# Dalip Singh v. The Slale of

- **Citation:** [1961] 1 S.C.R. 96
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1958-12-12
- **Bench:** !} •. P. SINHA; c. J, Jafer Imam, P. B. GAJENDRAGADKll.R, A. K. Sarkar, K.- Subba Rao, K. N. Wanchoo, K. c. DAS GUPTA, J. 0. Shah
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/dalip-singh-v-the-slale-of-2192
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

State Legislature-Breach of Privilege-Decision of Court, if
res-judicata betw.en parties-Constitution of India, Arts. I94(3),
Ig(I)(a).
The petitioner, the Editor of the Searchlight, an English
daily newspaper published from Patna, was called upon to show
cause before .the Committee of Privileges of the Bihar Legislative .A:ssembly why. he should not be proceeded against for the
breach of privilege of the Speaker and the Assembly for publishing 1tn)naccurate .account of the proceedings of the Legislative
Assembly. He moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitutioμ for quashing the said proceediqg and the question for decision in ~ubstance was whetjier the said ·privilege conferred ·by
Art. 194(3) of the Constitution was subject to the fundamental
1
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
97
rights of a citizen under Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. This
r960
Court by a majority found against the petitioner. Thereafter the
Assembly was prorogued several times, the Committee of
Pandit
Privileges reconstituted and a fresh notice was issued to, the M. S. M. Sharma
petitioner. By the present petition the petitioner ip. substance
v.
sought to reopen the decision, raise t~·e;same contrbv~rsy once Dr. Shree Krish~a
again and contend that the majority detision was wrong. The Sinha 6- Others
question was whether he could he allowed to do so.
Held, that the general principles of res judicata applied and
the judgment of this Court could not be allowed to be reopened
and must bind the petitioner and the Legislative Assembly of
Bihar and the reconstitution of the Committee of Privileges in
the meantime could make no difference.
Raj Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen, [1953) S.C.R. 154, applied.
Since this Court had held that the Legislature had the power
to control the publication of its proceedings and punish any
breach of its privilege, there could be no doubt that it had com-
. plete jurisdiction to carry on its proceedings in accordance with
its rules of business and a mere non-compliance with rules of procedure could be no ground for interference by this Court under
Art. 32 of the Constitution.
Janardan Reddy v. The State of Hyderabad, [1951] S.C.R. 344,
referred to.
Prorogation of the Assembly does not meap. its dissolution
and the only effect it has is to interrupt its proceedings which
can be revived on a fresh motiqn to carry on or renew them.
It
was, therefore, not correct to contend that since the Assembly
was prorogued several times since after the, alleged breach of
privilege, the proceeding ml)st be deemed to be dead.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:
Petition No. 176 of 1959.
Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India for enforcement of Fundamental Righ.ts.
Basudeva Prasad, M. K. Ramamurthi, K. N. Keshwa
and R. Mahalingier, for the petitioner. -
Lal Narain Sinha, B. K. P. Sinha, L. S. Sinha and
B. P .. Varma, for the respondents.
M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, 0. K.
Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, H. J. Umrigar
and T. M. Sen, for the Attorney-General of India.
1960. August 1. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
SINHA C. J.-By this petition under Art. 32 of the
Constitution the petitioner raises almost the same
//
13
Sinha C. J.
98
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
i96o
controversy as bad been done in Writ Petition No. 122
of 1958, which was beard and determined by this
M 5 ~:ind~harma Court by its judgment dated December 12, 1958, and
· · '.·
by Writ Petition No. 106 of 1959, which was heard by
Dr. Shm Krishna this Court on November 10, ll and 12, 1959, but which
· Sfoha b Others did not reach the stage of judgment by this Court,
ina.smuch as the petitioner's Advocate requested the
Sinha c. J.
Court to permit him to withdraw the petition and the
Court allowed the prayer and permitted the petitioner
to withdraw the petition. In each of these petitions
the petitioner, who is a journalist by profession and is
functioning as the Editor of "the Searchlight", an
English daily newspa.per published from Patna in the
Stat

## Text

' 96
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
Dalip Singh
v.
