# DATTATRAYA GOVJND MAHAJAN & ORS. ETC v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR - **Citation:** [1977] 2 S.C.R. 790 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1977-01-27 - **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1307 of 1976 - **Bench:** A. N. Ray, M. H. Beg, P. N. Bhagwati, V. R. Krishna Iyer, P. N. Sh!Nghal - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/dattatraya-govjnd-mahajan-ors-etc-v-state-of-maharashtra-anr-7110 - **Pages:** 35 ## Headnote Maliaraslitra Agricultural LaT1ds (Ceiling of Holdings) Act. 1961 as ame11ded /1y the Maharashtra Agric11lt11ral Lands (LoweriT1g of Ceiling of Holdings) AmeT1dment Acts 1972 and 1975 (Maharaslitra Act~ 21 of 1975 and 47 cf 1975 and 2 of 1976)-Ss. 2(11A), 2(22), 3.4.5.(1) rlw Schedule I and Sectio11 6 Principal Act and the \'Grious amending Acts, placed in tl1e Ninth ScheduleWhether the Act as amended, in so far as it creates an artificial family unit and fixes a ceili111< on holding of land by sucli family unit is void and violatfre of the second proviso to clause (I) of Art. 31A and not sal'ed by tl1' i11111111nisi11g provision enacted in A rt. 3 lB. Constitutio11 of !11dia, 1950-Art. 31H, interpretation of. Constitution of India, 1950-Art. 3l(A)(l), Second prol'iso-Wheth,·r co11fer.s a Funda111en1al Right. • Constitution of Lndia 1950 (Sei·enteenth Amendment) A ct, 1964, S. 3-Exr:lanation----Construction of. Interpretation of Statutes-Construction of a "pro1'i.\o" to a section or clause in an PllGCf!JU'llf. Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972 included in the protectil·c umbrella uf rile iVi11th Schedule, subsequent to the decision of the Jligll Court declaring certain provisions thereof as unconstitutional~A rt. 31 lJ b:!ing retrospectii·e is entitled to the iJnn1unity conferred by it. ' U.P. lmpMition of Ceiling Oil Land Holdings Acr (Act Nu. l) 1971 as amended by Act No. 18 of 1973 and Act No. 2 of 1975, all i11c/11dcd in the Ninth Schedule-The question, "'hether s.5(6) is violarii•c of second provi.w to clause (l) of Art. 31A'. of the Constitution cannot be assailed by reawn ·of inununity {'flaC!Pd in .Art. 31R. The Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling of Holdings) Act, J 961 which \Vas enacted in in1plementation of the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in clauses (b) and ( c) of Art. 39 of the Constitution imposed a maximum ceiling on the holding of agricultural land in the State of Maharashtra and provided for the acquisition of land held in excess of the ceiling and for the distribution of such excess land to landless and other persons with a Yiew to securin:; the distribution of agricultural land in a manner wJ:!ich would best observe the common good of the people. Maharashtra Amendment Act 21 of 1975 effected radical amendments in the principal Act by lowering the ceiling on agricultunil holding and created a concept of artificial family unit for fixing ceiling on. holdings of agricultural land. The person as defined in s.2(22) r/w. s.2(ll) a1;d his spouse and their minor daughters were clubbed together for the purpose of constituting a family unit as defined in the Explanation to s.4 sub-section (1) and all lands held by each member of the family unit whether jointly or separately were aggregated together, and by a fiction of law deemed to be held by the family unit. The appellant landlords in the State of Maharashtra preferred writ fl''lit!Om in the High Court of Bombay challenging the constitutional validity of the Principal Act, as amended on various grounds since the effect of the provisions of the pricipal Act as amended by the three Maharashtra Acts, viz. 21 of 197 5, 47 of 1975 and 2 of 1976 was to expropriate a part of the lands belonging to concept of family unit and fixed a ceiling on holding of land by such family unit. it was violative of the second proviso to clause (l) Art. 3 IA and was not saved by the immunising provision enacted in Art. 31 B. The High Court dismissed them. The main contention was that in so far as the Act created an artifici"I ,. " ... ..,-__ --=---.. • .. l D. G. MAHAJAN 1'. MAHARASHTRA (Bhagwati, J.) 791 the petition holding that Art. 31B afforded complete immunity to the provisions of the principal Act. In appeal by special leave to this Court, the appellant contended : ( 1) On a true construction of Art. '3 lB a pOBt constitution enactment such as the Act is protected from invalidation only when it merely transgresses a restriction on legislative competence imposed b ## Text _Characters 0–38,700 of 113,762. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=38700 for what follows._ A B D E F· G H 790 DATTATRAYA GOVJND MAHAJAN & ORS. ETC. