# DAXABEN v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS

- **Citation:** [2022] 13 S.C.R. 295
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2022-07-29
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal Nos. 1061-1084 of 2022
- **Bench:** Indira Banerjee, V. Ramasubramanian
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/daxaben-v-the-state-of-gujarat-ors-35378
- **Pages:** 28

## Headnote

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s. 482 - Quashing of FIR
- FIR u/s.306 for abetment to commit suicide, entailing punishment
of imprisonment of ten years - Quashed by the High Court on the
basis of a settlement between the complainant and the accused named
in the FIR - On appeal, held: Once an FIR and/or criminal complaint
is lodged and a criminal case is started by the State, it becomes a
matter between the State and the accused - State has a duty to ensure
that law and order is maintained in society and the offender is
prosecuted - An informant has no right in law to withdraw the
complaint of a non- compoundable offence of a grave, serious and/
or heinous nature, which impacts society - Offence u/s. 306 of
abetment to commit suicide is a grave, non-compoundable offence
- s.307 falls in the category of heinous and serious offences and
are to be treated as crime against society and not against the
individual alone - On a parity of reasoning, offence u/s. 306 would
fall in the same category - An FIR u/s. 306 cannot even be quashed
on the basis of any financial settlement with the informant, surviving
spouse, parents, children, guardians, care-givers or anyone else -
Thus, the impugned orders of the High Court set aside - Penal
Code, 1860 - s. 306.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The issue whether the criminal miscellaneous
applications filed by the accused under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could
have been allowed and an FIR under Section 306 IPC for abetment
to commit suicide, entailing punishment of imprisonment of ten
years, could have been quashed on the basis of a settlement
between the complainant and the accused named in the FIR, is
answered in negative. [Para 25][308-C-D]
[2022] 13 S.C.R. 295
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1.2 Even though, the inherent power of the High Court
under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to interfere with criminal proceedings
is wide, such power has to be exercised with circumspection, in
exceptional cases. Jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C is not
to be exercised for the asking. In exceptional cases, to prevent
abuse of the process of the Court, the High Court might in
exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 quash criminal
proceedings. However, interference would only be justified when
the complaint did not disclose any offence, or was patently
frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. [Paras 27, 29][308-F; 309-AB]
1.3 Offence under Section 306 of the IPC of abetment to
commit suicide is a grave, non-compoundable offence. Of course,
the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C. is wide and can even be exercised to quash criminal
proceedings relating to non-compoundable offences, to secure
the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of Court.
Where the victim and offender have compromised disputes
essentially civil and personal in nature, the High Court can
exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash the criminal
proceedings. In what cases power to quash an FIR or a criminal
complaint or criminal proceedings upon compromise can be
exercised, would depend on the facts and circumstances of the
case. However, before exercising its power under Section 482
Cr.P.C. to quash an FIR, criminal complaint and/or criminal
proceedings, the High Court has to be circumspect and have
due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous or
serious crimes, which are not private in nature and have a serious
impact on society cannot be quashed on the basis of a compromise
between the offender and the complainant and/or the victim.
Crimes like murder, rape, burglary, dacoity and even abetment
to commit suicide are neither private nor civil in nature. Such
crimes are against the society. In no circumstances can
prosecution be quashed on compromise, when the offence is
serious and grave and falls within the ambit of crime against
society. [Paras 37, 38][313-D-G]
1.4 Orders quashing FIRs and/or complaints relating to
grave and serious off

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DAXABEN
v.
THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 1061-1084 of 2022)
JULY 29, 2022
[INDIRA BANERJEE AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s. 482 - Quashing of FIR
- FIR u/s.306 for abetment to commit suicide, entailing punishment
of imprisonment of ten years - Quashed by the High Court on the
basis of a settlement between the complainant and the accused named
in the FIR - On appeal, held: Once an FIR and/or criminal complaint
is lodged and a criminal case is started by the State, it becomes a
matter between the State and the accused - State has a duty to ensure
that law and order is maintained in society and the offender is
prosecuted - An informant has no right in law to withdraw the
complaint of a non- compoundable offence of a grave, serious and/
or heinous nature, which impacts society - Offence u/s. 306 of
abetment to commit suicide is a grave, non-compoundable offence
- s.307 falls in the category of heinous and serious offences and
are to be treated as crime against society and not against the
individual alone - On a parity of reasoning, offence u/s. 306 would
fall in the same category - An FIR u/s. 306 cannot even be quashed
on the basis of any financial settlement with the informant, surviving
spouse, parents, children, guardians, care-givers or anyone else -
Thus, the impugned orders of the High Court set aside - Penal
Code, 1860 - s. 306.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The issue whether the criminal miscellaneous
applications filed by the accused under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could
have been allowed and an FIR under Section 306 IPC for abetment
to commit suicide, entailing punishment of imprisonment of ten
years, could have been quashed on the basis of a settlement
between the complainant and the accused named in the FIR, is
answered in negative. [Para 25][308-C-D]
[2022] 13 S.C.R. 295
295
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1.2 Even though, the inherent power of the High Court
under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to interfere with criminal proceedings
is wide, such power has to be exercised with circumspection, in
exceptional cases. Jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C is not
to be exercised for the asking. In exceptional cases, to prevent
abuse of the process of the Court, the High Court might in
exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 quash criminal
proceedings. However, interference would only be justified when
the complaint did not disclose any offence, or was patently
frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. [Paras 27, 29][308-F; 309-AB]
1.3 Offence under Section 306 of the IPC of abetment to
commit suicide is a grave, non-compoundable offence. Of course,
the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C. is wide and can even be exercised to quash criminal
proceedings relating to non-compoundable offences, to secure
the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of Court.
Where the victim and offender have compromised disputes
essentially civil and personal in nature, the High Court can
exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash the criminal
proceedings. In what cases power to quash an FIR or a criminal
complaint or criminal proceedings upon compromise can be
exercised, would depend on the facts and circumstances of the
case. However, before exercising its power under Section 482
Cr.P.C. to quash an FIR, criminal complaint and/or criminal
proceedings, the High Court has to be circumspect and have
due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous or
serious crimes, which are not private in nature and have a serious
impact on society cannot be quashed on the basis of a compromise
between the offender and the complainant and/or the victim.
Crimes like murder, rape, burglary, dacoity and even abetment
to commit suicide are neither private nor civil in nature. Such
crimes are against the society. In no circumstances can
prosecution be quashed on compromise, when the offence is
serious and grave and falls within the ambit of crime against
society. [Paras 37, 38][313-D-G]
1.4 Orders quashing FIRs and/or complaints relating to
grave and serious offences only on basis of an agreement with
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the complainant, would set a dangerous precedent, where
complaints would be lodged for oblique reasons, with a view to
extract money from the accused. Furthermore, financially strong
offenders would go scot free, even in cases of grave and serious
offences such as murder, rape, bride-burning, etc. by buying off
informants/complainants and settling with them. This would
render otiose provisions such as Sections 306, 498- A, 304-B
etc. incorporated in the IPC as a deterrent, with a specific social
purpose. [Para 39][314-A-B]
1.5 In criminal jurisprudence, the position of the complainant
is only that of the informant. Once an FIR and/or criminal
complaint is lodged and a criminal case is started by the State, it
becomes a matter between the State and the accused. The State
has a duty to ensure that law and order is maintained in society.
It is for the state to prosecute offenders. In case of grave and
serious non- compoundable offences which impact society, the
informant and/or complainant only has the right of hearing, to the
extent of ensuring that justice is done by conviction and
punishment of the offender. An informant has no right in law to
withdraw the complaint of a non- compoundable offence of a grave,
serious and/or heinous nature, which impacts society. [Para
40][314-C-D]
1.6 In exercise of power under Section 482, the Court does
not examine the correctness of the allegation in the complaint
except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that
the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence. [Para
49][322-A]
1.7 The criminal proceeding cannot be nipped in the bud
by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P.C. only because
there is a settlement, in this case a monetary settlement, between
the accused and the complainant and other relatives of the
deceased to the exclusion of the hapless widow of the deceased.
