# Daf.deo Singh and OtherJ v. The State of Bihar and OthtrJ S. /[.Das]

- **Citation:** [1957] 1 S.C.R. 995
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1954-07-20
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 145 of 1955
- **Bench:** S. R. DAS c. J
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/daf-deo-singh-and-otherj-v-the-state-of-bihar-and-othtrj-s-das-1386
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

]AFER
IMAM, s. K.
DAS,
GOVINDA
MENON and A. K. SARKAR JJ.)
Gram Cutchet'l'y-Criminal
Jurisdictio11-Concu1-re1,t
jurisdiction
of ordinary ffiminal Courts-Enactment, if discriminatory in
character.-Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (Bihm· Act 7 of 1948),
ss. 60, 62, 68, 69, 70, 73-Co11sti1t1tion of India, A1·t. 14.
The appellants
wcr~ coilvicte<l of an offence under s. 379 of
the Indian Penal Code by a full bench of the Gram Cutcherry
constituted under
the
provisions
of
the
Bihar
Panchayat Raj
Act, 1947. It was contended for the appellants that the convic·
tion was bad on the grounds int<T alia, that s. 62 of the
Act
which provided for the criminal jurisdiction of Gram Cutcherries
ga \'e concurrent jurisdiction to the ordinary criminal Courts and
left it open to a party
to go either to. the ordinary criminal
Courts or to a bench of the Gram Cutcherry, and as the procedure
followed in
the ordinary
criminal
Courts
was
substantially
different from that followed by a Gram Cutcherry, the Act was
discriminatory in
nature and as such infringed Art. 14 of the
Constitution.
Held, that
the impugned provisions of the
Act · are
net
discriminatory in nature.
The scheme of the
Act
is
that a case or suit ·cognizable
under the Act by a Gram Cutcherry should be tried only by it
unless the
Sub-Divisional
Magistrate
or
the
Munsif concerned
chooses to take action under s. 70 or s. 73 of the Act.
The
1957"
V adioelu The var
v.
. The Stak of
Madras
Sinha J.
1957
April 2.
1957
Daf.deo Singh
and OtherJ
v.
The State of
Bihar and OthtrJ
S. /[.Das].
996
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
reference
to concurrent
jurisdiction
in s.
62 is
explainable
by
reason of the
provisions
in ss. 69,
70
and 73, so that on the
transfer or withdrawal of a case fro1n the
Gr~un Cutcherry or the
cancellation of the
jurisdiction of
the
bench,
it may not
be
said that the ordinary criminal
Courts also have no jurisdiction to
try it.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JuRISDICTION :
Criminal
Appeal No. 145 of 1955.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated July 20, 1954, of the Patna High Court in
Criminal Miscellaneous No. 228 of 1954 .
. S. P. Verma. for the appellants.
R. C. Prasad. for the respondents.
1957. Aoril 22. The Judgment of the Court was
·delivered b~
S. K.
DAs J.-J'his is
an appeal by special
leave
from an order cf summary dismissal passed by the
High Court of Pama on lulv 20. 1954. on an application under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of
India. The relevant facts are these. One Uma Shankar
Prasad instituted a case against eight persons, including the
three
appellants before us.
Baldeo Singh,
Ramdeo Singh and Sheodhar Singh, on the allegation
that they had
forcibly cut
and removed 'urad' and
'kodo' crops from his
field
in
village Darwan on
October 1.
1953. at about IO a.m. Uma Shankar said
that he objected,
but was
threatened
with
assault.
The case was instituted before the Gram Cutcherry of
Bankat in the
district of
Chamoaran, constituted
under the provisions of the
Biha,-
Panchavat Raj Act,
1947 (Bihar Act 7 of 1948), hereinafter referred to
as
the Act. Altogether four witnesses were examined in
the case, two on behalf of the prosecution and two
for the accused persons. The defence of some of
the
accused persons was that the land on which the crops
stood belonged to one Yogi Sahni. who had sold it to
Sunder Singh, accused, on
September 25.
1953. On
December 28, 1953, a bench of the Gram Cutcherry
acquitted all the accused persons.
On Tanuary 7, 1954,
Uma Shankar Prasad preferred an appeal under s. 67
of the Act. The appeal was heard on June 24, 1954,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
997
and the full bench by a majority, with three dissentient
panches, held the three appellants guilty of the offence
under s. 379, Indian Penal Code. and sentenced them
to imprisonment for fifteen days each. The appellants
then moved the High Court of Patna under Arts. 226
and 227 of the Constitution. with the result stated
above. The appellants then moved
this Court and
obtained special

## Text

S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
995
time, determined
to
see
that their victim did not
possibly escape the assassins' hands.
As regards the second appellant, we need
not say
anything more than that he was lucky enough to
escape conviction under s.