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR. January 27, 1977 [A. N. RAY, C.J., M. H. BEG, P. N. BHAGWATI, V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND P. N. SH!NGHAL, JJ.] Maliaraslitra Agricultural LaT1ds (Ceiling of Holdings) Act. 1961 as ame11ded /1y the Maharashtra Agric11lt11ral Lands (LoweriT1g of Ceiling of Holdings) AmeT1dment Acts 1972 and 1975 (Maharaslitra Act~ 21 of 1975 and 47 cf 1975 and 2 of 1976)-Ss. 2(11A), 2(22), 3.4.5.(1) rlw Schedule I and Sectio11 6 Principal Act and the \'Grious amending Acts, placed in tl1e Ninth ScheduleWhether the Act as amended, in so far as it creates an artificial family unit and fixes a ceili111< on holding of land by sucli family unit is void and violatfre of the second proviso to clause (I) of Art. 31A and not sal'ed by tl1' i11111111nisi11g provision enacted in A rt. 3 lB. Constitutio11 of !11dia, 1950-Art. 31H, interpretation of. Constitution of India, 1950-Art. 3l(A)(l), Second prol'iso-Wheth,·r co11fer.s a Funda111en1al Right. • Constitution of Lndia 1950 (Sei·enteenth Amendment) A ct, 1964, S. 3-Exr:lanation----Construction of. Interpretation of Statutes-Construction of a "pro1'i.\o" to a section or clause in an PllGCf!JU'llf. Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972 included in the protectil·c umbrella uf rile iVi11th Schedule, subsequent to the decision of the Jligll Court declaring certain provisions thereof as unconstitutional~A rt. 31 lJ b:!ing retrospectii·e is entitled to the iJnn1unity conferred by it. ' U.P. lmpMition of Ceiling Oil Land Holdings Acr (Act Nu. l) 1971 as amended by Act No. 18 of 1973 and Act No. 2 of 1975, all i11c/11dcd in the Ninth Schedule-The question, "'hether s.5(6) is violarii•c of second provi.w to clause (l) of Art. 31A'. of the Constitution cannot be assailed by reawn ·of inununity {'flaC!Pd in .Art. 31R. The Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling of Holdings) Act, J 961 which \Vas enacted in in1plementation of the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in clauses (b) and ( c) of Art. 39 of the Constitution imposed a maximum ceiling on the holding of agricultural land in the State of Maharashtra and provided for the acquisition of land held in excess of the ceiling and for the distribution of such excess land to landless and other persons with a Yiew to securin:; the distribution of agricultural land in a manner wJ:!ich would best observe the common good of the people. Maharashtra Amendment Act 21 of 1975 effected radical amendments in the principal Act by lowering the ceiling on agricultunil holding and created a concept of artificial family unit for fixing ceiling on. holdings of agricultural land. The person as defined in s.2(22) r/w. s.2(ll) a1;d his spouse and their minor daughters were clubbed together for the purpose of constituting a family unit as defined in the Explanation to s.4 sub-section (1) and all lands held by each member of the family unit whether jointly or separately were aggregated together, and by a fiction of law deemed to be held by the family unit. The appellant landlords in the State of Maharashtra preferred writ fl''lit!Om in the High Court of Bombay challenging the constitutional validity of the Principal Act, as amended on various grounds since the effect of the provisions of the pricipal Act as amended by the three Maharashtra Acts, viz. 21 of 197 5, 47 of 1975 and 2 of 1976 was to expropriate a part of the lands belonging to concept of family unit and fixed a ceiling on holding of land by such family unit. it was violative of the second proviso to clause (l) Art. 3 IA and was not saved by the immunising provision enacted in Art. 31 B. The High Court dismissed them. The main contention was that in so far as the Act created an artifici"I ,. " ... ..,-__ --=---.. • .. l D. G. MAHAJAN 1'. MAHARASHTRA (Bhagwati, J.) 791 the petition holding that Art. 31B afforded complete immunity to the provisions of the principal Act. In appeal by special leave to this Court, the appellant contended : ( 1) On a true construction of Art. '3 lB a pOBt constitution enactment such as the Act is protected from invalidation only when it merely transgresses a restriction on legislative competence imposed by any provision of that Part and is therefore inconsistent with such provision. The larger ground of validation curing generally •ny inconsistency with any provision of PJ!rt Ill is available only in case of pre-constitution legislation. (ii) The second proviso to clause ( 1) of Art. 37 A does not confer any Fundamental Right but merely imposes a !imitation on the .legislative competence of the legislature and, therefore, Art. 31 B does not exonerate the Act from its obligation to conform with the requirements of the second proviso to clause Jl) of Art. 31. (iii) To interpret the second proviso