# DEEPAK SIBAL & ORS v. PUNJAB UNIVERSITY AND AN01HER - **Citation:** [1989] 1 S.C.R. 689 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1989-02-14 - **Bench:** Murari Mohon Dutt, T.K. 1Hommen - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/deepak-sibal-ors-v-punjab-university-and-an01her-10260 - **Pages:** 22 ## Headnote Constitution of India, 1950: Am. 14 & 15(4)-Admission of •e•»<::ning .cJasses of LL. B. Degree of Punjab University-Rule restricting a•Zniission to 'egular employees of Government and semi-Government institutions-Validity of-Classification should satisfy tests laid downSurrounding circumstances-When relevant-Classification by identification of sources should noi be arbitrary-Oent percent reservation of seats for certain classes of persons 'to the ·excl1isi'?n of'merit cimdidatesWhether valid. A c A rt. 13-Doctrine of severability-When part of a rule held viola0 tive of Art. 14 and prima facie not severable ftom valid part-Wh~ther entire rule to be struck down . .. .. ,L Professional Colleges~Admission to: Punjab University- \ Admission to evening class of LLB. course-Rule providing that \ admission open only to 'regular employees' of Government/SemiGovernment institutions-Employees of private institutions excluded- \ Whether discriminatory and violative of Art. 14-Cent perc~nt reserva~ "twn of seats for certain classes of persons only to the exlcuswn of merit ) candidates-Whether valid. ~- The prospectus for the year i9ssis9, for admission in tiie evenlii~ F ' classes of the Three-Year Lt.Ii. Degree Course conducted by the be' partment of Laws of the Punjab University, prescribed that admission to evening classes was open only io regular employees of Government/ Semi-Government institutions/affiliated Colleges/Statutory Corpora• lions and Government Companies and that a candidate should attach No Objection/Permission ietter from his empfoyer wlih his application {l for admission. Out of the 150 seats available in the evening classes, 64 _,, ~ were reserved for scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, backward classes, physically handicapped persons, outstanding· spottstneil and defence personnel and the remaining 86. were reserved for tegulat employees of Government/Semi-Government institutions etc., as rnentionetl in ill~ aforesaid rule for admission. 689 A B 690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19891 1 S.C.R. The two appellants, one employed In a Limited Company, a joint venture with an Undertaking of the State Government and the other working as a temporary employee in a State Government office, applied for admission in the evening classes with 'No Objection Certificates' from their employees. Both were interviewed but were not selected, although their positions in the merit list were 29 and 19 respectively, on the ground that while one or the appellants was an employee of a Public Limited Company and did not fall within the exclusive categories as mentioned in the impugned rule, the other was only a temporary employee. . / -- Both the appellants filed writ Jl\ltitions in the High Court, cbal- "( c lenging the validity of the impugned rule. Petitions were also filed by five other refused candidates. It was contended that the impugned rule whas vi~lativ~ of ArtWb. 14 of the Cdonstitution. The High Court dismissed ~ t e .writ petitions. lie uphol ing the validity of the impugned rule, the High Court held that Government employees bad protection of Art. 311 of the Constitution which non-Government employees did not have D and that the employees of the Semi-Government institutions w"re also on the same footing. Hence the two appellants filed appeals in this Court. In the counter affidavit filed in this Court the respondents sought l,.,.: to justify the exclusion of private employees, restricting admission to , E evening classes only to the Government employees and similar other institutions on the grounds of production of bogus certificates of employment from private employers and imparting of legal educatlo1m to the ~ employees of the Government/Semi-Government and other insti'tutions as in public interest. It was also contended that a candidate should have, an assured tenure of employment likely to continue for three years and ! F that, as far as possible, there should be no possibility or wastage or a~-, aa seat. Allowing the appeals, HEL ## Text _Characters 0–39,997 of 56,507. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39997 for what follows._ DEEPAK SIBAL & ORS. v. PUNJAB UNIVERSITY AND AN01HER FEBRUARY 14, 1989 (MURARI MOHON DUTT AND T.K. 1HOMMEN, JJ.) Constitution of India, 1950: Am. 14 & 15(4)-Admission of •e•»<::ning .cJasses of LL. B. Degree of Punjab University-Rule restricting a•Zniission to 'egular employees of Government and semi-Government institutions-Validity of-Classification should satisfy tests laid downSurrounding circumstances-When relevant-Classification by identification of sources should noi be arbitrary-Oent percent reservation of seats for certain classes of persons 'to the ·excl1isi'?n of'merit cimdidatesWhether valid. A c A rt. 13-Doctrine of severability-When part of a rule held viola0 tive of Art. 14 and prima facie not severable ftom valid part-Wh~ther entire rule to be struck down . .. .. ,L Professional Colleges~Admission to: Punjab University- \ Admission to evening class of LLB. course-Rule