# DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. GURDIP SINGH UBAN AND ORS. ETC - **Citation:** [2000] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 496 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 2000-08-18 - **Case number:** I.A. No 3 etc. IN Civil Appeal No. 4656 of 1999 - **Bench:** S.B. Majmudar, M. Jagannadha Rao - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/delhi-administration-v-gurdip-singh-uban-and-ors-etc-17528 - **Pages:** 27 ## Headnote Land Acquisition : Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Sections 4, 5A, 6, 48-A batch of writ petitions for quashing the acquisition proceedings allowed by High Court on the ground that satisfaction of the Lt. Governor under Section 6 was vitiated as objections filed were not properly considered-Applicant not having filed any objections, seeking benefit of the said judgment for quashing acquisition proceedirr.gs qua his /and-Legality of-Held, those claimants who have not.filed objections cannot be permitted to contend that Section 5A inquiry is vitiated so far as they are concerned-Applicant not having filed objections on grounds personally applicable to him or his land seeking exclusion.from acquisition, the objections in that behalf must be deemed to have been waived-However, DDA having represented to the applicant that acquisition proceedings had been quashed and applicant having constructed a building on that representation, estoppel prima facie arising in favour of the applicant-Applicant's case directed to be considered sympathetically for release of his land-Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925-Section JO-Indian Evidence Act, 1872-Section 115. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose-Satisfaction of Government-Requirement of-Held, no reasons or other.facts need be mentioned in Section 6 declaration on its face-If satisfaction is challenged, it would be sufficient if such satisfaction is proved by producing the record on the basis of which the declaration was issued-While referring to its satisfaction, the Government need not refer to every piece of particular land-It is sufficient if the authority which conducts-Section 5A inquiry has considered the objec- .. tions raised in relation to any particular land. Supreme Court Rules, 1966-0rder XL, Rules I and 35-Review applications-Restraint in.filing, emphasised-Practice of filing review applications in the garb of applications for 'clarification', 'modification' or 'recall' to avoid listing in chambers by way of circulation and obtain a hearing in the open 496 DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. GURDIP SINGH UBAN 497 court-Permissibility of Practice and Procedure : Matter disposed ()f by one order and reasons thereto provided in a subsequent order-Held, the latter order containing reasons cannot go beyond A the four corners of the order already passed. B Words and Phrases : 'Rule nisi' and 'Rule obsolute'-Meaning of-Explained. A notification tinder Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was C issued for acquisition of the land in question. The said acquisition was challenged in a batch of 73 writ petitions before the High Court. The said petitions were allowed by a Division Bench quashing the acquisition proceedings. Thereafter the Division Bench passed another order giving reasons for its earlier order allowing the writ petitions. Subsequently, the applicants also moved the High Court for quashing of acquisition proceedings in respect of their lands. The High Court treating its aforesaid subsequent order providing reasons for allowing the ' batch of 73 petitions, as a judgment in rem, allowed the said petitions filed by the applicants. Against this judgment, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority, who were not before the High Court, preferred two civil appe~ls before this Court. The said appeals were allowed upholding the land acquisition proceedings in respect of the applicants. Thereafter the applicant in I.As 4 and 5 filed Review Petitions which D E were dismissed in circulation by a reasoned order. Despite dismissal of his F Review Petitions, the applicant filed the present I.As for clarification. The applicant in I.A. 3 also filed a Review Petition which was still pending when she filed the present application for clarification and modification. A writ petition was also filed in this Court against the order of the DDA which stipulated going ahead with the possession of the land in question after the aforesaid Civil Appeals were allowed. G On behalf ## Text _Characters 0–39,946 of 67,274. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39946 for what follows._ A B c D E F G H DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. GURDIP SINGH UBAN AND ORS. ETC. AUGUST 18, 2000 [S.B. MAJMUDAR AND M. JAGANNADHA RAO, JJ.) Land Acquisition : Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Sections 4, 5A, 6, 48-A batch of writ petitions for quashing the acquisition proceedings allowed by High Court on the ground that satisfaction of the Lt. Governor under Section 6 was vitiated as objections filed were not properly considered-Applicant not having filed any objections, seeking benefit of the said judgment for quashing acquisition proceedirr.gs qua his /and-Legality of-Held, those claimants who have not.filed objections cannot be permitted to contend that Section 5A inquiry is vitiated so far as they are concerned-Applicant not having filed objections on grounds personally applicable to him or his land seeking exclusion.from acquisition, the objections in that behalf must be deemed to have been waived-However, DDA having represented to the applicant that acquisition proceedings had been quashed and applicant having constructed a building on that representation, estoppel prima facie arising in favour of the applicant-Applicant's case directed to be considered sympathetically for release of his land-Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925-Section JO-Indian Evidence Act, 1872-Section 115. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose-Satisfaction of Government-Requirement of-Held, no reasons or other.facts need be mentioned in Section 6 declaration on its face-If satisfaction is challenged, it would be sufficient if such satisfaction is proved by producing the record on the basis of which the declaration was issued-While referring to its satisfaction, the Government need not refer to every piece of particular land-It is sufficient if the authority which conducts-Section 5A inquiry has considered the objec- .. tions raised in relation to any particular land. Supreme Court Rules, 1966-0rder XL, Rules I and 35-Review applications-Restraint in.filing, emphasised-Practice of filing review applications in the garb of applications for 'clarification', 'modification' or 'recall' to avoid listing in chambers by way of circulation and obtain a hearing in the open 496 DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. GURDIP SINGH UBAN 497 court-Permissibility of Practice and Procedure : Matter disposed ()f by one order and reasons thereto provided in a subsequent order-Held, the latter order containing reasons cannot go beyond A the four corners of the order already passed. B Words and Phrases : 'Rule nisi' and 'Rule obsolute'-Meaning of-Explained. A notification tinder Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was C issued for acquisition of the land in question. The said acquisition was challenged in a batch of 73 writ petitions before the High Court. The said petitions were allowed by a Division Bench quashing the acquisition proceedings. Thereafter the Division Bench passed another order giving reasons for its earlier order allowing the writ petitions. Subsequently, the applicants also moved the High Court for quashing of acquisition proceedings in respect of their lands. The High Court treating its aforesaid subsequent order providing reasons for allowing the ' batch of 73 petitions, as a judgment in rem, allowed the said petitions filed by the applicants. Against this judgment, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority, who were not before the High Court, preferred two civil appe~ls before this Court. The said appeals were allowed upholding the land acquisition proceedings in respect of the applicants. Thereafter the applicant in I.As 4 and 5 filed Review Petitions which D E were dismissed in circulation by a reasoned order. Despite dismissal of his F Review Petitions, the applicant filed the present I.As for clarification. The applicant in I.A. 3 also filed a Review Petition which was still pending when she filed the present application for clarification and modification. A writ petition was also filed in this Court against the order of the DDA which stipulated going ahead with the possession of the land in question after the aforesaid Civil Appeals were allowed. G On behalf of the applicant, it was contended that grave injustice would take place if the judgment of this Court in the aforesaid Civil H A B 498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. Appeals were allowed to stand without being reviewed or recalled; that the applicant had constructed a building pending proceedings pursuant to the representation by the DDA that land acquisition proceedings stood quashed by an earlier judgment