as conferring a Fundamental Right would convert the second proviso into a substantive provision and that would be contrary to the \vell-recognised canon of construction that a proviso n1ust be read so as to carve out from the inaln pr6vision somtthing which would otherwise fall with it and (iv) The Explanation to s.3 of the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act. 1964 shows that an acquisition n1ade in contra~ention of the second proviso to clause (i) of Art. 31A is void and does not have the protection of Art. 31B, even if the law under which such acquisition is made is included in the Ninth Schedule. Dismissing the appeals, the Court, Held : Per Bhagwati. ). (for himself and on behal[ of Ray, C. J .. Beg and Shing.hal, JJ.) (I) The Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling of Holdings) Act, 196 I as amended by Maharashtra Acts 21 of 1975, Maharnshtra Act 47 of 1975 and Maharashtra Act 2. '?f 1976 in s_o far as it creates an artificial concept ·of family unit and fixes a ce1lmg on holdmg of land by such family unit, does not conflict with the second proviso to clause (1) of Art. 31A. [810 El · · (2) It would not be possible to say in the case of an individual member of the family unit that when any land held by him under his personal cultivation is taken over by the State under the Act by reason of the land deemed to be held by the family unit being in excess of the ceiling limit applicable to the family unit, the acquisition is of any land "within the ceiling limit applicable to liim" and hence in such a case there would be no question of any violation of the provision enacted in the second proviso to clause (I) of Art. 3 !A in so far as the land held by him is concerned. It may be that by reason of the creation of an artificial concept of a family unit, one or more members of the family 'lmit may lose the land held· by them, but that cannot be helped, because having regard to the social and eco'nomic realities of our rural life and with a view to nullifying transfers effected in favour· of close relations for the purpose of avoiding the impact of ceiling legislation, a family unit has been taken by the State Legislature as a unit for the applicability of the limitation of ceiling area. [809 H, 810 A-Bl (3) Even if the Act, in so far as it introduces an artificial concept of a family unit and fix-es ceiling on holding of agricultural land by 'such family unit, is violative of the second proviso to clause (I) of Art. 31A it is protected by Art. 318, by reason of its inclusion in the Ninth Schedule. [808 F-G] Hasmukh/al Dayab/wi v. State of Gujarat [1977] 1 SCR 103 followed. ( 4) It is an elementary rule of construction that a statutory pro".isiop must al ways be interpreted in a manner which would suppress the m1schwf and advance the remedy and carry out the object and purpose of the legislation. Our Constitution has a social purpose and an economic mission and every Article of the· Constitution must, therefore, be construed so as to advance the social purpose and fulfil the economic mission it seeks to accomplish. [803 F-G] (5) The aim and obi<:ctive of Art. ~lB _is to ma~e th~ m?st comprehenshc provision for saving agra~1~n r~form leg1slat10~ from mvahdat10n on 1:be ground of infraction of any prov1s10n m Part III and 1t must therefore be so mterpreted as to have the necessary sweep and coverage. An expansive _interpretation must be placed on the language of Art. 31 B so to carry out the obJect and purpose of enacting that Article. [803 F-H] A B c D E F G H 792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1977] 2 S.C.R. ~I\. (6) Article 31.B is sufficiently wide to protect legislation not c•.·U)' where it takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provisions of Part Ill but also where it is inconsistent with any such provisions. [803 H, 804 A] B E G H ( 7) The words "such Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent with or lakes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by ani provision of this Part" m Art.3 lB are clearly an echo of the language of clauses ( 1) and (2) of Art. 13 and they have obviously been employed because the enactments specified Ill th". Ninth Schedule may be pre-constitution as well as post-constitution laws. But, it _woud· not be right to introduce an artificial dichotomy in Art. 31 B by correlatmg the first part of the expression namely, "is inconsistent wirh ..... . ani: pr_ovisions of this . Part" and confining its applicability to pre-constitution legtSlat10n and correlatmg and confining the applicability of the other Part of che expression namely "takes away or abridges ;my of the richtsconferred by; any provisions of this Part" to post constitution legislation. Hoth the parts of the expression, on