providing that \ admission open only to 'regular employees' of Government/SemiGovernment institutions-Employees of private institutions excluded- \ Whether discriminatory and violative of Art. 14-Cent perc~nt reserva~ "twn of seats for certain classes of persons only to the exlcuswn of merit ) candidates-Whether valid. ~- The prospectus for the year i9ssis9, for admission in tiie evenlii~ F ' classes of the Three-Year Lt.Ii. Degree Course conducted by the be' partment of Laws of the Punjab University, prescribed that admission to evening classes was open only io regular employees of Government/ Semi-Government institutions/affiliated Colleges/Statutory Corpora• lions and Government Companies and that a candidate should attach No Objection/Permission ietter from his empfoyer wlih his application {l for admission. Out of the 150 seats available in the evening classes, 64 _,, ~ were reserved for scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, backward classes, physically handicapped persons, outstanding· spottstneil and defence personnel and the remaining 86. were reserved for tegulat employees of Government/Semi-Government institutions etc., as rnentionetl in ill~ aforesaid rule for admission. 689 A B 690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19891 1 S.C.R. The two appellants, one employed In a Limited Company, a joint venture with an Undertaking of the State Government and the other working as a temporary employee in a State Government office, applied for admission in the evening classes with 'No Objection Certificates' from their employees. Both were interviewed but were not selected, although their positions in the merit list were 29 and 19 respectively, on the ground that while one or the appellants was an employee of a Public Limited Company and did not fall within the exclusive categories as mentioned in the impugned rule, the other was only a temporary employee. . / -- Both the appellants filed writ Jl\ltitions in the High Court, cbal- "( c lenging the validity of the impugned rule. Petitions were also filed by five other refused candidates. It was contended that the impugned rule whas vi~lativ~ of ArtWb. 14 of the Cdonstitution. The High Court dismissed ~ t e .writ petitions. lie uphol ing the validity of the impugned rule, the High Court held that Government employees bad protection of Art. 311 of the Constitution which non-Government employees did not have D and that the employees of the Semi-Government institutions w"re also on the same footing. Hence the two appellants filed appeals in this Court. In the counter affidavit filed in this Court the respondents sought l,.,.: to justify the exclusion of private employees, restricting admission to , E evening classes only to the Government employees and similar other institutions on the grounds of production of bogus certificates of employment from private employers and imparting of legal educatlo1m to the ~ employees of the Government/Semi-Government and other insti'tutions as in public interest. It was also contended that a candidate should have, an assured tenure of employment likely to continue for three years and ! F that, as far as possible, there should be no possibility or wastage or a~-, aa seat. Allowing the appeals, HELD: I.I Article 14 forbids legislation, but does not forbid G reasonable classification. Whether a classificali'on is a permissible classification under Art. 14 or not, two conditions must be satisfied, namely, (l) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others. left out of the group, and (2) that the differentia must have a rational' nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the H statute in question. [697F] .. ')··· ' ' ;. ' .,,,-. DEEPAK SIBAL v.. PUNJAB UNIVERSITY 691 1.2 In considering the reasonableness of classification from the point of view of Art. 14 of the Constitution, the Court has lo consider the objective for such classification. If the objective he illogiCal, unfair and unjust, necessarily the classification will . have lo be held as unreasonable. [703C-D] 1.3 No doubt, a classification need not be made with mathematical precision but, if there be little or no difference between the persons or things which have been grouped together and those left out of the group, then the classification cannot be said to be a reasonable one. [700C] 1.4 Surrounding circumstances may be taken into consideration in support of the constitutionality of a law which is oth.,rwise hostile or discriminatory in nature. But the circumstances must be such as to justify the discriminatory treatment or the classification subserving the object sought to be achieved. [700G-H] A B c Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendo/kar, [1959] SCR D 279, relied on. 1.5 A classification by the identification of sources must not be arbitrary but should be on a reasonable basis having a nexus with the object sought to be achieved. [704H; 705A4] Chitra Ghosh v. Union of India, [1970] 1 SCR 413 and D.N. Chanchala v. State of Mysore, [1971] Supp. SCR 608 relied on. 1 1.6 In the instant case, the objective of starting the evening clasE ~l. ses was to accommodate in the evening classes employees in general -·-r r' including private employees who were unable to attend morning classes F because of their employment. However, in framing the impugned rule, - the respondents have deviated