# DALBIR SINGH AND OTHERS v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB

- **Citation:** [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 25
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1959-10-07
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. I 02 of 1960
- **Bench:** B. P. 'Inha, K. SuBBA RAo, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. R. MuDHOLKAR, T. L. Venkatarama Aiyar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/dalbir-singh-and-others-v-the-state-of-punjab-2377
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Police Force-Breach of discipline-Law providing for
penalty for such breach-Validity-Pepsu. Police (Incitement to
disaffection) Act, 1953 (Pepsu 1 of 1953), s. 3-Constitution of
India, Art. 19(1)(a), 19(2), 33.
Section 3 of the Pepsu Police (Incitement to disaffection)
Act,
1953,
provided:
''Whoever intentionally causes or
attempts to cause, or does, any act which- he knows is I_ikely
to cau~e, disaffectioh towards any Government estabhshed
by- law in India amongst the members of a police force, or
induces or attempts to induce, or does any act wh1ch he
knows is likely to induce, any member of a police force to
withhold his·services or to commit a breach of Jiscipline shall
be punishable with imprisonment .. ,.,,
After the administration of the State of Pepsu was taken
over by the Presiclent under Art. 356 of the Constitution o[
India, Parliament enacted a law by which the power of the
legislature of the State of Pepsu !was conferred on the President. By virtue of this power the President enacted the Pepsu
Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1953, the object of
which was to provide a penalty, inter alia, for spreading dis.
affection among the police. The appellants were charged with
having induced or attempted to induce members of the police
force tO withhold their services and thus to commit a breach
of discipline by staying away without doing their duty, and
thereby having committed an offence under s. 3 of the Act.
They were convicted by the Magistrate and the conviction
was confirmed by the High Court. The appellants challenged
. the validity of the conviction on the ground that s. 3 was
violative of the freedom guaranteed by Art.
19(l)(a) of the
Constitution and was not saved by Art. 19(2).
Held, thats. 3 of the· Pepsu Police (Incitement to disaffection) Act, 19j3, did not infringe Art. (19)(l)(a) of the
Constitution and was intra 1)ires.
The Police service is an arm of the State charged with
the duty of ensuring and maintaining public order and since
ilny breach of discipline on. the part of its members mi&hi
1952
February 6.
1962
Dalbir _ Singh
v.
7 A~ State oj Punjab
AJya11ga1 J.
..
26
SCPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
result in a 1hreat to puLiic order, s. 3 nnist he held to be valid
as having br.('n r:-naclrd "in the
intr.re~ts of
public order"
within the meaning of Art. 19(2).
l9upr:rintendent,
('fntral /lrison,
Frrll'.lu;arh
v.
Rr1111
Manohar Lohia, (1960) 2 S. C.R. 821, relied on.
Held, furrhrr, that Art. 33 of the Conc;titution \Vas not
applicable became Parliament had deh ga1ed the pow.rs of
the legislature of ti.<: State to tl.e President and any law
enacted by hiih \\·ould riot have the force of Parliamentary
legisla1ion contemplated by Art. 33.
Cnnni; AL A l'PJ:LLATE .J cn1s PICT!ON: Criminal
Appeal No. I 02 of 1960.
· Appeal by special leave from the judgment
and order daterl October 7, 1959,- of the Punjab
High Court in Criminal Revision N:o. 610 of 1959.
Hardei.• Singh ancl Y. Knmar, for the appellants.
.
S. JJ. Sikri. Advocate.General for the Stat,e of
Punjrtb, S. S. Rindm and P. I>. Menon, for the
respondent.
1962. February 6.
The .Tmlgment of the
Court wa8 delirnr<~cl. by
AYL1-.<Hll, .f.--This app<'al hy special bavc
against th!l rleci•ion of tlw High Court of Punjab
raises for
considc~ation principally the
con~titu·
tional valirlitv of"· :~ <>f the Pepsu
P<llicc~ : Incitement to dis11ffPction) Act. (Act, I nf Hl:>3 ), which
will be referre<I to hereafter ns thP imp:igned Acr ..