302 of the Indian Penal
Code, for the reasons 'given by the High Court, which
may not bear close scrutiny. He amply deserves the
punishment of 5 years' rigorous imprisonment under
s. 326 of the Indian Penal Code.
For the reasons aforesaid, both the appeals fail and
are dismissed.
Appeals dismissed.
BALDEO SINGH AND OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS
(S. R.
DAS c. J.,
]AFER
IMAM, s. K.
DAS,
GOVINDA
MENON and A. K. SARKAR JJ.)
Gram Cutchet'l'y-Criminal
Jurisdictio11-Concu1-re1,t
jurisdiction
of ordinary ffiminal Courts-Enactment, if discriminatory in
character.-Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (Bihm· Act 7 of 1948),
ss. 60, 62, 68, 69, 70, 73-Co11sti1t1tion of India, A1·t. 14.
The appellants
wcr~ coilvicte<l of an offence under s. 379 of
the Indian Penal Code by a full bench of the Gram Cutcherry
constituted under
the
provisions
of
the
Bihar
Panchayat Raj
Act, 1947. It was contended for the appellants that the convic·
tion was bad on the grounds int<T alia, that s. 62 of the
Act
which provided for the criminal jurisdiction of Gram Cutcherries
ga \'e concurrent jurisdiction to the ordinary criminal Courts and
left it open to a party
to go either to. the ordinary criminal
Courts or to a bench of the Gram Cutcherry, and as the procedure
followed in
the ordinary
criminal
Courts
was
substantially
different from that followed by a Gram Cutcherry, the Act was
discriminatory in
nature and as such infringed Art. 14 of the
Constitution.
Held, that
the impugned provisions of the
Act · are
net
discriminatory in nature.
The scheme of the
Act
is
that a case or suit ·cognizable
under the Act by a Gram Cutcherry should be tried only by it
unless the
Sub-Divisional
Magistrate
or
the
Munsif concerned
chooses to take action under s. 70 or s. 73 of the Act.
The
1957"
V adioelu The var
v.
. The Stak of
Madras
Sinha J.
1957
April 2.
1957
Daf.deo Singh
and OtherJ
v.
The State of
Bihar and OthtrJ
S. /[.Das].
996
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
reference
to concurrent
jurisdiction
in s.
62 is
explainable
by
reason of the
provisions
in ss. 69,
70
and 73, so that on the
transfer or withdrawal of a case fro1n the
Gr~un Cutcherry or the
cancellation of the
jurisdiction of
the
bench,
it may not
be
said that the ordinary criminal
Courts also have no jurisdiction to
try it.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JuRISDICTION :
Criminal
Appeal No. 145 of 1955.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated July 20, 1954, of the Patna High Court in
Criminal Miscellaneous No. 228 of 1954 .
. S. P. Verma. for the appellants.
R. C. Prasad. for the respondents.
1957. Aoril 22. The Judgment of the Court was
·delivered b~
S. K.
DAs J.-J'his is
an appeal by special
leave
from an order cf summary dismissal passed by the
High Court of Pama on lulv 20. 1954. on an application under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of
India. The relevant facts are these. One Uma Shankar
Prasad instituted a case against eight persons, including the
three
appellants before us.
Baldeo Singh,
Ramdeo Singh and Sheodhar Singh, on the allegation
that they had
forcibly cut
and removed 'urad' and
'kodo' crops from his
field
in
village Darwan on
October 1.
1953. at about IO a.m. Uma Shankar said
that he objected,
but was
threatened
with
assault.
The case was instituted before the Gram Cutcherry of
Bankat in the
district of
Chamoaran, constituted
under the provisions of the
Biha,-
Panchavat Raj Act,
1947 (Bihar Act 7 of 1948), hereinafter referred to
as
the Act. Altogether four witnesses were examined in
the case, two on behalf of the prosecution and two
for the accused persons. The defence of some of
the
accused persons was that the land on which the crops
stood belonged to one Yogi Sahni. who had sold it to
Sunder Singh, accused, on
September 25.
1953. On
December 28, 1953, a bench of the Gram Cutcherry
acquitted all the accused persons.
On Tanuary 7, 1954,
Uma Shankar Prasad preferred an appeal under s. 67
of the Act. The appeal was heard on June 24, 1954,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
997
and the full bench by a majority, with three dissentient
panches, held the three appellants guilty of the offence
under s. 379, Indian Penal Code. and sentenced them
to imprisonment for fifteen days each. The appellants
then moved the High Court of Patna under Arts. 226
and 227 of the Constitution. with the result stated
above. The appellants then moved
this Court and
obtained special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution.
Learned counsel for the appellants has pressed the
following contentions before us. His first and foremost
contention
is that the
Act, bv reason
of certain
provmons
contained
therein, · is discriminatory in
nature and offends against Art. 14 of the Constitution.