Section 307 IPC falls in the category of heinous and serious
offences and are to be treated as crime against society and not
against the individual alone. On a parity of reasoning, offence
under section 306 IPC would fall in the same category. An FIR
under Section 306 IPC cannot even be quashed on the basis of
any financial settlement with the informant, surviving spouse,
DAXABEN v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
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parents, children, guardians, care-givers or anyone else. It is
clarified that it was not necessary for this Court to examine the
question whether the FIR in this case discloses any offence under
Section 306 IPC, since the High Court, in exercise of its power
under Section 482 CrPC, quashed the proceedings on the sole
ground that the disputes between the accused and the informant
had been compromised. The impugned orders of the High Court
are set aside. [Paras 50, 51][322-B-E]
M. Arjunan v. State, Represented by its Inspector of
Police (2019) 3 SCC 315; Ude Singh & Ors. v. State of
Haryana (2019) 17 SCC 301 : [2019] 9 SCR 703;
Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhatisgarh (2001) 9 SCC
618 : [2001] 4 Suppl. SCR 247; S.S. Chheena v. Vijay
Kumar Mahajan and Another (2010) 12 SCC 190 :
[2010] 9 SCR 1111; New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v.
Krishna Kumar Pandey (2019) SCC Online 1786; State
of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar and Ors.
(2011) 14 SCC 770 : [2011] 15 SCR 540; Monica
Kumar (Dr.) v. State of U.P. (2008) 8 SCC 781 : [2008]
9 SCR 943; Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar
AIR 1990 SC 494 : (1990) Supp SCC 686 : [1989]
Suppl. SCR 165; Municipal Corporation of Delhi v.
Ram Kishan Rohtagi and Others (1983) 1 SCC 1 :
[1983] 1 SCR 884; State of Andhra Pradesh v.
Gourieshetty Mahesh (2010) 11 SCC 226 : [2010]
8 SCR 423; Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttrakhand
(2013) 11 SCC 673; Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v.
Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre (1988) 1 SCC 692 :
[1988] 2 SCR 930; Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of
Uttaranchal (2007) 12 SCC 1 : [2007] 10 SCR 847;
State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471 :
[1980] 1 SCR 1071; Kapil Agarwal & Ors. v. Sanjay
Sharma & Others (2021) 5 SCC 524; Gian Singh v.
State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 : [2012]
8 SCR 753; Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014)
9 SCC 466 : [2014] 4 SCR 1012; State of Maharashtra
v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi (2014) 15 SC 29 : [2013]
12 SCR 563; CBI v. Maninder Singh (2016) 1 SCC 389
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: [2015] 10 SCR 277; State of Tamil Nadu v. R. Vasanthi
Stanley (2016) 1 SCC 376 : [2015] 9 SCR 772;
Parbatbhai Aahir Alias Parbathbhai Bhimsinhbhai
Karmur and Others v. State of Gujrat and Another
(2017) 9 SCC 641 : [2017] 10 SCR 12; State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan & Ors. (2019) 5 SCC 688 :
[2019] 2 SCR 864; Arun Singh and Others v. State of
Uttar Pradesh Through its Secretary and Another (2020)
3 SCC 736 : [2020] 3 SCR 707 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
(2019) 3 SCC 315
referred to
Para 10
[2019] 9 SCR 703
referred to
Para 11
[2001] 4 Suppl. SCR 247
referred to
Para 12
[2010] 9 SCR 1111
referred to
Para 13
[2011] 15 SCR 540
referred to
Para 21
[2008] 9 SCR 943
referred to
Para 28
[1989] Suppl. SCR 165
referred to
Para 29
[1983] 1 SCR 884
referred to
Para 31
[2010] 8 SCR 423
referred to
Para 31
(2013) 11 SCC 673
referred to
Para 32
[1988] 2 SCR 930
referred to
Para 33
[2007] 10 SCR 847
referred to
Para 34
[1980] 1 SCR 1071
referred to
Para 35
(2021) 5 SCC 524
referred to
Para 36
[2012] 8 SCR 753
referred to
Para 41
[2014] 4 SCR 1012
referred to
Para 42
[2013] 12 SCR 563
referred to
Para 43
[2015] 10 SCR 277
referred to
Para 44
[2015] 9 SCR 772
referred to
Para 45
[2017] 10 SCR 12
referred to
Para 46
DAXABEN v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
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[2019] 2 SCR 864
referred to
Para 47
[2020] 3 SCR 707
referred to
Para 48
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
Nos. 1061-1084 of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.10.2020 of the High Court
of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in R/Criminal Misc Application Nos.5600, 5107,
5004, 5108, 5165, 5159, 5161, 5524, 5166, 5162 and 5739 of 2020 and
Order dated 29.07.2021 in R/Criminal Misc Application Nos.10845, 10846,
10847, 10848, 10849, 10850, 10851, 10852, 10853, 10855, 10856 and
10858 of 2021.
Priank Adhyaru, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Advs. for the
Appellant.