The four app.,llants were at one tiarn member• of the Peps11 P.J!ice force anrl wer<'
chaq~ed,
before the First Cla's Ma!!istrnte at Faridkot., with
having committed three offunccs: (I) under s. :>6 of
tho Pepsu Public S;ifoty Orilinancc (Xo. 7 of Sam·
1·at 2006), (2) under s. 33 of tlte said Ordinance,
JLnd (3) under"· 3 of the impugned Act.
Wt• shall
he referring to th" provisinns of the r<·levant enact·
monts in due course.
The accused pleaded not
guilt.v and were tried by tho learned Magistrate who
by bis judgment daw

## Text

•
...
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
25
DALBIR SINGH AND OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF PUNJAB
(B. P. 'INHA, o. J., :K. SuBBA RAo, N. RAJAGOPALA
AYYANGAR, ,J. R. MuDHOLKAR and
T. L. VENKATARAMA AIYAR, JJ.)
Police Force-Breach of discipline-Law providing for
penalty for such breach-Validity-Pepsu. Police (Incitement to
disaffection) Act, 1953 (Pepsu 1 of 1953), s. 3-Constitution of
India, Art. 19(1)(a), 19(2), 33.
Section 3 of the Pepsu Police (Incitement to disaffection)
Act,
1953,
provided:
''Whoever intentionally causes or
attempts to cause, or does, any act which- he knows is I_ikely
to cau~e, disaffectioh towards any Government estabhshed
by- law in India amongst the members of a police force, or
induces or attempts to induce, or does any act wh1ch he
knows is likely to induce, any member of a police force to
withhold his·services or to commit a breach of Jiscipline shall
be punishable with imprisonment .. ,.,,
After the administration of the State of Pepsu was taken
over by the Presiclent under Art. 356 of the Constitution o[
India, Parliament enacted a law by which the power of the
legislature of the State of Pepsu !was conferred on the President. By virtue of this power the President enacted the Pepsu
Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1953, the object of
which was to provide a penalty, inter alia, for spreading dis.
affection among the police. The appellants were charged with
having induced or attempted to induce members of the police
force tO withhold their services and thus to commit a breach
of discipline by staying away without doing their duty, and
thereby having committed an offence under s. 3 of the Act.
They were convicted by the Magistrate and the conviction
was confirmed by the High Court. The appellants challenged
. the validity of the conviction on the ground that s. 3 was
violative of the freedom guaranteed by Art.
19(l)(a) of the
Constitution and was not saved by Art. 19(2).
Held, thats. 3 of the· Pepsu Police (Incitement to disaffection) Act, 19j3, did not infringe Art. (19)(l)(a) of the
Constitution and was intra 1)ires.
The Police service is an arm of the State charged with
the duty of ensuring and maintaining public order and since
ilny breach of discipline on. the part of its members mi&hi
1952
February 6.
1962
Dalbir _ Singh
v.
7 A~ State oj Punjab
AJya11ga1 J.
..
26
SCPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
result in a 1hreat to puLiic order, s. 3 nnist he held to be valid
as having br.('n r:-naclrd "in the
intr.re~ts of
public order"
within the meaning of Art. 19(2).
l9upr:rintendent,
('fntral /lrison,
Frrll'.lu;arh
v.
Rr1111
Manohar Lohia, (1960) 2 S. C.R. 821, relied on.
Held, furrhrr, that Art. 33 of the Conc;titution \Vas not
applicable became Parliament had deh ga1ed the pow.rs of
the legislature of ti.<: State to tl.e President and any law
enacted by hiih \\·ould riot have the force of Parliamentary
legisla1ion contemplated by Art. 33.
Cnnni; AL A l'PJ:LLATE .J cn1s PICT!ON: Criminal
Appeal No. I 02 of 1960.
· Appeal by special leave from the judgment
and order daterl October 7, 1959,- of the Punjab
High Court in Criminal Revision N:o. 610 of 1959.
Hardei.• Singh ancl Y. Knmar, for the appellants.
.
S. JJ. Sikri. Advocate.General for the Stat,e of
Punjrtb, S. S. Rindm and P. I>. Menon, for the
respondent.