of the High Court; that the representation was acted upon and hence a clear case of estoppel arose; that while allowing the bulk of 73 writ petitions, the High Court had struck down the entire notification and not only qua the petitioners therein; that since the objections filed in certain other cases were not properly considered, satisfaction of the Lt. Governor for the rest of the land was also vitiated. On behalf of the non-applicants, it was contended that the applicaC tions couched as applications for 'clarification', 'modification' or for 'recall' could not be entertained once the Review Petitions filed by the applicant were dismissed; that these I.As were an abuse of the process of Court; that if the Section 4 notification was sought to be avoided on personal grounds, it was necessary that objection be filed by each land owner whose D land was sought to be acquired, to avoid a voidable notification. Disposing of the I.As and dismissing the writ petition, the Court HELD : 1. Those claimants who have not filed objections to the Section 4 notification cannot be permitted to contend before Court that the E Section 5-A inquiry is vitiated so far as they are concerned. Nor can they be permitted to seek quashing of Section 6 declaration on that ground. In the present cases, there is no dispute that the acquisition is for a public purpose. The applicant had not filed objections on grounds personally applicable to him or to his land seeking exclusion from acquisition, and the F objections in that behalf must be deemed to have been waived. Such a person cannot be allowed to file a writ petition seeking the quashing of Section 5-A inquiry and Section 6 declaration on personal grounds if he had not filed objections. The writ petitions allowed by the High Court was based on non-consideration of objections in each case and not on the basis G H of there being no public purpose. The decision in each case, must therefore be confined to the land covered therein. The individual objections in each writ petition can only be personal to each writ petitioner or peculiar in respect of each of the pieces of land owned. In that event, the rejection of the objections by the Land Acquisition Officer and the 'satisfaction' of the GovernmenULt. Governor can relate only to each of these pieces of land and not the whole. [517-B; 518-F; G; B; C; 514-B; C] DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. GURDIP SINGH UBAN 499 Abhey Ram v. Union of India, [1997J 5 SCC 421 and Delhi AdministraA tion v. Gurdip Singh Uban, [1999J 7 SCC 44, affirmed. Delhi Development Authority v. Sudan Singh, [1997J 5 SCC 430, distinguished. B.R. Gupta v. Union of India, (1989) 37 DLT 150 (DB) and Udai Ram Shanna v. Union of India, [1968J 3 SCR 41, referred to. 2. There is a clear representation by the DDA to the applicant that the acquisition proceedings have been quashed by the High Court. The applicant, acting upon the representation constructed a building. Having regard to the principles of Section 115 of the Evidence Act, a question of estoppel prima facie arises in favour of the applicant. As to the extent of land that can be released under Section 48 in addition to the building, it has to be left to the reasonable discretion of the competent authority. [520-A; BJ 3. The argument that Section 6 declaration must contain reasons or refer to the objections for every particular land, is not correct. No reasons or other facts need be mentioned in the Section 6 declaration on its face. If the satisfaction is challenged in the Court, the Government can show the record upon which the Government acted and justify the satisfaction expressed in the Section 6 declaration. While referring to its satisfaction in regard to the need to acquire the entire land, the Government need not refer to every piece of particular land. It is sufficient if the authority which conducts the Section SA inquiry has considered the objections raised in relation to any particular land. [516-D; F; G; HJ Ganga Bishnu v. Cal. Pinjrapole Society, [1968J 2 SCR 117 = AIR (1968) SC 615 and Ratilal Shakarabhai v. State of Gujarat, [1970J 2 SCC 264, relied on. Balak Ram Gupta v. Union of India, AIR (1987) Delhi 239 (FB), B c D E F referred to. G 4.1. A review is not a re-hearing and that its scope is very narrow. If parties file review petitions indiscriminately, the time of the Court is unnecessarily wasted, even if it be in chambers where the review petitions are listed. Greater care, seriousness and restraint are needed in filing review applications. [505-8; Fl H 500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. A Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, [1964] 