Anitha Shenoy, Maninder Singh, Sr. Advs., Ms. Deepanwita
Priyanka, Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, Vivek Mathur, Ms. Aarti Krupa
Kumar, Ms. Ayushma Awasthi, Vaibhav Joshi, Ankur Mathur, Ivan,
Ms. Mohini Priya, Ms. Chitrangda Rastravara, Prabhas Bajaj, Pranav
Saigal, Ajay Sabarwal, Manvendra Singh, Gp. Capt. Karan Singh Bhati,
Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
INDIRA BANERJEE, J.
Leave granted.
2. These Appeals are against the impugned final judgment and
order dated 20th October 2020 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at
Ahmedabad allowing the Criminal Revisional Applications under Section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (Cr.P.C), being R/Criminal
Misc. Application Nos. 5026 of 2020, 5600 of 2020, 5107 of 2020, 5004
of 2020, 5108 of 2020, 5165 of 2020, 5159 of 2020, 5161 of 2020, 5524 of
2020, 5166 of 2020, 5162 of 2020, 5739 of 2020 and quashing the FIR
being C.R. No. I-11209016200112 dated 1st March 2020 registered with
Himmatnagar 'A' Division Police Station, District Sabarkantha, and also
the order dated 29th July 2021 passed by the High Court dismissing the
Criminal Miscellaneous Applications filed by the Appellant, registered
as R/Criminal Misc. Application Nos. 10845 of 2021, 10846 of 2021,
10847 of 2021, 10848 of 2021, 10849 of 2021, 10850 of 2021, 10851 of
2021, 10852 of 2021, 10853 of 2021, 10855 of 2021, 10856 of 2021,
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10858 of 2021 for recalling the said common final order dated 20th October
2020.
3. The Appellant is the wife of late Shaileshkumar Chimanbhai
Patel, hereinafter referred to as the "deceased", who is stated to have
committed suicide on 1st March 2020 by consuming poison in his office.
4. One Pinakin Kantibhai Patel, claiming to be a cousin of the
deceased, as also an Accountant working for the deceased, lodged an
FIR being C.R. No. I-11209016200112 dated 1st March 2020 with
Himmatnagar Police Station, District Sabarkantha, naming 12 accused
persons, being the applicants in the Criminal Miscellaneous Applications
in the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC, referred to above,
alleging that they had committed offence under Section 306 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) of abetting the commission of suicide by the
deceased.
5. As per the FIR, the deceased left a hand-written note, the
contents whereof are as hereunder:-
"With due respect, I am to state that I, Shaileshkumar
Chimanlal Patel, Proprietor of Jigar Transport, state that I
have been cheated. The names and statement are as under
1. As per the instructions of Anil Mathur, I have paid amounts
as under: Anil Mathur, RTO, Jodhpur, Service Ratanpur RTO
Check Post, Anil Mathur, Rs.600000/-, Pramod Dadhichi
Rs.10,00,000/-, Sunil Mathur, Rs.300000/-, Niharika Mathur
Rs.800000/-, Malvika Mathur Rs.300000/-, Niru Mathur
Rs.700000/-, Dolly Mathur Rs.300000/-. The accounts of
above amounts are not cleared and they have not returned
the amounts.
2. Karni Bhavarsha serving in RTO, Mandar Border, and
Rajkuar G. serving in RTO had launched company and amount
is given in their RP Powertech company and total amount
comes to Rs.3723200/-.
3. Vijaysinh Bhati who has committed most cheating and fraud
with me. I am in credit of Rs.14700000 (Rupees one crore
forty seven lakhs only). From this person. I am also in credit
of Rs.1,50,000/- from Chandravirsinh Bhati and in credit of
Rs.10,00,000 from Padam Bhati. They have taken my CRETA
DAXABEN v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
[INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
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car bearing RT No.6797 and they are not giving my car back.
It is requested to do needful."
6. The FIR records :-
"There is signature in English. The name Patel Shaileshkumar
Chimanlal is written in gujarati under the signature. The
names of Padam Bhati, Chandravirsinh Bhati, Dolly Mathur,
Niru Mathur, Malvika Mathur, Niharika Mathur, Sunil Mathur,
Pramod Dadhichi, Anil Mathur, PK Powertech, Kamalpal
Mineral Pvt. Ltd., Leena Computerized Ledger Statements are
affixed with staple pin. These words are written in the
handwriting of Shaileshkumar. I know the handwriting. I had
given this chit to Apurvabhai in the office. He had read over
the said chit. He told me that this is suicide note of
Shaileshkumar.