a plain natural construction of the langua"c o; Art. 3 lB apply equally to post-constitution legislation as well as pre-c0nstit~1tion legislation. [803 D-F] . (8) The Second Proviso to clause (1) of Art. 3 !A does confer a Fundamental Right. The second proviso to Art. 3 lA confers a right higher than the one under clause (2) of Art. 31 on a person in respect of such portion of land under his personal cultivation as is within. the ceiling limit applicable to him and if t~e Act by ~reating an artificial concept of a family unit n·nd fixing ceiling on holdmg of agricultural lands by such family unit enables land within the ceiling limit to be acquired without payment of full market value, it would be taking away or abridging the right conferred by the second proviso, but it would be protected by Art. 31-B. [804 B, 806 E] (9) The second proviso to clause (1) of Art. 31A is also couched in the negative language like clauses (1) and (2) of Art. 31 and it imposes a fetter on the exercise of the legislative power of the State by providing. that the Sta1e shall not be entitled to make a Jaw authorising acquisition of land held by a person under his personal cultivation within the ceiling limit applicable to him, unless the law provides for payment; of compensation at a rate not less than the market value. This limitation on the legislative power of the State is the measure of the fundament&l right conferred on the owner of the land. It is by imposing limitation on the exercise of legislative power that protection is given to the owner in respect of the land held by him under his personal cultivation within the ceiling limit. [805 D-E] State of Bihar v. Ka111es/1war Singh [1952] SCR 889 @ 986; R. C. Cooper v. U11io11 of India [1970] SCR 530 @ 569, reiterated. (10) Restriction on legislative competence and conferment of right on the holder of land within the ceiling limit are complementary to each other. They are merely two different facets of the same provision. What is !imit.ation of legislative power from the point of view of the State is conferment of nght from the point of view of holder. of land within the ceiling limit. The former secures the latter. The second proviso in effect guarantees protection to the holder against acquisition of tha·t portion of the land which is within the ceiling limit except on payment of the market value of such land. The secon.d proviso clearly confers a right to property on a person holding land under his personal cultivation. r805 F-Gl (11) The Explanation to s. 3 of the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act 1964 does no more than provide that so far as the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 is concerned, if any acquisition is made under it in contravention of the second proviso to clause ( l) of Art. 3 lA, it shall, to the extent of contravent~on be void. Obviously this Explanation was rendered necessary, because otherwise, acquisition under the Rajasthan Act, 1955, even if in cont.ravention of the second provise to clause (l) of Art. 3 lA y.1ould have been valtd under _.~it. 31 B snd that result the Parliament did not wish to produce. It was mamtestly fiOl the intention of Parliament that acquisition made under any enactment included in the Ninth Schedule should be void where if conflicts with the second proviso to clause (1) 0f Art. 3 lA and that Art. 31 B should not protect it from invalidation. [806 G, 807 F-Hl ' ·lo( • ., Ii>. G. MAHA.JAN v. MAHARASHTRA (Bhagwaii, J.) 793 (1_2 J It is true that the orthodox function of an 'explanation is to explain the meamng and effect of the main provisif>n to which it is an explanation and to clear up any doubt or ambiguity in it, but ultimately it is the intention of the legislature which is paramount and mere use of a label cannot control or clefiect such intention. [807 D-E] ( 13} It is true that the proper. function of a. proviso is to except or qualify something enacted m the substanhve clause, which, but for the proviso would be within that clause. The question is one of interpretation of the provfao and there is no rule that the proviso must always be restricted to the ambit of th main enactment. (805-H, 806A] Ishwarlal Thakarlal A/111a11ia v. Motablwi Nagjibliai (1966] 1 SCR 367 @; 373, followed. C. A. 1040176. (14) The inclusion of the Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972, in the Ninth Schedule as entry 78 by the Constitution (Thirty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1974 subsequent to the decision of the High Court entitles it to the immunity conferred by Art. 3JB. It does not suffer from any of the constitutional infirmities alleg ed in the writ petition. [814 C-E] Hasmllklilal v. State of Gujarat (1977) I SCR 103, applied. C.A. 