1962. February 6.
The .Tmlgment of the
Court wa8 delirnr<~cl. by
AYL1-.<Hll, .f.--This app<'al hy special bavc
against th!l rleci•ion of tlw High Court of Punjab
raises for
considc~ation principally the
con~titu·
tional valirlitv of"· :~ <>f the Pepsu
P<llicc~ : Incitement to dis11ffPction) Act. (Act, I nf Hl:>3 ), which
will be referre<I to hereafter ns thP imp:igned Acr ..
The four app.,llants were at one tiarn member• of the Peps11 P.J!ice force anrl wer<'
chaq~ed,
before the First Cla's Ma!!istrnte at Faridkot., with
having committed three offunccs: (I) under s. :>6 of
tho Pepsu Public S;ifoty Orilinancc (Xo. 7 of Sam·
1·at 2006), (2) under s. 33 of tlte said Ordinance,
JLnd (3) under"· 3 of the impugned Act.
Wt• shall
he referring to th" provisinns of the r<·levant enact·
monts in due course.
The accused pleaded not
guilt.v and were tried by tho learned Magistrate who
by bis judgment dawd. August ~8, IU58, l)eld thl'
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
27
prosecution case fully established against all the
accused. He convicted the four appellants under
s. 26 of .the Public Safety Ordinance and sentenced
them to imprisonment for six months. The third
appellant alone was convicted of the offence under
s. 33 of the same Ordinance and was sentenced to
imprisonmPnt for six months. Appellants 1, 2 and
4- were further convicted of off onces under s. 3 of
the impugned Act and sentenced to imprisonment
for six months, the several ~entences against the
respective accused being · directed to run concurrently. The appellants filed an appeal to the
Sessions Judge at Bhatinda who upheld the convictions but reduced the sentences. In respect of
the offence under s. 26 of the Public Safety Ordinance the sentence passed against the four appellants was reduced to imprisonment 'for three months
while in respect of the third accused who had been
additionally sentenced under s. 33 of the Ordinance the
same was reduced to imprisonment for 1-J /2 months
and the sentences on appellants 1, 2 and 4 under
s. 3 of the impugned Ac't was reduced to imprisonment for three months, the sentences again being
directed to run concurrently. With these modifications the appeals stood dismissed.
The appellants
thereafter preferred a revision to the High Court
and this was heard by a learned Single ,Judge who
while accepting the revision of the appelhnts in so
far as it related to their conviction and sentence
nnder s. 26 of the Ordinance. maintained the other
convictions and sentences but reduced the sentences.
It is from this judgment of the High Court that this
appeal has been preferred by the four appellants.
It would be seen from the above narrative that
the appeal is concerned with the propriety of the
conviction of appeilants 1, 2 and 4- of an offence
under s. 3 of the impugned Act ·and of the third
appellant under s. 33 of the Ordinance, all the
appellants having been acquitted by the High
Qm1rt of the charge against t!iem under s, 26 of the
1962
Dalbir Singh
v.
1'he ')fate of Punjab
Ayyangar J.
1902
I>alb ir Singh
'·
T~ SL2tt of Pun,j"h
28
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
Ordinance. It is therefore not necessary to refer
to the terms of s. 26 or the offenco comtitut.ed by
it. In the Courts below including the High Court no
challenge was made as regards the legality of any
of the provisions of law of the violation of which the
appellanta were found guilty but before us though
learned Counsel did not raise any contention
regarding the validity of~. 33 of the Pepsu Public
Safety Ordinance, challenged the constitutio11ality
of s. :i of the impugw~d Pcpsu
Polic~ (Incitement
to disaffection) Act which appellants I, 2 and 4
were found to have violated and for which thev
were sentenced to :t tc·rm of imprisonment.
•
Le1trned Counsel for the appellants raised for
our co11sideration three points : ( l) the constitutional 1·alidity of s.:J of thn irnpugnerl Act, (2) ifs. 3
were constitutional a11d vidid whether appcllant8 I,
2 and 4 were• pro1·cd to have been guilty of an
offence for 1·iolating that provision, and(:!) whether
appellant 3 was properly held guilty of an
offon~e
under "· 3:! of the p,,I' •u Public Safety Ord inn nee.