The name Pramod Dhidhasi is written in the suicide note but
the real name is Pramod Dadhichi. That money was given to
all persons through Bank except Vijaysinh. Kamalpal Minerals
Pvt. Limited of Vijaysinh was given Rs.18,52,000/."
7. In the FIR, it was alleged that the deceased had been making
phone calls to the accused persons calling upon them to return his money,
but they did not do so. The accused had cheated the deceased of
Rs.2,35,73,200/-. The deceased was in acute financial crunch and,
therefore, constrained to take his own life.
8. Section 306 of the IPC reads:
"306. Abetment of suicide. -If any person commits suicide,
whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to
fine."
9. As argued by Ms. Shenoy, learned Senior Counsel appearing
on behalf of the Respondents, what is required to constitute alleged
abetment of suicide under Section 306 of the IPC is that there must be
an allegation of either direct or indirect act of incitement to the commission
of the offence of suicide.
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10. Ms. Shenoy cited M. Arjunan v. State, Represented by its
Inspector of Police1, where this Court held:-
"7. The essential ingredients of the offence under Section
306 IPC are: (i) the abetment; (ii) the intention of the accused
to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide.
The act of the accused, however, insulting the deceased by
using abusive language will not, by itself, constitute the
abetment of suicide. There should be evidence capable of
suggesting that the accused intended by such act to instigate
the deceased to commit suicide. Unless the ingredients of
instigation/abetment to commit suicide are satisfied the
accused cannot be convicted under Section 306 IPC."
11. Ms. Shenoy also cited Ude Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana2,
where this Court held:
16. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be a
proof of direct or indirect act(s) of incitement to the commission
of suicide. It could hardly be disputed that the question of
cause of a suicide, particularly in the context of an offence
of abetment of suicide, remains a vexed one, involving
multifaceted and complex attributes of human behaviour and
responses/reactions. In the case of accusation for abetment
of suicide, the Court would be looking for cogent and
convincing proof of the act(s) of incitement to the commission
of suicide. In the case of suicide, mere allegation of harassment
of the deceased by another person would not suffice unless
there be such action on the part of the accused which compels
the person to commit suicide; and such an offending action
ought to be proximate to the time of occurrence. Whether a
person has abetted in the commission of suicide by another
or not, could only be gathered from the facts and
circumstances of each case.
16.1. For the purpose of finding out if a person has abetted
commission of suicide by another, the consideration would
be if the accused is guilty of the act of instigation of the act
of suicide. As explained and reiterated by this Court in the
decisions above-referred, instigation means to goad, urge
1 (2019) 3 SCC 315
2 (2019) 17 SCC 301
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[INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
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forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do an act. If the
persons who committed suicide had been hypersensitive and
the action of accused is otherwise not ordinarily expected to
induce a similarly circumstanced person to commit suicide, it
may not be safe to hold the accused guilty of abetment of
suicide. But, on the other hand, if the accused by his acts and
by his continuous course of conduct creates a situation which
leads the deceased perceiving no other option except to commit
suicide, the case may fall within the four corners of Section
306 IPC. If the accused plays an active role in tarnishing the
self-esteem and self-respect of the victim, which eventually
draws the victim to commit suicide, the accused may be held
guilty of abetment of suicide. The question of mens rea on the
part of the accused in such cases would be examined with
reference to the actual acts and deeds of the accused and if
the acts and deeds are only of such nature where the accused
intended nothing more than harassment or snap show of anger,
a particular case may fall short of the offence of abetment of
suicide. However, if the accused kept on irritating or annoying
the deceased by words or deeds until the deceased reacted or
was provoked, a particular case may be that of abetment of
suicide. Such being the matter of delicate analysis of human
behaviour, each case is required to be examined on its own
facts, while taking note of all the surrounding factors having
bearing on the actions and psyche of the accused and the
deceased."
12. Ms. Shenoy referred to Ramesh Kumar v. State of
Chhatisgarh3, where this Court defined 'instigate' as under:-
"Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or
encourage to do an act."
13. In S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan and Another.4,
cited on behalf of the Respondent, this Court observed:-
"25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person
or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive
act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing
3 (2001) 9 SCC 618
4 (2010) 12 SCC 190
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suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the
legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court is clear
that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has
to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an
active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide
seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the
deceased into such a position that he committed suicide."