5 SCR 174 and Northern India Caterers (I) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, [1980] 2 sec 167, referred to. 4.2. A review application has first to go before the Judges in circulation and it will be for the Court to consider whether the application is to be B rejected without giving an oral hearing or whether notice is to be issued. < c D However, with a view to avoid this procedure of 'no hearing' sometimes applications are filed for 'clarification', 'modification' or 'recall' etc. not because any such clarification, modification is necessary but because the applicant in reality wants a review and also wants a hearing, thus avoiding listing of the same in Chambers by way of circulation. By describing an application as one for 'clarification' or 'modification' - though it is really one of review - a party cannot be permitted to circumvent or by-pass the circulation procedure and indirectly obtain a hearing in the open Court. What cannot be done directly cannot be permitted to be done indirectly. [505-H; 506-C; DJ Sonelal and Ors. v. State of U.P., [1982] 2 SCC 398, referred to. 5. If the Court allows a writ petition and reasons were to follow later the first order allowing the writ petition and issuing the writ absolute is the operative order. If reasons therefor are supplied later, as a matter of E convenience, the latter order containing reasons cannot go beyond the four corners of the rule absolute already issued. [510-D] F Ralph Waldo Emerson, Essays, (1803-1882) first series, 1841 'circles'; Selected writings of Cardozo, pp. 223-224, Fallon Publications; Ramanatha Iyer '.f Law Lexicon, (page 1698 2nd Edition, Reprint 2000), referred to. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : I.A. No 3 etc. IN Civil Appeal No. 4656 of 1999. G From the Judgment and Order dated 17.12.96 of the Delhi High Court in C.W.P. No. 920 of 1986. WITH I.A. Nos. 4-5 IN H C.A. Nos. 4656-4657/99 • DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. GURDIP SINGH UBAN [M. JAGANNADHA RAO, J.] 501 AND W.P.(C) No. 15512000. Harish N. Salve, Solicitor General, K.N. Raval, Additional Solicitor General, R. Venkataramani, Shanti Bhushan, C.S. Vaidyanathan, P. Chidambaram, P.P. Rao, D.N. Goburdhan, Ms. Pinky Anand, Ms. Geeta Luthra, Ashok Mathur, Rajesh Kumar, P.B. Suresh, Vipin Nair, Hiren Dasan, Manoj Swarup, Ms. Vijayalakshmi Menon, Ms. Anuradha Dutt, Ms. Ekta Kapil, Vishnu B. Saharya, Sanjeev Sahay, Sanjay Sarin and Nikhilesh R. for the appearing parties. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by M. JAGANNADHA RAO, J. Krishna Iyer, J. said that "A plea for review unless the first judicial view is manifestly distorted, is like asking for the moon". [Northern India Caterers(!) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, (1989) 2 167 (173)]. That is the precise position in these applications. Applicant is Sri Gurdip Singh Uban, the respondent in the main appeals, who questioned the acquisition of his land in village Chatrapur, near Delhi. These IAs, are filed in the following circumstances, after dismissal of the Review Petition on 24.11.99. The Civil Appeals 4656-4657199 were disposed of by this Court, by a Bench of two Judges on 20.8.99 (Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban, (1999] 7 SCC 44) and the appeals of Delhi Administration and Delhi Development Authority were allowed. The appellant in C.A. 4656/99 was the Delhi Administration while the appellant in C.A. 4657199 was the Delhi Development Authority. The appeals were allowed and the judgment of the High Court of Delhi in CWP. 920 of 1986 dated 17.12.96 was set aside and the said writ petition was dismissed. This Court followed the judgment of a three Judge Bench in Abhey Ram v. Union of India, (1997] 5 SCC 421 relied upon by the appellants in preference to the judgment of a two Judge Bench in Delhi Development Authority V. Sudan Singh, [1997] 5 sec 430, relied upon by the Ist respondents-writ petitioners (applicant in these IAs). The writ petitioners before the High Court were Mr. Gurdip Singh Uban, Mrs. Har Sharan Mishra and Mrs. Har Kiran and they were respondents in both Ci vii Appeals. The result was that reversing the High Court's judgment the land acquisition proceedings were upheld by this Court. After the appeals were allowed by this Court on 20.8.99 as stated above, Review Petitions Nos. 1402-1403/99 were filed in the two Civil appeals by Sri A B c D E F G H A B c D E F G H 502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. Gurdip Singh Uban and they were dismissed in circulation by a reasoned order on 24.11.99. (Another Review Petition No. 2112000 filed by Mrs. Har Kiran