The Slale of
Punjab
Das Gupta f•
August I.
observation. It·had.not in that case to deal with a·rule
w.liich did provide for compulsory retirement, at any
age w·hatsoever irrespective of the length of. service
put in. It will not be' pr'oper to read the observation~
in Doshi's" Gase referred to above as laying down the
law that retirement undar the..rule we are considering
must necessarily be regarded as dismissal cir removal
within the meaning of Art. 311.
.
}Ve are therefore oI opinion that the High Court was
right in holding that the order of compulsory retirement made against the appellant was not removal
from service so as to attract the provisions of Art. 311
of the Constitution and that the suit was rightly dismissed.
'The appeal Is accqrdingly dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
PANDIT M. S. M. SHARMA
.-
v.
DR. SHREE KRISHNA -SINHA AND OTHERS.
(:!} •. P. SINHA; c. J., JAFER IMAM, P. B. GAJENDRAGADKll.R, A. K. SARKAR, K.- SUBBA RAO, -
K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS GUPTA
and J. 0. SHAH, JJ.)
State Legislature-Breach of Privilege-Decision of Court, if
res-judicata betw.en parties-Constitution of India, Arts. I94(3),
Ig(I)(a).
The petitioner, the Editor of the Searchlight, an English
daily newspaper published from Patna, was called upon to show
cause before .the Committee of Privileges of the Bihar Legislative .A:ssembly why. he should not be proceeded against for the
breach of privilege of the Speaker and the Assembly for publishing 1tn)naccurate .account of the proceedings of the Legislative
Assembly. He moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitutioμ for quashing the said proceediqg and the question for decision in ~ubstance was whetjier the said ·privilege conferred ·by
Art. 194(3) of the Constitution was subject to the fundamental
1
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
97
rights of a citizen under Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. This
r960
Court by a majority found against the petitioner. Thereafter the
Assembly was prorogued several times, the Committee of
Pandit
Privileges reconstituted and a fresh notice was issued to, the M. S. M. Sharma
petitioner. By the present petition the petitioner ip. substance
v.
sought to reopen the decision, raise t~·e;same contrbv~rsy once Dr. Shree Krish~a
again and contend that the majority detision was wrong. The Sinha 6- Others
question was whether he could he allowed to do so.
Held, that the general principles of res judicata applied and
the judgment of this Court could not be allowed to be reopened
and must bind the petitioner and the Legislative Assembly of
Bihar and the reconstitution of the Committee of Privileges in
the meantime could make no difference.
Raj Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen, [1953) S.C.R. 154, applied.
Since this Court had held that the Legislature had the power
to control the publication of its proceedings and punish any
breach of its privilege, there could be no doubt that it had com-
. plete jurisdiction to carry on its proceedings in accordance with
its rules of business and a mere non-compliance with rules of procedure could be no ground for interference by this Court under
Art. 32 of the Constitution.
Janardan Reddy v. The State of Hyderabad, [1951] S.C.R. 344,
referred to.
Prorogation of the Assembly does not meap. its dissolution
and the only effect it has is to interrupt its proceedings which
can be revived on a fresh motiqn to carry on or renew them.
It
was, therefore, not correct to contend that since the Assembly
was prorogued several times since after the, alleged breach of
privilege, the proceeding ml)st be deemed to be dead.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:
Petition No. 176 of 1959.
Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India for enforcement of Fundamental Righ.ts.
Basudeva Prasad, M. K. Ramamurthi, K. N. Keshwa
and R. Mahalingier, for the petitioner. -
Lal Narain Sinha, B. K. P. Sinha, L. S. Sinha and
B. P .. Varma, for the respondents.
M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, 0. K.
Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, H. J. Umrigar
and T. M. Sen, for the Attorney-General of India.
1960. August 1. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
SINHA C. J.-By this petition under Art. 32 of the
Constitution the petitioner raises almost the same
//
13
Sinha C. J.
