be detained for a period longer
than three months under any law providing for preventive detention without obtaining the opinion of an
Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions of
sub-clause (a) of clause (4)." Therefore, detention for
more than three months can be justified either on the
ground of an opinion of the Advisory Board sanctioning or warranting longer detention or on the ground
that the detention is to secure the due maintenance of
public order, in which case it cannot exceed one year
in any event, as stated in section 12 of the Preventive
Detention Act:. It is thus clear that the period is not
to exceed three months generally, but may go up to
one year in certain special cases.
In view
of these
provisions, the non-specification of any definite period
..
"' .
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
761
in the detention order is not a material omission rendering the order itself invalid.
Under section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act,
the authority to make the order is the State Government. Section
166
(1) of the Constitution provides
that all executive action of the Government of a State
shall be expressed to be taken 'in the name of the
Governor.
The orders of detention expressly
state
that the Governor of Punjab was satisfied of their
necessity and that they were made by his order. The
orders are signed no doubt by the Home Secretary,
but this
is no defect. The communication of the
grounds need not be made directly by the authority
making the order. Section 7 does not require this. The
communication may be tlirough recognized channels
prescribed by the admimstrative rules of busines~.
Let us now turn our attention to the main contentions.
There '1s nothing strange .or surprising in the
fact that the same grounds have been repeated after
the lapse of several months in both the cases when it
is remembered that the petitioners were under detention and in jail during the whole of the intervening
period. No fresh activities could be attributed
to
them. There could only be a repetition of the original
ground or grounds, whether good or bad. It does not
follow from this that the satisfaction of the detaining
authority was purely mechanical and that the
mind
did not go with the pen. The past conduct .or antecedent history of a person can be taken into account
when making a detention order, and, as a matter of
fact, it is largely from prior events showing the
tendencies or inclinations of the man that an inference
could be drawn whether he is likely even in the future
to act in · a manner prejudicial to the main·enance of
public order. If the authority satisfied himself that
the original ground was still available and that there
was need for detention on its basis, no mala fides can
be attributed to the authority from this fact alone.
The Act does not fix the time within which' the
grounds should be furnished to the person detained.
6-8 S 0 India/71
1951
Ujagar Singh
v.
The State o/
Pun7ab.
Chand1·asekhara
Aiyar /.
1951
U1agar Singh
v.
The State of
Pun1ab.
Chandrasekhara
Aiyar /.
762
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1952]
It merely states that the communication must be "as
soon as may be".
This
means reasonable
de~patch
and what is reasonable must depend on the facts of
each case.
No arbitrary time limit can be set down.
The delays in the communication of the grounds in the
two petitions have been adequately explained
by the
Home
Secretary
who
says
in
his
affidavits that
grounds had to be supplied to nearly 250 detenus
and that the printing of the necessary forms
occupied
some time.
According to
him, he made an order even
on 11-3-1950 for the supply of the grounds.
The extreme vagueness of the grounds ts alone left
as
the chief line of attack.
As stated
alrtady, the
original ground communicated in Petition No. 149 of
1950 is "to create public disorder amongst tenants in
the Tehsil by circulating and distributing objectionable
literature
issued
by
underground communists".
In the other petition, the ground is "In pursuance of
the policy of the Communist Party you were engaged
in
preparing
the
masses for
violent
revolutionary
campaign and attended secret party meetings to give
effect to this programme."
We shall leave aside for
the
moment
the
supplementary
grounds
furnished
later.
There can be little doubt that in both the cases the
grounds furnished in the first instance were highly
vague.
If we had only lswar Das's case to go by,
Petition
No.
30
of
1950, such vagueh~ss by
itself
would constitute a justification for
release of
the
petitioners.
Since the date of that decision, however,
this Court had to consider the question at great
length in two cases from Bombay and Calcutta respectively-Cases
Nos. 22 and 24 of 1950--where the
subject of the meaning and scope of section 7 of the
Preventive Detention Act and article 22, sub clauses
(5) and ( 6) of the Constitution of India, came up for
elaborate consideration. The said cases were decided on
25th January, 1951, and we are now governed by the
principles laid down in these judgments.
It was held
by a majority of the Judges in Case No. 22 of 1950(')
(!).State of Bombay v. Atmaram Sridhar Vaidya [1951] S.C.R. 167.
. '
. '
-
·-
.. _
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
763
(a) that mere vagueness of grounds standing by itself
and without leading to an inference of mala fides or
lack of good faith is not a justiciable issue in a court of
law for the necessity of making the order, inasmuch
as the ground or grounds on which the order .of detention was made is a matter for the subjective satisfaction of the Government or of the detaining authority ;
(b) that there is nothing in the Act to f>1·event particulars
of the grounds being furnished to the detenu within
a reasonable time, so that he may have the earliest
opportunity of making
a
representation
against
the
detention
order-what
is
reasonable
time
being
dependent on the facts of each case; (c) that failure to
furnish grounds with the speedy addition of such particulars as would enable the detenu to make a representation at the earliest opportunity against the detention
order can be considered bv a court of law as an invasion
of a fundamental right ~r safeguard guaranteed by the
Consti tut10n, viz., being given the earliest_ opportunity
to ma.ke a representation; and (d) that no new grounds
could be supplied to strengthen or fortify the original
order of detention.