\Vn shall first take up for consideration the
attack on the validity of s. :i of the impugned Act.
Patiah and East. Punj:Lb State Uuion, commonly
oallecl Pepsu was one of the States specified in Part
B of the First Sohrdulc to the Coustitution when
the Constitution was brought into forco in .January
J!l;)(J,
For reasons uot necesoarv to be stated here,
the administration of Pepsu was· taken over by the
Prcsidc.,nt under Art. :i.;G of the Constitution.
The
powers of the State Lrgislature were declared by
t:he Presidential Proclamation ismecl on
~Tarch 4,
I 953. to be "exerciseable hy or under the authority
of Parliament"
(virl<1 Art. :r>G(l )(b) ).
Thereafter
Parliament enacted Ac. XXII of 195:! which received
the assent of the Pros1clent on i\Iay Ii, 195:1, which
was entitled : "The Patiala and East Punjab States
Union Legislaturn {D"lrgatiou of Powers) Act,
) 953." Section :i oft his enactment provided ;
-.
•
•
3 'S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR'.l'S
29
"The power of the legislature of the State
of Patiala and East Punjab States Union to
make Jaws which has been declared by the
proclamatioIJ.to be exerci~eable by or under the
authority of the l!arliament is hereby conferred on the .l:'resident."
There are other provisions which are contained in
the other sub-sections of s. 3 but these have no
relevance for. this appeal. In exercise of the power
thus delegated to him by Parliament the President
enacted Pepsu Act l of 1953 whose long title runs :
"An Act to provide a penalty for spreading disaffection among the police and for
kindred offences."
It is the 3rd section of this cnJ.ctm0nt whose vali- .
dity is challenged in this appe·1.l and that reads :
":1.
Penalty for causing disaffection, etc.
-Whoever intentionally causes or attempts
to cause, or .does any act which he knows is
likely to cause, disaffection towards any
Government establiRhed by law in
India
amongst the members of a police force, or
induces or attempts to induce, or does any
act which he knows is likely to induce, any
member of a police force to withhold his services or to commit a breach of discipline shall
be punishable with imprisonment which may
extend to six months, or with fine, or with
both."
The attack upon the validity of this provision was
rested on its •being violative of the freedom guaranteed ·by Art.• l9(l)(a), the submission being that the
section was not saved by Art. 19(2).
Before considering the arguments advanced it
is necessary 1to mention, for being put aside, that in
construing the validity of s. 3 of the impugned Act
1962
Ealbir Singh
v.
'The State of Punjab
Ayyangar J.
1962
Da/bir ;Singh
v.
Thi State nf Punjab
A)'J.lngar J.
30
SUPREME COURT .REPoRTs (1962] SU.PP.
the provision contained in Art. 3:l of the Constitution bus nu relevance. That 'Article enacts :
"Art. 33. Parliament may by law determine tn what Pxtcnt any of the· rights conferred by this Part, shall in their application
to the members of the Armed Forces or the
Forces' charged with the maintenance of public
order, be restricted or abrogated so as to ensuro the proper discharge of their duties and
the maintenance of discipline among them."
No doubt, the impugned provision is concerned with
ensuring discipline among the forces charged with
the nmintenance of public order but as the powers
of the President were exercised by virtue of the
delegation contained in s. 3 of Act XXII of 1953
under which only the powers of the State Legislature were v<'st-cd in him, any law enact-cd by him
would not have the force of Parliamentary legislation eontomplated by Art. 33.
Article 3:l being out of the way the very short
question that bas to be considered is whether the
impugner! provision is saved by Art. 19(2), for it is
common ground that that provision does not violate
any freedom other than that of "free speech and
expression"
gunra.nteed
by
Art.
19 (I) (a).