Commar is yet to be circulated. So far as Mrs. Har Kiran Commar is concerned, she filed IA. 3 on 4.11.99, before the dismissal of Review Petition of Sri Gurdip Singh Uban on 24.11.99. Her IA came up before another Bench of this Court on 3.12.99. By that date, Review Petition of Gurdip Singh Uban was dismissed on 24.11.99 by this Bench, as stated earlier. Therefore, the court before which the IA. 3 waS' listed, directed the Review Petition of Mrs. Har Kiran Commar to be placed before this Bench which disposed of the Review Petition of Mr. Gurdip Singh Uban. IA. 3 was for the following reliefs : (i) to direct the matter to be referred to a larger Bench in view of certain alleged conflict between Abhey Ram v. Union of India,[1997] 5 SCC 421 and some judgments of 1968 and 1991; (ii) for modification of the order dated 20.8.1999 to allow the said Gurdip Singh Uban to submit a representation to the authority for releasing the land from land acquisition and (iii) clarify that the applicant was free to approach the authority and the judgment was to be modified to that extent. (We shall deal with this IA under Point 8). By 31.1.2000, when the IA. 3/99 was again listed before this Bench, two other !As. 4 and 5 were filed on 23.12.99 by Sri Gurdip Singh Uban himself, in spite of dismissal of his review petition on 24 .11.99, !As. 4 and 5 were filed as a composite application for reliefs (i) to (x) set out therein. The principal reliefs were to direct the Civil Appeals 4656-4657 to be heard by a larger Bench because of the conflict between Abhey Ram and Sudan Singh, to direct the matter to be placed before a Constitution Bench in view of Udai Ram Sharma v. Union of India, [1968] 3 SCR 41, and to recall the order dated 24.11.99 passed in the review petitions, to modify the order dated 20.8.99 passed in the main CA, and to permit the applicant to make representation to the authority for release of the land, to declare the land acquisition proceedings as having lapsed, set aside the acquisition proceedings and to give benefit of section IO of the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925. Writ Petition No. 155 of 2000 was filed on 5.4.2000 by one Rajinder Pal Singh questioning the validity of an order dated 17.11.99 and circular dated 7.12.99 issued by the authority subsequent to the main judgment in Civil Appeals dated 20.8.99 and for restraining the authority from taking any action against the petitioner's land in village Raipur Khurd, as the land acquisition proceedings had allegedly lapsed. (We shall deal with this writ petition under Point 7). - DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. GURDIP SINGH UBAN [M. JAGANNADHA RAO, J.] 503 We shall first deal with IAs. 4 and 5 filed by Sri Gurdip Singh Uban. A When these applications 4 and 5 were listed before us finally for arguments, learned Solicitor General, Sri Harish N. Salve raised a preliminary objection that these applications couched as applications for 'clarification', 'modification' or for 'recall' could not be entertained once the Review petitions filed by the applicant were dismissed. He contended that there must be some finality somewhere. These petitions amounted to filing a second review, which was not permissible under the Rules. In any event, a hearing of the case in open Court could not be granted in these IAs. to recall order in the review petition, if the main review petition itself had to be dealt with in circulation. According to Sri Salve, these IAs. were an abuse of the process of Court. B c On the other hand, learned counsel for the applicant Sri Shanti Bhushan submitted that this was a case where grave injustice would take place if the judgment of this Court in Civil Appeals dated 20.8.99 was allowed to stand without being reviewed or recalled. It was brought to our notice that the applicant had constructed a building pending proceedings pursuant to a letter D issued by the DDA in favour of the applicant on 6.2.96 - representing to the applicant that the land acquisition proceedings stood quashed by an earlier judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi and permitting him to construct the building. This representation was acted upon and a building was constructed and it was argued that hence a clear case of estoppel E arose. In reply, learned Solicitor General Sri Harish N. Salve submitted that first this Court must declare that such applications for 'clarification, modification or recall' could not be allowed to be filed endlessly after review applications were dismissed and that we must put an end to this unhealthy practice. This part of the legal position must, according to him, be firmly laid