14. The proposition of law enunciated and/or re-enunciated in the
judgments cited above are well settled. Whether the acts alleged would
constitute an offence, would depend upon the facts and circumstances
of the case. Each case has to be judged on its own merits.
15. In this case, however, it appears that the High Court did not
even address to itself, the question of whether the allegations in the FIR
constituted an offence under Section 306 IPC or not. The FIR was
quashed in view of a settlement between the accused named in the FIR
and the complainant.
16. It is not necessary for this Court to go into the question of
whether there was any direct or indirect act of incitement to the offence
of abetment of suicide, since the High Court has not gone into that
question. Suffice it to mention that even an indirect act of incitement to
the commission of suicide would constitute the offence of abetment of
suicide under Section 306 of the IPC.
17. In Court, it was submitted that the parties had amicably resolved
their disputes. In support of such submission, affidavits of Settlement of
Disputes, signed by the complainant and other family members of the
deceased were placed on record.
18. The High Court held:
"9. Since now, the dispute with reference to the impugned
FIR is settled and resolved by and between parties which is
confirmed by the original complainant through their learned
advocate, the trial would be futile and any further continuation
of proceedings would amount to abuse of process of law.
Therefore, the impugned FIR is required to be quashed and
set aside.
10. Resultantly, the applications are allowed. The impugned
FIR being No. C.R.No. I-11209016200112 of 2020 registered
DAXABEN v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
[INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
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with Himmatnagar 'A' Division Police Station, District
Sabarkantha and all other consequential proceedings arising
out of said FIR are hereby quashed and set aside qua the
applicants."
19. By the common order dated 29th July 2021, also impugned in
these appeals, the prayer of the Appellant for recalling the order dated
20th October 2020 was declined. The High Court held:-
"22. ...However, as discussed herein above, this Court has
passed an order dated 20.10.2020 after considering the
settlement arrived at between the original first informant, who
is cousin brother of the deceased and was working as an
Accountant of the firm of the deceased. Further, investigating
agency has verified about the genuineness of the settlement
arrived at between the parties. It is not in dispute that the
present applicant is a third party - as stated in Paragraph
No.1 of the application and, hence, so far as the FIR in
question is concerned, she is merely a witness in the FIR.
Therefore, when this Court has passed an order after giving
an opportunity of hearing, the original first informant -
cousin brother of the deceased, the order dated 20.10.2020
passed by this Court is not required to be recalled while
exercising power under Section 482 of the Code.
23. At this stage, it is once again required to be noted that the
applicant has stated in the memo of application at Page No.9
that the respondent No.3 - original first informant has
pocketed hefty amount from an individual original accused
and is totally out of picture post allowing of the quashing
petition and is not in contact with the present applicant. Thus,
it appears that after settling the dispute by the respondent
No.3 - original first informant with the original accused, he
has not given/paid the said amount to the applicant, however,
for the reasons, it is always open for the applicant to file
appropriate proceeding against the respondent No.3 -
original first informant. Therefore, the present application,
which is filed for recalling the order, is not maintainable, and
in the facts of the present case, this Court is not inclined to
exercise the powers under Section 482 of the Code for
recalling of the order dated 20.10.2020.
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24. In view of the aforesaid discussion, all these applications
are dismissed."
20. In the aforesaid judgment, the High Court referred to an order
dated 6th December 2019 passed by a three Judge Bench of this Court
in Crl. Appeal No.1852 of 2019 (New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v.
Krishna Kumar Pandey5) where this Court held that in a revision arising
out of conviction, the High Court could not have sealed the right of the
employer to take disciplinary action against the accused for misconduct
in accordance with the Service Rules.
21. In Krishna Kumar Pandey (supra) this Court referred with
approval, to the judgment of this Court in State of Punjab v. Davinder
Pal Singh Bhullar and Ors.6 where this Court held that the High Court
was not denuded of inherent power to recall a judgment and/or order
which was without jurisdiction, or in violation of principles of natural
justice, or passed without giving an opportunity of hearing to a party
affected by the order or where an order was obtained by abusing the
process of Court which would really amount to its being without
jurisdiction. Inherent powers can be exercised to recall such orders.