Article 1!1(2) as it. stands after the amendment by
the Constitution (First Amendment) Act of 1951
reads :
"19(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause
(I) shall affect. the operation of any existing
law, or prevent the· State from making any
law, in so for as such law imposes reasonable
restrictions on tho exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interest of
the security of the State, friendly relations
with foreign States, public order, de(l(•ney or
morality, or in relation t-0 contempt of cou::t,
defamation or incitement to an .offence,"
Of the criteria set out in this clause the one re)eyant
•
...
::i S.C.R.
SbPREMtll COURT REPoRTS
31
in the present context is that which refers to "in
the interests of ............ public order". The contention urged hy learned Counsel·was thats: 3 was too
wide in that it embraced within itself not merely
matters which might h<tve relevance to circumstances intimately connected with the maintenance
of public order, but also those whoslil connection
with it might .be remote or fanciful.
While not
seriously disputing that seducing the loyalty of the
police force, or inducing the mem hers thereof not
to do their duty might imperil public order and so
fall within the limit of restrictions permissible of
imposition under Art. 19(2), learned Counsel laid
stress on the fact that the impugned section made
it an offence to induce a member of the police force
to "commit a breach of discipline," laying special
emphasis on the fact that the words "breach of discipline" besides being vague, might include within
itself acts which might be innocent as wdl as others
of varying degrees of culpability.
The content of the expression "in the interests
of. ........... public order" has been the subject of
detailed and elaborate consideration by this 0ourt
in Superintendent, Central Prison,
Fatehgarh v.
Ram M anohar Lohia ( 1) where the effect of the First
(Constitution) Amendment by which the words "for
the maintenance of public order" were replaced
by the words "in the interests of public order" was
considered in the light of the previous decisions of
thie Court on that topic. Subba Rao, J., speaking
for this Court said that the expression · "public
order'' in the juxtaposition of the different grounds
set out in Art. 19(2) was. synonymous with "public
peace, safety and tranquillity". He also pointed
out that the expression "in the interests of public
order" though undoubtedly wider than the previous
phrasing "for the maintenaP.ce of public order"
could not mean that the existence of any . remote
or fanciful connection between the impugned act
(I) [ 1960] 2 S.C.R. 821.
1962
Dalbir Singh
v.
7 he State of Punjt1h
-1_vyanga1 J,
/
1962
Dolhir Sin1h
..
The State of Punjab
Ay1angar J.
'
32
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
and public order was sufficient to sustain the
validity of the law, but that on the other hand, tho
connection between the act prohibited or pnnalised
· and public order should be intimate; in other words
there should be a reasonable and rational relat.ion
between it and the object sought to be achieved,
viz., public order. The nexus shoulrl thus bn proximate-not for-fetched, problcmaticlll or too remote
in the chain of its relation with public order.
Keeping this exposition in mind. the question
to bo considered is whether the connection between
what is prohibited or penalised by the impugned
provision and public order, i.e., the ensuring of
tranquillity and orderly lifo is so remote or fanciful
as to lead tu an inference that there is no proximate connection between the two.
We have no
hesitation· in answering this question against the
appellants. The impugned enactment seeks to lay
an embargo on certain >1ctivities in thti interests of
the Police service which is tho <trm of tho State
charged with the duty of ensuring and maintaining
public order. The efficiency of that service and its
utility in achieving the purpose for which it is form·
ed and cxista is sought to be secured by penalising attempts to undermine its loyalty and dissuad·
ing the members of that force from performing
their functions and boing available to the State as
a disciplined body.
Any breach in the discipline
by its members must neceBBarily bn reflected in a
threat to public order .and tranquillity. If the police
force itself were indisciplined they could hardly
servo as instruments for the maintenance of public
order or function
properly as the machinery
through which order could bo maintained among
the general public. As we have pointed out e•ulier,
learned Counsel did not seriously contest that the
impugned provision in so far as it penalised tho
creation of disaffoctiun among members of the
police force or the incitement of the members of the
police forco to withhold their services from the
government could properly be sustained as enacted
..
' 1
!.
• '
3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
"in the interests of public order," We consider that
attempts to induce indiscipline among the police do
not stand on any different footing.
Wo do not
further consider well-founded the submission of
learned Counsel that the word "discipline" or the
phrase "breach of discipline" is vague. We have
·therefore no hesitation in rejecting this challenge
to the validity of s. 3 of the impugned Act.