98
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
i96o
controversy as bad been done in Writ Petition No. 122
of 1958, which was beard and determined by this
M 5 ~:ind~harma Court by its judgment dated December 12, 1958, and
· · '.·
by Writ Petition No. 106 of 1959, which was heard by
Dr. Shm Krishna this Court on November 10, ll and 12, 1959, but which
· Sfoha b Others did not reach the stage of judgment by this Court,
ina.smuch as the petitioner's Advocate requested the
Sinha c. J.
Court to permit him to withdraw the petition and the
Court allowed the prayer and permitted the petitioner
to withdraw the petition. In each of these petitions
the petitioner, who is a journalist by profession and is
functioning as the Editor of "the Searchlight", an
English daily newspa.per published from Patna in the
State of Bihar, impugned the validity of the proceedings before the Committee of Privileges and pra.yed
for restraining the opposite party, namely, the Chief
Minister of Biha.r as Chairman of the Committee of
Privileges, Bihar Legislative Assembly, Committee of
Privileges and the Secretary of the Bihar Legisla.tive
· Assembly, from proceeding a.gainst the petitioner for
the publication in its issue dated Ma.y 31, 1957, of the
Searchlight an account of the debate in the Legisla.-
tive Assembly, Bihar, on May 30, 1957.
The facts of the caRC have been stated in great detail
in the majority judgment of this Court delivered by
S. R. Dae, C. J., in M. S. M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna
Sinha('). In the opening paragraph of this Court's
judgment aforesaid, the parties before the Court have
been enumerated and the anomaly pointed out. This
Court held in effect that under Art. 194(3) of the Constitution a House of a Legislature of a State has the
same powers, privileges and immunities as the House
of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom
had at the commencement of the Constitution. The
House of Commons at the relevant date had the power
or privilege of prohibiting the publication of even a
true and faithful report of proceedings of the House
and had a fortiori the power or privilege of prohibiting
the pu blica ti on of an inaccurate or garbled version of
such debate or proceedings. The 'powers or privileges
of a House of State Legislature are the same as
. (1) [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. SoO,
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REFORTS
99
those of the House of Commons in those matters
z960
until Parliament or a State Legislature, a.a the ca.se
.
may be, ma.y by law define those powers or privi- M. st;d~hrma
leges.
Unti) that event has happened the powers,
.,,
privileges and immunities .of a. House of Legislature of Dr. Shree Kri.sh•a
a. State or of its members and committees ate the sa.me Sinha b Others
as those of the House of Commons a.t the date of commencement of our Constitution. This' Court also exSinha c. f.
pressed. the view that Legislatures in this country like
the House of Commons will no doubt appreciate the
benefit of publicity and will not exercise those powers,
privileges and immunities, except in gross cases. The
minority judgment delivered by Subba. Rao, J., on the
other hand, expressed , 'ie view that at the relevant
date the House of Cc,.·nmons, even as the Legislatures
in this country, had no privilege to prevent the publication of a correct and faithful report of the proceedings of those Legislatures, except those of secret
sessions, and had only a limited privilege to prevent
mala fide publication of garbled, unfaithful or expunged reports of the proceedings.
He also held tha.t the
petitioner ha.d the fonds.mental right to publish the
report of the proceedings of the Legislature. In the
result, this Court, in view of the judgment of the majority, dismissed the petition, but ma.de no order a.a to
costs. This Court further held that the Assembly of
Bihar was entitled to take proceedings for breach of its
privileges and it was for the House itself to determine
whether there had in fact been any breach of any of
its privileges.
.
·After Writ Petition No. 122 of 1958 had thus ended,
the petitioner again moved this Court under Art. 32 of
the Constitution. That case was registered a.a Writ
Petition No. 106 of 1959. On January 5, 1959, the
petitioner received a notice that the case of breach of
privilege against him would be considered by the Committee of Privileges of the Assembly on February 3,
1959. That hearing wa.s postponed from date to date,
• .
until in August, 1959, the petitioner filed his petition
under Art. 32 of the Constitution. He contended in
that petition that, a.a a citizen of India., the petitioner
had the funda.menta.1 right under Art. 19(l)(a.) of the
100
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
r96o
Constitution to freedom of speech and expression
d
which included the freedom of publication and circulaM s.~;1n ~h••••a tion and that the Legislature of the State of Biha.r
v.
could not claim any privilege contrary to the right
Dr. Shm Krishna th us claimed. In effect, it was contended that the
Sinha &· Othm privilege conferred on the Legislature of a State by
Art. 194(3) of the Constitution was subject to the funds;,, •• c. J.
amental right of a. citizen contained in Art. 19(I)(a).