from its objective for starting the evening classes. I 699F-G] The classification of the employees of Government/Semi-Government institutions etc. by the impugned rule for the purpose of admission in the evening classes of Three-Year LL.B. Degree Course to the exclusion of all other employees, is unreasonable and unjust, as it does not subserve any fair and logical objective. [7030] G The Government and public sector employees cannot be equated with Government undertaking and companies. The classification of H 692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 1 S.C.R. Government undertakings and companies may, in certain circumstanY A ces, be a .reasonable Classification satisfying the tests laid down hut the employees of Government/Semi-Government institutions etc., as 'mentioned in the impugned rule, cannot be held to constitute a valid classification for the purpose of admission to evening classes of Threeyears LL.B. Degree Course. [703F-G] B _\( • c Hindustan Paper Corpn. Ltd. v. Government of Kera/a, [1986] 3 sec _398, distinguished. I. 7 The Government employees or the employees of SemiGovernment and other institutions cannot stand on a differen¢ footing from the employees of private concerns, insofar as . the question of admission to evening classes is concerned. [699H] Though the service conditions of employees of,Government/SemiGovernment institutions etc. are different, and they may have greater security of service, that hardly,mattei:s for the purpose of admission in D the evening classes. The test is ,whether. both the employees of private establishments and the employees of Government/Semi-Gove•rnment institutions etc. are eqnally in a disadvantageons position in attending morning classes. There cap be no doubt that both of them stand on an equal fm>ting and there 'is no difference between .these two classes of employees in _that regard. To exclude the employees of private establish· E ments will not, therefore, satisfy the test of intelligible differentia that distinguishes the employees of Government/Semi,Government institutions etc.', grouped together from the employees of private establishments. [700A-C] · · ... F 1.8 Though an educational institution is entitled to identify ~/ _ sources from which adm.ission will be made in such inclitution, there is · ,,.-- no difference between identification of the sources and a classifi: It is difficult to accept the contention that the Government employees or the employees of Semi-Government and other institutions, as mentioned in the impugned rule, stand on a different footing from the employees of private concerns, in so far as the question of admisA B c D E F G sion to evening classes is concerned. It is true that the service condiH A B c D 700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989) 1 S.C.R. lions of employees of Government/Semi-Government institutions etc, ).- are different, and they may have greater security of service, but that hardly matters for the purpose of admission in the evening classes. The test is whether the employees of private establishments are e.1ually in a disadvantageous p0sition like the employees of Government/SemiGovernment institutions etc. in attending morning classes. There can be no doubt and it is not disputed that both of them stand on an equal )!;; footing and there is no difference between these two classes of employees in that regard. To exclude the emplo, ~es of private establishments will not, therefore, satisfy the test of intelligible differentia that distinguishes the employees of Government/Semi-Government insti- ~1 tutions etc. grouped together from the employees of private establishments. It is true that a classification need not be made with mathematical precision but, if there be little or no difference between the persons or things which have been grouped together and those left out of the group, in that case, the classification cannot be said to be a wasonable one. It is, however, submitted on behalf of the respondents that the employees of private establishments have been left out as it is difficult for the University to verify whether or not a particular candidate is really a regular employee and whether he will have a tenure for at least three years during which he will be prosecuting his studies in the -+- Three-Year LL.B. Degree Course. It is submitted that in making the E classification, the surrounding circumstances may be taken into account. In support of that contention, much reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar, [19591 SCR 279. In that case, it has been observed by Das, C.J. that while good faith and knowledge of the F existing conditions on the part of a legislature are to be presumed, if 1 there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circum-·~ ·'! stances brought to the notice of the court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that thc:re must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation. It G follows from the observation that surrounding circumstances may be taken into consideration in support of the constitutionality of a law which is otherwise hostile or discriminatory in nature. But the circumstances must be such as to justify the discriminatory treatment or the classification subserving the object sought to be achieved. In the instant case, the circumstances which have been relied on· by the H respondents, namely, the possibility of production by them of bogus DEEPAK SIBAL v. PUNJAB ·UNIVERSITY [DUTI, J..! 701 -...