1307176. (15) Section 5, sub-section (6) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Lrnd Holdings Act is valid and its constitutional validity cannot be assailed by reason of the immunity enacted in Art. 3JB. Section 5(6), even if it contravenes the second proviso to clause (l) of Art. 31A is validated under Art. 31B by virtue of inclusion under the protective umbrella of the Ninth Schedule. [~12 C-E Per .Krishna Iyer, J. (concurring) (l) The Maharashtra, the Punjab and the 1.J.P. Acts are not unconstitutional taking the constructive view that Art. 31-B vis-a-vis agrarian reforms, is a larger testament of vision and values in action and a bridge between individual right A B c D and collective good. (824 B-C] E (2) The purpose of Art. 31-B is conferment of total immunity from challenge on the score. of violation of Part ill. The words used are as comprehensive as English language permits. No land reform law shall be narrowed down by use of Part III, once included in the Ninth Schedule. No matter what the grounds are, if they are traceable to Part III in whatever form, they fail in the presence of Art. 3 lB. No master of English legal diction could have med, so tersely, such protean words which in their potent totality bang, bar and bolt the door against every possible invalidatory sally based on Part III. It is not correct to argue that the phraseology of Art. 3 lB must be correlated to Art. 13 and read with a truncated connotation. (817 H, 822 E-F, G] (3) Every Fundamental Right, from the point of view of the - individual. gives a right and from the stand point of the State is a restraint. Wbethcr the manner of expression used is in positive terms or negatively, whether the >;tatutory technique of a proviso, saving clause, exception or explanation, is used or a direct interdict is imposed, the substantive content is what matters. Many of the Articles in Part HI worded in a variety of ways, arm the affectod individua _ with a right and pro tanto _prohibit the legislature and the execntivc fron1 cnate of Maharashtra and provided for the acquisition of land held in excess of the ceiling and for the distribution of such excess land to landless and other persons. During the subsequent years, various amendments were made in the Principal Act from time to time and the Principal Act, as amended upto that date, was included in the Ninth Schedule by the Constitution (Seventeenth ,\.mendment) Act, 1964. Thereafter certain further amendments were made in the Principal Act and the amending Acts were also included in the Ninth Schedule as a result of the Constitution (Thirtyninth Amendment) Act, 1975. Then came three major amending Acts which, according to the appellants, introduced the vice of unconstitutionality in the Principal Act. Maharashtra Act 21 of 1975 <;fleeted radical .amendments in the Principal Act by lowering ceiling on agricultural holding and creating an artificial family unit for fixing ceiling on holding of agricultural land. This amending Act was fol_ lowed by Maharashtra Act 47 of 1975 and Maharashtra Act 2 of 1976 which affected certain further changes in the Principal Act but these are not very material for the purpose of the present appeals. Since these three 'amending Acts were enacted after the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1975, they were included in the Nmth Schedule along with certain other enactments by the Constitution (Fortieth Amendment) Act, 1976. The result was that the Principal Act, as amended by all the subsequent amending Acts including Maharashtra Act 21 of 1975, Maharashtra Act 47 of 1975 and Maharashtra Act 2 of 1976 was protected against invalidation under Art. 31-B. The appellants are landholders in the State of Maharashtra and ~ince the effect of the pr~visions of the Principal Act, as ame'lded by Maharashtra Act 21 of 1975, Maharashtra Act 47 of 1975 and Maharashtra Act 2 of 1976 was to expropriate a part of the lands· telonging to them, they preferred writ petitions in the High Coult of ;Bombay challenging the constitutional validity of the Principal Act as amended by these amending Acts on various grounds. It is not necessary for the purpose of the present appeals to set out the different grounds on which the constitutional challenge was based, since none of these grounds has been pressed before us save one based on contravention of the second proviso to cl. ( 1) of Art. 3 lA. The only contention that has been urged before us on behalf of the appellant> is that the Principal Act, as it stands after its amendment by Maharashtra Act 21 of 1975, Maharashtra Act 47 of 1975 and Mahara>htra Act 2 of 1976 is void, in so far as it creates an artificial family unit and fixes a ceiling on holding of land by such fumily unit, since it is violative