We are not concerned so much with the earlier
history of the detenus as with what_ happened to them
under the Preventive Deteution Act, 1950.
Overlooking _ the fact that the ground mentioned in March
1950 was the same as that given in September 1949,
and condoning the 'vagueness in the original ground
furnished in both the cases to support the making of
the order, it is impossible to justify the delay of nearly
four months in furnishing what have been called addi6onal or supplementary grounds.
Let us take up Petition No. 149 first. In the
grounds furnished
in
July
1950,
there are
several
which do not apparently relate to the original ground.
"You were responsible for hartal by labourers working
on Bhalera Dam in October 1947" .. - "You ms ti gated
laboure1s working in Nangal in 1948 to go on strike to
secure the acceptance of their demands"
"After
release you absconded yourself from your village anrl
7-3 s a Iudia/71
1951
Ujagar Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab.
Chandrasi:khara
Aiyar /.
1951
Ujagar Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab.
Chandrasekhara
Aiyar /.
764
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
remained untraced for a considerable period"
"When
you wed re-arrested on 29-9-1949, lot of objectionable communist
literature
was recovered from your
personal search"-are instances of new grounds, and
they have to be eliminated therefore from consideration.
In Jagjit Singh's petition No. 167 of 1950, the supplemental grounds, which are as many as ten in number,
are dated 31-7-1950, but
they were
served
on
him
on 5-8-1950, that is two days after he haq prepared
his petition to this court under article 32 of the Constitution. The grounds may be taken as
particulars
of
the
general
allegation
made
against him on
3-4-1950
when the
original
grounds of
detention
were served.
But the time factor to enable him to
make a represention at the earliest opportunity was
not borne in mind or adhered to. In the affidavit of
Shri Vishan Bhagwan, Home Secretary to the Punjab
Government,
dated 6th
September,
1950,
no
explanation has been offered for this abnormal delay
in the
specification of the
particulars.
This delay
is very unfortunate indeed.
But for its
occurrence
the petitioner would not have
been
able to urge
that one of the valuable rights guaranteed
to" him
by the
Constitution has
been
violated.
It
h not
alleged
by the
Home
Secretary that
the
detenu
was furnished with these particulars when he was
arrested and detained under the Provincial Act and
that
consequently
it
was
considered
unnecessary
to give him the same particulars once over. On the
other hand, the detenu's cqmplaint has throughout
been that he was given no particulars at all till the
5th August, 1950.
As the pet1t10ners were given only vague grounds
which were not particularised or made spec'ific so as to
afford
them
the
earliest
opportunity of
making
representatiom
against
their
detention
orders, and
their having
been
inexcusable delay
in acquainting
them with particulars of what was alleged, the petitioners have to be released, the rules being made
absolute. Ordered accordingly.
\_-
. -l
. .(
-
r
) -·
) .
-
..
'·
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
765
PATANJALI SAsTRr J.-I concur in the order proposed by my learned brother Chandrasekhara Aiyar J.
DAs J.-In view of the ma=ority
decision in Case
No. 22 of 1950 (The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram
Sridhar Acharya), I concur in the order proposed by
my learned brother.
Order accordingly.
Petition No. 194 of 1950
Agent for the petitioner : R. R. Biswas.
Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.
Agent for the intervener : P. A. Mehta.
Petition No. 167 of 1950
Agent for the petition: R. S. Narula.
Agent for the respondent : P. A. Mehta.
THE UNION OF INDIA
v.
HIRA DEVI AND ANOTHER.
[MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR
and BosE, JJ.]
Civil Procedure code, 1908, s. 60 (k)-Provident Funds Act
(XIX of 1925), ss. 2 (a), 3 (1)-Compulsory deposit in Provident
Fund-Exemption
from
attachment-Appointment of
receiverLegality.
A receiver cannot be appointed in execution of a decree in
respect of a compulsory deposit in a Provident Fund due to the
judgment debtor.
Whatever doubts may have existed under the
earlier Act of 1897, the definition of "compulsory deposit"
in
s. 2 (a) of the Provident
Funds Act (XIX of 1925) clearly
includes deposits remaining to the credit of
the
subscriber or
depositor after he has retired from service.
Arrears of salary and allowances
stand
upon
a
different
footing and are not exempt from being
proceeded against in
execution.
CML
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Civil
Appeal
No. 132 of 1951.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and
Decree dated 17th May, 1950, of the High Court of
Judicature at Calcutta (Harries C.J. and Sinha J.) in
Appeal No. 41 of 1950 arising out of the Order of
1951
Ujagar Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab.
Chandrasekhara
Aiyar /.
1952
May 21.