It is advisable to set out first those provisions of the
Act which, according to learned counsel for 'the appellants, are discriminatory in character. Section
62 of
the Act, which provides for the criminal iurisdiction of
Gram Cutcherries, is in these terms :
"Notwithstanding
anything
contained
in
the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and subiect to the
provisions of this Act. a bench of the Gram Cutcherry
shall have jurisdiction concurrent with that of the
Criminal Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the bench is situate for the trial of the following offences as well as abetment of and attempts to
commit any such offence, if committed within the local
limits of its jurisdiction, namely :
(a) offences
under the • Indian Penal
Code,
sections 140, 143, 145, 147, 151,
153, 160, 172.
174, 178,
179, 269, 277, 279, 283, 285, 286, 289, 290, 294, 323,
334, 336, 341, 352, 356, 357, 358, 374, 379, 380, 381,
403, 411. 426, 428, 430, 447, 448, 461, 504, 506, 510 ;
(b) offences
under the
Bengal
Public
Gambling
Act, 1867:
( c) offences under sections
24 and 26
of the
Cattle Trespass Act, 1871 :
( d) except
as
otherwise
provided,
offences
under this Act or under · any rule or bye-law made
thereunder ;
( e) any other
offence
under any other enactment, if empowered in this behalf by the Government :
1957
Ba!tleo Singh
and Others
"·
The State af
Bihor and Othm
S. K. Do,].
1957
Baldeo Singh
and Otlu1s
v.
T"' State qf
Bihar and Othtrs
S. K. Dar J.
998
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
Provided that the bench shall not take cognizance
of ahy offence under sections 379, 380, 381 or 411 of
the Indian Penal Code in which the value of the property alleged to be stolen exceeds fifty rupees or in
which the accused-
(i) has been
previously
convicted
of an offence
punishable under
Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal
Code with imprisonment of
either description for a
term of three years or upwards; or
(ii) has been
previously
fined for theft by any
bench of the Gram Cutcherry ; or
(iii) is
a registered member of a criminal tribe
under section 4 of the Criminal Tribes Act, 1924 ; or
(iv) has
been bound over to be of good behaviour
in proceedings instituted under section
109 or 110 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898."
It is worthy of note that the section contains two
important qualifications : one is contained in the nonobstante clause with which the section begins and the
other is
contained in the expression 'subject to the
prqvisions of this Act.' The importance of this second
qualification will be apparent when some of the other
provisions of the Act are set out. Subject to the two
qualifications mentioned above, s. 62 gives a bench of
the Gram Cutcherry jurisdiction concurrent with that
of the ordinary criminal . Court within the local limits
of whose jurisdiction the bench is situate for the trial
of the offences mentioned therein.
Section 63 vests
the bench with the powers of a Magistrate of the third
class. Section 64 is not relevant for our purpose and
need not be read. Section 65 provides
for exclusive
civil jurisdiction of a bench of the Gram Cutcherry in
certain classes of suits, subject
to certain provisos.
Section 66 says that certain suits shall not be heard
by a bench of the Gram
Cutcherry.
Section 67
provides for appeals.
Then comes s. 68,
which
is
very important for our purpose and must be quoted in
extenso--
"No court shall take cognizance of any case or
suit which is cognizable under the Act by a bench of
the Gram Cutcherry unless an order to the contrary
has been passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
999
the Munsif concerned under the provisions of the Act
or any other law for the time being in force."
Section 69 gives the Sub-Divisional
Magistrate or the
Munsif power to transfer a case or suit pending before
a Magisuate or a MunsiJ to a bench of the Gram
Cutchen1'
having jurisdiction
to try
it.
Section 70
gives the
Sub-Divisional
Magistrate
or
the
Munsif
power to withdraw any case or suit pending before a
bench of the Gram Cutcherry and transfer the same to
the ordinary Courts.
Section 71 provides, inter alia,
that no legal practitioner shall appear, plead or act on
behalf of any party in any suit or case before the Gram
Cutcherry.
Section
73
gives power to the
Sub-Divisional
Magistrate and the
Munsif to take necessary
action when there has been a miscarriage of justice or
there is
an apprehension
of
a miscarriage of justice.
Sub-section (2) of s. 73 says that when an order under
sub-s. ( 1) has been made in respect of any suit or case,
the complainant or the plaintiff, as the case may be,
may institute the case or suit afresh in the Court of
the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or a Munsif of competent
jurisdiction.