of the second proviso to clause ( 1) of Art. 3 lA and. is nor saved by the immunising provision enacted in Art. 31-B. Tnis contention was also urged before the High Court but it was negatived on the ground that Art. 3 lB afforded complete immunity to the provisions of the Principal Act. We may make it clear at this stage that for the sake of convenience, when we hereafter refer to the Act, we mean the Principal Act as amended by Maharashtra Act 21 of 1975, Maharashtra Act 47 of 1975 and Maharashtra Act 2 of 1976. • 'II D. G. MAHAJAN v. MAHARASHTRA (Bhagwati, J.) 79 7 1be •appellants in the present appeals assail this view taken by the A High Court and the only question which, therefore, arises for consideration is as to whether the impugned Act, in so far as it creates an artificial concept of family unit for fixing ceiling on holding of land by such family unit, is in conflict with the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 3 lA and if it is, whether it is protected under Article 31-B ? ·Though logically the first part of the question as to infraction of the second proviso to clause (I) of Article 3 lA should B receive our consi_deration earlier in point of time, it would be convenient first to exa.mine the second part of _the question, for if we are of the view that Article 31-B immunises the Principal Act against attack on the ground of violation of the second proviso to Article 31A, it would become unnecessary to consider whether in fact there is any infraction of the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A. But before we examine the scope and applicability of Article 31B in C the present case, it would be desirable to refer to a few relevant provisions of the Principal Act. The Preamble and the long title of the Principal Act show that it was enacted to impose a maximum ceiling on the holding of agricultural land in the State of Maharashtra and to provide for the acquisition of land held in excess of ceiling and for the distribution of such D land to landless and other persons with a view to securing the distribution of agricajtural land in a manner which would best subserve the common good of the people. Sectio_n 2 contains various definitions of which only one is material, namely that contained in subsection ( 11A). That sub-section defines family unit to mean a family unit as explained in section 4. Section 3 imposes a prohibition on holding of land in excess of ceiling area and so far as material, it E reads as follows : "3 (1) Subject_ to the provisions of this Chapter and Chapter III, no person or family unit shall, after the o:.>mmencenient date, hold land in excess of the ceiling area, as determined in the manner hereinafter provided. * * * * (2) All land held by a person, or as the case may be, a family unit whether in this State or any other part of India in excess of the ceiling area, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or usage, be deemed to be surplus land, and shall be dealt with in the manner hereinafter provided (or surplus land. In determining surplus land from the holding of a person or as the case may be, of a family unit, the fact that the' person or any member of the fa1nily unit bas died (on or after the commencement date or any date subsequent to the da-te on which the holding exceeds the ceiling area, but G before the declaration of surplus land is made in respect of H that holding) shall be ignored; and accordingly, the surplus land sh-all be determined as if that person, or as the case may be, the member of a family unit had not died." 7 98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (i977J 2.S.C.R. A \Vhat ohall be regarded as land held by a family unit is laid down in section 4, sub-section ( 1) which provides : B c D F G H " ( 4) All land held by each member of a family unit, whether jointly or separately, shall for the purposes of .:ictermining... the ceiling area of the family unit, be deemed to be held by the family unit. Then there is an explanation to this sub-section which explains a 'famiiy unil' to mean : .. (a) a person and his spouse (or more than one spouse) and their minor sons and minor unmarried daughters; if any; or (b) where any spouse is dead, the surviving spouse or spouses, and the m.inor sons and minor unmarried daughters; or ( c) where the spouses are dead, the minor sons and minor unmarried daughters of such deceased spouses." Sec.:tion 5, sub-section (1) read with the First Schedule provides for different ceilings for different classes of lands in the various districts and talukas of the State and sub-sections (2) and (3) lay down the method of computation of the ceiling area where different classes of lands are held by a person or a family Unit. Then follows section 6 which is in the