down. Once that is done, he could by way of consent, if need be, even accept that in the peculiar facts of this case and in particular in view of the letter of the DDA dated 6.2.96, this Court could issue suitable directions for exercise of power under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act to a limited extent of saving the building. As to the extent to which he made the concession, he put it in writing before the Court on 16.8.2000 and we shall refer to it under Point 6. In other words, this Court could give a direction that the orders passed by this Court in the Civil Appeal or Review Petition would not come in the way of the respondents considering any representation by the applicant for release of part of the land under Section 48. F G H 504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. A Counsel, after having making elaborate submissions earlier on various B c D E F G dates, filed written submissions on 16.8.2000. The following points arise for consideration : (!) Whether a party who had lost his case in Civil appeal could be permitted to by-pass the procedure of circulation in Review matters and adopt the met?od of filing applications for 'clarification', 'modification' or 'recall' of the said order in Civil Appeals so that the matters were not 1'sted in circulation but could be listed in Court strz'ghtaw~/? Whether such applications could be filed even after dismissal of review applications? What is the procedure that can be followed in such caE~s? (2) Whether, in any event, the judgment of this Court dated 20.8.99 allowing the appeals of the Delhi Administration and Delhi Development Authority was liable to be .set aside on merits, treating this as the first review petition, and whether such a relief could be granted on the ground that the two judge Bench of this Court in these Civil appeals which followed Abhey Ram (decided by three learned Judges) should have referred Abhey Ram to a larger Bench? (3) Whether the order of the Division Bench in Balak Ram Gupta's case, where there are two orders, the order dated 14.10.88 allowing the-writ petitions in 73 Civil Writ petitions (reasons to follow) controlled the subsequent order passed in those cases on 18.11.88 containing the reasons and whether in the latter order, the High Court could have quashed land acquisition proceedings in writ petitions which were not before them? ( 4) Whether under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, while dealing with an inquiry report under section 5A, the Government (here the Lt. Governor) is required to give elaborate reasons? (5) To what extent could a person who had not filed objection in section SA inquiry challenge the section 6 declaration? (6) Whether any relief could be granted under section 48 of the Act in the light of the letter of the DDA dated 6.2.96 in the light of the fair stand taken by the learned Solicitor General and, if so, to what extent? (7) Whether in the writ petition !SS of 2000, the subsequent order of the Department dated 7.12.99 was liable to be set aside? H (8) Whether IA 3 filed by Mrs. Har Kiran Conunar for 'recall' of the -· , DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. GURDIP SINGH UBAN [M. JAGANNADHA RAO, J.] 505 order dated 20.8.89 in the Civil Appeal is to be considered in open Court even A though her Review Petition No. 21/2000 is pending before this Court and is yet to be circulated? POINT I: It is first necessary to refer to the well-known concept that a review is not a re-hearing and point out that its scope is very narrow. Order XL, Rule ( 1) of the Supreme Court Rules provides as follows : B "The Court may review its judgment or order but no application for review will be entertained in a civil proceedings except on the grounds C mentioned in Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code and in a criminal proceedings except on the ground of an error on the face of the review." In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, [1964] 5 SCR 174, this Court stated that there was a real distinction between a mere D erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by 'error apparent' and that a 'review' was by no means an 'appeal' in disguise. This legal position was reiterated in subsequent judgments of this Court. At the outset, we have to refer to the practice of filing review applications in large numbers in undes~rving cases without properly examining whether the cases strictly come within the narrow confines of Rule XL of the Supreme Court Rules. In several cases, it has become almost everyday experience that review applications are filed mechanically as a matter of routine and the grounds for revie