22. The High Court rightly found, in effect, that it had the inherent
power to recall a judgment and/or order which was without jurisdiction
or a judgment and/or order passed without hearing a person prejudicially
affected by the judgment and/or order. The High Court, however, fell in
error in not recalling the order dated 20th October 2020. The High Court
did not address to itself, the question of whether it had jurisdiction to
quash a criminal complaint under Section 306 of the IPC, which is a
grave non-compoundable offence, entailing imprisonment of ten years,
on the basis of a settlement between the parties.
23. The High Court erred in declining the prayer of the Appellant
for recalling its order dated 20th October 2020, passed without hearing
the wife of the deceased only because the original informant/complainant,
a cousin brother and an employee of the deceased had been heard.
Hearing a cousin-cum-employee of the deceased cannot and does not
dispense with the requirement to give the wife of the deceased a hearing.
The wife of the deceased would have greater interest than cousins and
5 2019 SCC Online 1786
6 (2011) 14 SCC 770
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employees in prosecuting accused persons charged with the offence of
abetting the suicide of her husband.
24. Be that as it may, since the initial order dated 20th October
2020 is also under challenge in these appeals, it is really not necessary
for this Court to delve deeper into the question of whether a final order
passed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. quashing an FIR could have, at
all, been recalled by the High Court, in the absence of any specific
provision in the Cr.P.C. for recall and/or review of such order. The High
Court has, in effect, held that in exceptional circumstances, such orders
can be recalled, in exercise of the inherent power of the High Court, to
prevent injustice.
25. The only question in this appeal is whether the Criminal
Miscellaneous Applications filed by the accused under Section 482 of
the Cr.P.C. could have been allowed and an FIR under Section 306 of
the IPC for abetment to commit suicide, entailing punishment of
imprisonment of ten years, could have been quashed on the basis of a
settlement between the complainant and the accused named in the FIR.
The answer to the aforesaid question cannot, but be in the negative.
26. Section 482 of the Cr.P.C provides :-
"482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.-Nothing in
this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers
of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary
to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent
abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice."
27. Even though, the inherent power of the High Court under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., to interfere with criminal proceedings is wide,
such power has to be exercised with circumspection, in exceptional cases.
Jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C is not to be exercised for
the asking.
28. In Monica Kumar (Dr.) v. State of U.P.7, this Court held that
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C has to be exercised
sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is
justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself.
7 (2008) 8 SCC 781
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29. In exceptional cases, to prevent abuse of the process of the
Court, the High Court might in exercise of its inherent powers under
Section 482 quash criminal proceedings. However, interference would
only be justified when the complaint did not disclose any offence, or was
patently frivolous, vexatious or oppressive, as held by this Court in Mrs.
Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar8.
30. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi
and Others.9, a three-Judge Bench of this Court held:
"6. It may be noticed that Section 482 of the present Code is
the ad verbatim copy of Section 561-A of the old Code. This
provision confers a separate and independent power on the
High Court alone to pass orders ex debito justitiae in cases
where grave and substantial injustice has been done or where
the process of the court has been seriously abused. It is not
merely a revisional power meant to be exercised against the
orders passed by subordinate courts. It was under this section
that in the old Code, the High Courts used to quash the
proceedings or expunge uncalled for remarks against
witnesses or other persons or subordinate courts. Thus, the
scope, ambit and range of Section 561-A (which is now Section
482) is quite different from the powers conferred by the present
Code under the provisions of Section 397. It may be that in
some cases there may be overlapping but such cases would
be few and far between. It is well settled that the inherent
powers under Section 482 of the present Code can be
exercised only when no other remedy is available to the litigant
and not where a specific remedy is provided by the statute.
Further, the power being an extraordinary one, it has to be
exercised sparingly. If these considerations are kept in mind,
there will be no inconsistency between Sections 482 and
397(2) of the present Code.
7. The limits of the power under Section 482 were clearly
defined by this Court in Raj Kapoor v. State [(1980) 1 SCC
43 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 72] where Krishna Iyer, J. observed as
follows : [SCC para 10, p. 47 : SCC (Cri) p. 76]
8 AIR 1990 SC 494 : 1990 Supp SCC 686
9 (1983) 1 SCC 1
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"Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of law
when a specific provision is made : easy resort to inherent
power is not right except under compelling circumstances.
Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but that inherent
power should not invade areas set apart for specific power
under the same Code."