It was also contended that the first respondent, the
Chief Minister of Bihar, who, it was alleged, ha.d control over the majority of the members of the Biha.r
Legislative Assembly and of the Committee of Privileges, was proceeding ma1a fide in getting the proceedings instituted against the petitioner for alleged breach
of the privilege of the House. Though not in terms,
but in effect, the points raised in this petition were a
reiteration of those already determined by this Court
in its judgment aforesaid of December 12, 1958. The
prayer made in the petition was that the proceedings
of the Committee of Privileges a.t its meeting held on
August IO, 1958, might be quashed and the respondents restrained by a writ in the nature of a writ of
prohibition from proceeding against the petitioner in
respect of publication aforesaid of the proceedings of
the Bihar Legislative Assembly of May 30, 1957.
After the petitioner had made his writ a.pplica.tion to
this Court as aforesaid, the Bihar Legislative Assembly reconstituted tho Committee of Privileges of the
Assembly, and on tha.t very date a member of the
Legislative Assembly sought to move a motion in that
Assembly for revive.I a.nd re-reference of the matter of
the alleged breach of privilege by the petitioner. Some
memberscof the Bihar Legislative Assembly objected
to the motion being moved and the Speaker of the
Assembly deferred giving his ruling on that objection.
At the instance of some of the members of the Assembly, the Speaker of tho Assembly referred two queE·
tions to the Advocate General of Bihar for his
opinion on the floor of the House on October 20,
1959, namely, (1) whether it was open to tho Assem-
. bly to debate on an issue which might be sub judice
in view of the writ petition aforesaid filed by. the
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
101
petitioner in the Supreme Court under Art. 32; and
1 960
(2) whether the matter which was dead by reason
P
a·t
of prorogation of the House several .times could be M. s .• ~~ ~h.arma
legally revived and restored. On October 20, 1959, the
v.
Advocate General of Bihar attended the House and Dr. Shm Krishna
gave his opinion, which it is not relevant to state here. ~Sinha & Others
The Writ Petition, 106 of 1959, was heard in part and
allowed to be withdrawn, as indicated above, on
Sinha c. f.
November 12, 1959.
!)n November 24, 1959, the petitioner received a
fresh notice from the Secretary of the Legislative
Assembly, opposite party No. 3, calling upon the
petitioner to show cause on or before December 1,
1959, why appropriate action should not be recommonded against him for a breach of the privilege of
the Speaker and the Assembly.
The petitioner again
instituted proceedings under Art. 32 of the Constitution complaining that the motion adopted by the
Committee of Privileges of the Bihar .Legislative
Assembly at its meeting held on November 23, 1959,
amounted,to an abridgement of his fundamental right
of speech 'and expression guaranteed under Art. 19(1)
(a) of the Constitution and was an "illegal and mala
.fide threat to the petitioner's rersona.l liberty in violation of Art. 21 of the Constitution of India and that
the Committee of Privileges, respondent No. 2 had
no jurisdiction Ol" authority to proceed against the
petitioner a.s threatened by the notice aforesaid ".
The grounds of attack raise substantially the same
questions that were agitated on the previous occasions
in this Court. It was contended before us that the
pet.it.ioner, as a citizen of India, had the fundamental
right of freedom of speech and expression which included the freedom of obtaining the earliest and most
correct intelligence of the events of the time including
the proceedings of a Legislature and publishing the
same and that no Legislature of a State could claim a
privilege so as to curtail that right. It was, therefore,
contended that the majority decision of this Court in
Pt. M. S. M. Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha (1) was
wrong, In this connection it was also contended that
(1) [1959] Supp. I S.C.R. 806.