following terms : "Where a family unit consists of members which exceed five in number, the family unit shall be entitled to hold land exceeding the ceiling area to the extent of one-fifth of the ceiling area for each meinber in excess of five, so however that the total holding shall not exceed twice the ceiling area, and in such case, in relation to the holding of such family unit, such area shall be deemed to be the ceiling area." This is followed by sections 8 to 1 lA which de-al with ri:strictions on transfers and acquisitions and consequences of contraventions and sections 12 to 21A which provide inter alia for holding an enquiry for determination of land held in excess of the ceiling area and making of a declaration by the Collector stating his decision on the total area of land which is in excess of the ceiling area and the area, description and full particulars of the land which is delimited as surplus land. Sub-section ( 4) of section 21 provides that •as soon as may be after the announcement of the declaration, the Collector shall take in the prescribed manner possession of the land which is delimited as surplus and the surplus land shall, with effect from the date on wh'.ch possession is taken, be deemed to be acquired by the State Government for the purposes of the Act and sh•all accordingly vest, without further assurance and free from all cncnmbrances, in the State Government. Sections 21 to 26 provide for determination and payment of compensation for the surplus land acquired by the State Government. Then follow provisions in sections 27 to 29 in regard to distribution of surplus land. These provisions require the State • > D. G. MAHAJAN v. MAHARASHTl{A (Bhagwati, J.) 799 Government to distribute the surplus land in certain order of priority with a view to carrying out the purposes of the leg:slation. Sections 30 to 36 lay down the procedure for holding inquiries under the Act and also provide for appeal mechanism. These are followed by certain miscellaneous provisions in sections 37 to 49 which are not material for the purpose of the present~ appeals. · It will be seen from this brief resume of the relevant provisions of the Act th~t ther~. are two u~its recognised by the Act for the purpose of fixmg ce1lmg on holdmg of agricultural !•and. One is 'person' which by its definition in section 2, sub-section (22) includes a family and 'family' by virtue of section 2, sub-section ( 11) includys a Hindu Undivided family and in the case of other persons, a group or unit the members of which by custom or usage, are joint in estates of possession or residence, and the other is 'family unit' as defined in ,the Explanation to section 4 sub-section ( 1) . So far as the· applicability of the Act to a 'person' is concerned, there is no conceptual difficulty, for any person, natural or artificial, can hold land and if the land held by' such person is in· excess of the ceiling laid down in section 5, sub-section (1) read with the First Schedule, the surplus land would vest in the St•ate Government. . But the Act has created an artificial 'family unit' and a person and his spouse and their minor sons and minqr unmarried daughters are clubbed together for the purpose of constituting a family unit and all lands held by each member of the family unit, whether jointly or separately, are aggregated togther and by a fiction of law deemed to be held by the family unit. We have described the family unit as contemplated in the Act a> an artificial legal conception because in quite a few cases it would be different from the family as known in ordinary parlance : the latter would include 'even major sons and unmarried daughters which the former by its definition does not. It is clear from the scheme of the Act that for the purpose of determining whether land is held in excess of the ceiling area, a family unit is taken as a unit and the limitation of ceiling area is applied in relation to the land deemed to be held by such family unit and in such a case, each individual member of the family unit is not treated a:s a ·separate unit for the purpose of applicability of the limitation of ceiling. The land held by each member of the family unit is fictionally treated as land ' held by the family unit and to tpe aggregate of such land which .is deemed to be held by the family unit, the limitation of the ceiling area is applied. This feature of clubbing together the land held by each member of family unit for the purpose of applying the Emitation of ceiling area, it may be noted, was introduced by the amendments made by Maharashtra Act 21 of 1976 almost fourteen years after the . Principal Act was enacted and it is interesting to notice the reasons why it had to be done. A B c D E F G The necessity for wide ranging radical lal)d reforms in order to improve our rural econo1t1y was acutely realised. w?