< certificates and insecurity of their services are not, in our opinion, ·such A circumstances as will justify the exclusion of the employees of private establishments from the evening classes. We are also unable to accept the contention of the respondents .that such .exclusion of the employees of private establishments is .. _j( justified on the ground of administrative convenience. The decision in B Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, ·(1957] SCR 233 reli.ed on by the respondents does.not, in our opinion, lay down any such.proposition·of ;law. In that case, :the provision of section 5(7)A of the Income Tax Act 1982 was, .inter alia, challenged as ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitu- .tion .inasmuch a~ it was discriminatory. Section 5(7A) confers power -)-- .on the ·Commissioner of Income Tax and the Central Board of C Revenue, inter a/ia, to transfer any case from one Income Tax Officer - '· ')-· :to another. It has been observed by this Court that in order to minimise the inconvenience of the assessee, the authority concerned may transfer the.case of such assessee to the Income Tax Officer who is nearest to the area where it would be convenient for the assessee to atten.d and if, on account of administrative exigencies, this is not possiD ble and the assessee requests that the examination of accounts or evidence to be taken should be in a place convenient to him, the Income Tax Officer comply with the request of the assessee by holding the hearing at the place requested. It is manife.stly clear from the observation that the power of transfer is not exercised for administrative .convenience, but for the convenience of the assessee. In the E instant case, there is no question of any administrative inconvenience. The respondents have not placed any material before the High Court ,or in .this Court as to in how many cases they had come across such . bogus certificates produced by private employees during the time the ··+' admission to evening classes was open also to private employees. It -· -·· . -may be that there were one or two cases of production of bogus certifiF cates, but that cannot be a ground for th exclusion of all private .employees from the benefit of getting legal education in the evening classes. In the circumstances, we are not at all impressed with the contention that in order to. avoid production of bogus certificates of employG men! from the private employers and having regard to the fact that employees of Government/Semi-Government institutions etc. have an assured tenure of employment likely to continue for three years, the private employees were excluded for the purpose of admission to the evening classes. By the impugned rule, admission to evening classes is restricted to regular employees of Government/Semi-Government H - A B c D E F 702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 1 S.C.R. institutions etc. There is no material to indicate that by the: expression "regular employees" it is intended to include only those employees who will have an assured tenure of service for three years, that is to say, co-extensive with the period of the Three-Year LLB. Degree Course. The expression "regular employees", in our opinion, normally means bona fide employees. Such bona fide employ1,es may be permanent or temporary. All that the University can insist is that one should be a bona fide employee and if there be materials to show that a candidate for admission in the evening classes is a bona fide: .employee the University, in our opinion, cannot further insist on an assured tenure of service of such an employee for a period of three years. Be that as it may, the reason for exclusion of private employees on the ground that there may not be an assured tenure of employment likely to continue for three years, not only does not stand scrutiny but also is unfair and unjust and cannot form the basis of such an exclusion. In this connection, we may also examine another ground restricting the admission in the evening classes to the employees of Government/Semi-Government and other institutions, as mentioned in the impugned rule, namely, imparting of legal education to such employees. According to the respondents, imparting of legal education to the employees of Government/Semi-Government and other institutions, as mentioned in the impugned rule, would be .in public i- - interest. Indeed, in the counter-affidavit filed in this Court on behalf of the respondents by the Registrar of the University, that is also the objective for framing the impugned rule. The counter-affidavit is, however, silent as to why imparting of legal education to the employees of Government/Semi-Government institutions ew. would - be in public interest. It is not understandable why Government/SemiGovernment employees in general should be imparted legal educatio~t/ ~ and what sort of public interest would be served by such legal education. It may be that certain sections of Government employees require legal education but, surely, Government employees in general do not require legal education. A similar rule, which was framed by the Government of Kerala G reserving 100 per cent seats to Government and quasi-Government employees irrespective of