102
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
19'0
the rule of construction adopted by th is Court in its prep "" 1
vious decision had been wrongly applied. It wa.s further
M. s. ;,, ~hanna contended tha.t even ifthe Honse of a. State Legislature
·-
v.
ha.d the ea.me powers, privileges and immunities a.a
Dr. Sim K•ishna those of the House of Commons, those will be only
Sida 6: Othm such a.a were being a.ctua.lly exercised a.t· the da.te of
the commencement of the Constitution a.nd the right
Si•ha c. J.
to prevent publication of its proceedings was not one
of those powers, privileges or immunities.
An a.ppea.1
wa.s a.Iso ma.de to Art. 21 of the Constitution a.nd it
we.a contended tha.t no citizen could be deprived of
his persona.I liberty, except in a.ccorda.nce with the
procedure established by la.w.
Hence, it we.a further
contended tha.t the ma/.a fide a.ct of respondents 1 11.n<l
2 ca.Hing upon the petitioner to show ca.use wad a.
threat to his funda.menta.l right, a.nd, finally, it wa.s
contended tha.t after severe.I prorogati?ns, the previous
proceedings for breach of privilege were dead a.nd. the
House of the Assembly ha.d, therefore, no power or
jurisdiction to issue the fresh notice in accordance
with the motion of Novembor 23, 1959, reviving tho
proceedings.
I·
· It will thus appear tha.t in the present proceedings
also the very same questions which were discussed
a.nd decided in Writ Petition No. 122 of 1958 a.re
sought to be raised once a.gain.
I'i:1 effect, it is sought
to be a.r~ued tha.t the previous decision of this Court
/ ha.s proceeded on a wrong appreciation of the legal
positiort In short, it is insisted that the petitioner
ha.s the fundamental right of publishing the proceedings of the Bihar Legislature and tha.t the Legisla.turn
bas no power to restrict or control the publication of
its proceedings.
The Government Advocate of Biha.r, on behalf of
•
the opposite party, ha.s contended, in the first instance,
tha.t the present writ petition age.inst the parties,
namely, the Cha.irma.n and the Members of the CommiLtee of Privileges, respondents I a.nd 2, is barred by
the principle of res judicata and, therefore, not
ma.inta.iua.ble.
His contention a.Iso is tha.t the writ
cannot issue either age.inst a.n individual member or
against the House of the Legislature a.s a. whole in
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
103
respect of what has been done by it in exercise of its
r96o
Privilege of prohibiting or, at any rate, controlling
Pandit
the publication of its proceedings.
M. s. M. Sharma
On behalf of the petitioner it was contended by
v.
Mr. Basudeva Prasad that respondent No, 2, the Dr. Shree K.rishna
Committee of Privile"es has been reconstituted as Sinha & Others
0
'
aforesaid after the first decision of this Court which
is sought to be availed of as res judicata and that
Sinha c. f.
therefore the rule of res judicata· is inapplicable. In
this connection it may be pointed out .that in Writ
Petition No. 122 of 1958, Sri Krishna Sinha, Chief
Minister of Bihar, was imp!eaded as opposite party
No. 1 in his capacity as the Chairman of the Committee of Privileges of the Bihar Legislative Assembly
and opposite party No. 2 was cited as Committee of
Privileges, Bihar Legislative Assembly, without any
names being given.
In the present writ petition,
opposite party No. 1 is the same. Opposite party
No. 2 is impleaded as the (New) Committee of Privileges of Bihar Legislative Assembly and then a
number o,f names are given including that of Dr. Sri
Krishna Sinha, the Chief Minister, as Chairman.
Would it make any difference that though opposite
party No. 2 is the Committee of Privileges, its personnel. is different from that of the Committee of
Privileges constituted as it was in 1958 ! In our
opinion, it does not make any difference. So long as
the Assembly remains the same it is open to the
Assembly to reconstitute its Committees according to
the exigencies of the business of the Assembly. The
Committee of Privileges is one of the agencies through
which the Assembly has to transact its business. It
is really the Assembly as a whole which is proceeding
against the petitioner in purported exercise of its
powers, privileges and immunities as held _by this
Court in its judgment in Writ Petition No. 122 of
1958. This Court has laid it dowri in the case of Raj
Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen (1) that the principle
underlying res judicata is applicable in respect of a
question which hais been raised and de9ided after full
contest, even though the first Tribunal which decided
(<) [1953] S.C.R. 154.