8. Another important consideration which is to be kept in
mind is as to when the High Court acting under the provisions
of Section 482 should exercise the inherent power insofar as
quashing of criminal proceedings are concerned. This matter
was gone into in greater detail in Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna
Shivalingappa Konjalgi [(1976) 3 SCC 736 : 1976 SCC (Cri)
507 : 1976 Supp SCR 123 : 1976 Cri LJ 1533] where the
scope of Sections 202 and 204 of the present Code was
considered and while laying down the guidelines and the
grounds on which proceedings could be quashed this Court
observed as follows : [SCC para 5, p. 741 : SCC (Cri) pp.
511-12]
"Thus it may be safely held that in the following cases an
order of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused
can be quashed or set aside:
(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the
statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same
taken at their face value make out absolutely no case
against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the
essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against
the accused;
(2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently
absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent
person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused;
(3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in
issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been
based either on no evidence or on materials which are
wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and
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(4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal
defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a
complaint by legally competent authority and the like.
The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative and
provide sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies
where the High Court can quash proceedings."
9. Same view was taken in a later decision of this Court
in Sharda Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar [(1977) 1 SCC
505 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 132 : (1977) 2 SCR 357 : 1977 Cri LJ
1146] where Bhagwati, J. speaking for the Court observed
as follows : [SCC para 2, p. 506 : SCC (Cri) p. 133]
"It is now settled law that where the allegations set out in
the complaint or the charge-sheet do not constitute any
offence, it is competent to the High Court exercising its
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure to quash the order passed by the
Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence.
10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against
an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the
face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same,
no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking
the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding
or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the
High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in
exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code."
31. As held by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v.
Gourieshetty Mahesh10, the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C, would not ordinarily embark upon an
enquiry into whether the evidence is reliable or not or whether there is
reasonable possibility that the accusation would not be sustained.
32. In Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttrakhand11, this Court
held:-
"12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to
10 (2010) 11 SCC 226
11 (2013) 11 SCC 673
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be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends
of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence
or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein.
Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present
or not has to be judged by the High Court. ..."
33. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao
Chandrojirao Angre12, a three-Judge Bench of this Court summarized
the law with regard to quashing of criminal proceedings under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. This Court held:-
"7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution
at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied
by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations
as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the
court to take into consideration any special features which
appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient
and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to
continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be
utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of
the court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and,
therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing
a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking
into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the
proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage."
34. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal13, this
Court observed:-
"46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not
used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private
vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused.
On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are of the opinion
that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down an
inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts under
Section 482 CrPC though wide has to be exercised sparingly,
carefully and with caution and only when it is justified by the
12 (1988) 1 SCC 692
13 (2007) 12 SCC 1
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tests specifically laid down in the statute itself and in the
aforementioned cases. In view of the settled legal position,
the impugned judgment cannot be sustained."
35. It is a well settled proposition of law that criminal prosecution,
if otherwise justified, is not vitiated on account of malafides or vendetta.
As said by Krishna Iyer, J. in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh14 "if the
use of the power for the fulfilment of a legitimate object the actuation
or catalysation by malice is not legicidal."
36. In Kapil Agarwal & Ors. v. Sanjay Sharma & Others15,
this Court observed that Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is designed to achieve
the purpose of ensuring that criminal proceedings are not permitted to
degenerate into weapons of harassment.
37. Offence under Section 306 of the IPC of abetment to commit
suicide is a grave, non-compoundable offence. Of course, the inherent
power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is wide and
can even be exercised to quash criminal proceedings relating to noncompoundable offences, to secure the ends of justice or to prevent abuse
of the process of Court. Where the victim and offender have
compromised disputes essentially civil and personal in nature, the High
Court can exercise its power under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash
the criminal proceedings. In what cases power to quash an FIR or a
criminal complaint or criminal proceedings upon compromise can be
exercised, would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case.
38. However, before exercising its power under Section 482 of
the Cr.P.C. to quash an FIR, criminal complaint and/or criminal
proceedings, the High Court, as observed above, has to be circumspect
and have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous
or serious crimes, which are not private in nature and have a serious
impact on society cannot be quashed on the basis of a compromise
between the offender and the complainant and/or the victim. Crimes
like murder, rape, burglary, dacoity and even abetment to commit suicide
are neither private nor civil in nature. Such crimes are against the society.
In no circumstances can prosecution be quashed on compromise, when
the offence is serious and grave and falls within the ambit of crime
against society.
14 (1980) 2 SCC 471
15 (2021) 5 SCC 524
DAXABEN v.