their category, came to be considered by the ·:ii. "' Kerala High Court in Jolly v. State of Kera/a, AIR 1974 Kerala 178. In that case, it has been observed by the Kerala ·High Court that there may be some posts in Government service, some even in public corporations which may require incumbents who may be able to p1,rform H their functions very efficiently with a legal background provided to ·r ! DEEPAK SIBAL v. PUNJAB UNIVERSITY [DUTT, J,[ 703 them, but this cannot be said of all employees whether of the State Government or Central Government or of the public corporations or Government owned companies. In our opinion, there is much force in the observation of the Kerala High Court. It cannot be laid down that only Government employees require legal education and not private employees. Certain private sector employees may require legal education in the interest of the establishments of which· they are employees. It is difficult to understand the logic of the rule restricting admission in the evening classes to employees of Govenwient/Semi-Government institutions etc. on the plea that such employees require legal education in public interest. In considering the reasonableness of classification from the point of view of Article 14 of the Constitution, the Court has also to consider the objective for such classification. If the objective be illogical, unfair and unjust, necessarily the classification will have to be held as unreasonable. In the instant case, the foregoing discussion reveals that the classification of the employees of Government/Semi-Government institutions etc. by the impugned rule for the purpose of admission in the evening classes or Three-Year LLB. Degree Course to the exclusion of all other employees, is unreasoriable and unjust, as it does not subserve any fair anci logical objective. it is, however, submitted that classification in favour of Government and public sector is a reasonable and valid classification. In support of that contention, the decision in Hindustan Paper Corpn. Ltd. v. Government of Kera/a, [1986] 3 SCC 398 has been relied on by the learned Counsel for the respondents. In that case, it has been observed that as far as Government undertakings and companies are concerned, it has to be held that they form ·a class by themselves, since any project that they may make l would in the end result in the benefit to the members of the general .___,,· -r·. public. The Government and public sector employees cannot be equated with Government undertakings and companies. The classification of Government undertakings and companies may, in certain circumstances, be a reasonably classification satisfying the two tests mentioned above, but it is difficult to hold that the employees of Government/Semi-Government institutions etc., as mentioned in the impugned rule, would also constitute a valid classification for the purpose of admission to evening classes of Three-Year LLB. Degree Course. The contention in this regard, in our opinion, is without any substance. A B c D E F G The next contention of the respondents is that the University, being an educational institution, is entitled to identify the sources for H A B c D E F :?04 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 1 S.C.R. admission to the evening classes and that has been done by the University by the impugned rule and that cannot be challenged as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In support of this contention, much reliance has been placed on behalf of the respondents on a decision of this Court in Chitra Ghosh v. Union of India, [ 1970] 1 SCR 413 relatiiig to reservation of seats in a medical college. In upholding such re.servation of seats it has been observ!'.d by this Court as follows: "It is the Central Government which bears the financial burden of running the medical college. It is for it to lay down the criteria for eligibility. From the very nature of things it is not possible to throw the admission open to students from all over the country. The Government cannot be denied right to decide from what sources the admission will be made." This observation in Chitra Ghosh's case has also been relied on by the High Court. It has been contended by the learned Counsel for the respondents that the question of reasonable classification has nothing to do with the identification of sources for admission by an educational institution. We are unable to accept the contention. It is true that an educational institution is entitled to identify sources from which admission will be made to such institution, but we do not find any difference between identification of a source and a classification. If any source is specified, such source must also satisfy the test of reasonable classification and also that it has a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. Indeed in Chitra Ghosh's case, it has also been observed that if the sources are properly classified whether on territorial, geographical or other reasonable basis, it is not for the courts to interfere with the manner and method of making the classification. It is very clear i from this observation that the sources must be classified on reasonable t-·.-·-· basis, that is to say, it cannot be classified arbitrarily and unreasonably. The principle laid down in Chitra Ghosh's case has been reiterated by this Court in a later decision in D.N.