The argument of learned counsel for the appellants
is
that inasmuch as s. 62 gives only concurrent jurisdiction, it leaves it open to a party to go either to the
ordinarv criminal
Courts or to a bench of the Gram
Cutche;ry. According to him, this opens the door for
discrimination, because
the
procedure followed in the
ordinary criminal Courts is
substantially different from
tliat followed
by a Gram Cutcherry. The procedure
to be followed by the latter is indicated in s. 60 which
states :
"Subject to the provisions of this
Act and to am
rules or directions that mav be made or issued bv the
Government in this behalf, the procedure to be f~l!ow
ed by a bench of the Gram Cutcherry shall be such as
it rn~ty co!1sidcr just and convenient and the bc:Kh
shall not be bound
to fol\mv anv laws of evidence o;:
procedure other than the procedure prescribed bv or
under tliis Act."
This argument as to cfocriminaiion fails to take note
of the other pro·:isions 0£ the Act which we have set
4--61 S. C. Indi:\/59
1957
Ba/deo Singh
~and Others
v.
The State o
Bihar and Othm
S. K. Das].
1957
Baldeo Singh
and Others
v.
The:s1ate of
Bi~ar and Others
S. K. Das].
1000
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
out above.
Section 62 is. in express terms, subject to
other provisions of the Act ; therefore, it is subject to
s. 68 which states that no Court shall take cognizance °"
of any case or suit which is cognizable under the Act
by a bench of the Gram Cutcherry, unless an order to
the
contrary bas been passed by
the Sub-Divisional
Magistrate or the Munsif concerned under the provisions
of the Act or any other law for the time being in
force. On a proper construction of s. 62 and s. 68. it
is clear that there is really no discrimination and a
case cognizable by a bench of the Gram Cutcherry
must be tried there. unless there bas been an order to
the contrary in the exercise of his judicial discretion
by
the
Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the
Munsif concerned as contemplated by the latter part of s. 68. The ~
provisions of the Act under which such an order can
be passed
are
contained
in
the
succeeding sections
already referred to by us. The whole scheme of Cb. VII
of the Act is that a case or suit cognizable under the
Act by a Gram Cutcberrv should be tried by a bench
of the Gram Cutcherry save in those exceptional cases
which are provided for in ss. 70 and 73. The reference
to concurrent jurisdiction in s. 62 is explainable by
reason of the provisions in ss. 69, 70 and 73, so that on
the transfer or withdrawal of a case from the Gram
Cutcberry or the cancellation of the jurisdiction of the
bench, it may not be said that the ordinary criminal y
Courts also have no jurisdiction to try it.
For these reasons, we are nf the view that tk
impugned provisions of the Act are not discriminatory
in nature, and there is no merit in the first contention
pressed before us.
Secondly,
learned
counsel for
the
appellants has
referred us
to rr.
60 and 61 of the
Bibar
Gram
Cutcberry Rules, 1949. Rule 60(2)
requires that the
decision of the full bench shall be signed by the
members and where a dissentient judgment has been
delivered, the minute of dissent shall also be recorded . ~·· •.
under the signatures of the dissenting members. These
r
requirements were fulfilled in the present case, and no
materials have been placed before us which may lead
to the conclusion that rr. 60 and 61 have been violated.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1001
The third and last cor1tention on
behalf of
the
appellants is that the conviction of t;vo of the appellants, Ramdeo
Singh and Sheodhar
Singh, is bad,
because there was no evidence at all against them. The
two witnesses examined
on behalf of the prosecution
definitely said that they saw Baldeo Singh (appellant)
and two other named persons who have been acquitted,
but <lid not identify
the rcmaiuing persons
who aho
forcibly cut an,! removed the crops. Oa this evidence,
there was no legal basis for the conviction of Ramdeo
SinglL and
Shcodhar
Singh.
Our attention bas been
drawn to Ramdeo Singh's own statement in which he
said that he had
removed
the crops of his own field
That statement, standing by itself. is not an admission
of guilt. We agree with learned counsel for the appellants that there was
no evidence whatever to sustain
the conviction of Ramdeo Singh and Sheodhar Singh.
Their conviction was
manifestiv, and on the face of
the record, erroneous.
,
The High Court was moved for the exerme of its
power of superi1m:ndence under
Art.
227, and it is
open to us in this appeal to exercise the same power.
We would accordingly
allow
this appeal
so
far
as
Ramdeo Singh and Sheodhar Singh are concerned and
set aside their conviction and sentence. They will now
be discharged from bail.
So far as Bakko Singh is
concerned,
he
was rightly
convicted.
We do not,
however, think that any useful purpose will be served
by sending him to jail for a short period. We would
accordingly reduce his sentence to a fine· of Rs. 30/-
only or in default imprisonment as directed by the full
bench of the Gram Cutcherry. The appeal is disposed
of accordingly.
Appeal disposed of accordingly.
1957
Ba/deo Singh
and Others
v.
The Stalt of
Bihar and Others
S. K. Das].