~n, on .attaining independence, we became free to mould our dest1111e.s. With that end in view, immediately after independence, the leg1s!atures of the H country started enacting laws for bringing about a.~ranan ref?rm a.s a part of the process of socio-economic reconstruction. The 1mpos1tion of ceiling on agricultural holdings was found necessary as a part A B c D E F G H 800 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1977] 2 S.C.R. of the scheme of agrarian reform because it was calculated to remove undue balance in society resulting from landless dass on the one hand and concentration of land in the hands of a few on the other. The concept of socio-economic justice embodied in the Constitution in fact rendered the imposition of ceiling inevitable, as this step was symbolic. of new social ideas. ('1) The growth of monopolistic tendencies m land ownership had to be arrested, if the optimum .area was to be made available to the largest number of people. The Panel on Land Reform set up by the Planning Commission in 1955, therefrom, unanimously accepted the principle that there should be an absolute limit to the amount of land which any individual might hold and .observed that the policy of imposition of ceiling should be able to make contribution towards achieving the following objectives : (1) meeting the widespread desire to possess land; (ii) reducing glaring inequahties in ownership and use of land; (iii) reducing inequalities in agricultural income and {iv) enlarging the sphere of selfemployment. The Second Five Year Plan also pointed out : "In the conditions of India large disparities in the distribution of wealth and income are inconsistent with economic progess in any sector. This consideration applies with even greater force land. The area of land available for cultivation is necessarily limited. In the past rights in land were the principal factor which determined hoth social status and economic opportunity for different groups in the rural population. For building up a progressive rural economy, it is essentia!l that dissimilarities in the ownership of land should be greatly reduced." and added that this step would go a long way "--to afford opportunities to landless sections of the rural population to gain in social st>atus and to feel a sense of opportunity equally with other sections of the community." It is emphatic that in the conditions which prevail in rural India, the possession of some land in itself would, be an immunity against abject poverty and would ensure for the owner some minimum resources to fall back upon and his economic and _social condition would also improve on account of his owning some land which he can call as his own. Ihe Agricultural Labour Enquiry conducted in the 1960s showed that the average of per capita income of an agricultural labourer with land was much more than the average or per capita income of an agricultural labourer without land. The policy of imposing ceiling on agricultural holdings was, therefore, initiated in the country with the twin objectives of changing the skewed distribution of agricultural land ownership in the country and making some land available for distribntion among the landless. It was in implementation of this policy that the Principal Act was passed by the l\faharashtra Legislature. in 1961. The ceiling which was initially fixed was found to be rather high and it had, therefore, to be lowered by (1) India-Proi:ress of Lqnd Reforms 1955, p. 19. ). .... D. G. MAHAJAN v. MAHARASHTRA (Bhagwati, J.) 8 0 1 subsequent amendments. But until the enactment of Maharashtra Act 21 of 1976, ceilifl:g 'Y~s made applicable only to holding of agricultural at lands by md1v1duals. However, it was felt that if the ceiling law was to be really effective, it was necessary to take the fumily as a unit for the purpose of applying the ceiling. There were two main reasons which inclined the legislature to this view. One was that, in the context of the social and cultural realities of Indian rural life, "family is the real operative unit in land ownership as in land management" and, therefore, in the fixing of the ceiling, the aggregate area held by all the numbers of the family should be taken into account"(1) and the other was that taking the family as a unit and imposing ceiling on the aggregate land held by all the members of the family acted as a disincentive to effect mala fide transfers in the names of close relations such as wife, minor sons and unmarried daughters with a view to bringing the holdings within the ceiling and operated to nullify such transfers where they had been effected with a view to circumventing the ceiling imposed on land holding.