104
SUPREJIIE COVRT REPORTS
[1961]
r96o
the matter may have no jurisdiction to try the sub.
P
d .
sequent suit and even though the subject.matter of
an II
h d.
I
h
.
h
M. s. M. Sharma t e 1spute was not exact y t o same m t e two pmv.
eeedings.
In that case the rule of res judicata·waii
Dr. Shrtt Krishna applied to litigation in land acquisition proceedings.
Sinha&. Others In that case the general principles of law bearing on
the rule of res judicata, and not the provisions of s. 11
Sinha c. J.
of the Code of Civil Procedure, were applied to tho ca.se.
The rule of res judicata is meant to give finality to a
decision arrived at after due contest and a.foer hearing
the parties interested in the controversy.
There
cannot be the least doubt that, though eo nomine
opposite party No. 2 were not the same, but there is
no escape from the conclusion that the Committee of
Privileges is the same Committee irrespective of its
personnel at a given time so long as it was a Com1 mittee constituted by the same Legisl!l-ti ve Assembly.
The question decided by this Court on the previous
occasion was substantially a question affecting the
whole Legislature of the State of Bihe.r and was of
genera.I importance and did not dopend upon tho
particular constitution of the Committee of Privileges.
It cannot, therefore, be said that the question decided
by this Court on the previous occasion had not been
folly debated and had not been decided after duo deli.
beration. That there was difference of opinion and
one of the Judges constituting the Court held another
view only shows that there was room for difference of
opinion. It was a judgment of this Court which binds
the petitioner as also the Legislative Assembly of
Bihar. For the application of the genera.I principles
of res judicata, it is not necessary to go into the question whether the previous decision was right or wrong.
In our opinion, therefore, the questions determined
by the previous decision of this Court cannot be
reopened in the present case and must govern the
rights and obligations of the parties whieh, as indicated above, a.re substantially the same. It is manifest,
therefore, that the petitioner has no fundamcnta.1
right which is being threatened to be infringed by the
proceedings ta.ken by the opposite party.
lt now remains to consider the other subsidiary
\
-
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
10.3
questions raised on behalf of the petitioner. It was
Ig6o
contended .that the procedure adopted inside th~ Hou~e
Pandit
of the Legislature was not regular and not strictly m M. s. M ~ Sharma
accordance with law.
There are two answers to this
v.
contention, firstly, that according to the previous deci. Dr. Shree K6>hna
sion of this Court, the petitioner has not the fundSinha <~ Othm
amental right claimed by him. Re is, therefore, out
of Court. Secondly, the validity of the proceedings
Sinha c. f.
inside the Legislature of a State cannot be called in
question on the allegation that the procedure laid down
by the law had not been strictly followed.
Article 212
of the Constitution is a complete ·answer to this part
of the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner.
No Court can go into those questions which are within
the special jurisdiction of the Legislature itself, which
has the power to conduct its own business. Possibly,
a third answer to this part of the contention raised on
behalf of the petitioner is that it is yet premature to
consider the question of procedure as the Committee is
yet to conclude its proceedings. It must also be observed that once it has been held that the Legislature has
the jurisdiction to control the publication of its proceedings and to go into the question whether there has
been any breach of its privileges, the Legislature is
vested with complete jurisdiction to carry on its proceedings in accordance with its rules of business. Even
though it may not have strictly complied with the
requirements of the procedural law laid down for conducting its business, t)lat cannot be a ground for interference by this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution.
Courts have always recognised the basic· difference
between complete want of jurisdiction and improper
or irregular exercise of jurisdiction. \Mere non.compliance with rules of procedure cann·ot be a ground
for issuing a writ under Art. 32 of the Constitution vide
J aoordan Reddy v. The State of Hyderabad (1 ).