The next question that was urged by learned
Counsel was that the High Court was wrong in
considering that the three appellants 1, 2 and 4
were guilty of any contravention oi s. 3 of the Act.
We do not consider that this submission is justified.
It is needless to point out that in considering an
appeal which comes before us by special leave this
Court normally accepts as final every finding of fact
reached by the High Court as well as its appreciatiOn of oral testimony and that if there is evidence
which could serve as a basic for any finding reached
by the High Court the same cannot be canvassed
before us. If the submission of learned Counsel is
viewed in the light of this principle it appears to
us that there is hardly any scope for argument as
regards what might be termed the merits of the
case. One of the witnesses whose evidence has
been accepted by the Courts below and which is
referred to in the judgment of the learned Judge in
the High Court was Krishan Dayal P.W, 4 who
deposed to the accused saying "Police brothers,
come and join us, stop the office work; we will
.sit here in dharma, start hunger strike ............ and
would not allow the office work to run." It is clear
from this evidence that the accused had induced or
had attempted to induce members of the police.
force to withhold their services as also to coi:nmit a
breach of discipline by staying away without doing
their duty. In our opinion, it is not shown that
the conviction of appellants I, 2 and 4 of an offence
under s. 3 of Act I of 1953 was improper or illegal.
Dalbir Singh
v.
The State of Punjah
Avyarigar J.
lf/62
Dolbir Sin/lh
••
Tiu Slate aj Punjab
Ayyangor J,
34
SUPR~ME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
The last of the points arising in the appeal
is as regards the conviction of Lal Siugh the third
appellant- of an offence under s.
3~ of tht• Ordinance. Soctiou 33 of the Ordinance runs :
"Whoever induces or attemptH: to i11uueu
any public se1 rn.11t or any serva11t of local .
authority to disregard 0·1· fail in his duties as.
such servant
shall
be punishable
with
imprisonment which may extend to one year.
or with fine or with both.''
As regards this appellant this is what th~·
learned Judge qf tho High Court stated :
"As against Lal Siugh there is evidcni:e
of P.W. II Kartar Singh and P.W.
18
Balwant Singh, Foot-Constable that he asked
them to disobey their officers and should
give up government work.
His offence under
s. 3:J of the Ordinance is substantiated."
As we have pointed out earlier, th1· validity
of s. ::ia (If the Ordinanre was not challcnμed and
the 1mly qu<'Etion therefore was whether the th(rd
appellant was properly held guilty of th1· offence.
It was not disputed that the two prosecution witnesses I l & 18 did state on oath the ma.ttern referred to by the learned Judge. In view of what we
have stated earlinr as regards the manner in which ·
this Court deals with appeals under Art. 13fi there
is no ground shown for interfering with the conviction of the third appellant or the sentence passed.
Before parting with this case it is necessary
to advert to one matter. In the course of his arguments learned Counsel for the appellant drew our
att~ntion to certain police rules framed by the State
Government which prohibited policemen from joining unions and ~ought to raise a point that the said
rule was unconstitutional as in violation
of
Art.19(l)(b) and that all the activities of the four
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
35
accused were in reality an attempt to form an union
and that therefore we should consider the legality
of this rule of the police force in considering the
propriety of their convictions.
Though there is
a reference to the rule in the judgment of the High
Court, it is referred to only incidentally and as
part of the narrative in detailing the activities of
the accused. The offence with which the accused
were charged was certainly not the violation of that
rule, which it might be pointed out did not create
any offence, so that the validity of that rule was
wholly irrelevant to their guilt when charged with
substantive offences under the various enactments
we have noticed earlier. It need hardly be pointed
out that the fact that a person is engaged in aseert·
ing a fundamental right affords no defence to
a charge ·of having contravened a valid penal
statute while so engaged. In the High Court the
validity of the police rule was never challenged and
in the circumstances we declined to permit learned
Counsel to argue any question before us in relation
to the validity of that rule.
The appeal fails and is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
196a
Dalbir Singh
••
The State of Punjab
Ayyangar J.