It was also sought to be argued that the subjectmatter of the proceedings in contempt, whatever it was,
took place more than three years ago, and that, therefore, it has become much too stale for proceeding
·(3) [1951] S.C.R. 344·
14
106
Sl'PREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1961 l
'96°
age.inst the petitioner in contempt. In our opinion,
P
d
this is also a. matter within the jurisdiction of the
M. s. ,~ ~"•••i• Legislature which must decide whether or not it was
v.
recent enough to he ta.ken serious notice of, or whether
Dr. sn.u K"shn• any punishment in the event of the petitioner being
S1nh• '-" 01hm found guilty is . ca.lied for.
These are matters with
which this Court is in no way concerned.
Mr. Lal
5'""" c. 1·
:Kara.in Sinha., the Government Advocate of Bihar, who
appeared on behalf of tho respondents, informed the
Court that the Legislature wa.s interested more in the
vindication of its constitutional rights than in inflicting any punishment on the petitioner.
Hence, no
more need be said on this aspect of the matter.
lt remains to consider one other point sought to be
made on behalf of the petitioner that the Assembly
had no power to proceed against the petitioner for
breach of privilege in May, 1957 when we know as a
fact that the Assembly wa.s prorogued several times
between May 31, 1957 a.nd November 23, 1959. In
our opinion, there is no substance in this contention,
for the simple reason that the prorogation of the
Assembly does not mean its dissolution. The House
remains the same; only its sessions are interrupted by
prorogation of the. House according to the exigencies
of public demands on the time and attention of the
members of the Assembly and the volume of business
of the Assembly itself. In this connection reliance
wa.s pla.ced on the following passage in May's Parliamentary Practice, 16th Edition, p. 279 :-
" The effect of a prorogation is at once to suspend
all business until Parliament shall be summoned again.
Not only are the sittings of Parliament at an end, but
all proceedings pending at tho time are quashed,
except impeachments by the Commons and appeals
before the House of Lords. Every bill must therefore
be renewed after a prorogation, as if it were introduced
for the first time."
The observations quoted above do not support the
extreme contention raised on behalf of the petitioner
that the proceedings in contempt are dead for all time.
The effect of the prorogation only is to interrupt the
proceedings which a.re revived on a. fresh motion to
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
107
carry on or renew the proceedings. In this case, it is
'960
not necessary to pronounce upon the question whether
P-;;n--;;i,
dissolution of the House necessarily has the effect of M. s. M. Sharma
completely wiping out the contempt or the proceedings
v.
relating thereto.
Dr .. Shree Krishna
In· our opinion, for the reasons given above, no Sinha & Others
grounds have been made out for the exercise by this
Sinha c. J.
Court of its powers under Art. 32 of the Constitution.
The petition is accordingly dismissed.
There will be
no order as to costs.
Petition dismissed.
HOSHIARPUR CENTRAL CO-OPERATIVE
BANK LTD.
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME.TAX, SIMLA.
(8. K. DAS, M. HIDAYATULLAH, and J. c. SHAH, Jj,)
Income-tax-Co-operative Society-Profits earned in business
with non-members-Whether exempt from tax-Income-tax Act,
I92I (IX of I92I), s. 60, notification.
The assessee Bank, which was a _co-operative society, did
business is controlled commodities with the approval of the
Registrar of Co-operative Societies and earned profits.
It
claimed that these profits were also exempt from taxation under
F. D. (C. R.) Notification R. Dis. No. 291-I. T./25 dated August
25, 1925, as subsequently amended, issued under s. 60 of the
Income-tax Act. This notification exempted "the profits of any
co-operative society." from tax. It was urged for the Department that these words referred to profits made by a co-perative
society in its business as a pure co-operative society, i.e., ifLbusi.
ness with its own members. within the four corners of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1912, and the bye-laws made thereunder.
Held, that the said profits were exempt from tax. The
words of the Notification were wide enough to include profits of
business of a co-operative society in transactions· with nonmembers also. It was always open to the appropriate Government to allow a society to exten<f its business operations to trading with persons other than its members. Once there was such
z960
. August 2.